Book Description
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
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This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.
Customer Reviews:
A beginning.......2006-10-04
My opinion on this book lies some where between the two already presented. The application of economics and game theory to this problem is most definitely original and is the greatest achievement of the book. It is a tribute to the authors that such a simple model that so ruthless applies Occam's razor can explain so much, however the work is flawed it simply does not reflect reality. The reasons behind democratisations are more complex than this model, as powerful as it is, can reflect. This book and the model developed within should be viewed as beginning which other works can develop and expand upon. I have no doubt that economists will continue to contibute to this field with more advanced and better models. For this reason alone political scientists and historians should not ignore this text, but rather accept it for what it is a new way of looking at an old problem.
Wielding Occam's Razor.......2006-02-28
Economists are turning their focus of inquiry to subjects that were once the exclusive preserve of their colleagues in other social sciences--history, sociology, and political science. The title of this book, "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," appears to have been deliberately, even provocatively, chosen for contrast with its famous predecessor, "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," by the sociologist Barrington Moore. It is as if the economists are saying, "You've had your go. It is now our turn."
One thing follows when economists have a go: Occam's razor is wielded ruthlessly. Occam's razor is the principle associated with a medieval Franciscan monk, William of Ockham, which extols simplicity over complexity: in his words, "plurality should not be posited without necessity." This has, over time, become an important principle in distinguishing good from less-good science, useful from less-useful descriptions of reality.
Acemoglu and Robinson take this cut-the-chaff exhortation to heart. A few simple and sharp answers are provided even for the complex and difficult questions that are at the heart of the book: why and how does democracy arise? Why and how does democracy take root in some places at some times, while making only cameo appearances in others?
Acemoglu and Robinson daringly reduce the determinants of democratization to three or perhaps four: the level of inequality in society; the structure of the economy (i.e. whether it is predominantly agrarian or otherwise); the kind of assets owned by the elites; and the extent of globalization.
It is remarkable how many historical experiences-in Latin America, Europe, and Africa-- can be explained by the simple theory put forward by the authors. For example, Argentina's frequent lurching between various forms democracy and autocracy follow neatly from the high levels of inequality, which made the elites very resistant to democratization and the consequent redistribution of wealth away from them that political change would entail.
To be sure, the fit between theory and the historical experience is not perfect, and the authors are candid about this. Some of the cases that the book does not discuss-India's ability to maintain democracy in the face of overwhelming odds, for example--have traditionally defied easy explanation, even for political scientists. And there are surely cases where non-economic factors such as ideology, individuals (leaders), randomness, and unintended consequence, have had a significant role in determining the path of political development. For example, if Sir Sewoosagur Ramgoolam, Mauritius' first Prime Minister, had responded to the referendum before independence by entrenching the majority Hindus rather than assuaging the minority by guaranteeing minimal political participation for the latter, Mauritius might well have been like the archetypal, strife-ridden, ethnically divided African country rather than a durable democracy.
A quibble about the book's structure. While there are considerable rewards to reading the book, patience and deft maneuvering through the thicket of mathematics, are required to reap them. The authors could have demarcated more clearly the Greek from the English to allow the mathematically challenged to obtain the benefits in one continuous flow. That way, the book could have been more accessible to the curious generalist in addition to being a required reference for the specialist.
But these minor shortcomings are ultimately swamped by, and are perhaps even the unavoidable consequence of, the sheer ambitiousness of the effort: nothing less than to provide a simple and unified explanation of democracy. And here's the additional bonus, the theory can be taken to the data, and even falsified. So, the skeptics and the naysayers can have their go, and refute or validate. Either way, inquiry will be furthered and the stock of knowledge enriched. The most memorable rendition of Occam's razor is due to Einstein: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler." The book certainly meets that standard.
Interesting but ..........2006-01-24
This substantial work provides a useful review of the relevant literature, and outlines the simple but powerful idea that the political impact of different types of assets [land, labor or capital] and the costs of repression rather than democratization are key influences on the process of democratization or political repression. This approach has however already been spelt out more succinctly by Carles Boix.
But unfortunately much of the book's approach is fundamentally flawed when the authors then proceed to put their ideas into models based on game theory. They rapidly lose sight of the old reality check - 'garbage in, garbage out'. No model however neatly laid out will tell us much if the initial premise is flawed, and many of the theories here are too simplified to be anything beyond a classroom exercise. The whole book is based on Median Voter Theory [MVT} - but even many distinguished scholars in this field like Alberto Alesina have been pointing out for years that MVT has never been shown to hold true in real life complexities.
Some other key ideas are simply not addressed - the importance of fiscal bargaining, usually to fund foreign wars, as the origins of democracy is dismissed in one sentence, and yet is the best documented source of democratization - see major works by Charles Tilly and Robert Bates.
Other more specific technical detail - such as the ratio of voters to taxpayers, or the ratio of public employees to taxpayers, are not outlined let alone explained and yet clearly have great impact on the topic. Broad generalizations about elites are simply inadequate -- many elites are much more than the 'rich'; and even the authors admit they have no explanation for their argument on the likelihood of military coups that the military, presumably recruited from the broad mass of the population, would choose to side with either elites or taxpayers because of future tax rates. In real life complex bureaucratic incentive structures often turn the 'agents' into the 'principals' and they then doubly benefit from also being future pensioners of the state -- recent attention paid to intergenerational accounting implications of taxation do not figure here either.
Even more distrurbing, the authors have nothing to say on the conflicts of interests between the 'elite sub-groups' of taxpayers and bondholders -- yet scholars such as Dornbusch & Draghi {Public Debt Management: Cambridge 1990] have shown that taxation to pay government debts to bondholders was profoundly regressive throughout the 19th century -- the very period of democratization outlined in this book: so how did that happen?
Furthermore some of the history is also wrong - widening of the franchise in 1832 in Britain was intended as a way to give the vote to existing taxpayers, not vice versa.
The authors have overlooked many stimulating classics in this field - e.g. Sydney Buxton's major work 'Finance and Politics' from 1888.
Most irritatingly the book is littered with reference to the authors' claims to originality for their work in various 'important findings' -- but when did such conclusions cease to be the prerogative of the reader?
Book Description
What are the most fundamental differences among the political economies of the developed world? How do national institutional differences condition economic performance, public policy, and social well-being? Will they survive the pressures for convergence generated by globalization and technological change? These have long been central questions in comparative political economy. This book provides a new and coherent set of answers to them. Building on the new economics of organization, the authors develop an important new theory about which differences among national political economies are most significant for economic policy and performance. Drawing on a distinction between 'liberal' and 'coordinated' market economies, they argue that there is more than one path to economic success. Nations need not converge to a single Anglo-American model. They develop a new theory of 'comparative institutional advantage' that transforms our understanding of international trade, offers new explanations for the response of firms and nations to the challenges of globalization, and provides a new theory of national interest to explain the conduct of nations in international relations. The analysis brings the firm back into the centre of comparative political economy. It provides new perspectives on economic and social policy-making that illuminate the role of business in the development of the welfare state and the dilemmas facing those who make economic policy in the contemporary world. Emphasizing the 'institutional complementarities' that link labour relations, corporate finance, and national legal systems, the authors bring interdisciplinary perspectives to bear on issues of strategic management, economic performance, and institutional change. This pathbreaking work sets new agendas in the study of comparative political economy. As such, it will be of value to academics and graduate students in economics, business, and political science, as well as to many others with interests in international relations, social policy-making, and the law.
Book Description
The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade.
Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths.
Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia's economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths--paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas.
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The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade. Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths. Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta.
Customer Reviews:
Powerful data and arguments.......2007-04-26
Kenneth Pomeranz's The Great Divergence reinforces some arguments of Frank's ReOrient and reformulates some others. Like Frank, Pomeranz argues that European economy was not unusually different from or superior to the economies of China and Japan until the 19th century. Like Frank, Pomeranz also argues that the critical factors that made possible the rise of Europe were external rather than internal factors. However, unlike Frank who explained the rise of the West in the 19th century through "the fall of Asia" in the previous century, Pomeranz attributes the nineteenth-century divergence between the European economy and the Asian economies to Europe's coal and New World's land that jointly relived the ecological constraints of the nineteenth-century Europeans.
Explaining Pre-Divergence Similarities:
Pomeranz starts his book with comparisons of European and Asian economies in 16th through 18th centuries. A difference in Pomeranz's approach is that he prefers to compare "regions" rather than countries. He argues that such places as Yangzi Delta, The Kanto plain, Britain, the Netherlands, and Gujarat, shared some crucial features with each other, which they did not share with the rest of the world or subcontinent around them. Thus, he prefers to compare these special areas directly rather than within the larger "arbitrary" continental units (p. 8).
Pomeranz first demonstrates that there were no significant differences between England, China, and Japan in terms of average standards of life. Average life expectancy and calorie intake were at comparable levels in all three countries. In the same vein, the European had no superiority to Asians with respect to technology and mining. China was ahead of Europe in physical science, mathematics, and maternal and infant health. Europe's irrigation technology also lagged behind China, India, and Japan. Even as late as first half of the 19th century, Indian iron was reported to be superior to English iron (pp. 44-6). If Europe had any real technological edge in the 18th century, it was not in tools or machines, but in "instruments" such as clocks, watches, telescopes, and eyeglasses (p. 67).
Pomeranz then tries to show that differences in terms of labor and land markets in Europe and China in 16th through 18th centuries were significant and did not always favor Europe so that they would be a viable explanation for the later divergence. Indeed, overall China was closer to market economy than was most of Europe, including most of "western" Europe. Much of Western Europe's farmland was harder to buy and sell than that of China. In Yangzi Valley, for example, close to half of land was rented (p. 72-3). This was also similar in labor market. Labor was not less free in China than in Europe (pp. 80-1). Thus, Pomeranz concludes that Europe's factor markets for land and labor "seem no closer to Smithian ideas of freedom and efficiency than do those of China, and perhaps a good deal less so," (p. 107).
Part II of The Great Divergence deals with the less-analyzed issue of consumption. Pomeranz takes issue with Sombart and some others' argument that Europe a produced a unique "consumer society" that provided a demand base for industrial revolution. Pomeranz challenges the "consumer society" argument on two grounds. On the one side, he demonstrates that the rise in the European consumption of such luxury goods as tea, sugar, and tobacco was very incremental until the 19th century. He therefore asserts that imagining an irreversible "birth of a consumer society" before 1850 may be seriously misleading (p. 119). On the other side, he demonstrates that consumption of these everyday luxury goods were at comparable levels in China and Japan. The consumption of durable luxuries (furniture, pictures, china, books, jewelry, etc.) was not significantly different in these three regions either (pp. 130-1). Thus, Europe did not have any type of "consumer society" advantage vis-à-vis China and Japan that would give her a head start in the competition to rise. I should also note that European figures as to consumption of luxury goods refute the arguments on "European" miracle as well. Pomeranz demonstrates that, if anything, it was a British, and to lesser extent Dutch, revolution and not a European one until 1850 (pp. 119).
To sum up the first part, Pomeranz demonstrates that Europe was not exceptionally different from China or Japan in terms of production, market regulation, or the consumption of luxury goods. Given this similarity of internal factors, Pomeranz turns to external linkages to explain the nineteenth-century divergence.
Explaining the Divergence:
A weakness in Andre Gunder Frank's book was that he could not adequately account for the "rise of the West" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Frank's argument was that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that "the fall of Asia" preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (ReOrient, pp. 266-8). Pomeranz finds this argument impressionistic and discards it on the grounds that population growth and ecological effects that were argued to make China "fall" were present in Europe as well. Thus, he asserts, "if Europe was not yet in crisis, then in all likelihood China was not either," (p. 12).
Pomeranz argues that the primary problem that both European and Asian nations were facing by 18th century were the ecological constraints that resulted from increasing population and scarce land. Therefore, the real and long-lasting solution would necessitate land-saving innovations rather than labor-saving ones.
As such, industrial revolution was a cause of later European rise than result of previous European exceptionality.
A Conclusion:
When compared with Frank's ReOrient, Pomeranz's The Great Divergence is more robust and convincing in two respects. First, it does not have a "Sinocentrism" bias and argues that the pre-1800 world was "a polycentric world with no dominant center," (p. 4). Second, it tries to explain the rise of Europe in the 19th century with substantive factors rather than mysterious Kondratieff cycles. In that respect, The Great Divergence is a nice remedy to the gaps and problems in ReOrient. However, I think that Pomeranz's downplaying the importance of profits that European made through colonialism is misleading. In evaluating the role of colonial profit-extraction in Europe's rise, one should take into account its impact on the continuation and spread of industrial revolution as well as on industrial revolution itself. Even if the spark of the industrial revolution could be lighted without the profits made in the New World, the fire of industrial revolution would not have survived a couple decades if it were not for the colonial resources and markets.
povocative and meticulously researched!.......2006-05-25
The strengths: Very provocative, aiming straight at conventional wisdom, be it euro-centric or world-system ones. Solid research behind the comparative study of Europe, China, and to a lesser extend, Japan. Pomeranz gives out hard evidence in life-expectacy, birth rates, market condition, ecological stress etc., hightlighting striking similarites between these socities in the 18th century.
Some readers may have problem with his conclusion that industrialization went ahead only because Europe got lucky in the convenient location of coal and the readily available resourses of the new world. However, just because these are paramount factors does not mean that they are all it needed. Put another way, had China got the same good fortune, it does not necessarily follow that China would industrilize, nor has Pomeranz argued this way.
Weaknesses: The writing is BAD, very convoluted. However, the most important failure is that Pomeranz treats these societies as though they were static. He failed to take into consideration their difference in the RATE of change. The fact that Europe was playing a catch up to Asia through-out the middle ages, and achieved par in pre-modern time, had to imply a quicker pulse. Europe's gradual opening of the mind (reformation ,renaissance), was roughly concurrent with China's gradual closing (the advent of neo-confucianism, ossification of the civil examination system). It's hard to believe that this change of fortune had no long-lasting impact on the underlying dynamics of the societes. Culture does matter, it's just been given a bad name by the likes of Huntington and Landes:)
Europe Got Lucky.......2006-02-13
Pomeranz advances the thesis that Europe's rise to world power (instead of a potentially similar but not historically realized rise by China, Japan, or India) was not caused by any internal social advantage possessed by western Europe-at least not principally caused. Pomeranz uses extensive research to demonstrate that western Europe, China, and Japan were not fundamentally different societies at the beginning of the modern era. The author maintains that Europe had the good fortune of having the land and mineral resources of the New World available at the right time, along with the conveniently-located coal resources of England; and it is this collection of fortuitous advantages that enabled Europe to propel itself into industrial revolution and world power.
The premise of the book is promising. The meat of the book can be a bit difficult to chew. The author compares the human, energy, land, and other resources of Europe and China in great detail to make his case. The sheer volume of facts and figures can make the going slow. Still, it's worth reading all of what the author has to say.
Overall, the argument is compelling. All three societies (western Europe, China, and Japan) were faced with populations that had more-or-less come in line with the carrying capacities of their lands based on the level of technology of the day. Additional agricultural productivity could only have come with additional inputs of labor into the existing stock of land. This is essentially what happened in China. Western Europe, led by England, went the way of labor-saving techniques and technologies that would not have been practicable without access to the additional agricultural potential and mineral wealth of the New World. Other factors, such as financial institutions and internal competition fade in importance before the simple math of carrying capacity.
The Great Divergence is quality reading. One does not have to agree with everything contained in the book to absorb the basic point: Europe got lucky. Be prepared to wade through an appropriately generous supply of facts and figures to back Pomeranz's claim.
nonsense.......2005-12-05
In "The Great Divergence", Kenneth Pomeranz presents an exhaustive investigation of the minutest differences and similarities in development of China and Western Europe. His claim, and stated objective, is to show that Europe's emergence as a preeminent power was the result of privileged access to overseas colonies, exploitation of non-Europeans, and a fortunate `geographic accident' of the location of coal in England. However, considering China's significant, and much earlier, developments in science, technology, and shipping, not to mention their huge deposits of coal, and its use some 600 years before the Europeans to make iron, it's difficult to understand Pomeranz's rationalization of those claims and ultimately the whole point of his book.
His specialty and interests clearly lie in China. In this book he attempts to shed a somewhat biased benevolent light on China by explaining the violent circumstances that led to the industrial revolution in Europe, and why it didn't happen in China. He presents a comparative analysis in such close, tortuous, detail that he becomes myopic in drawing his conclusions. His joy and skill clearly lie in analysis, rather than synthesis, and in the process, and among the ensuing debris, he loses a view of the whole as processes of nation building rather than competing sets of historical data. The outcome notwithstanding, he consistently paints each step in the process of growth in Europe and its colonies as a violent and ugly stepsister to a more sophisticated, benign version taking place in China. All of which may be true, but he discounts the effects of institutions, capital markets, capital accumulation, and regulatory competition in Europe as having marginal effect on the difference in outcome between the two areas because in his opinion what was happening in Europe was so similar to what was going on in China. He states that "European science, technology, and philosophical inclinations alone do not seem an adequate explanation, and alleged differences in economic institutions seem largely irrelevant".
Regulatory competition in Europe, for Pomeranz, equates to military competition. Although it could be argued from a more objective perspective that military research and development regularly spins off technological advances applicable in commercial areas, Pomeranz claims that in Europe `the net effect of warfare on technological innovation is likely to have been negative'. Clearly not true, but his argument about it possibly killing off other inventors was kind of funny. The development of institutions and property rights arising from this competition for him equals only the purchases of position, interference of guild control, and the granting monopoly privileges. He claims that all served to keep prices high, limit the extent of markets, and restrict output. The most positive function of `military' competition seen by Pomeranz is in the overseas projection of power. This lies in contrast to his claim that China was engaged in competitive trade with low margins, unprivileged by the state, that couldn't generate enough profits to finance a European style military capitalism. Here he ignores the Chinese obsession with intensive land use to feed its armies. The vast differences between the European states and the diversity of politics, social constructs, and institutions therein will show that had any single one of them been dominant the story of Europe, and the world, would have been very much different. Had the Chinese the benefit of this fracture, the voyages of Zheng He would have been continued, but when he died, the Confucians were regaining power and There was no political or spiritual will to continue. They felt that other nations had nothing to offer the already prosperous Chinese and they had no need to conquer their souls. Their voyages were ended, their fleets were dismantled and they turned inward. It became a crime to set sail from China in a multi-masted ship. This was their choice. One nation, one choice. Had there been competition among states in China, someone, somewhere would have chosen to continue.
As far as ethical systems and ideology are concerned, Pomeranz doesn't consider the consequences of differing motivation but only writes that philosophical inclinations do not seem an adequate explanation of divergent paths. Lost in analysis of the details of the similarities, here he misses the significance of the differences. Arguing that they were too small to create the large disparities in outcomes, he fails to ask whether those differences were what led to different choices. The differences in the ethical systems of Christian Western Europe and Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist China are enormous. The differences in the choices made within the context of those systems, especially within the protestant reformation and the creation of the Church of England, are significant. Pomeranz claims that ideology, or `philosophical inclinations', can't explain the different outcomes in the fortunes of China and Europe, but it was ideology and philosophy that led to the divergence in their development paths. Western Europe's history of fighting Muslims to keep them at bay and out of Europe established their crusading zeal to protect themselves by trying to convert everyone they could find. They embodied this fear and hegemonic drive and made Christian solipsism an imperative part of their culture. Vasco Da Gama said that the objectives of his voyages were "Christians and Spices". This dogmatic drive of the Europeans and their churches' implicit consent of their conquests and colonialism lent a higher power to their expansion. The Chinese chose not to continue their voyages. The Europeans were on a mission from God.
In this book, great tenaciousness in presenting historical data meets an astounding lack of insight into behavior and economics, and leaves the reader (at least me anyway) wondering why it was written in the first place.
Somewhat Innovative, Hard to Read.......2005-11-24
This book does a good job of criticizing many Anglo-centric explanations of why Europeans industrialized first by providing detailed evidence that the area near the Yangzi river delta was mostly as advanced as England when England started the industrial revolution.
It does a less convincing job of arguing that coal and new world land were the main reasons for England's success. I'm tempted to believe that American sugar provided desperately needed calories to break out of a Malthusian trap, but the evidence doesn't show that became significant until the industrial revolution had already started.
Conveniently located coal undoubtedly gave England a boost, but not a big enough boost that there is a practical way to decide it was more important than the numerous cultural differences which might have given England the edge it needed.
The book makes a serious effort to dismiss those cultural explanations, but is not thorough enough. In particular, I'm disappointed with the cryptic way that it dismisses the relevance of the ideas in Helmut Schoeck's book Envy.
The style is often deadening, with lengthy descriptions of details whose relevance is unobvious.
Book Description
This updated and expanded edition of the highly acclaimed book Democracies offers an even broader, more thorough analysis of today`s democracies. Encompassing thirty-six democracies around the world, the book compares cabinets, legislatures, parties, election systems, supreme courts, interest groups, and central banks to arrive at important-and unexpected-findings about what type of democracy works best.
Customer Reviews:
Between Fallacy and Irrelevance... .......2007-05-02
Arendt Lijphart's book Patterns of Democracy is an interesting book in that it says something strong with a weak support. The primary goal of Lijphart is to compare the consensus model of democracy with the majoritarian one, and by doing so prove the superiority of the former to the latter in terms of democratic ideals and government performance. Yet the arguments he puts forward lack both theoretical consistency and empirical support, not to mention their irrelevance as a policy-recommendation to most of the developing world, of which main problem is "to govern" rather than "how to govern". I think, as a student from a developing country, I have enough background and reason to oppose the arguments and findings (?) of Lijphart.
Lijphart does a nice job in bringing together the salient distinguishing characteristics of majoritarian and proportional democracies. He first divides these characteristics into two main groups as executive-parties dimension and federal-unitary dimension; then, he demonstrates that majoritarian and consensus democracies differ remarkably on each dimension. So far this section -which comprises the bulk of the book- is concerned, patterns of democracy is an invaluable resource for its breadth, clarity, and strength.
Yet the problems surface when Lijphart starts answering the "so what?" question. Above all, Lijphart is biased toward the ideal of democracy which maintains that every person must have a say in any decision that influences his/her life. Actually, no one has any problem with this ideal. But Lijphart's conclusion that because consensus democracies fare better in accomplishing this ideal they are superior to the majoritarian models of democracy is misleading and inconsistent with the premise of representational democracy. It is misleading simply because Lijphart criterion for judging between the two models of democracy is only one of the criteria that is to be used, it is neither the most important nor the determining one. Democratic governments are formed to "govern" and "represent". Yet Lijphart's arguments are predominantly based on the "representation" criterion. There is trade-off between efficient/durable governments and proportional/representational ones. As Powell (2000) shows in his Elections as Instruments of Democracy, and Lijphart acknowledges this fact, majoritarian governments fare better in terms of efficiency and durability, hence "governability". Lijphart's own research reveals that majoritarian governments perform better in terms of economic growth (p. 266); and all his "bivariate" findings supporting the purported positive relationship between consensus democracy and economic performance evaporates when he includes control variable. It is inconsistent, because taken to the extreme, to satisfy the proportional representation criterion, every single party in every single district should send at least one candidate to the parliament, which would increase the size of the parliaments to tens, if not hundreds, of thousands. The mere "size of the body elected", which is in general less than a thousand because of the idea of representation, forces us to satisfy only the preferences of some voters. So, why blame a principle that we stick at lower level, and we believe that it works well at that level, when it comes to upper level? If we are only concerned about the democratic ideal, why do we not apply "direct democracy" then?
The salient superiority of majoritarian democracy (and the characteristics that are associated with it) over proportional democracy is that it gives way to strong, durable, and efficient government. True, efficiency and strength might translate into negative outcomes as well (such as the repression of minorities or the abolishing of some rights). But the appropriate to overcome this possible problem is not to get rid of majoritarian system (and the advantages it brings forward); rather, we should devise ways in which we can incorporate the elements of "direct" and "proportional" governments into our majoritarian democracies. Increasing decentralization and constitutional rigidity and introducing new instruments such as initiative and referendum have the potential to increase the performance of majoritarian governments with regard to achieving the democratic ideal without losing their existing advantages. To me, therefore, Lijphart is searching after a wrong question, which deals with "whether" consensus or majoritarian democracy. We are more likely to be better-off if we work to find synthetic ways of bringing together the differing characteristics of majoritarian and consensus governments. Thus, so far as the relationship between consensus and majoritarian democracies is concerned, the question is "how much", not whether.
Testing Institutional Performance.......2005-11-19
Lijphart seeks to test which type of democratic institutions - consensus or majoritarian - performs most effectively. He tests the performance of these institutions through a statistical analysis of their relative efficiency in three broad fields: macroeconomic management, control of violence, and what he terms the "kinder and gentler" qualities of democracy (293). However, before discussing the results of Lijphart's study, it is necessary to explore what distinguishes the institutions of majoritarian and consensus systems.
Lijphart distinguishes between these two types of democracy by illustrating ten institutional differences which divide the typologies. For clarity, the author divides these ten differences into two distinct dimensions: executives-parties, and federal-unitary. The executives-parties dimension addresses "the arrangement of executive power, the party and electoral systems, and interest groups" (3). The federal-unitary dimension illustrates differences in institutional structure of a federated versus unitary government.
According to the executives-parties dimension, the majoritarian system, or Westminster model, is found to have a two party system and a strong one-party executive and cabinet. Often the executive is more powerful than his or her legislative counterparts. Furthermore, a majoritarian system often uses a single member district electoral system which can lead to disproportional representation, and has a highly competitive pluralist interest group system. Lijphart cites Britain and pre-1996 New Zealand as majoritarian systems.
Lijphart's consensus democracy varies institutionally from the Westminster model. First, under the majoritarian model, the executive office is often composed of a multi-party power-sharing cabinet or coalition. In addition, power-sharing exists between the executive branch and the legislature the electoral system often promotes proportional representation. Lastly, unlike the highly competitive special interest group system of the Westminster model, a consensus democracy promotes a system of interest group compromise (4). Lijphart uses Switzerland and Germany as examples of consensus democracy.
According to the federated-unitary dimension, the Westminster system has a strong, centralized government and a unicameral legislature. In addition, most majoritarian systems possess a very flexible constitution that can readily be amended or changed. Furthermore, in many majoritarian systems, the legislature holds the final word in the constitutionality of legislation, and as such, majoritarian systems do not have a strong system of judicial review.
The consensus model, on the other hand, often has a decentralized government, and can be a federated system. Often the legislature is divided into two houses. In addition, the constitution is often rigid, making change difficult. Lastly, the consensus system often has a strong institution of judicial review to monitor the legality of legislation.
To test the effectiveness of consensus and majoritarian systems, Lijphart compares the performance of the two democracies on three main categories: macroeconomic management, levels of political violence, and the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy. Lijphart's hypothesis "is that consensus democracy produces better results - but without the expectation that the differences will be very strong and significant" (261).
When exploring the effectiveness of the two democracies in macroeconomic management, the author operationalizes a number of variables. For the sake of brevity, I will condense the findings into six categories: economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment, strike activity, budget deficits, and freedom index. Lijphart tests the performance of the democracies by using both the executives-parties dimension and federated-unitary dimensions.
In the case of economic growth using the executives-parties dimension, there was little difference between majoritarian and consensus democracy. There was a weak negative relationship between consensus democracy and economic but the findings were not statistically significant. This implies that the difference between consensus and majoritarian democracies in regards to economic development is negligible. In regards to inflation, Lijphart finds that consensus democracies have a slightly lower rate of inflation than majoritarian systems. Consensus also performs slightly better than the majoritarian model in regards to unemployment, but again, the differences are slight.
Interestingly, Lijphart found a massive relationship between strike activity and consensus democracy. According to the regression coefficient, levels of strike activity would have been substantially lower in consensus systems than in majoritarian. However, upon further analysis the relationships are not statistically significant and as Lijphart illustrates, the large difference is a result of "big exceptions to the tendency of consensus countries to be less strike-prone than majoritarian democracies" (269). Lastly, Lijphart explores the performance of consensus democracies on budget deficits and economic freedom. Again, the author finds the differences negligible. When using the federated-unitary dimension, Lijphart's finding are similar except when looking at the inflation variable. When comparing consensus democracy on federal-unitary dimension on inflation, Lijphart discovers that a strong negative relationship exists, the relationship is statistically significant, and there is an acceptable t-value. The author explains this relationship by citing that in a consensus democracy the central bank independence. Lijphart writes, "the most important reason why central banks are made strong and independent is to give them the tools to control inflation" (273).
In conclusion, the author writes, "the evidence with regard to economic growth and economic freedom is mixed, but with regard to all of the other indicators of economic performance, the consensus democracies have a slightly better record and a significantly better record as far as inflation is concerned" (270).
The results regarding the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies in controlling political violence are also rather vague. Statistically, the consensus system is slightly violent than the majoritarian system. However, Lijphart contends that the significance of the relationship declines when other variables are controlled and outlying observations are removed. Ultimately, Lijphart contends that the statistics show "at least a slightly better performance of the consensus democracies" (271).
The last group of variables that Lijphart addresses is what he terms the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy. The author contends that consensus systems are more apt to be "kinder and gentler" than their majoritarian counterparts. Lijphart writes, "Consensus democracies demonstrate these kinder and gentler qualities in the following ways: they are more likely to be welfare states; they have a better record with regard to the protection of the environment; they put fewer people in prison, and are less likely use the death penalty; and the consensus democracies in the developed world are more generous with their economic assistance to the developing nations" (275-6).
Lijphart measures the effectiveness of consensus intuitions by measuring a number of variables: women's representation, political equality, electoral participation, satisfaction with democracy, government-voter proximity, and accountability and corruption. Statistically, Lijphart's findings when comparing the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies in regards to the "kinder and gentler" qualities are much more revealing. Lijphart finds that consensus democracy "makes a big difference with regard to almost all of the indicators of democratic quality and with regard to all of the kinder and gentler qualities" (300).
To conclude, Lijphart has found that the institutions of consensus democracies perform slightly better than majoritarian institutions in both macroeconomic management and in the prevention of political violence. However, the differences are slim and arguably irrelevant. But, Lijphart did discover that when looking at the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy, such as women's rights, incarceration rates and other, consensus democracy performed substantially better.
Not nearly what the original was.......2004-01-30
Unfortunately not everything gets better with time. The original 1984 version of this book was stellar. An excellent introduction to comparative politics. Easily accessible to undergraduates and a useful reference for early graduates. Unfortunately the new book adds nothing to the original insights and uses surprisingly poor statistical methodology to force points when the data are simply not supportive. At times the author even admits to "arbitrarily selecting thresholds." As a result of the alarmingly poor methodology employed I can no longer use this text as a key componant of my undergraduate comparative politics courses. For graduates I would use it only as an example of what not to do.
Past his prime.......2002-09-06
Lijphart was indeed on the the most influential political scientists of his generation.
This book, however, is pure advocacy and a simple rehashing of previous work.
The quantitative analysis in this book is APPALLINGLY bad. I has become an exemplar in our department of misleading and inept use of basic statistics.
If you want to read something outstanding by Lijphart find one of his books on consociationalism.
Essential Reading for Comparative Political Studies.......2002-03-03
This revision of Lijphart's Classic 'Democracies' is a first-rate survey of 36 democracies, which focuses on the relationships between a number of political variables. One of the most striking features of the book is the manner in which Lijphart divides the book into 10 areas of inquiry (e.g. electoral systems, party formations, executive power, etc.), devoting one chapter per area. He reviews the theory regarding the area of interest, while also attempting to use applied examples from the 36 countries to illustrate that theory. He then tries to construct rough numerical indices to outline more formally the degree and extent to which qualitative differences exist. This helps in conceptualizing how (dis)similar two countries are with respect to one another.
The other outstanding aspect of the book is that by the end, the reader is broadly familiar with the structure of all 36 democracies. You walk away understanding how diverse the party formations of federal Germany are, or how UK Commonwealths tend to mirror their colonial power in terms of parliamentary power, centralisation of power, and so forth.
Because of its lucid and and pragmatic structure, as well as its strong comparative approach, I would recommend this book to anyone who is interested in learning more about what features differentiate democracies and why France is or is not similar to Japan or Paupa New Guinea--an excellent study by a classic thinker!
Book Description
The laws that legislatures adopt provide a crucial opportunity for elected politicians to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy vary considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in an effort to micromanage policymaking processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial discretion to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address these issues by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the U.S. States, they argue that particular institutional forms--such as the nature of electoral laws, the structure of the legal system, and the professionalism of the legislature--have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policymaking process.
Book Description
The essays in this book trace the development of Joel Migdal's "state-in-society" approach. The essays situate the approach within the classic literature in political science, sociology, and related disciplines but present a new model for understanding state-society relations. It allies parts of the state and groups in society against other such coalitions, determines how societies and states create and maintain distinct ways of structuring day-to-day life, the nature of the rules that govern people's behavior, whom they benefit and whom they disadvantage, which sorts of elements unite people and which divide them, and what shared meaning people hold about their relations with others and their place in the world.
Customer Reviews:
Excellent review of state and society subject.......2006-09-29
Hegal once said "Philosophy is the history of philosophy". I have the same feeling after reading Migdal's State in Society.
In this book, Migdal masterfully presents his "state in society" theory by examining the history of State-Society study. If his theory can be reduced by some as simply the final stage of a thesis-antithesis-synthesis process (e.g. "culturalist"-"statist"-"state-in-society"), the way he establishes his theory is nevertheless exceptionally informative and eloquent. Migdal does not tell you everything about every author in this grand debate. Yet after reading his book, you will be left with a distinct impression of each author's role and position in the debate.
A must read for students of State-Society studies.
Book Description
Kathleen Thelen explains the historical origins of important cross-national differences in four countries (Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan), and also provides a theory of institutional change over time. The latter is considered a frontier issue in institutionalist analysis, of which there are several varieties emerging from economics, political science, and sociology. Thelen's study contributes to the literature on the political economy of the developed democracies that focuses on different institutional arrangements defining distinctive models of capitalism.
Customer Reviews:
Cutting Edge Institutionalism.......2006-02-12
How Institutions Evolve is widely considered one of the most important recent contributions to the institutionalist literature. It received the Woodrow Wilson award, the most prestigious book award of the American Political Science Association.
Thelen is concerned with the interplay between continuity and change in institutions. Focusing on vocational training, she demonstrates the persistence of country specific patterns of vocational training through periods of dramatic political change. In an extended treatment of the German case she demonstrates how, in spite of this continuity, the function of vocational training in Germany has dramatically changed over the years. While created against the opposition of organized labor at the end of the 19th century, it gradually changed into an importan pillar of union power in Germany's political economy.
Her argument is directed mainly against the 'punctuated equilibrium' approach to institutional change, which views institutions as stable until a major 'critical juncture' changes them entirely.
Though 'vocational training' may not strike most readers as the most exciting of subjects, Thelen's focused theoretical lense, as well as the historical depth of her treatment make this book a good, at times fascinating, read. It is sure to become required reading for all students and scholars of political institutions.
Book Description
This book argues that the dramatic post-1970 rise in international capital mobility has not systematically contributed to the retrenchment of developed welfare states as many claim. Nor has globalization directly reduced the revenue-raising capacities of governments and undercut the political institutions that support the welfare state. Rather, institutional features of the polity and the welfare state determine the extent to which the economic and political pressures associated with globalization produce Welfare state retrenchment.
Download Description
This book argues that the post-1970 rise in international capital mobility has not contributed to the retrenchment of developed welfare states. Nor has globalization reduced the revenue-raising capacities of governments and undercut the political institutions that support the welfare state. Rather, institutional features of the polity and the welfare state determine the extent to which the economic and political pressures associated with globalization produce welfare state retrenchment. In systems characterized by electoral institutions, social corporatist interest representation and policy-making, centralized political authority, and social insurance-based program structures, pro-welfare state interests are favored. In nations characterized by majoritarian electoral institutions, pluralist interest representation and policy-making, decentralization of policy-making authority, and liberal program structure, the economic and political pressures attendant on globalization are translated into rollbacks of social protection. Globalization has had least impact on large welfare states of Northern Europe and most effect on small welfare states of Anglo nations.
Book Description
Recasting labor studies in a long-term and global framework, the book draws on a major new database on world labor unrest to show how local labor movements have been related to world-scale political, economic, and social processes since the late nineteenth century. Through an in-depth empirical analysis of select global industries, the book demonstrates how the main locations of labor unrest have shifted from country to country together with shifts in the geographical location of production. It shows how the main sites of labor unrest have shifted over time together with the rise or decline of new leading sectors of capitalist development and demonstrates that labor movements have been deeply embedded (as both cause and effect) in world political dynamics. Over the history of the modern labor movement, the book isolates what is truly novel about the contemporary global crisis of labor movements. Arguing against the view that this is a terminal crisis, the book concludes by exploring the likely forms that emergent labor movements will take in the twenty-first century.
Customer Reviews:
Good coverage for labor unrest.......2006-07-11
The history events on labor movements for the past 130 years were put together in this book. However, the book has very few tables and figures, making it very dry to read.
It will be better to cover just a narrow range, say year 1956 to 2006, for more graphical illustrations.
It is a useful reference book for researchers.
Best Book on Contemporary Labor Studies.......2004-11-27
As a labor educator for 22 years, director of a labor education center, and adjunct professor of labor studies, this is simply the best book on labor studies I have ever read. I highly recommend it to anyone who is interested in figuring out what is happening to the world labor movement today. I can't say enough or recommend it enough.
Book Description
The authors of this timely and provocative book use the tools of economic analysis to examine the formation and change of political borders. They argue that while these issues have always been at the core of historical analysis, international economists have tended to regard the size of a country as "exogenous," or no more subject to explanation than the location of a mountain range or the course of a river. Alesina and Spolaore consider a country's borders to be subject to the same analysis as any other man-made institution. In The Size of Nations, they argue that the optimal size of a country is determined by a cost-benefit trade-off between the benefits of size and the costs of heterogeneity. In a large country, per capita costs may be low, but the heterogeneous preferences of a large population make it hard to deliver services and formulate policy. Smaller countries may find it easier to respond to citizen preferences in a democratic way.
Alesina and Spolaore substantiate their analysis with simple analytical models that show how the patterns of globalization, international conflict, and democratization of the last two hundred years can explain patterns of state formation. Their aim is not only "normative" but also "positive" -- that is, not only to compute the optimal size of a state in theory but also to explain the phenomenon of country size in reality. They argue that the complexity of real world conditions does not preclude a systematic analysis, and that such an analysis, synthesizing economics, political science, and history, can help us understand real world events.
Customer Reviews:
very stimulating book.......2004-02-09
This is an original and stimulating book. The authors's main point is that the size of nations is determined by a trade-off between the costs and benefits of size. Among the costs of large countries there is the difficulty of satisfying the preferences of a more diverse population. However, as they point out, some of these preferences can be accommodated through decentralization and federalism. That is the case in the US. I think that the reviewer below here who mentions Washington and Hawaii is not right. Public amenities are as good in Hawaii as in Washington these days because most public goods are chosen locally in the US (if you go to France things are still pretty different). But the real costs of joining the US for the Hawaians was loss of political independence. The original Hawaians had a very distinct language, culture, etc. and they would have chosen very different policies if they had been independent rather than a part of the US. And that, I understand, is the authors' main point: by expanding a country, you may end up with many people who have preferences that are far from the average preferences. That is a very good and general point, although the authors may have overstressed the link geography-preferences in order to get neat mathematical models, as economists always do. My overall impression from reading this fascinating book is that their story holds pretty well and explains a lot of what actually happened - and is still happening - in the real world.
Stimulating, but centrally flawed........2004-02-03
The book raises two interesting questions and attempts to answer them; What determines the size of nations, and what effect country size has on economic success? The discussions that follow are thought provoking and I recommend the book to anyone that finds the questions fascinating.
The central flaw is one that comes up early and has far too much influence in subsequent chapters. A principle assumption is that public services are localized and that the further the distance from the those services, the less benefit a citizen will derive from them. Distance therefore becomes a key factor in determining the populations loyalty to the center. Providing those services, or compensating for the lack of them, is progressively more expensive the further from the center. This may have once been true in earlier, more centralized times when capital cities were lavished with amenities that other cities lacked. The same argument now would imply one of the following:
1) that people living in Washington DC have far better public utilities than those living in Honolulu and the central government gives substantial tax breaks to those living in Hawaii to compensate.
or 2) Honolulu has public amenities comparable to DC, but that the cost to the center to provide it to Hawaii is prohibitive and far outweighs taxes collected in Hawaii.
This book is far more valuable for raising the right questions than for giving the right answers. If the reader can appreciate that, this book is well worth the read.
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