History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)

Book Description

Recorded history is a finely-woven magic fabric of intricate lies about events predating the sixteenth century. There is not a single piece of evidence that can be reliably and independently traced back earlier than the eleventh century. This book details events that are substantiated by hard facts and logic, and validated by new astronomical research and statistical analysis of ancient sources.

Customer Reviews:

Calculations are only as good as your numbers.......2007-08-03

Yes, we can all agree that mainstream history is nearly 100% BS due to politics, economics, ego, problems with dating techniques, and various conspiracies. Agreed. But, I've been researching the distinct possibility that human history (in terms of civilizations) are much more ancient than we've been told, so coming across this book was very interesting to me. I wondered how Fomenko could be wrong (if at all) because he is very persuasive in his presentations. Then it dawned on me. If at previous times in prehistory, due to the various catastrophies that are well documented (comets, asteroids, planetary disruptions, plasma discharge, pole reversals, etc) the Earth was in a different position in relation to the sun, different tilt on its axis, different orbit, different rotation (in terms of velocity and DIRECTION), and the continents were in different positions, then would this not cause the ancients to see the sky (constellations) differently? In other words, is Fomenko making erronious assumptions about the physics of the Earth in pre-history, which then corrupt his data with regards to dating the relevant astrology? The last event to seriously disrupt our planet occured roughly 3500 years ago, according to other good researchers, so is it possible Fomenko has been confused by this? The vastly different physics of our planet in the not so distant past may explain this confusion, which is not to say the "mainstream" version of history is correct; on the contrary. I am not an expert in these fields, but wanted to see if this idea could spark discussion.

Pants on fire?.......2007-07-19

Will people ever read before spamming? Yes, Jesuits could not rewrite world history alone, they had help. Anyway, Dr Prof Acad A.Fomenko does not point to jesuits as the driving force of world wide history manipulation in published volumes 1,2,3;, actually he barely mentions the poor devils. Check it with 'Search inside' feature, please. China is rarely mentioned either, in fact, Dr Fomenko is completely eurocentric. Right, his theory contradicts all mainstream schools of history, because in their actual state they are all built on blatantly erroneus chronology. You don't need a mysterious cabal (conspiracy) to falsify history, the falsification is its modus operandi. It is inherent to history(ians) to falsify (distort) events, as it is inherent to humans to boast as it is inherent to power (authority) to legimize itself by referrring to glorious past made to its own order. Dr Prof Fomenko and team have identified scores of instances of such manipulation in Russian, European, etc.. history, and delivered valid statistical proof thereof. His own 'reconstruction' is completely another story. Forget c14 as a valid method of dating. W.Libby has initially discovered a brilliant method of INDEPENDENT dating. Too bad, c14 method has become a joke after a forced marrige with dendrochronology with consensual chronological scale inbuilt. Radiocarbon method can't stand blind tests, but is so very productive as a rubberstamp.

Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed. .......2007-04-09

There is no doubt that history as most know it is a sham, & institution's version of History both University & Church is fradulent & inaccurate. Everything was established with an agenda, The real "Dark Ages" are now when we have access to incredible amounts of information past authorities & more important 'common folk' didn't have but our institutions & educators are slow to evolve because of what has ignorantly & arrogantly been taught for too long. This is on many subjects not just Chronology.

For anyone to question "Why would a Mathematician have anything credible to say of History?" The answer is from Dr. Fomenko's preface in the book: "It would be worthwhile to remind the reader that in the XVI-XVII century Chronology was considered to be a subdivision of Mathematics." These volumes could possibly be some of the most important works to date & should be read by everyone with an interest in History, especially professors & educators who have a duty to the public. I have read both books & must say that 'Chronology 1' has some very eye opening & revolutionary information. Even if these volumes are part true the implications are profound & opens the doors to further investigations & questions which must be done. I speak several different lanquages & must say the logic Dr. Fomenko uses with "inflection" of words & words being read from left to right in one region & right to left in another then written backwards, the removal of vowels & get down to basics of words, or different cities & locations having the same name etc. is correct. Vowel usage has always been optional & varied, actually complicating linquistics & study. The first thing one has to understand is that words never had a fixed spelling in history like we do now, the spelling of words was mutable & regional, as well as names & titles of people were vast, varied & changed, NOTHING WAS FIXED or understood linear. Matters of Life & Death as well as financial profiteering yesterday & today were & are made with ignorant, illogical & conspiratorial views of history & reality, it's time people get closer to the Truth & society collectively grow up.

Very Interesting.......2007-03-07

It is a good proposal and I believe it will mature into something even better in the future. I think it deserves to be read.

History as Science Fiction.......2007-01-10

Anatoly Fomenko has written a very intriguing book, full of pictures, charts, and computer 'proof' of his thesis: backwards of AD900 we don't really know what happened or when. Between AD900 and AD1600 there is more certainty, but there is still a lot of fuzzy ground, and things don't get reliable until we get past the 1600's where the printing press made it very difficult for the perpetrators of this timeline manipulation to change anything that had been committed to print. The Dark Ages did not happen. Books were burned for a reason. One organization has doubled the actual length of its existence by expanding the real chronology. Read why.

I had always wondered why Christ died about AD33 and yet men waited until the 11th century to form the Knights Templar, the Cathars, etc and go after the Holy Land by force. Why the 1000 year gap? Turns out there wasn't more than a 10-12 year gap and he proves it using astronomy. This also implies that the planet is not as old as we have been told, and current Christian and other creationist scientists are already championing that idea without being aware of Fomenko's book. The two groups, creationist scientists and the Russian mathematical analysts corroborate each other. Fascinating.

Of course, all this flies in the face of what we have been told traditionally is the 'proper' chronology of western civilization, and most readers will experience 'cognitive dissonance' in reading this book. It means that our history going backwards from AD1600 becomes progressively more incorrect and unreliable until it cannot be trusted at all... in the space of 700-800 years.

Naturally, the curious, open-minded reader will want to know WHO did this, WHY, and did any of the events we think of as really ancient ever happen?
Dr. Fomenko is a respected scientist/mathematician at Moscow State University who has already answered these questions to the satisfaction of his initially skeptical colleagues. Most of them are now believers, a few still refuse to believe (the usual diehards), and of course the western press has ignored Fomenko's work -- for obvious reasons when you read the book. The ones who perpetrated this chronology ruse have a lot to answer for. They are still with us. That's why this book is a well-kept secret.

I gave the book a 4-star rating because I was unable to check out some of his claims; those I checked were as he said. But if even 1/3 of his claims are true, this punches a big hole in what we think is our history, the meaning of western civilization, our educational process (for repeating the ruse as gospel), and the trustworthiness of the organization that perpetrated this ruse, well-intentioned or not.

This book relates to current research into a Young Earth paradigm, to John Keel's discoveries about our planet, and Fr Malachi Martin's insights (in his now out-of-print books). We are indeed sheep who are manipulated and kept ignorant -- for a reason. While knowing what these men have to say may be the "booby prize" (as in: 'what can you do with this knowledge?'), it will provide interesting reading. Didn't someone say: "...and the Truth will set you free."?? For you to judge if this book contains the truth.

Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America: Climate Change, the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism

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Occasionally insightful, but generally uninspired
Important book
What we should have learned in school about the world...
Very informative reading
Debunking the global warming myth!

Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America: Climate Change, the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism
Harm de Blij
Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0195315820

Book Description

Over the next half century, the human population, divided by culture and economics and armed with weapons of mass destruction, will expand to nearly 9 billion people. Abrupt climate change may throw the global system into chaos; China will emerge as a superpower; and Islamic terrorism and insurgency will threaten vital American interests. How can we understand these and other global challenges? Harm de Blij has a simple answer: by improving our understanding of the world's geography. In Why Geography Matters, de Blij demonstrates how geography's perspectives yield unique and penetrating insights into the interconnections that mark our shrinking world. Preparing for climate change, averting a cold war with China, defeating terrorism: all of this requires geographic knowledge. De Blij also makes an urgent call to restore geography to America's educational curriculum. He shows how and why the U.S. has become the world's most geographically illiterate society of consequence, and demonstrates the great risk this poses to America's national security. Peppering his writing with anecdotes from his own professional travels, de Blij provides an original treatise that is as engaging as it is eye opening. Casual or professional readers in areas such as education, politics, or national security will find themselves with a stimulating new perspective on geography as it continues to affect our world.

Customer Reviews:

Occasionally insightful, but generally uninspired.......2007-08-29

I would describe this book as the rambling--but occasionally insightful--musings of a thoughtful scholar. Unfortunately, many, if not most, of Blij's arguments are not made from a geographic perspective. For instance, his chapter on the European Union rambles on for page after page about the history of the EU from the European Coal and Steel Community, to the European Economic Community, to the European Community, and, finally, to the European Union. That's not to say that's not and interesting and important history lesson for people who are unfamiliar with EU history, but its not geographic! I was hoping for a book of theories explaining human events using reasoning built on spatial orientations or location. Why Geography Matters had some of that, but Blij could have, in my view, omitted much of the voluminous background information. Doing some would have made his book more concise and allowing his genuine insights to be featured more prominently.

And for what its worth, the book could have used a better editor. For instance, on p.160 it refers to "South Ossetia" as a Russian Republic instead of North Ossetia. I noticed a couple errors like this.

Perhaps, I would be more positive about this book if its last chapter hadn't been the low point. The chapter on Africa had absolutely nothing original to say (AIDS is bad, we need to do more to stop it; colonization and slavery were bad too; Africa has been plagued by bad leadership; etc.).

Important book.......2007-08-28

This is an exceptional and needed introduction to Geography and how it relates to world problems.

What we should have learned in school about the world..........2007-05-27

This is essential reading for anyone who should have a sound foundation of knowledge to back up one's social commentary, but doesn't. Geography can be understood and used to understand our world with great clarity. Everyone who watched Al Gore's movie should read this book if only to know that Harm de Blij has been explaining geographic issues for decades better than nearly anyone.

The US Department of Education needs to buy and issue a copy of this book to every teacher in America.

Very informative reading.......2007-05-13

This is definitely a quality work in the field of Geography with an emphasis on Politics i.e. GeoPolitics. However, it is important to point out a couple of incorrect facts I found while reading this work.

1. On page 190 we have the statement, "On an aircraft carrier off the coast of California, President Bush declared "mission accomplished.", regarding the war in Iraq. If you read the speech that President Bush gave, you will find that he never uttered the words "mission accomplished." The author just regurgitated this line from the biased print media i.e. The NYTimes, Time, Newsweek, etc... Intuitively, if you think about it, George Bush, assigns the mission to the military and after assigning the mission to the military he is not going to turn around and say good "mission accomplished. That is what the military's response, will be, to the President, after they have completed the mission. This is reflected by the fact that the military hung a banner up on the aircraft carrier that said "Mission Accomplished."

2. On pages 193-194 The author states. "The American invasion severly damaged the city, which was for months afterward, and remains as of this writing, without a reliable water supply, power, medical facilities, or schools." It is very true that much of the infrastructure in Iraq is severly damaged, but the author has tried to blame this on American firepower and it is simply not true. The precision guided weapons our U.S. forces utilized were excellent at avoiding collateral damage. The truth is more damning for the Saddam regime. THE INFRASTUCTURE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED BY 30 PLUS YEARS OF NEGLECT ON THE PART OF THE BAATH PARTY AND NOT AMERICAN MILITARY MIGHT. Also, the military planners who provided for getting the infrastructure back online, after the war, grossly underestimated the level of the existing infrastructure of Iraq, before the U.S. military even set foot inside the country.

Overall I recommend this work, but it cannot be given five stars due to these errors.

Debunking the global warming myth!.......2007-03-08

This is an excellent book based on scientific fact debunking the "global warming" myth.

I highly recommend this book.

The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy.

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Powerful data and arguments
povocative and meticulously researched!
Europe Got Lucky
nonsense
Somewhat Innovative, Hard to Read

The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy.
Kenneth Pomeranz
Manufacturer: Princeton University Press
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Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0691090106

Book Description

Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths.

Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia's economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths--paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas.

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The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade. Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths. Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta.

Customer Reviews:

Powerful data and arguments.......2007-04-26

Kenneth Pomeranz's The Great Divergence reinforces some arguments of Frank's ReOrient and reformulates some others. Like Frank, Pomeranz argues that European economy was not unusually different from or superior to the economies of China and Japan until the 19th century. Like Frank, Pomeranz also argues that the critical factors that made possible the rise of Europe were external rather than internal factors. However, unlike Frank who explained the rise of the West in the 19th century through "the fall of Asia" in the previous century, Pomeranz attributes the nineteenth-century divergence between the European economy and the Asian economies to Europe's coal and New World's land that jointly relived the ecological constraints of the nineteenth-century Europeans.

Explaining Pre-Divergence Similarities:

Pomeranz starts his book with comparisons of European and Asian economies in 16th through 18th centuries. A difference in Pomeranz's approach is that he prefers to compare "regions" rather than countries. He argues that such places as Yangzi Delta, The Kanto plain, Britain, the Netherlands, and Gujarat, shared some crucial features with each other, which they did not share with the rest of the world or subcontinent around them. Thus, he prefers to compare these special areas directly rather than within the larger "arbitrary" continental units (p. 8).

Pomeranz first demonstrates that there were no significant differences between England, China, and Japan in terms of average standards of life. Average life expectancy and calorie intake were at comparable levels in all three countries. In the same vein, the European had no superiority to Asians with respect to technology and mining. China was ahead of Europe in physical science, mathematics, and maternal and infant health. Europe's irrigation technology also lagged behind China, India, and Japan. Even as late as first half of the 19th century, Indian iron was reported to be superior to English iron (pp. 44-6). If Europe had any real technological edge in the 18th century, it was not in tools or machines, but in "instruments" such as clocks, watches, telescopes, and eyeglasses (p. 67).

Pomeranz then tries to show that differences in terms of labor and land markets in Europe and China in 16th through 18th centuries were significant and did not always favor Europe so that they would be a viable explanation for the later divergence. Indeed, overall China was closer to market economy than was most of Europe, including most of "western" Europe. Much of Western Europe's farmland was harder to buy and sell than that of China. In Yangzi Valley, for example, close to half of land was rented (p. 72-3). This was also similar in labor market. Labor was not less free in China than in Europe (pp. 80-1). Thus, Pomeranz concludes that Europe's factor markets for land and labor "seem no closer to Smithian ideas of freedom and efficiency than do those of China, and perhaps a good deal less so," (p. 107).

Part II of The Great Divergence deals with the less-analyzed issue of consumption. Pomeranz takes issue with Sombart and some others' argument that Europe a produced a unique "consumer society" that provided a demand base for industrial revolution. Pomeranz challenges the "consumer society" argument on two grounds. On the one side, he demonstrates that the rise in the European consumption of such luxury goods as tea, sugar, and tobacco was very incremental until the 19th century. He therefore asserts that imagining an irreversible "birth of a consumer society" before 1850 may be seriously misleading (p. 119). On the other side, he demonstrates that consumption of these everyday luxury goods were at comparable levels in China and Japan. The consumption of durable luxuries (furniture, pictures, china, books, jewelry, etc.) was not significantly different in these three regions either (pp. 130-1). Thus, Europe did not have any type of "consumer society" advantage vis-à-vis China and Japan that would give her a head start in the competition to rise. I should also note that European figures as to consumption of luxury goods refute the arguments on "European" miracle as well. Pomeranz demonstrates that, if anything, it was a British, and to lesser extent Dutch, revolution and not a European one until 1850 (pp. 119).

To sum up the first part, Pomeranz demonstrates that Europe was not exceptionally different from China or Japan in terms of production, market regulation, or the consumption of luxury goods. Given this similarity of internal factors, Pomeranz turns to external linkages to explain the nineteenth-century divergence.

Explaining the Divergence:

A weakness in Andre Gunder Frank's book was that he could not adequately account for the "rise of the West" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Frank's argument was that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that "the fall of Asia" preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (ReOrient, pp. 266-8). Pomeranz finds this argument impressionistic and discards it on the grounds that population growth and ecological effects that were argued to make China "fall" were present in Europe as well. Thus, he asserts, "if Europe was not yet in crisis, then in all likelihood China was not either," (p. 12).

Pomeranz argues that the primary problem that both European and Asian nations were facing by 18th century were the ecological constraints that resulted from increasing population and scarce land. Therefore, the real and long-lasting solution would necessitate land-saving innovations rather than labor-saving ones.
As such, industrial revolution was a cause of later European rise than result of previous European exceptionality.

A Conclusion:
When compared with Frank's ReOrient, Pomeranz's The Great Divergence is more robust and convincing in two respects. First, it does not have a "Sinocentrism" bias and argues that the pre-1800 world was "a polycentric world with no dominant center," (p. 4). Second, it tries to explain the rise of Europe in the 19th century with substantive factors rather than mysterious Kondratieff cycles. In that respect, The Great Divergence is a nice remedy to the gaps and problems in ReOrient. However, I think that Pomeranz's downplaying the importance of profits that European made through colonialism is misleading. In evaluating the role of colonial profit-extraction in Europe's rise, one should take into account its impact on the continuation and spread of industrial revolution as well as on industrial revolution itself. Even if the spark of the industrial revolution could be lighted without the profits made in the New World, the fire of industrial revolution would not have survived a couple decades if it were not for the colonial resources and markets.

povocative and meticulously researched!.......2006-05-25

The strengths: Very provocative, aiming straight at conventional wisdom, be it euro-centric or world-system ones. Solid research behind the comparative study of Europe, China, and to a lesser extend, Japan. Pomeranz gives out hard evidence in life-expectacy, birth rates, market condition, ecological stress etc., hightlighting striking similarites between these socities in the 18th century.

Some readers may have problem with his conclusion that industrialization went ahead only because Europe got lucky in the convenient location of coal and the readily available resourses of the new world. However, just because these are paramount factors does not mean that they are all it needed. Put another way, had China got the same good fortune, it does not necessarily follow that China would industrilize, nor has Pomeranz argued this way.

Weaknesses: The writing is BAD, very convoluted. However, the most important failure is that Pomeranz treats these societies as though they were static. He failed to take into consideration their difference in the RATE of change. The fact that Europe was playing a catch up to Asia through-out the middle ages, and achieved par in pre-modern time, had to imply a quicker pulse. Europe's gradual opening of the mind (reformation ,renaissance), was roughly concurrent with China's gradual closing (the advent of neo-confucianism, ossification of the civil examination system). It's hard to believe that this change of fortune had no long-lasting impact on the underlying dynamics of the societes. Culture does matter, it's just been given a bad name by the likes of Huntington and Landes:)

Europe Got Lucky.......2006-02-13

Pomeranz advances the thesis that Europe's rise to world power (instead of a potentially similar but not historically realized rise by China, Japan, or India) was not caused by any internal social advantage possessed by western Europe-at least not principally caused. Pomeranz uses extensive research to demonstrate that western Europe, China, and Japan were not fundamentally different societies at the beginning of the modern era. The author maintains that Europe had the good fortune of having the land and mineral resources of the New World available at the right time, along with the conveniently-located coal resources of England; and it is this collection of fortuitous advantages that enabled Europe to propel itself into industrial revolution and world power.

The premise of the book is promising. The meat of the book can be a bit difficult to chew. The author compares the human, energy, land, and other resources of Europe and China in great detail to make his case. The sheer volume of facts and figures can make the going slow. Still, it's worth reading all of what the author has to say.

Overall, the argument is compelling. All three societies (western Europe, China, and Japan) were faced with populations that had more-or-less come in line with the carrying capacities of their lands based on the level of technology of the day. Additional agricultural productivity could only have come with additional inputs of labor into the existing stock of land. This is essentially what happened in China. Western Europe, led by England, went the way of labor-saving techniques and technologies that would not have been practicable without access to the additional agricultural potential and mineral wealth of the New World. Other factors, such as financial institutions and internal competition fade in importance before the simple math of carrying capacity.

The Great Divergence is quality reading. One does not have to agree with everything contained in the book to absorb the basic point: Europe got lucky. Be prepared to wade through an appropriately generous supply of facts and figures to back Pomeranz's claim.

nonsense.......2005-12-05

In "The Great Divergence", Kenneth Pomeranz presents an exhaustive investigation of the minutest differences and similarities in development of China and Western Europe. His claim, and stated objective, is to show that Europe's emergence as a preeminent power was the result of privileged access to overseas colonies, exploitation of non-Europeans, and a fortunate `geographic accident' of the location of coal in England. However, considering China's significant, and much earlier, developments in science, technology, and shipping, not to mention their huge deposits of coal, and its use some 600 years before the Europeans to make iron, it's difficult to understand Pomeranz's rationalization of those claims and ultimately the whole point of his book.

His specialty and interests clearly lie in China. In this book he attempts to shed a somewhat biased benevolent light on China by explaining the violent circumstances that led to the industrial revolution in Europe, and why it didn't happen in China. He presents a comparative analysis in such close, tortuous, detail that he becomes myopic in drawing his conclusions. His joy and skill clearly lie in analysis, rather than synthesis, and in the process, and among the ensuing debris, he loses a view of the whole as processes of nation building rather than competing sets of historical data. The outcome notwithstanding, he consistently paints each step in the process of growth in Europe and its colonies as a violent and ugly stepsister to a more sophisticated, benign version taking place in China. All of which may be true, but he discounts the effects of institutions, capital markets, capital accumulation, and regulatory competition in Europe as having marginal effect on the difference in outcome between the two areas because in his opinion what was happening in Europe was so similar to what was going on in China. He states that "European science, technology, and philosophical inclinations alone do not seem an adequate explanation, and alleged differences in economic institutions seem largely irrelevant".

Regulatory competition in Europe, for Pomeranz, equates to military competition. Although it could be argued from a more objective perspective that military research and development regularly spins off technological advances applicable in commercial areas, Pomeranz claims that in Europe `the net effect of warfare on technological innovation is likely to have been negative'. Clearly not true, but his argument about it possibly killing off other inventors was kind of funny. The development of institutions and property rights arising from this competition for him equals only the purchases of position, interference of guild control, and the granting monopoly privileges. He claims that all served to keep prices high, limit the extent of markets, and restrict output. The most positive function of `military' competition seen by Pomeranz is in the overseas projection of power. This lies in contrast to his claim that China was engaged in competitive trade with low margins, unprivileged by the state, that couldn't generate enough profits to finance a European style military capitalism. Here he ignores the Chinese obsession with intensive land use to feed its armies. The vast differences between the European states and the diversity of politics, social constructs, and institutions therein will show that had any single one of them been dominant the story of Europe, and the world, would have been very much different. Had the Chinese the benefit of this fracture, the voyages of Zheng He would have been continued, but when he died, the Confucians were regaining power and There was no political or spiritual will to continue. They felt that other nations had nothing to offer the already prosperous Chinese and they had no need to conquer their souls. Their voyages were ended, their fleets were dismantled and they turned inward. It became a crime to set sail from China in a multi-masted ship. This was their choice. One nation, one choice. Had there been competition among states in China, someone, somewhere would have chosen to continue.

As far as ethical systems and ideology are concerned, Pomeranz doesn't consider the consequences of differing motivation but only writes that philosophical inclinations do not seem an adequate explanation of divergent paths. Lost in analysis of the details of the similarities, here he misses the significance of the differences. Arguing that they were too small to create the large disparities in outcomes, he fails to ask whether those differences were what led to different choices. The differences in the ethical systems of Christian Western Europe and Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist China are enormous. The differences in the choices made within the context of those systems, especially within the protestant reformation and the creation of the Church of England, are significant. Pomeranz claims that ideology, or `philosophical inclinations', can't explain the different outcomes in the fortunes of China and Europe, but it was ideology and philosophy that led to the divergence in their development paths. Western Europe's history of fighting Muslims to keep them at bay and out of Europe established their crusading zeal to protect themselves by trying to convert everyone they could find. They embodied this fear and hegemonic drive and made Christian solipsism an imperative part of their culture. Vasco Da Gama said that the objectives of his voyages were "Christians and Spices". This dogmatic drive of the Europeans and their churches' implicit consent of their conquests and colonialism lent a higher power to their expansion. The Chinese chose not to continue their voyages. The Europeans were on a mission from God.

In this book, great tenaciousness in presenting historical data meets an astounding lack of insight into behavior and economics, and leaves the reader (at least me anyway) wondering why it was written in the first place.

Somewhat Innovative, Hard to Read.......2005-11-24

This book does a good job of criticizing many Anglo-centric explanations of why Europeans industrialized first by providing detailed evidence that the area near the Yangzi river delta was mostly as advanced as England when England started the industrial revolution.
It does a less convincing job of arguing that coal and new world land were the main reasons for England's success. I'm tempted to believe that American sugar provided desperately needed calories to break out of a Malthusian trap, but the evidence doesn't show that became significant until the industrial revolution had already started.
Conveniently located coal undoubtedly gave England a boost, but not a big enough boost that there is a practical way to decide it was more important than the numerous cultural differences which might have given England the edge it needed.
The book makes a serious effort to dismiss those cultural explanations, but is not thorough enough. In particular, I'm disappointed with the cryptic way that it dismisses the relevance of the ideas in Helmut Schoeck's book Envy.
The style is often deadening, with lengthy descriptions of details whose relevance is unobvious.

State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan)

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a fine book, intelligent theory backed by strong research

State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government (Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan)
Jean C. Oi
Manufacturer: University of California Press
ProductGroup: Book
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ASIN: 0520076370

Customer Reviews:

a fine book, intelligent theory backed by strong research.......1999-08-09

Oi's book, which adopts a clientist model of rural Chinese politics is a well supported, and strongly argued analysis backed by extensive interviews with former participants at all levels of Chinese rural politics. An added pleasure for the student of Chinese is Oi's consistent use of "pinyin" Chinese equivalents of English terms such as "production brigade" which add color to the book's already fine prose.

"China and the New World Order: How Entrepreneurship,Globalization, and Borderless Business Are Reshaping China and the World"

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Cooking With the Iron Rice Bowl
The most important book I read in the last 5 years
Is a new world order in the making?...It might just happen.
Insightful and Intelligent
Prepare for the Dragon Market - Winston Ma, Author of "Investing in China: New Opportunities in a Transforming Stock Market

"China and the New World Order: How Entrepreneurship,Globalization, and Borderless Business Are Reshaping China and the World"
George, Zhibin Gu
Manufacturer: Fultus Corporation
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Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 1596821078

Book Description

China is the world's number-one growth story now. But how is it that China has achieved such quick growth in this era? How is it that made-in-China products can flood the globe? Is a trade war going to happen? Or is a new world order in the making? This second volume of a trilogy-by Chinese journalist/consultant George Zhibin Gu-aims to answer these questions and more.

Today, more than a half-million overseas companies conduct business inside China. Learn about all the opportunities this exploding market presents, including banking, insurance, and stock market, as well as the yuan and trade and cross-border business issues. Moreover, it contains extensive studies on China's political-economic reform as well as evolving international relations.

This volume addresses eight key topics:

I. China's New Role in the World Development
II. The Yuan, Trade, and Investment
III. China's Fast-Changing Society, Politics, and Economy (in light of Chinese and global history)
IV. China's Banking, Insurance, and Stock Market Reforms
V. Chinese Multinationals vs. Global Giants
VI. The Taiwan Issue: Current Affairs and Trends (federation as an alternate way for unity)
VII. India vs. China: Moving Ahead at the Same Time
VIII. The Japan-China Issue: Evolving Relations in Light of History

Today, all nations increasingly rely on one another for development, a trend that will only strengthen as time passes. As a saying goes, "The future is being shaped today." This book will appeal to readers everywhere regardless of their particular interests.

Customer Reviews:

Cooking With the Iron Rice Bowl.......2007-03-27

Part reference, part musing, part insightful and timely analysis, George Zhibin Gu's latest book "China and the New World Order: How Entrepreneurship, Globalization, and Borderless Business are Reshaping China and the World" is a welcome and refreshing read among the endless new titles printed on China today.

Picking up on a focus of his previous book "China's Global Reach...," Gu goes further and identifies the chief impediment to China's latest and perhaps most difficult transition as the Chinese state itself. Gu reveals the seemingly historical inevitability of China's vast government apparatus but explains that Communist Party bureaucracy is unique in Chinese experience in the size and scope of its all-encompassing control.

In topics relative to today's readers Gu ably demonstrates through the book that changes in China come from the revived entrepreneurial instinct of the Chinese. Along with huge foreign investment China's ever-growing private sector is the outside influence that is challenging Chinese bureaucracy as never before. But while the Chinese people struggle to create a law-based society and break the bureaucracy's grip on all aspects of economic life, the Chinese state seeks an equal footing among world national powers.

"China and the New World Order" is nicely segmented into short but highly relevant chapters. As in his earlier works Gu deftly examines the pros and cons of numerous hot-button issues on China. For example he takes on the Taiwan - China knot and proposes an interesting solution, a federation or federal system as a means toward meaningful (and mutually beneficial) reunification although his federal system shares more similarity to a commonwealth in the opinion of this reviewer. Gu's look at delicate state of Japan and China relations reveals that Japan remains as apprehensive over Chinese growth and potential as it was in the past. In examining the India versus China debate Gu shows that there is far less competition (as Western press prefers to portray it) and more similarities between the two giants of Asia.

There is plenty of current information here and the detailed contents and summaries make the book a good quick reference for anyone with an interest in what's happening right now in China. And there are goodies such as a lengthy interview with Mark Mobius and a foreword by Hoover Institute fellow William Ratliff.

At one point in his analysis, Gu intriguingly compares the struggle in China to the old European church-state alliance. With that view in mind, what may be needed next and with luck what Chinese entrepreneurs may succeed in bringing is a Chinese "Glorious Revolution."

The most important book I read in the last 5 years.......2006-12-25

This new book from Dr. George Zhibin Gu is a geo-economics and geopolitical masterpiece from an insider, someone that thrives his consulting work and daily life inside China, not writing or comment from a comfortable chair in London or New York paid by a western think tank, or only for academic proposals. His challenge is to write for a broad audience out of China. I must refer his clever suggestions about Taiwan - a political proposal for a a federation - and the way he sees the go global from Chinese emergent multinationals. It is needed a lot of courage for an insider to be so clear in his proposals and to identify the old Chinese problem - bureaucracy, the same that stopped admiral Cheng Ho and the Discoveries in the XV Century, that closed China for so many centuries and gave an opportunity for foreign powers to humiliate China, hyper-bureaucracy that in the Mao period pulled China for chaos and economic and social distress. China and the New World Order is a must reading. Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues, editor of www.gurusonline.tv and translator of Made in China (published in Portuguese language).

Is a new world order in the making?...It might just happen........2006-12-15

Base on the number of book in relation to this matter so far I believe that no one has come close to capturing "new China's" spirit and meaning as Gu. After reading his second volume I found it to be hugely insightful on the current events of China and global affairs. It greatly explores the key factors that shape Chinese and global development in the next stages. It gives tremendous info and analysis on the Chinese government, politics, business and economy for any one's interest.

There's a huge amount of info on foreign businesses inside China. You will be able to see about twenty five American and global multinationals inside of China that are studied. In the meantime it gives us a very provocative analysis on China's new role in the world. Gu details this general picture of how China is walking away from a practical society and embracing an open, restless and dynamic society. It claims that an overextended, self-appointed bureaucracy remains the key problem for China. To overcome countless technical barriers, greater openness, entrepreneurship and global involvement is all needed. Again, it's very insightful on the issues between China, Taiwan, Japan, India and West. I will add that his analyses on Japan-China line up are very interesting as well as Taiwan. There' a tremendous amount of info and analysis on China's financial, banking, insurance and stock market.

Author George Zhibin Gu is a very outspoken and a well known Chinese journalist who has generally covered mergers and acquisitions, capital activities, business expansion, and restructuring. He's an insider who gives us scrupulous examination on current China and global affairs which is more than a reason why you should grab hold to this book.

Insightful and Intelligent.......2006-12-11

George Gu provides a depth of understanding that distinguishes his work from most other business books. His wide network of contacts gives insight into emerging trends. He provides useful context that western authors often lack and Chinese authors frequently take for granted.

Prepare for the Dragon Market - Winston Ma, Author of "Investing in China: New Opportunities in a Transforming Stock Market.......2006-11-07

For the international investor community, "Investing in China" in the new century is more or less a one-way investment and capital flow. Mr. Gu's book, however, looks one step further to explore how all these interactions would reshape the global horizon, both for China and the rest of the world.

In fact, China's outward influence is increasingly obvious. For instance, whether China would diversify its foreign currency reserve -- and consequently whether China will enter into the gold market to hedge its US dollar exposure -- has profound implications in the global financial markets.

Comparing to many other books on China, Mr. Gu's book has a truly "authentic Chinese" flavor. The reason is obvious: He is an INSIDER. As a native Chinese, he captures the spirit of China's latest developments in its not-too-short historic context.

War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe

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War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe
Victoria Tin-bor Hui
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
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ASIN: 0521525764

Book Description

There is a common belief that the system of sovereign territorial states and the roots of liberal democracy are unique to European civilization and alien to non-Western cultures. The view has generated popular cynicism about democracy promotion in general and China's prospect for democratization in particular. This book demonstrates that China in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (656-221 BC) consisted of a system of sovereign territorial states similar to Europe in the early modern period. It examines why China and Europe shared similar processes but experienced opposite outcomes.

China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy

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highly intelligent in-depth analysis
An Unscholarly Book
A Great Resource
Academic's trapped mentality: The limits of linear ideology
A book for those who actually know the ABCs of China

China's Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy
Minxin Pei
Manufacturer: Harvard University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0674021959

Book Description

The rise of China as a great power is one of the most important developments in the twenty-first century. But despite dramatic economic progress, China's prospects remain uncertain. In a book sure to provoke debate, Minxin Pei examines the sustainability of the Chinese Communist Party's reform strategy--pursuing pro-market economic policies under one-party rule.

Pei casts doubt on three central explanations for why China's strategy works: sustained economic development will lead to political liberalization and democratization; gradualist economic transition is a strategy superior to the "shock therapy" prescribed for the former Soviet Union; and a neo-authoritarian developmental state is essential to economic take-off. Pei argues that because the Communist Party must retain significant economic control to ensure its political survival, gradualism will ultimately fail.

The lack of democratic reforms in China has led to pervasive corruption and a breakdown in political accountability. What has emerged is a decentralized predatory state in which local party bosses have effectively privatized the state's authority. Collusive corruption is widespread and governance is deteriorating. Instead of evolving toward a full market economy, China is trapped in partial economic and political reforms.

Combining powerful insights with empirical research, China's Trapped Transition offers a provocative assessment of China's future as a great power.

Customer Reviews:

highly intelligent in-depth analysis.......2007-09-04

I am not a political scientist, economist or expert on China, and I found this book quite clear and understandable. It is a highly intelligent, in-depth and convincing analysis of China as a dysfunctional, 'predatory' state. It is highly unlikely it will evolve in positive directions of increasing democracy. While it may collapse, the future may instead be that of a corrupt, stagnating failed state which exports its problems to the rest of the world - failure to control drugs, arms sales to dangerous regimes, aids, illegal immigration, etc etc. An important antidote to all the self-serving business propaganda on China's economic miracle.

An Unscholarly Book.......2007-07-06

While the writing in this book is quite smooth, it by no means is a scholarly work (though in the guise of scholarship). The author picks and uses data and evidence that only fits his/her own political/ideological (rather than theoretical) framework, and ignores those that have been well researched and documented. In addition, most works--theoretical or empirical--cited this book is quite obsolete (except those from the internet, which tended to be superficial), even though more up-to-date and important scholarly works were already available in the body of the literature. For example, well before the book was published, there were already new, major findings about Chinese people's support for the government and democratization, and their political participation in both rural and urban settings. But the author totally ignored these new findings, probably because these findings were not very convenient to his/her political/ideological framework. More disappointingly, the book is full of the ideology/emotion-charged, groundless, and arbitrary statements (or beliefs) that you should never see in scholarly works. In short, this book has decisively departed from scholarly or scientific inquiry.

A Great Resource.......2006-12-07

Pei is well known is his field for writing about the political divide between the CCP and the Chinese people. This book does an excellent job in covering the realities of the economic and political situations within China. The vast majority of the book is actually quite an easy read, but the beginning of the book can be challenging for those that aren't use to conceptual models (hence 4 stars).

I highly recommend that those interested in China read this book. While I do not agree with specific points, Pei's general ideas are sound and provide lots to think about. China's government (read the CCP) must withdraw from the market if the economic reforms laid down by Deng Xiaoping are to continue and be successful. However, as Pei points out, by withdrawing from the markets, the CCP will lose a lot of its hard power.

Academic's trapped mentality: The limits of linear ideology.......2006-07-06

Reading this book is almost like reading "China's democratic future" all over again. It is all too familiar how normative idealism ruins positive analysis in these two books. The difference is: this one is disguised by more theoretical tools, the other one was an outright shout for a democratic China.

Democracy is a beautiful linear process that can be attributed to "growth determinism". Once the per capita income reaches $1000, then just "smile, you are on candid camera". The development theory is summarized by Pei as all about how growth determines democratization, and the evidence of growth not causing democracy is easily dismissed by seeing it as a short term phenomenon (rising prosperity makes political monopoly more valueable). If this logic is valid, one can also argue that the state's decentralized corrupted "grabbing hand" can also be a short term phenomenon for the long term reform. It's all about your starting point of analysis.

The pre-determined linear ideology of Pei leads to another glaring flaw: he fails to analyze the cause of democracy, as if what appears to be a correlation between growth and democracy is the causation. Douglass North is frequently quoted in this book, yet the major feat of North is: he starts with the cause of economic growth, not a linear ideology from the "prison of one culture". Given this, the discussion of gradual reform and shock therapy is a "fake issue" and a major distraction. More important, "trapped transition" is more a normative tautology than a useful analytical concept. When Pei wears a pair of dark glasses with an idealistic picture in mind, what else can he see except problems? What else can readers experience except his troubled mentality in dealing with China's achievements and problems (the whole book simply boils down to an ad hoc pattern of "on the one hand...on the other hand...")? As for the critical question on "why China is doing great if everything is really so dark?" Pei brushed aside the challenge with only a few paragraphs of guessing work. If one uses John Rawls' "justice principles" for the reality in the US, he can also argue what we see is a "trapped democracy" which is "for the few people, from the few people, and by the few people". And he can also get a reviewer to hail "trapped democracy" as a new concept for the satisfaction of self-congratulation.

Put it simply, when the target of analysis is totally Chinese, Pei is still obsessed with "Leninism" and the cold war ideology. As a Chinese, he didn't even talk about Chinese culture; as a US educated, he failed to start from the realistic perspective of "public choice" (rather than use it selectively to support his normative conclusion). If social scientists are all moral scientists, you think all research can still be fun?

It is really sad to see another serious Chinese scholar again fell into the one culture linear ideological trap. Assuming this book starts with the cause and reason of democracy, with the employment of available theories and a peaceful mind of multi-culturalism, we might see more fruitful results. One quick example is to analyze how each reform approach is actually structured by the contextual reality and how the state evolves and functions as a grabbing hand or a helping hand (instead of asserting gradual reform leads to a predatory state, which is nothing more than an ad hoc analysis); Other questions can be asked include: Are those "copy and paste" democracy (Taiwan, Mexico, the Philippines, India) and "plug and play" democracy (Iraq) actually doing well in economic growth and government cleanness? What is really beyond the simple installation of democracy? Will culture fail in "making democracy work"? What is behind the actual enforcement of democratic institutions?

The development of cognitive science and cultural psychology may be helpful for being self-conscious of the intellectual thinking trap, but the reality of research sociology may not be really in accord with a more sensible research direction. I wish I am wrong on this.

A book for those who actually know the ABCs of China.......2006-05-03

For those who's never been to China or lived there, this book might be a little out of their scope. Afterall, the only things you hear in the news are how if Walmart were a country, it'd be China's 7th biggest trading partner, or how Intel is building their fabs in China (away from Shanghai towards inland to further reduce cost). For those people, go read on how China will take over the world economically by the middle of this century and believe what you want.

For those who Does have any clue about China's political system is keenly aware that the entire Chinese economy is still tied into the political system, and that is just a time bomb waiting to explode. If the CCP were to collapse, half of the country's wealth will be exported and rest will go down with the defunct banking system. This book digs into the depth of the current geo-political situation, and is so accurate that the People's Congress is taking note and implementing changes (albeit slowly) previously pointed out by the author. If you want to know the REAL story behind the Chinese economic system and where it'll truely head in the next several decades, this is THE book to read. Not some "economic model that projects blah, blah, blah and threaten's US's position in the world," where the author is totally cluelss of all fundamentals of the Chinese economy other than published economic numbers.

ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age

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Fascinating, albeit incomplete
How Asia Once Won (And Could Again)
A New Frame in Which to View World History
A fundamental book for the 21st century
One of the best books of this century

ReORIENT: Global Economy in the Asian Age
Andre Gunder Frank
Manufacturer: University of California Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0520214749

Book Description

Andre Gunder Frank asks us to ReOrient our views away from Eurocentrism--to see the rise of the West as a mere blip in what was, and is again becoming, an Asia-centered world. In a bold challenge to received historiography and social theory he turns on its head the world according to Marx, Weber, and other theorists, including Polanyi, Rostow, Braudel, and Wallerstein. Frank explains the Rise of the West in world economic and demographic terms that relate it in a single historical sweep to the decline of the East around 1800. European states, he says, used the silver extracted from the American colonies to buy entry into an expanding Asian market that already flourished in the global economy. Resorting to import substitution and export promotion in the world market, they became Newly Industrializing Economies and tipped the global economic balance to the West. That is precisely what East Asia is doing today, Frank points out, to recover its traditional dominance. As a result, the "center" of the world economy is once again moving to the "Middle Kingdom" of China. Anyone interested in Asia, in world systems and world economic and social history, in international relations, and in comparative area studies, will have to take into account Frank's exciting reassessment of our global economic past and future.

Customer Reviews:

Fascinating, albeit incomplete.......2005-03-31

ReOrient is one the most important works of the last decade in that it not only challenges a dominant perspective in Western social science but it also refutes author's and his colleagues' earlier arguments. Andre Gunder Frank lays down two central arguments in ReOrient which complement one another: 1) the "rise of the West" did not happen due to any internal factors but was predicated on American silver and Asian market; 2) Asia in general and China in particular was the center of global economy until the 19th century. Thus, Frank aims to destroy the bases of Eurocentrism in social sciences.
Frank argues that Europe was not an important figure in world economy until the 19th century. Asians were more productive and competitive than Europeans and Asia remained at the center of global economy until the industrial revolution. Throughout this period European nations constantly had trade deficits with Asian nations, particularly with China and India. An indication of this European trade deficit was that gold and silver were never less than two-thirds of total European exports (p. 74). New World silver was for this reason very important for the Europeans; it helped them cover their trade deficits with the Asians and become a more active player in Asian economy. Thus, Frank contends that American silver bought Europeans a ticket in the "Asian productive and commercial train, which was steaming ahead on an already well-established track," (p. 115).
One of Frank's original arguments regarding the superiority of the Chinese economy vis-à-vis the European economy in the 15th to 19th century is the different effects on these economies of the influx of New World silver. To make his case, Frank utilizes Fisher's famous quantity-price equation which maintains that an increase in the amount of money in an economy will result in increases in the prices of goods unless it is matched by an increase in quantity of goods (p. 154). Frank then demonstrates that whereas American silver caused substantial increases in the price of goods in Europe, it did not have any remarkable inflationary effect on the Chinese economy. For this to happen, Chinese production must have increased parallel to the increase in the amount of silver. This means that the massive arrival of new American money stimulated production more in Asia than in Europe (pp. 157-8). According to Frank, this situation attests to higher productivity of Chinese economy compared to European economy. Thus, Frank refutes the orthodox Eurocentric "hoarding" argument on China which assumed that the Chinese used American/European silver by and large in non-economic and unproductive ways, primarily as jewelry: "Asians earned this money first because they were more industrious and more productive to begin with; the additional money then generated still more Asian demand and production," (p. 177).
Another historical fact Frank uses to demonstrate the superiority of Asian economies over European economies is the per capita production in these two economies in the 16th to 19th century. Using the estimates of such prominent historians as Braudel and Bairoch, Frank shows that in 1750 Asians accounted for 66 percent of world population but produced 80 percent of total world output; by contrast, Europe, which constituted 20 percent of world population then, produced only part of the remaining 20 percent. This again means that on average "Asians must have been significantly more productive than Europeans in 1750" (p. 173). As in the fist case, Franks' reasoning is simple, but smart and convincing.
After all these economic comparisons, Frank concludes that the Europeans did not "create" the world economic system but "purchased" an existing one with American silver. He therefore asserts that "the rise of the West" must be derived from the prior and contemporaneous development of "The rest," (p. 224).
Prospects:

The principal importance of ReOrient lies in its demolishing the bases of Eurocentrism in theories that explain "the rise of West" with factors that are internal to Europe. These theories attributed European economic development to Europe's exceptionality in such factors as rationality, religion, science, and geographic location. Yet Frank demonstrates that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia and Asian nations were at least as much rational, industrial, capitalist, and dynamic as the European ones. Thus, there was no European "head start" or "exceptionality" that would necessitate the creation of a European hegemony over others. It was American silver and Asian market that allowed the "rise of the West". As such, Frank's arguments change the central question to be dealt with regarding the rise of the West. The critical question is no more why it was the West that rose in the 15th century -because it did not-, but why and how the West rose in the late 18th and early 19th century. As Frank argues, the new question is not about a mere difference in time but begs a qualitatively different answer.
What makes ReOrient particularly important is that it not only destroys the myth of "European exceptionalism" but it also uncovers and refutes the Eurocentrism in the critics of these theories as well. Frank argues that such important critics of capitalist world economy as Marx, Braudel, and Wallerstein could not escape the Eurocentrism embedded in the theories they criticized either. While Marx viewed Asian nations as stagnant, traditional and inferior; Wallerstein assigned an insignificant role to Asia and the Mediterranean in the making of his modern world-system (p. 45). Frank views these arguments as mere assumptions and refutes them in two ways: first, he tries to demonstrate that Europe did not have any inherent superiority in the 15th through 18th century vis-à-vis Asia; second, Frank argues that Europe owe its future "rise" to its borrowing from and integration to a well-established Asian economy. Thus, Frank demonstrates that Europe did not create a world system and incorporated more and more of the rest of the world as Wallerstein argued, but rather integrated itself to the Asian market and "climbed up on the back of Asia," (pp. 4, 30)
Problems:

Unfortunately, Frank's novel theorizing turns out to be at the expense of some conceptual clarity. Frank's approach to world economy and modes of production renders such important concepts like world system and capitalism ambiguous. Frank argues that there has always been "one world economy/system" and it had its "own structure and dynamic," (p. 139). In Frank's view, existence of any trade relations between regions of the world create a world system. Thus, Frank equates global trade with world system. However, until the 18th century trade was highly regionalized and most regions had miniscule contacts with others. Frank himself notes that Europeans' role in Asian trade before the second half of the 18th century was insignificant and Europe accounted for only one percent of Asian nations' international trade (pp. 178-85). Thus, if we define world-system as a global economic system in which most parts of the world are economically dependent on one another, I will have to side with Wallerstein who argued that such a system did not exist until the 19th century ("The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System", in The Essential Wallerstein, p. 74). Indeed, although unintentionally, Frank also provide support to this point when he notes that Europeans were the first to "operate in all markets simultaneously or systematically to integrate its activities between all of them," (p. 177). As such, there has been only one world-system so far and -unfortunately- it has been a European one.
A subsequent problem that results from Frank's bias towards holistic analysis is his search for single centers in world economy. Frank argues that the entire world economy was "Sinocentric" until the 19th century (p. 117). However, I have doubts regarding China's central role in economies of European and Middle Eastern countries in any period of history. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries the Ottomans and Persians were more central to Middle Eastern economies than were the Chinese. Similarly, in the same period the British and the Dutch were more central to European economy than the Chinese. I therefore tend to agree with Pomeranz who later stated that the pre-1800 world was "a polycentric world with no dominant center," (The Great Divergence, p. 4).
Another shortcoming in Frank's book is that he cannot adequately account for the "rise of the West" in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. His argument is that Asian economies were altogether facing a Kondratieff B-cycle in the first half of the 18th century and this allowed Europe to finally outdo the Asians. He therefore asserts that "the fall of Asia" preceded European political and military intervention in Asian nations (pp. 266-8). The first problem one might have with this argument is that it is impressionistic and allows little room to human agency. A more fundamental problem that I have, however, is that Frank's account does not consider the possibility that the Asian economic decline in the first half of the 18th century could have been a temporary problem and Asian economies could have easily recovered if it were not for European military intervention. Indeed, Frank himself reports that average annual exports from Asia by both Dutch and British East India companies declined in the decades of 1730s and 1740s "but recovered in the 1750s," (p. 270). Frank also notes that throughout the 18th century the balance of trade between Britain and China was constantly in China's favor and the British could reverse this situation only through forced opium trade in the 19th century. Thus, contra Frank, I believe that Asian economic problems in the 18th century were not insurmountable and "the fall of Asia" was indeed a European creation. As such, we still do not have a satisfying answer as to why Europe outdid the Asians by 1800.

How Asia Once Won (And Could Again).......2002-01-23

Andre Gunder Frank wrote ReOrient to demonstrate that the present Western predominance in the world economy is fairly new. It began when Europe gained control of the New World's natural resources, particularly silver, and used it to "buy a ticket on the Asian train" (Gunder Frank's apt metaphor).

Gunder Frank also speculates that East Asia's present economic growth and potential will eventually help it regain economic hegemony in the not too distant future.

A New Frame in Which to View World History.......2001-05-18

I confess. I was Eurocentric. Despite a degree in International Economics from an east coast school known for its School of Foreign Service, I firmly believed Max Weber that the Protestant work-ethic was the source of western prosperity. I also believed in American exceptionalism. Frank's book cured me of both those false notions.

A couple points I'd like to add to Frank's thesis explained in other reviews.

1) I work for one of the major trans-Pacific ocean shipping companies. The company was founded in California in 1848 and sold to the Singapore government in 1997. (Shipping going East)

2) US-bound shipments are full of manufactured goods. Asia-bound ships are filled with wastepaper or are largely empty. The West continues to produce nothing that Asia really wants. Where in times past, most of the Asian-bound shipments from England and the Netherlands were boats filled with silv