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Amid the sand and rock of Central Asia, Russia and England spent much of the 19th century playing what historians have come to call the Great Game: the struggle for control over transcontinental routes from Europe to the Far East. When the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, Lenin continued to press Russian--now Soviet--claims to faraway, fabled places such as Samarkand and Hotan. The intrigues of his agents and their British counterparts, swashbucklers all, could come from a modern spy novel, and they make for fascinating reading in Peter Hopkirk's vivid account.
Book Description
A DANGEROUS NEW TWIST IN THE GREAT GAME
In this gripping narrative Peter Hopkirk tells how Lenin and his revolutionary comrades tried, in the period between the two world wars, to set the East ablaze with their heady new gospel of Marxism. Their dream was to "liberate" the whole of Asia, and their starting point was British India, the
richest of all imperial possessions.
The bloody struggle that ensued, the full story of which has never been told, marked a dramatic new twist in the Great Game. Among the players were British Indian intelligence officers and the armed revolutionaries of the Communist International. There were also Muslim visionaries and Chinese
warlords-as well as a White Russian baron who roasted his Bolshevik captives alive.
Pieced together from secret archives, intelligence reports, and the long-forgotten memoirs of the players involved, here is an extraordinary tale of intrigue and treachery. Like Hopkirk's bestselling The Great Game, its theme is ominously topical in view of the violent events that still grip this
turbulent region-from the Caucasus to Afghanistan-where the Great Game never really ended.
Customer Reviews:
Another great installment.......2006-12-15
Peter Hopkirk's third installment of the Great game is as masterful as the first two. Lenin's drive to take over the central Asian territories and hold the oil there inspires a true terror of what the great game had evolved into. From continuing intrigued in Afghanistan to the development of Iran as a major actor in the region come directly from this time period. The great game is one of the most interesting events in history and no one tells it better than Hopkirk. You will not believe that this book is true by the time you are done. It is utterly amazing what people will do for their countries when they are called upon to serve. The adventures of the great game should be read by everyone.
Fascinating Tales of an Obscure Piece of the Planet. .......2006-07-27
Hopkirk hooked me with his "Great Game" book, which brimmed with fascinating characters in the competition between England and Russia in Central Asia. This book is equally well-done and its players are, if anything, even more fascinating than the earlier work. You couldn't make people like this up if you were writing a novel. The way they succumbed to avarice or power and swam with or against the tide of history in a most bloody fashion is spellbinding. Hopkirk is that rare author who brings important history to us in a most palatable fashion. A great read.
Carries the story on from The Great Game--but not as well.......2002-12-29
Hopkirk is a mater story teller. Anyone who cares about how Afghanistan and the surrounding countries ended up the way they did must read The Great Game--Hopkirk's gripping description of the battle between Russia and England for control of Central Asia--a hint: they both lost.
This volume picks up the story with the Russian Revolution. Again, Hopkirk does an excellent job of out lining the players, the global politics, and how it all impacted on this traditional "crossroads of the world". Here, the focus is on Lenin, and Russia's (successful) attempt to claim/re-claim Central asia as its own.
My criticisim is that the story is not nearly as gripping as a story as was the Great Game. There are superb vignettes, but the overall narrative is simply not as good.
However, if you want to know why Russia was willing to dvote a decade (1980 to 1990) to its war in Afghanistan, which set the stage for the Taliban and Al Queda, then I know of no better book.
A Gripping Tale of the Last Stages of the Great Game!.......2002-07-28
This is an instant classic! But some of you may be wondering: what's so great about an obscure conflict in an obscure land?
For a start there's the psychopathic White Russian general, Ungern-Sternberg, the "Mad Baron", who believes himself to be the reincarnation of Genghis Khan, and who dreams of conquering Russia at the head of a Mongol army. There's Enver Pasha, the former Ottoman Minister of War recruited by the Bolsheviks, but soon betraying them in pursuit of his dream - a new Turkish empire in Central Asia. For Britain the greatest threat comes from the new Russia of Lenin and Trotsky, once more playing hard at the Great Game, eager to undermine Britain by striking at India. There are Chinese Warlords, defeated White Russian armies, Muslim rebels, bandits, an ambitious Afghan king, secret agents, Tibetan bandits, and always the possibility of a British expedition.
At the geographical centre of all this is the Chinese province of Sinkiang - a land surrounded on 3 sides by soaring mountain ranges, at its heart the world's most inhospitable desert, littered with lost cities. Between mountains and desert lies a ring of walled towns where travellers cross with a single step from an arid expanse of sand and gravel into a world of trickling streams and shady groves. Along the ancient Silk Road between the towns trudge trade caravans of camels, donkeys, huge-wheeled carts and the occasional motor car or lorry. In the towns among the narrow streets, crumbling buildings, and bustling markets Indian traders watch, sending reports back to British India...
Well, there it is, and as I have said before, you must get this book! The gripping narrative just makes you unable to put the book down until you have finished, and then it forces you to read it again! Get this book quickly!
Absolutely brilliant.......2001-10-17
One of the best books I have read in years. Possibly better than Hopkirk's original 'The Great Game'. While this is the tale of about espionage and sabotage behind enemy lines in Central Asia, it reads like an adventure novel.
The action centres around immediate aftermath of the Russian revolution, just when the new soviet state was most intent on exporting revolution to the rest of the world. Hopkirk is at his best when he introduces Russia's nemesis in Central Asia - a certain Colonel Frederick Bailey, 'Great Game' hero and butterfly collector. Totally bonkers, in a truly British way. It's so exciting that you can scarcely believe that it's true - apparently it is.
Bailey, a british agent from the Raj, is sent to Central Asia to foil Soviet attempts to expand their empire south. Along the way he evades hit squads, execution chambers and even manages to circulate amongst the enemy by joining their own secret service and working as a double agent. About half way through, Bailey evenually gets back to India and drops out of sight - much to the frustration of the Soviets, but not before one final shoot out at the border post.
Hopkirk then sets off on another romp from Moscow to the Pacific Ocean, detailing the struggle between the Whites, the Reds and their respective supporters in the international community. This time there are multiple players -: the Soviet Comintern, Indian Communists, Turkish Nationalists, White Russians, British agents fighting for the Whites and some very, very cruel members of God's creation. Everything swirls around in a vast game where everyone is out to grab what they can from the dismembered Russian empire.
Almost everyone in here will be new to most readers - with the exception of Mikhael Borodin - but that shouldn't detract from an excellent piece of story telling. This is history the way it should be written. Five Stars is five too few.
Book Description
A thorough analysis of where U.S./European relations have gone wrong--and how to set them right
ALLIES AT WAR is the first and most comprehensive assessment of what went wrong between America and Europe during the crisis over Iraq and is based on extensive interviews with policymakers in the United States and Europe.
It puts the crisis over Iraq in historical context by examining US-Europe relations since World War II and shows how the alliance traditionally managed to overcome its many internal difficulties and crises. It describes how the deep strategic differences that emerged at the end of the Cold War and the disputes over the Balkans and the Middle East during the Clinton years already had some analysts questioning whether the Alliance could survive. It shows how the Bush administration’s unilateral diplomacy and world-view helped bring already simmering tensions to a boil, and describes in depth the events leading up to the Iraq crisis of 2003.
Gordon and Shapiro explain how powerful forces such rising American power and the September 11 terrorist attacks have made relations between America and Europe increasingly difficult. But the authors argue that the split over Iraq was not inevitable: it was the result of misguided decisions and unnecessary provocations on both sides. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that claims that the Iraq war signaled the effective end of the Atlantic Alliance, the authors warn that assuming the end of the Alliance could quickly become a self-fulfilling prophesy: leaving the United States isolated, resented, and responsible for bearing the burdens of maintaining international security largely alone.
In response to those who argue that the Atlantic Alliance is no longer viable or necessary, ALLIES AT WAR demonstrates that even after Iraq, the United States and Europe can work together, and indeed must if they wish to effectively address the most pressing problems of our age. The book makes concrete proposals for restoring transatlantic relations and updating the alliance to meet new challenges like global terrorism and the transformation of an unstable Middle East.
Download Description
"Masterful ... a timely demonstration that a new transatlantic compact is both possible and necessary for our common security."--Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Ranking Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee A Detailed Examination of What Has Gone Wrong in the Fragile U.S./Europe Alliance--and How to Make It Right
Customer Reviews:
This is the best study yet of the transatlantic crisis over.......2005-01-09
Iraq, well informed and eminently fair; it concludes with excellent advice, particularly regarding the need for Washington to continue supporting European integration and a collective European defense effort. What the authors make clear, without shrillness or grandstanding, is that "the European complaint that the American decision-making process and diplomacy about Iraq violated reasonable alliance norms and expectations is valid." They prove this point with careful analysis of what happened in 2002 and 2003 and with a short, sharp reminder of previous alliance crises and how they were overcome. This is not to say that the authors side with France and Germany; their criticism of those countries' diplomacy is often quite stinging. But the fact that the United States is the "indispensable power" does not mean that its allies must support it in every case. As Gordon and Shapiro write, "when taken too far, assertive leadership can quickly turn into arrogant unilateralism, to the point where resentful others become less likely to follow the lead of the United States." "Even a country as powerful as the United States," they explain, "needs a certain level of legitimacy and consent." And indeed, it is clear that U.S. rashness and roughness in its handling of Iraq has weakened its legitimacy and, as a result, badly damaged its interests.
Essential Reading to Inform Public Debate .......2004-10-07
The importance of persistent conflict in Iraq throughout the 2004 presidential campaign makes this volume an essential contribution to the on-going public debate about the Bush Administration's foreign policy, particularly its global war on terrorism. Gordon and Shapiro carefully analyze the motivations and perceptions of the political elites on each continent as well as the opinions of their publics as the Iraq crisis unfolded. The initial chapters set the historical context for an analysis of the deepening discord within the Atlantic Alliance, which came to a head after September 11. The second part analyzes the sources of disagreement regarding Iraq and the reasons for divergence among the members in the transatlantic relationship. The final chapter makes several constructive recommendations to restore the Atlantic Alliance.
These recommendations are particularly significant in light of findings reported after the book's publication. Recent confirmations question intelligence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, notably the aluminum tubes cited as evidence that Saddam Hussein was rebuilding Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The fact that these aluminum tubes were likely intended for small artillery rockets, not nuclear use, necessitates a more comprehensive and critical public inquiry. There is an ethical imperative for the American public and the world to receive the information that allows citizens to question intelligently why military action was taken in Iraq. In light of the mounting casualties on all sides, this is a civic responsibility that speaks to America's founding as a republican government, not a reluctant empire. In question are the Bush Administration's doctrine of preventive war and its insistence on the need for regime change, not containment, in the Middle East. This volume underscores the Bush Administration's reliance on military action to rid the region of terrorists. The fact that this reliance occurs without a steadfast pursuit of Middle East peace through a US commitment to the Road Map defies a basic premise of The 9/11 Commission Report's findings. The Report emphasizes that a global strategy to protect the nation should be a balanced one that uses all elements of national power, including diplomacy, intelligence and education to reach out to the larger Muslim world.
Perhaps the most relevant aspect of this case study analysis is the explanation of allied differences. The American faith in precision technology and military prowess is contrasted with the European willingness to accept, contain and try to deter the threat Iraq represented under the dictatorial leadership of Saddam Hussein. More fundamentally, Europe's, and particularly Germany's, awareness of historical mistakes in the rush to militarism is opposed by an increasing American proclivity to accept military force as just another tool in its global strategy against terrorism. This difference brings to mind the influence of the Bush Administration's distinction between a September 10th and a September 12th mentality. For a government that initially shied away from nation building, the undaunted belief in the creation of democracy with bombs in the Middle East flies in the face of French and British experiences with colonialism there. Moreover, this book's analysis is helpful as we evaluate whether success in Iraq is indeed possible, and if so, whether it can decisively define a new stage for Middle East peace as an alternative to negotiations with Arafat.
More fundamentally, this volume offers readers the opportunity to assess the impact of a consistency that has emerged in America's domestic and global policies since 9/11. Cornel West terms this "escalating authoritarianism" in his recent book, Democracy Matters. On the domestic front, the democratic public discourse so vital to the nation's capacity for renewal is at risk. The nature of the US popular debate about the war in Iraq, critical or passive, is a litmus test in this regard. It demonstrates the extent to which Americans are able to display a responsible consciousness about the nation's military involvement there. This public awareness is significant because, as Allies at War convincingly explains, the Atlantic Alliance is not doomed to disintegrate. The context in which the Alliance must evolve has changed, however, given the absence of the Cold War and current threats to world peace, including "out-of-area" ethnic conflicts as well as nationalism, which, in the case of the Beslan tragedy, is not always distinguished from global terrorism. This volume's timely conclusion should not be taken for granted amidst the factual confusion, media spin and political rhetoric of the 2004 presidential campaign. Gordon and Shapiro are right to assert that the post 9/11 context requires leaders and populations in Europe and the United States to understand the challenge they face: to adapt the Atlantic Alliance as a matter of choice as well as necessity.
Book Description
A remarkable view of how geopolitics affects ordinary people, this book documents, in words and pictures, the lives of Armenians in the last two decades. Based on intimate interviews with three hundred Armenians and featuring Jerry Berndt's superb photographs, it brings together firsthand testimony about the social, economic, and spiritual circumstances of Armenians during the 1980s and 1990s, when the country faced an earthquake, pogroms, and war. At times shocking and deeply emotional, Armenia: Portraits of Survival and Hope is a story of extreme suffering and hardship, a searching look at the fight for independence, and an exceptionally complex portrait of the human spirit.
A companion to the Millers' highly acclaimed work Survivors: An Oral History of the Armenian Genocide, which documented the genocide of 1915, this book focuses on four groups of people: survivors of the earthquakes that devastated northwestern Armenia in 1988; refugees from Azerbaijan who fled Baku and Sumgait because of pogroms against them; women, children, and soldiers who were affected by the war in Nagorno-Karabakh; and ordinary citizens who survived several winters without heat because of the blockade against Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Millers' narrative situates these accounts contextually and thematically, but the voices of individuals remain paramount. The Millers also describe their personal experiences in repeated research trips, inviting us to look beyond the headlines and think beyond the circumstances of our own lives as they bring contemporary Armenia to life.
Customer Reviews:
Excellent book.......2006-11-05
To the Turkish "review"ers:
This is the case always when any is published about any subject that bears the name Armenia. Armenia is "fake, bandit, criminal, murderous, genocidal" and the list goes on and on... I again ask objectively and scholarly as to where, when, how, who, why are these people charged with these heavy charges, when it was the OTTOMAN EMPIRE which ruled for over 630 years, over the known Christian world, from the doors of Vienna to the shores of Yemen, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black sea shores and Persia. During that period how many millions of Christians were forcefully converted to Islam, tortured, massacred, brutalized, their properties, wives and daughters confiscated and dishonored, and also how many wars did it have against even Muslim powers like the Persian Kingdom, the Berbers, the Albanians, the Kurds and Arabs?
Sure, it is easy to yeal "WE DIDN'T DO IT!" in regards to the Armenian Genocide.. Oh but hold it! Don't the Neo-Nazis say the same about the Holocaust? Don't the Khmer militia say the same about Cambodia? Don't SOME Hutus say the same about the Tutsis? DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN OR DOES YOUR GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY OR AZERBAIJAN say there is a Genocide going on in SUDAN? (I know exactly why can't you say it). Sudan would tell you to "look into a mirror..."
Do you want just one example of Genocide commited not only against the Armenians, but against every Christian minority for 630 years? WHERE DID YOU RECRUIT THE JANISSARIES FROM...? Being christian children forcefully taken as tax from their parents and grown as turks to massacre christians is or isn't a classical, methodological, systematic way to shrink or eliminate a race? What about the 300,000 Armenians massacred by the Hamidiye forces between 1894-1896? What about the 30,000 plus Armenians butchered in Adana in 1909? What about the 1,500,000 Armenians, and more than 400,000 Greeks, 250,000 Assyrians, and thousands of other non-turkic minorities between 1915 and 1923...? Some Turkish diplomats were shot during the Cold War by Armenian activists? What a pity... 30 plus diplomats for you weigh more than millions upon millions of other people... Elif Shafak the daughter of one of those diplomats shot, is more couragous than anyone to objectively examine for the truth and getting convinced that Turkey did commit the ultimate crime against humanity, that these Armenians acted for the recognition of the Genocide (even though the ways were extreme and sometimes unjustified.) Wasn't it the interior minister of Azerbaijan who in 2005 said that "Armenia would not exist in 30 years from now..? Any better words for Genocide?
Let the honest, unbiased, historically sound minded person objectively examine the events, and come to the conclusions. Conclusions that are nowadays reached by Turkish intellectuals (Akcam, Berktay, Muge, Ertem, Zarakoglu, Shafak, and many more) who recognize and condemn the first Genocide of the 20th Century.
"NOW GO AND LOOK INTO A MIRROR..."
Not the best read on the region.......2006-01-21
The books doesn't worst buying. It is poorly written, and is more about the "brainwashing" than presenting and objectively analysing the facts about Armenia ...
Biased, deceptive, non-factual.......2005-10-24
This book is another cheap-shot in the decades-long propaganda war between Armenian and Turkish and Azerbaijani nationalists. Not only the author tells only one-side of the story, but the book is completely based on fiction and non-facts. It has nothing to say about the massacre of Turks, Kurds, Jews and Azerbaijanis in 1890-1924 by the hands of Armenian gangs and military forces, ethnic cleansing and mass killings conducted from 1988 to present by Armenian forces in Karabakh and other areas of Azerbaijan, and brutal terrorist campaign by Armenian ASALA and other terror groups against Turkish and Azerbaijani diplomats and other civilians throughout 20th century. The author tries to reverse the facts, portray the aggressor (Armenian Republic and its militant gangs in Karabakh) as the victim, and uses religion as a tool to galvanize Christian readers against Muslim victims of Armeinian war crimes. While the conflict is a classic case of territorial dispute and ethnic hatred, the book tries to present the events as a result of a religious war, which is non-sense considering the overwhelming secular character of populations of all sides involved (Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan). The only way I would recommend this book - is as an example of the product of typical biased propaganda campaign.
The first 20th century holocaust was against Armenians.......2003-10-19
The first 20th century holocaust was against the thousands of innocent Armenians massacred by Turkish troops in the First World War. No soon as that war was over than most Armenians, if they were not forced under Turkish rule, became Soviet citizens. Then when they finally got their independence back after the end of the USSR, they found themselves involved in a bloody war with Azerbaijan. Few peoples have suffered as much as the Armenians in the past 20 years and a book like this is absolutely essential reading if we are to understand the people of the oldest continually Christian country in the world. Buy this book and then give all your friends this book as a present for Christmas. Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003)
Book Description
The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerrillas. The material was originally collected and published by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerrilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It was originally intended for internal use only and as such provides examples of both good and bad military practice. The hard lessons learned are not specifically 'Russian' in nature and many of the same mistakes and successes would apply equally to the American Army in Vietnam. Indeed, the knowledge gained from these reports should also apply to future conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rugged terrain.
This is not a history of the Soviet-Afghan War, but rather a series of snapshots of combat as seen by young platoon leaders, company commanders, battalion commanders and military advisers. It is an intimate look at the boring, brutal business of counterinsurgency punctuated by moments of heady excitement and terror.
Colonel Grau, the editor and translator, has added his own commentary to produce a useful guide for commanders to meet the challenges of this kind of war and to help keep his fellow soldiers alive. This book will also be of interest to the historian and general reader, who will discover that advances in technology have had little impact on this kind of war, and that many of the same tactics the British Army used on the Northwest Frontier still apply today.
Customer Reviews:
Great Documentation of a vital part of world history!.......2007-10-22
This book has some amazing statistics in the prelude and the individual accounts from russian officers covering the lessons learned in Afghanistan make this book a must read for anyone interested in the history of Afghanistan and especially all soldiers headed over there!
The definitive study of the Soviet-Afghan war.......2006-12-25
This is, by far, the most thorough treatment in english on the Soviet-Afghan war. The Soviet attempts at a heavy-handed approach to counter-insurgency only backfires in the end. A lesson few seem to understand. This brilliant work describes how the Afghan guerrilla tactics evolved with each new Soviet attempt to thwart them. The brutality on both sides is beyond comprehension and reminds us how evil is war.
The Bear Went over the Mountain.......2004-07-15
To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan & to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy in Russia compiled this book for their command & general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company & battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces & rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties & death, adaptation, & survival. Provides an intimate look at the boring but brutal business of counterinsurgency. Maps.
Tactically good but not so exciting.......2003-07-13
Being in afghanistan I ordered a few books to learn where I was and this one was a great tacitcal book, I could overlfy some places this book talked about and point out areas well but as for the average reader, its black adn white, no cool photos and no real exciting stories. Its more of a pure military history of battle book.
Tactically good but not so exciting.......2003-07-13
Being in afghanistan I ordered a few books to learn where I was and this one was a great tacitcal book, I could overlfy some places this book talked about and point out areas well but as for the average reader, its black adn white, no cool photos and no real exciting stories. Its more of a pure military history of battle book.
Book Description
This extensively researched book illuminates many of the enigmas that have surrounded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his catastrophic blunder.
“If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.”—Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review
"A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented."—Henry A. Kissinger
Customer Reviews:
Stalin is never wrong.......2007-09-12
It will come as no surprise to even the casual history buff that Stalin totally misread German intentions about Barbarossa, and the Red Army and Soviet citizens paid in blood for his error. David Murphy assembles overwhelming Soviet documentary evidence of the many sources of intelligence reporting which the Soviet military intelligence and NKVD reported on directly to the Soviet leadership leading up to June 22 1941, warning of impending German hostility. What is new is the evidence of Stalin's systematic elimination of all who had knowledge of the advance warnings he ignored, thus ensuring no one lived to tell of Stalin's fallibility. This is a sobering reminder of the immense evil that Stalin personified.
Very venomous on Stalin. Resembles cold war propaganda.......2007-01-18
Enigma behind Operation Barbarossa[Hitler's invasion of USSR]has always fascinated me.
Despite receiving intelligence warnings from several sources about an impending German assault,war began disastrously for Soviets.This happened because ,prelude to hostilities ,Stalin practised self deception on a extensive scale.Stalin's folly brought the nation on the brink of collapse.Soviet people paid dearly for their leader's mistake.More than 20 million lives were lost before Red Army managed to evict German invaders from the Soviet soil.
There is no doubt in the "war of wits" which preceded German attack,Hitler throughly foxed Stalin.German Fuehrer was able to read Stalin's mind ;latter's predispositon to a particular line of thinking.This was Nazi Germany will not invade USSR as long as Britain continued to hold out behind natural barrier:English Channel. Strange to say,Soviet leader adhered to this thought despite repeated violations of Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe.Hitler exploited Stalin's preconception by feeding disinformation via Latvian double agent controlled by Gestapo. Fuehrer's personal correspondence telling some rogue elements in the Wehrmacht were poised to strike;however,he would do his best to stop them further deceived Stalin.
Stalin's experience shows how dangerous it is to prejudge enemy's intentions.One needs to have open mind while evaluating enemy's capabilities,plans.If not,one is bound to fall into a self- made trap.
Fact that Wehrmact also made no preparations to conceal its build-up along Soviet borders confused Stalin. He thought Soviet spies were bluffing regarding an impending German attack. That accounts for his violent outburst against Richard Sorge.
To be fair you cannot expect Stalin to be privy to Hitler's innermost thought [incredibly convoluted logic]that he can bring Britain to heel by striking down Soviet Union.Further Soviet dictator was ,I think,was correct in his thinking that Brtish intelligence schemed to entangle Soviet Union in a war with Nazi Germany.Martin Allen's book Hitler/Hess Deception has unwittingly acknowledged this fact.
Author while striving to unravel mystery surrounding Barbarossa has demonised,maligned, Stalin.He dubs Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact as a cynical move on Stalin's side.In my view it was also vaccilation,indifference of Western Allies which gave him an opening to strike a deal with Nazi Germany.
Mr Murphy is a cold war warrior. He has viewed events which unfolded in the east from this angle.
worthy reading but less than expected.......2006-06-09
The book is a very good compilation of already existing information. There is definitely a value in having it together all under the same cover. Also, there are some new tidbits here and there.
And there is no enigma to be solved: in author's view Stalin was self-deceived about Hitler's plans, which is the traditional point of view.
A good effort.......2006-01-30
Since this is more or less my 'forte' when it comes to World War II studies and especially the Eastern Front is where my concentration lies, specifically 1941, I was very pleased to get my hands on a copy of this book even before it was published (thanks to my history professor at my University). Overall it was a solid effort on the part of the author to show how much information Stalin, GRU, and in effect the Soviet Union was receiving from abroad. From Eastern to Western Europe and the US, embassies and personnel were sending information confirming the time of the invasion and detailing what the invasion itself would encompass or simply denying it as part of a German deception campaign.
When viewing this information we can see that much of the data that confirmed the invasion was in fact correct while many details were not. Bottom line being that the idea that an invasion was going to occur was most definitely right but the dates being attributed to the invasion were not.
The first messages began to arrive soon after December 1940 when Hitler has first through up of the invasion, but they were in effect useless since no troop movements had begun. The first thoughts coming into Stalin's mind were probably that it couldn't be true since Germany was still at war with England and Hitler would never make the mistake that was made in World War I when a two front war was fought and lost by Germany.
The US was also one of the first to warn Stalin but in the end why should Stalin trust them? Or Great Britain who also tried to warn him? They had interfered in the Russian civil war, sent their troops to Russian lands to kill Red Army men, and now when only England was standing up to Hitler and Germany would it not suit England's interests to get the USSR on her side? This is one thing that has to be kept in mind, most messages from foreign sources like these were ignored, even worse if they were substantiated by other sources it simply made it seem as if this information was planted.
Later on during one or two months before the invasion began an avalanche of information was forthcoming about Germany's intentions from every corner of the globe. Yet this is where the author makes a mistake, he does not in fact show all German deception that was focused on keeping the Soviet uninformed about their plans nor does he show some of the contradictory information coming in from the very same Soviet agents and sources that said Germany would attack. This is most definitely a lot to grasp and keep in mind. One example of the authors omission is from that famous spy Sorge in Tokyo, a few days before the invasion he sent a message saying "Germany might not attack or if it does it'll be at the end of June" this was sent on June 17th. I have in fact collected some of the volumes that Murphy based his work on and much of the information found in them he has omitted, this being just one example. Although in the end one cannot blame him for this, there is a wealth of information and a limited amount of space to present it all in within Murphy's book. So I commend him for what he's done in at least bringing this topic to light in English.
Now going back to some of the first details that were surfacing about the invasion, their estimates were March, and then later on mid May. March was seen as a joke since this was right after winter and before the rasputitsa would begin, thus Germany would simply be bogged down in the mud. May was more feasible but when it came and went and nothing happened, why should Stalin even consider that if they were wrong once they'd be right the next time? Mobilizing a country, any country, is a lot of work and at that time for Stalin mobilization meant war. The reasons for why he thought Hitler would first make demands are explained in the book, which I give the author credit for finding out, as well as the fact that Golikov the Chief of GRU was hiding a huge amount of information from Stalin and supplying him with what he thought Stalin wanted to see and hear.
This of course made it much harder for Stalin to believe the few pieces of information that might have slipped through or he was told about by others which did in fact confirm the invasion. Usually his estimation of what Germany would do rested with the disinformation Germany was supplying throughout Europe to keep the USSR in the clouds vis a vis German intentions toward it. Also keep in mind that when information started to pile up about German invasion plans, who would believe that such a crucial event would be massively broadcast throughout the world? It would have been believable from a few sources, but from dozens all over the world parroting the same thing? It couldn't be true, it was a deception by the British and Americans to get the USSR into war with Germany! I'm sure I'm forgetting much that was addressed and was forgotten about in this book but overall it is a good investment for those who want to understand something of why this was a surprise to Stalin and what kind of information he was receiving.
Long on detail, but short on substance........2005-10-21
The only real question is why. Why was not Stalin prepared for the German offensive? Despite a huge number of details, some interesting, and most perhaps interesting only to a professional researcher of that epoch, the author does not even attempt to answer the main question, and this is why I am rating this book so low.
Let's face it, Stalin was no idiot. For close to thirty years he was holding together his huge empire not only by the force of his cruelty, but also by the force of his determination, his strong will, his shrewdness, and his superb intellect - this admission should not turn me into his apologist.
In fact, the answer to this question can be easily found right there on page 24 of this book, in the speech that Stalin gave in 1939. According to this speech, he was going to sit out the war in the West until that time that both the British and the Germans were weakened enough. What was supposed to happen after that is fairly obvious.
By many accounts, by the early summer 1941 Stalin thought that the time was ripe, and was amassing his troops in Ukraine for a decisive strike on Romanian oil wells in the Carpathians. As is well known from military history (or pretty much any team sport), preparations for an offensive war are quite different from those for defending one's territory. And Stalin was ready for a war, but only on his own terms. This turned out to be the biggest miscalculation of his whole life, for which the people of the Soviet Empire paid dearly. Stalin did not believe that Hitler would dare to move East, but for Hitler this was the only, however slim, chance to avoid being hit from the rear.
For me as a European Jew, it is truly very painful to say so, but I strongly believe that if Hitler did not expose his policy of racial superiority toward Ukrainian and Russian peasants, he might have been victorious in that war.
Unfortunately, instead of describing the critical personalities, this book is filled with trivial details, which well describe some second-rate personalities, second rate not because of their character or abilities, but because of their influence on unfolding events.
Book Description
The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) has been called "the Soviet Union's Vietnam War," a conflict that pitted Soviet regulars against a relentless, elusive, and ultimately unbeatable Afghan guerrilla force (the mujahideen). The hit-and-run bloodletting across the war's decade tallied more than 25,000 dead Soviet soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further demoralized a USSR on the verge of disintegration.
In The Soviet-Afghan War the Russian general staff takes a close critical look at the Soviet military's disappointing performance in that war in an effort to better understand what happened and why and what lessons should be taken from it. Lester Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of this important and illuminating work.
Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended to write, initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal aberration in Russian military history. The history of the 1990s has, of course, completely demolished that belief, as evidenced by the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with guerrilla forces in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. As a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.
Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed, and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a counter-guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations; and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader to blind spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.
This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on how yet another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. The Red Army had fought their war to a military draw but that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home.
This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
Customer Reviews:
I dare you to find an adjective........2006-01-01
Ah, the great literary prose of Nabakov and Dostoyevsky this is not. Keep in mind this is an official Soviet study of the conflict. For those wondering just how colorful an after-action report from the monolithic socialist empire can be, wonder no more.
You get what you pay for, this is the literary equivalent of the cold, soul-killing, concrete block architecture employed by the soviets through Eastern Europe and Afghanistan.
If you can get past all of that, and it is a DIFFICULT read, you will find a level of detail and thoroughness without peer. It is similar to books published by our own government. Lots of numbers, lots of diagrams, and tons of information (20 pages on Ammunition Combat Service Support anyone?). The reader will need a decent level of understanding of military science - because the book does not stop long to explain concepts, and assumes quite a bit of the reader.
In conclusion, it is the type of book you only really begin to enjoy when you have finished it. A worthy undertaking.
Not An Easy Read.......2005-02-05
Definitely a manual/lessons learned for Soviet leaders or those who have to read it for a class, etc... I couldn't get past page 84. The book couldn't keep my attention. I recommend reading "The Other Side of The Mountain." Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. This book is a testimonial of how the Mujahideen fought and defeated the Soviets. Much more engaging......
Talk about wooden prose!.......2004-03-20
Soviet General Staff studies are generally interesting, but difficult to read. They're intended for Soviet officers, and intend to convey lessons that can be used in future conflicts. I've read a couple that deal with World War II, and if they'd been carved into trees they couldn't have been more wooden. This book suffers from that: lifeless technical prose with no attempt to keep the reader's attention. What the book contains, though, is a wealth of information and knowledge of how the war in Afghanistan was fought, from the weapons and tactics that were used to the method by which Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan received their mail.
This is at times very interesting. There's a great deal about tactics and weaponry, and much about the technical aspects of soldiering, everything from aviation to engineering to supply and construction. Though there's a lot of information in the book, it's not sorted chronologically: there's no central narrative history of events. Instead, there's a brief prologue telling of the beginning of the war, and an even briefer epilogue recounting the Soviet withdrawal. I'm still waiting for a narrative of the war that's reasonably accessible, with detail and a reasonable narrative that I can follow, so that I have a better background into what's going on there now.
A sometimes boring book but VERY informative and useful.......2003-05-30
Let me first start off that this is not a quick easy read. It goes into VERY small detail about practically everything in the Soviet-Afghan War. However, some of the small things that the author goes over gets very boring very quick. When you read this book, it almost feels like a battle manual for the Soviet-Afghan War. However, when you get done reading the book, its probably the closest one person can come to understanding the war without actually being there. The drawings in the book are also very useful to help spell out what the author is saying. All in all, the book does not give an action/adventure story of the war, but when you comprehend it, you will have a firm understanding of what the war was like from an operational point of view
very informative,but very cold.......2002-07-15
This book is a must to read from informational point of view.If you need to find information on tactics, uniforms, weapons,etc-this is the one.But,this not the one,if you want to understand what this war was about.About real soldiers,who actually had to fight in Afghanistan:18-20 years old kids,who was drafted. And without any choice was thrown to a forien contry to play a strange game of survival : the one , who kill first, will win another chance to play this game again...and again.All we wanted was simple- just to go home ... alive.I was lucky to see my home.But many of my friends didn,t.
If you want to reed that kind of story,you need to find another book!
Book Description
Few people are more respected or better positioned to speak on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan than M. Hassan Kakar. A professor at Kabul University and scholar of Afghanistan affairs at the time of the 1978 coup d'état, Kakar vividly describes the events surrounding the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the encounter between the military superpower and the poorly armed Afghans. The events that followed are carefully detailed, with eyewitness accounts and authoritative documentation that provide an unparalleled view of this historical moment.
Because of his prominence Kakar was at first treated with deference by the Marxist government and was not imprisoned, although he openly criticized the regime. When he was put behind bars the outcry from scholars all over the world possibly saved his life. In prison for five years, he continued collecting information, much of it from prominent Afghans of varying political persuasions who were themselves prisoners.
Kakar brings firsthand knowledge and a historian's sensibility to his account of the invasion and its aftermath. This is both a personal document and a historical one--Kakar lived through the events he describes, and his concern for human rights rather than party politics infuses his writing. As Afghans and the rest of the world try to make sense of Afghanistan's recent past, Kakar's voice will be one of those most listened to.
Customer Reviews:
A Clinical and Concise Read.......2006-01-01
This book is a wonderful a study of the soviet-afghan conflict from 1979 to 1982. Those looking for a shoot-em up tactical non-fiction novel like some of the products of the US involvement in Afghanistan need look elsewhere. This is a thorough academic study by an author with vast and first hand knowledge.
However, taken in the historical context, it provides some interesting perspective of the history of Afghanistan and it's state of near constant conflict.
Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1.......2001-07-28
Kakar is that rare and unhappy intellectual fated to an eventful life. An Afghan who studied and published in the West, then became a prominent professor of history at Kabul University, his opposition to the Soviet invasion got him arrested by the communist regime in 1982. Kakar spent the next five years in the notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison, during which he had horrible experiences and witnessed even worse ones. Kakarýs own life was spared, perhaps because of the interest in his case generated by American colleagues and Amnesty International. Upon release, he fled to Pakistan; and in 1989 he immigrated to the United States, where he now lives (in San Diego).
Afghanistan is a monument of scholarship by an individual who lived closely through the events described (he tells of going onto his roof, for example, to watch the Soviet troops storm the presidential palace in 1979). Kakar kept a journal over the three years 1979-82 that exceeds one thousand pages; he also used his time in prison to interview a wide range of inmates. Much of his information is new and his interpretations fresh. At the same time, his is a work of unabashed passion. The author presents a fiercely partisan history of his country, for example justifying the increasingly close contacts with the Soviet Union from the 1950s on, while presenting the Russian invasion as a bitter act of betrayal. As for the United States, he believes Americans have a moral responsibility to the Afghans, and it is now time for them to assist in transforming the poisonous culture into a healthy one. Indeed, this is more a threat than an appeal, for Kakar ends his tome with a warning that the poisonous culture . . . may grow too great to ignore: in addition to the British graveyard in Afghanistan and the Soviet one, he warns there may also one day be an American one....
A Critique of the Title.......1999-01-25
Although the writer has squeezed much information and research into this book, it can hardly be labeled as possessive of a neutral character when analyzing the socio-political and economic situations prevalent in the country. This book certainly is not sufficient and certainly not recommended for developing an assessment of Afghan history or socio-political structure and strata.
The story of Afghan genocide at the hands of the Soviets........1998-12-27
A professor of history at the University of California at San Diego, Hassan Kakar's scholarly work on the dark days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan reveals the horrors of the war for those not present to experience it first hand. Meticulously documented, the book provides a detailed account of genocide by the Soviets, and the unspeakable torture of Afghans by KhAD, the Afghan government's agency of terror. While the Soviets killed over one million Afghans one village at a time, KhAD tried to break the will of the resistance in Kabul, brutalizing the proud Afghans in the overcrowded dungeons of Pul-e-Charkhi prison. Kakar speaks from personal experience, since he spent many years there as a prisoner of conscience.
The author reviews the period prior to the Soviet invasion, recounts the events and forces at work immediately prior to it, and provides an analysis of why the invasion occurred. That Brezhnev and a handful of Kremlin leaders erred is indisputably a contributing factor to the Soviet implosion which was to follow little more than a decade later. The Afghan resistence to communist rule began on a small scale shortly after the April 1978 coup by Taraki. Nationalist resistance organizations and Islamic resistence efforts gathered momentum in the years after, succeeding eventually - to the astonishment of the world. Kakar documents the "scorched earth" military policy of the Soviet invaders throughout rural Afghanistan and in the areas around Kabul.
The Afghan tragedy continued after the last US-supplied Stinger missile had been fired by the uncommonly brave Afghan mujahideen. As the Soviets withdrew, political machinations within the Pakistan based resistence groups intensified, exacerbated by foreign interference. Kakar's epilogue examines the fratricidal period following the Soviet withdrawal, and creates the context for understanding the emergence of the Taliban movement of today.Political organizations, biographical sketches, data on refugees, and the text of a 1979 telephone conversation between Kosygin and Taraki are provided in the appendices. Detailed notes and bibliography provide writers and researchers tools for further elaboration of the Afghan tragedy, the holocaust of the 1980s.
Average customer rating:
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Russian Annexation of Bessarabia, 1774-1828
George F. Jewsbury
Manufacturer: East European Monographs
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Book Description
An exhaustive and comprehensive study of Russian foreign policy and imperialism from 1774 to 1828 focussing on Russo-Romanian relations and the ever present and controversial "Bessarabian Question."
Customer Reviews:
Where are they?.......2006-12-18
It is constructive to have an open analysis of any controversial topic.
If there was no planned extinction of the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks, where are my father's sister, brother and mother. My father saw them butchered when he was 11 years old. His sister was younger than he. He feigned death and managed to escape alive and eventually come to America. I heard about his experiences first-hand. Is it possible that these children and mother were threats to the Ottomans? I think that the claim of the Armenians as a race being a threat to the Turks was a bit far-fetched. How can that justify murdering mothers and their children?
"Genocide?" Got the History wrong.......2005-05-07
It just astonished me as how certain discursive formations can actually lead people to believe as the 'real' reality. It does not matter whether for an event to 'really happen' or not. What matters is that you hear it on a radio or read it on a newspaper or website or even talk about it at the water-cooler. Those who have had the chance to watch 'Wag the Dog' might get the idea of how such 'reality' is constructed.
On a more advanced level 'discursivity', a la Foucault, is a building block of a discourse in which certain linkages, here and their, add to what ordinary people believe on the street.
Now obviously Hitler was one of the worst things that happened during the 20th century. This is commonsense. But to add certain 'material' so as to advance another claim by building upon Hitler, is something that should be carefully approached, at least for people who at least visit and read stuff through Amazon.
If a chain in a series of discursive formations can be shown to be weak or invalid than it would be proven that that chain of a discourse is on shaky grounds, and that most of what is known about it is likely to be false.
Unfortunately we see certain 'material' is attached to certain claims so as to resemble the Holocaust. Let us revisit a single claim on part of those would like to exploit the events during the early 20th century. A reviewer, for instance, obviously bought one claim and thus knows it to be the 'truth'
Adolf Hitler: "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?"
Now has anybody bothered to investigate it. No, of course. "It sounds like as if it is true, so why not believe it". Well fortunately there are still people who like investigating such stuff.
Read for example :
Heath W. Lowry
Washington, D.C.
Political Communication and Persuasion, Volume 3, Number 2 (1985)
Abstract This article traces the history of a purported Adolf Hitler quote which cites the perecent of the world's lack of reaction to the fate of Armenians during the First World War as a justification for his planned extermination of European Jewry in the course of the Second World War. By a detailed examination of the genesis of this quotation the author demonstrates that there is no historical basis for attributing such a statement to Hitler...
[...]
If one is serious about really getting into history, rather than believing simply what is out their in the popular press,
I would additionally suggest to take a tour of the documents of Ambassador Morgenthau. First let us not take any word for having a Godly truth 'Its ambassador so its gotta be true' mentality is ok if you're ok with it (respect of thought). But there are historical evidence that suggests that Morgenthau did not even know Ottoman scripture, and that this is proved throughout his letters when he attempts to translate 'words' and 'dates' of events. Do not hesitate to read...
[...]
For those who have CAREFULLY read what I have written so far, notice I am not either on one side of the argument between Armenian historians or historians of the Ottoman empire, but that I have just thrown out some thought provoking information so that one will at least ask some questions before believing what they read. Doubtless there will be those occasional pointless replies to this review, but again all I am saying is, think before you react. Now one could argue that I am saying is a postmodernist crituque and historical relativism. That would be false. I believe in historical analysis, as a scientific enterprise (and only the scientific version of it). But then again let us not forget that some American historians who were studying the case at hand were bombed by Armenians. Now if history is written by historians and that some historians (i.e. UCLA professor Stanford Shaw)are bullied so as not to investigate certain historical matters than, at least if you have a capacity to think critically than be suspicious about it. [...]
By the way absolutely nothing is mentioned about the equal ammount of civilian Turks that were slaugthered by Russian backed Armenian militia. Nor anything about the terrorism campaign of Armenians during the 1970's that left thousands of people dead and wounded. To say "denying genocide is a wrong thing" is one thing. But in doing so if one is denying the death of tens of thousands of innocent Turks, is called hypocrism and puts one in ethically shaky grounds.
The latest British governemeents acceptance that the "blue book", which Armenian claims are based upon, have been declared by the government itself to be a WW1 time propaganda material. Yes you heard it right!
Here's another eye opener: Often the claim is made there 1 million Armenians were murdered. What they do not say that the same material they indicate that a "genocide" happened says that
the ENTIRE Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire was 800 thousand (200 thousand difference!) MOREOVER Keep in mind that the Armenian diaspora, that builds its own desire to have a national identity, has a population of more than 9 million people across the world. HOW CAN this be??? Well thats how nationalism is formed: impossibile numbers, man on white horse, the evil "other" etc.... So this "genocide" attitude is more of identity building rather than real history.
Well I hope I contributed on an intellectual level and I hope 'thought thugs' would not misunderstand what I have suggested.
Great Intro.......2003-08-06
A great introduction for anyone interested in the Armenian Genocide and Comparative Genocide in general as opposed to those paid to engage in state sponsored propaganda.
Armenian Genocide.......2000-06-23
"Remembrance and denial" is an excellent account of the Armenian Genocide perpetraded by the Turks.
The book talks about how the Armenians were looked down upon and hated by the Turks. And how the CUP wanted to eliminate the Armenians (mind you citizens of the Ottoman Empire) forever.
Dr. Hovannisian has done a wonderful job accounting for facts on the Armenian genocide, and his book flows very well. He has show once again that the Armenian Genocide is not a hoax conjured up by the Armenian people, but a crime against humanity, for which Turkey, the government, and most of its people still do not take responsibilty for.
A must read for anyone interested in the Armenian Genocide.
A thorough study on why and how the Genocide is denied........1999-04-08
Read the book and you will understand why and how the Armenian Genocide continues to be denied by the Turkish government and how important it is to continue the struggle to show the world the truism of the Genocide that started the wave of Genocides in the 20th century. For those who continue to deny or distort the facts, I will not argue. I will simply ask for all reasonable human beings to check the facts, read archived documents and press articles by nations from all over world, and learn for yourself the real history. This book is a great place to start.
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