Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit (SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy)

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Martin Heidegger paved the road trod on by the existentialists with the 1927 publication of Being and Time. His encyclopedic knowledge of philosophy from ancient to modern times led him to rethink the most basic concepts underlying our thinking about ourselves. Emphasizing the "sense of being" (dasein) over other interpretations of conscious existence, he argued that specific and concrete ideas form the bases of our perceptions, and that thinking about abstractions leads to confusion at best. Thus, for example, "time" is only meaningful as it is experienced: the time it takes to drive to work, eat lunch, or read a book is real to us; the concept of "time" is not.

Unfortunately, his writing is difficult to follow, even for the dedicated student. Heidegger is best read in German: his neologisms and other wordplay strain the talents of even the best translators. Still, his thoughts about authentic being and his turning the philosophical ground inspired many of the greatest thinkers of the mid 20th century, from Sartre to Derrida. Unfortunately, political and other considerations forced Heidegger to leave Being and Time unfinished; we can only wonder what might have been otherwise. --Rob Lightner

Customer Reviews:

An Improvement But Not Perfect.......2007-06-17

I read the previous translation of Sein und Zeit in its totality, and am slightly more than halfway through the volume reviewed here. Overall, the text does seem a bit more accessible, but there are several places where there is a word wrong or missing. In a text such as this one--difficult to read and absorb even under optimal conditions--this is a considerable oversight.

This is one of those rare books that can be picked up and read a page at a time, then put down and picked up again later; it is well to let Heidegger's thought "run in the background," seeping through the interstices of everyday assumptions.

Unfortunately, Very Important.......2005-12-27

There is no point in trying to say whether Being and Time is "interesting" or "good," because anyone looking at this review already knows that this is not a breezy pleasure-read for the poolside. Heidegger's magnum opus is one of the landmark achievements in 20th century philosophy, and it is required reading for anyone interested in modern thought.
Essentially, the book is a dense explication of ontological priority of Being, or Dasein. Heidegger breaks with every sort of continental philosophical tradition in his work, for rather than trying to make the next step in ethical or metaphysical thought, he attempts an examination of the bare fact of being, in and of itself. In fact, he insists that he has nothing to do with the traditions of ethics or humanism (but without being a nihilist or an anti-humanist). I believe a good place to start with his work is a little essay by Derrida called The Ends of Man, in his Margins of Philosophy.
It has been claimed, quite vociferously and in many different quarters, that Heidegger's affiliation with Nazism precludes his being an important philosopher. This is like saying that relativity theory can be dismissed because Einstein didn't always treat his wife kindly. While there must of course be a connection between thoughts and deeds, this does not mean that a particularly brilliant thinker is always aware of the faults of his personal existence. If you are worried that an explication of the ontology of Dasein might lead you to promulgate the virtues of concentration camps, then perhaps this book is not for you. But if you have that concern, you probably wouldn't be considering purchasing one of the densest volumes of modern philosophy.

Catching your hand with your hand.......2004-05-20

In "Being and Time," Heidegger tackles the biggest and seemingly unanswerable question of them all: Why is there something rather than nothing?

In the introductory chapter, he narrows the focus of this ancient query: What significance does Being have for Dasein (human being), the asker of the question? He rejects analysis of the phenomena found "within" consciousness (as Heidegger's mentor Edmund Husserl prescribed) in favor of investigating the structure of human existence--how we exist. Heidegger claims that we exist as "thrown projections," that is, "thrown" into already-existent and distinctly historical nations, cultures, families; and always "project" a concrete future against a background of possibilities.

In Chapter three, he examines of the primary modes of "being-in-the-world." We are entangled in a world which has two possibilities: the "ready-at-hand" and the "present-to-hand".

The former state involves our mode of "taking-care-of-things" when we are in the flow of normal everyday activities; the "thingness" of beings is covered up, because we are absorbed in what we are doing.

The latter state is disclosed when a disruption in the flow occurs: we notice the thingness of things in the world; in this state, the background significance of our activities (the projection) recedes.

His analysis reveals that the second, "derivative" form of "existing-as" has lead to both philosophical problems and the scientific outlook, and in the course of his "deconstruction" Heidegger undermines the many readymade answers Western philosophy/science has used to essentialize reality. Fundamentally, Dasein is "always already ahead of itself," and this existential state cannot be encompassed by discourse, or symbolized in any way. Hence Heidegger's almost mystical idea of "silence" in the face of this state, which leads to the "call of conscience" which can bring a person to a state of "authentic being-towards-death" (my professor who taught "Being and Time" spent ten years trying to tease out a substantive doctrine to Heidegger's concept of authenticity. But there is none, and Heidegger admits it; to do so would contradict his idea of authenticity, for each person, always already thrown, must LIVE resolutely as the possibilities of life whittle away).

Part two of "Being and Time" was unfinished. There are several strains of mysticism throughout this work (Heidegger was trained as a theologian) particularly with regard to anxiety (angst) revealing the possibility of nothingness as our ground, a la Meister Eckhart.
"Being and Time" is a tough book to read, no doubt about it. Heidegger coined many torturously hyphenated phrases to express his concepts, and many questions remain unanswered, especially with regard to Part 2 on Temporality for which I've docked it one star (many of these threads are picked up and refashioned in Hubert Dreyfus's book "Being-in-the-World", an excellent intro to BT).

But with effort this is one of the most challenging philosophical inquiries ever written.

Being and Time..........2004-02-05

Frankly, I don't know where to begin. Should I give this One Star or Five Stars? But then it struck me: does it matter? No - it doesn't. The enormous and numerous difficulties encountered in this reading are not due solely to the style in which it was written, and more so, not to what it is trying to say. Not at all. A third factor, underplayed (or completely unknown) by many is the book is written for a person who is in himself concerned, in the highest and most dangerous extent, about the issue of being, to a person who's being is at stake, and therefore, to a person who has in his mind the "guidelines" of thought, the very well and spring and "metaphysical beginning," as regarding the question of being, beingness, the being of others, and above all, the historical condition of the world, from where it has originated, and, without hesitation, to where it is going. Being and Time is a book for those who already posses at their grasp a certain type of intensity, a "monomania," if you will - it is not at all for your average "open-minded" person, not for anarchist of spirits and the all-too liberal "humanist," not for liberators, not for fighters, but for those who (this is said at my own risk)...for those who have at least dreamt all of this philosophy *already* and are only now, for the first time, encountering what their dream is like when it is put into words. I must admit that I doubt that just anyone can understand this book without having been acquainted - not with...mere philosophy - but with that same haunting intensity which plunged Heidegger to the conception of this book. We all must understand that this book *has* and will always be misunderstood or regarded as an oddity by many professionals and critics - but the book is clear. It's very clear. It demands that you think for yourself. No. It demands that you have thought for yourself all those ideas, or at least felt that strange and inexplicable feeling which, by all means, borders on these ideas. Philosophically I disagree with Heidegger and even think he is naive - but that is refreshing to see. Nevertheless, the beauty (yes, beauty), enigma, and power that this book has is undeniable - even in disagreement, Heidegger deserves more sincere and distant reverence than any other philosopher in the 20th century. At the end, one summing up comment: this book does not teach you anything new, it only illuminates and builds on what you should already know, thought about, felt so intimately.

Unprecedented Thinking from an Unprecedented Thinker.......2003-12-20

Being and Time (1927) is the magnum opus of one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century and arguably Western Philosophy. Spending 7 years writing this first of 67 books, Martin Heidegger turns Husserlian phenomenology (Husserl being Heidegger's main teacher) on its head and introduces to the Western tradition a whole new way of understanding ontology (the formal study of existentia). Being and Time is the first installment of a greater work that was to compromise two parts each with three divisions. Being and Time is only the first two divisions of Part One of that endeavor. For the continuation of Heidegger's overall project, readers must purchase "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" and "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics." These three books together compromise the existing (though still not complete) totality of Heidegger's undertaking. "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" is particularly helpful because it outlines all three Divisions of Part Two of the project. If you read Being and Time, I recommend these other two as well, though they are by no means an easy read folks. To read either of those books one will require a background in the history of philosophy, especially in Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant.

As for Being and Time itself, this is not a beginner's book. If you were just attracted to the title and have no background in philosophy, I do not recommend this book--you will be lost and hate it. This is not to say you are not an intelligent person, the problem is the language and understanding of Heidegger's worldview. This is not to say he doesn't have good ideas, they just take much time to acquire, a lifetime really. The language is difficult not because Heidegger is arrogant and not because German is generally that hard to translate into English. The true reason why Heideggerian text is so hard to comprehend is because there are no words that explain the thoughts that Heidegger is dealing with. He had to invent his own language becuase language was itself to confining to what Heidegger was conceiving. If you're serious about this fellow, it would be worthwhile to learn the major word-concepts one at a time: Dasein, authenticity, inauthenticity, care (Sorge), ontic/ontical vs. ontological, existentiell vs. existential, thrownness, being-in-the-world, fallenness, being-with, idle talk, disclosure, discoveredness, hermeneutic circle, ontic-ontology, Being of beings, being-in, pre-ontological, call of conscience, et cetera. This is not to discourage but to prepare for the huge undertaking that this book demands.

Personally I love this book. It is extremely hard and Americans in particular struggle with this German philosopher. Philosophy majors and even professional philosophers can find Heidegger to be extraordinarily difficult so be patient and reserve any judgment stemming from your frustration of the language. You will find many of Heidegger's books much easier than this one. I recommend George Stenier's book "Martin Heidegger" if you're new to him. Dreyfus' book Being-in-the-World is alright for terminology, but it is too epistemological and often misrepresents Heideggerian thinking. Skip over chapter 4 and the stuff on A.I. and "expert systems" et cetera. The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger is excellent for undergrad. philosophy students. Look at chapters 4-7 in particular and the Introductory section. Re-read these chapters several times for it all to sink in, or else you'll miss stuff.

If you're still interested in Being and Time at this point and recognize the historical significance of Heidegger, here are some introductory remarks on the book itself. The book is broken down into two Divisions. Division I is often referred to as the "hermeneutics of everydayness"; meaning that humans interpret their existence through the way the world is disclosed to them via their day-to-day lives. As Heidegger says on page 42: "What is ontically nearest and familiar (i.e. our day-to-day lives) is ontologically the farthest, unrecognized and constantly overlooked in its ontological (i.e. existential) significance." Thus in order to understand the abstract existential problems of Being, we must first realize our human being essentially is. Heidegger uses the German phrase Da-sein (German for "being-there) to signify human being, or more specifically, the possibility of understanding Being through the disclosure of the "There".

Division II is often referred to as the "hermeneutics of suspicion" because this is Heidegger's attempt to break out of our everydayness and explain primoridally the existential underlying constructs of Dasein. The road to this understanding passes through death, because death is the ultimate possibility for all Dasein, for we are essentially temporal. The temporality of our being-in-the-world forces us to realize the fundamental truths of our existence. It should be noted that Later Heidegger rejected Division II of his book. Sartre and the existentialist movement misreads Division II and it eventually forced Heidegger to abandon that half of the work. But unlike what Dreyfus thinks, I still see the importance and relevance of that Division. But readers may want to note that most contemporary Continentalists emphasize Division I a heck of a lot more than Division II.

Hopefully this was useful. Best of luck friends.

Book Description

Anselm Kiefer and the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger is a work of cultural history that situates the art works of one of the most important contemporary painters in relation to the existential, phenomenological and hermeneutic philosophy of Heidegger. Analyzing the development of Kiefer’s art in terms of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, history, and technology, Matthew Biro demonstrates that the artist’s subjects reflect and transform the philosopher’s theoretical interests and intellectual development. The works of Kiefer and Heidegger, Biro argues, present a constellation of issues that unite German art and theory for most of the twentieth century. Showing the aesthetic relevance of the three stages of Heidegger’s philosophical thought to Kiefer’s work, this book also demonstrates the impact of Kiefer’s art works on contemporary art and theory.

Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two: Volumes One and Two (Nietzsche, Vols. I & II)

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brilliant pedagogy!
The Foundations of Fascism
Nietzsche Becomes a Heideggerian, too!
Mesmerizing and Meditative; The Mind of Heidegger
Long-winded

Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two: Volumes One and Two (Nietzsche, Vols. I & II)
Martin Heidegger
Manufacturer: HarperOne
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ASIN: 0060638419

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A landmark discussion between two great thinkers, vital to an understanding of twentieth-century philosophy and intellectual history.

Customer Reviews:

brilliant pedagogy!.......2007-06-14

Unlike traditional accounts of Nietzsche, of which there are many, and which dryly appropriate certain ideas to N. that are then delineated in linear, logical terms, Heidegger unfolds Nietzsche's thinking within its own domain. Heidegger thinks through and beyond Nietzsche in this work; as interpreters, we are called upon to enter the world as N. saw it, to think N.'s most abysmal thought deeply for ourselves.

Heidegger, in his unfolding of N.'s work, enters the questioning in his Heideggerian way (to me, H. truly inaugurated a new of "thinking")--which means: do not expect definitions of explicit explanations of terms and concepts. (do not expect concepts!). Rather, his lectures take us through N.'s ideas of "will to power" as "art" (Vol. 1), and "the eternal recurrence of the same" (Vol. 2) as a voyage through original (in the sense of 'origin', a place of creation) thinking--a voyage that sweeps us into the domain of Being itself, and of its configurations, domains, and manifestations.

(to those who say this is not N., this is Heidegger, in terms of ideas of the work: the fact that H. comes through so deeply in the work only speaks to his brilliant pedagogy. A teacher is precisely one who shows us the path by embodying the matter at hand in its full force. It does not mean he misunderstands N. Rather, it means he appropriates N. for himself, "incorporating" him into his own thinking. It is precisely this that students are taught to embody for themselves. Hence, this is not a flaw of Heidegger--that he "makes everything a prelude to himself", but rather, the very reason he helps us understand so deeply. Let us not forget this is a series of lecture courses...)

One day something will have to be written on Heidegger as pedagogue. Brilliant!!

The Foundations of Fascism.......2006-03-09

I have given the Nietzsche series by Heidegger 5-stars because of its absolutely central historical position in the philosophical development of fascism.

All attempts by professors with vested & sensationalist research interests to declare Nietzsche and/or Heidegger to have been "misappropriated" by fascism are futil. The works of Prof. Richard Wolin (available here at Amazon), have clearly demonstrated this once and for all time.

You say that the last statement is merely the expression of an opinion? Do you follow Nietzsche's dictum that "there are no facts, only opinions"? Here is a simple, Aristotalian (logos apophantikos) litmus test: Should we really take seriously anyone who asserts that Nietzsche's dictum is a valid description of the nhilistic condition of the world? Because that would violate the dictum itself, which asserts that it is impossible to have an Aristotalian corrspondance theory of truth. In that case, why even bother to read Nietzsche, or Heidegger, who want to be taken very seriously, after all, in their *assertions* that "assertion", as a mode of description, is itself impossible.

More grievous than the loss of Western metaphysics in this line of anti-reason, is their proposed replacement of it by a vague "Master of Truth" paradigm, for which they cabel together a false pre-Socratic geneology. See the works of Beatrice Han (also at Amazon), who takes the great neo-Heideggerian Foucault to task for not being Nietzschean enough in this regard. For the "Master of Truth", the Uberman, is nothing more than a Napolean (for Nietzsche), or a Hitler (for Heidegger).

Yes, the roots of fascism are still strong in the Postmodern movement which thrives on the works of the "iron triangle" of Nietzsche-Hiedegger-Foucalt.

What? How can the *Left* be the new harbinger of fascism, you ask? Again, see the works of Prof. Richard Wolin here on Amazon. Or, see Pink Floyd's "The Wall", in which a *Left-wing* rock poet descends into nhilism and is transformed into a Nazi before your eyes. The main character is named "Pink" after all, as in "socialist", as in Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

And for more serious proof of the precariousness of our age, look no further than the UN Conference Against Racism at Durbin, South Africa. Under the rubric "Against Racism", every Postmodern-inspired NGO with a political agenda (the politics of identity) rose to a frothing crescendo of anti-Semitism not heard since the collapse of the Weimer Republic. There was Mary Robinson, so shaken by her inability to staunch the hemmoraging of philosophical error before her eyes, that she stood at the final dinner and shouted, "Tonight I am a Jew". But that is syllogistically a false statement (demonstrating again the simply bedrock-valid nature of logos apophantikos). She is Irish. And she is the paragon of what Gertrude Stein would surely call "A Lost Generation".

Nietzsche Becomes a Heideggerian, too! .......2005-02-28

I hate to appear cynical, but in this book, isn't Heidegger doing what he has done with every other facet of Western philosophy - namely, making it a prelude to himself?

It is by no means certain that Nietzsche 'believed in' the heavy philosophizing Heidegger specialised in. Some of Nietzsche's writings even disavow 'philosophy' - period. Nietzsche's own writings make it clear that he changed his mind a lot, and therefore, anyone endeavouring to make a consistent reading - of an inconsistent philosophy, has either to ignore
large parts of someone else's thinking - or make stuff up - to fill in the gaps. Perhaps this explains why some readers find Heidegger's study of Nietzsche clarifying.Heidegger has filled in the blanks and patched planks over tricky precipices.

For a man who had trouble relating to reality - for most of
his active life, elated one week, deep in depression the next,
Heidegger erects a remarkably impressive image of solidity
and consistency over Nietzsche's thought. Of course, we all enjoy reading 'Zarathustra.' But it's art - not reality. Nietzsche visualised those lovely ideas - but couldn't live them out.It wasn't 'lebensphilosophie' or 'erlebniss' -
but fantasy substitute. Heidegger would have you believe otherwise. Read any of Nietzsche's biographers (except the slavish idolatrers) - and that becomes evident enough. Alas, Heidegger has said nothing about the psychology of the real Nietzsche. Nietzsche condemned 'pity' as the trait of weak men. But the very thing which triggered his final collapse, was the
sight of a horse being beaten mercilessly. Perhaps that was the real Nietzsche - not the one who ran from his sense of pity. This series of volumes is profoundly meaningful if you happen to share Nietzsche's and Heidegger's pessimistic verdict about 2,500 years of (mistaken) Western philosophy. If you don't,
it might be considered one big yawn. I recommend Kaufmann's
studies as a counter-balance.

Mesmerizing and Meditative; The Mind of Heidegger.......2003-12-07

.
If you like Nietzsche, don't ignore Heidegger's monumental achievement.

Walter Kaufmann's Nietzche, psychologist and philosopher and on Heidegger in Kaufmann's, Discovering The Mind, Vol II, criticizes Heidegger to a great degree. In much of Kaufmann's objections to Heidegger's analogy of Nietzsche include his attempt to explain man's "essential ontology" into what really amounts to anthropomorphism. Also the fact that Heidegger uses texts of Nietzsche from obscure manuscripts over his published works. This, along with Kaufmann's personal encounters with Heidegger, in which Heidegger claimed to have unpublished writings incapable of adequate translation and explanation in his possession, esoteric information, an obvious manifestation of a prideful and arrogant personality.

Now I will agree with the majority of Kaufmann's arguments against Heidegger, including the fact that the man was an active Nazi, a party member and an active advocate of a totalitarian atmosphere imposed at the University he taught at. And it must be noted; there is no anti-semtic writing here, there is only deep and profound analytic treatment of Nietzsche.

Despite all of Kaufmann's valid criticisms and objectifications, I find Heidegger's Nietzsche, both mesmerizing, thought provoking and soul stirring. One needs to recognize this book is Heidegger, not Nietzche and Heidegger is a deep analytical thinker, whereas, Nietzche was both philosophical and poetic and top it all off, psychological. It takes a man like Heidegger to give it the philosophical, analytical style. Perhaps it is bias and to a degree "scandalous," as Kaufmann so brazenly claims, but to ignore these volumes would be foolish. For me, Heidegger's work is monumental and inspirational. If one reads Heidegger with discernment and awareness, then the four volumes of Nietzche are most beneficial and most certainly worth the read, not to pass in one's study of Nietzsche.

In particular the study of the "Will to Power as Art," where the truth is an error since art is the becoming and truth is always the become that is becoming in self positing, in artistic creativity of thought, the affixation on an apparition. And Heidegger's analytical explanation of Nietzsche's "Eternal Return" are far worth this read.

Also in line with this, is the explanation of Kaufmann in Nietzsche's Will To Power; not being self-preservation of Spinoza, nor pleasure principle of Freud, but of power, the power of the self-positing and creative center, not the power that dictates over others, which has been administered by totalitarian and authoritarian governments.

In addition to Kaufmann and Heidegger, Also excellent books:
Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography by Rudiger Safranski
Nietzsche : The Man and his Philosophy - R. J. Hollingdale
Nietzsche: by Karl Jaspers

Long-winded.......2003-04-24

Heidegger is a man who knows how to fill up a full class period with lots of talk. It would be possible to condense this book, the transcripts of two lecture courses given in 1936 and 1938, into a book 1/4 the length of the current tome. First of all, the time spent on Nietzsche's Nachlass is not particularly fruitful. What Nietzsche has to say regarding the eternal recurrence and the will-to-power can be found, and in the mature form, in BGE and Zarathustra. The lectures are interesting in some respects, for instance the chapter on Nietzsche and positivism is interesting and worth consulting in connection with "Plato's Doctrine of Truth." The reading of Kant's Third Critique is unique as a demonstration of Heidegger's approval of Kant, specifically the treatment of the beautiful.

Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I.

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Best Available Secondary Source on Heidegger
A highly misleading interpretation of Heidegger
The clearest account of Heidegger's thought to date.
For those concerned with "living life at its best"
The essential companion to the challenge of Heidegger

Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I.
Hubert L. Dreyfus
Manufacturer: The MIT Press
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ASIN: 0262540568

Book Description

Being-in-the-World is a guide to one of the most influential philosophical works of this century: Division I of Part One of Being and Time, where Martin Heidegger works out an original and powerful account of being-in-the-world which he then uses to ground a profound critique of traditional ontology and epistemology. Hubert Dreyfus's commentary opens the way for a new appreciation of this difficult philosopher, revealing a rigorous and illuminating vocabulary that is indispensable for talking about the phenomenon of world.

The publication of Being and Time in 1927 turned the academic world on its head. Since then it has become a touchstone for philosophers as diverse as Marcuse, Sartre, Foucault, and Derrida who seek an alternative to the rationalist Cartesian tradition of western philosophy. But Heidegger's text is notoriously dense, and his language seems to consist of unnecessarily barbaric neologisms; to the neophyte and even to those schooled in Heidegger thought, the result is often incomprehensible.

Dreyfus's approach to this daunting book is straightforward and pragmatic. He explains the text by frequent examples drawn from everyday life, and he skillfully relates Heidegger's ideas to the questions about being and mind that have preoccupied a generation of cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind.

Hubert L. Dreyfus is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley.

Customer Reviews:

Best Available Secondary Source on Heidegger.......2004-02-09

The best secondary source on Heidegger's early philosophy available in English. Sets the standard for clear and forthright assessment of Heidegger's achievement.

A highly misleading interpretation of Heidegger.......2004-02-01

There's no getting away from Heidegger; most of the intellectual life of the later 20th century is a series of commentaries on or arguments with Being and Time. But the book is almost as difficult as its reputation would have it. Most of us need some help.

Probably the best short summary of its thesis came from Samuel Johnson: "Depend upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully." But Johnson died about 140 years before the book was published, so he didn't actually get to read it. Those of us born after its publication could use a more detailed guide to Heidegger's dense and unwieldy work. This, unfortunately, isn't it, in spite of Dreyfus's decades of teaching and the testimonials on the back cover from Charles Taylor and other luminaries.

Dreyfus, who teaches at UC Berkeley, reduces Being and Time to a neutral quasi-psychology in which "being-there is doing something it makes sense to do given the public situation, and given already taken-over public for-the-sake-of-whiches." And that's all, folks. Dasein (Heidegger's term for us human folk) and the world are knowable only through everyday public practice, and according to Dreyfus the point of Division I of this two-part work is to show how it's possible to get through one's day without thinking about it and how that provides the only basis for knowledge.

After being criticised for his failure to address Division II, Dreyful admitted that he had "overlooked warnings, scattered about in Division I, that the average intelligibility desribed there would later be shown to be an inferior form of understanding." Well, duh. Those aren't hints; they're screaming tirades. Dreyfus not only undervalues the importance of Division II; he is deaf to the emotional character of the whole work, which conveyed as much by its literary qualities as by its argument.

Although he tossed in a few half-hearted denials that he's doing anything more than ontology, Heidegger clearly loathed the world of everydayness, the inauthentic being of the "they," and he longed for its supercession. "Existential analysis," he said, "has the character of doing violence, whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its tranquillized obviousness." (H 311) In retrospect it's clear how this position led to his embrace of Hitler--not that one can read Nazi ideology off from the book, but because its hopes and fears were just those played on so expertly by the Nazis. Heidegger saw Hitler as the truly authentic man who could be the conscience of the nation. (He tried to cast himself in a similar role at Freiburg, with results that would be comical if anything about that time could appear humorous.)

But one doesn't need literary sensitivity to see what's wrong with Dreyfus's Heidegger. Why would young German intellectuals have flocked to his lectures if he were simply showing them that everyday skills were the be-all and end-all? It's simply impossible to imagine this spectacled epistemologist as "the secret king of philosophy," the charismatic magus who captivated the young Hannah Arendt in presenting "the thinking that springs as a passion."

Dreyfus's book contains a long Appendix on Kierkegaard, authenticity, and Division II; but its conclusions are just as bathetically deflationary as the main text. Here, too, Heidegger comes across as a multiculturalist liberal. Authenticity is supposed to make available a salad-bar of "marginal practices," a phrase which appears nowhere in Being and Time and which is not supported by the citations adduced. Instead of a stoic and joyful acceptance of one's fate--one of the themes that leads Heidegger to Nietzsche--Dreyfus sees merely a free choice of commitment from the social resources available and a concomitant choice of a role model like Jesus or Florence Nighingale.

And Dreyfus knew Heidegger. No doubt the sage listened politely to whatever he had to say and took it as further proof that Americans had no culture.

The clearest account of Heidegger's thought to date........2001-07-09

BEING-IN-THE-WORLD : A Commentary on Heidegger's 'Being and Time,' Division I. By Herbert L. Dreyfus. 370 pp. Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, Eighth Printing 1999 (1991). ISBN 0-262-54056-8 (pbk.)

Anyone who attempts to study Heidegger's commentators will quickly discover that many of them can be even more difficult than Heidegger himself. One notable exception is George Steiner, whose 'Martin Heidegger' (1989) is such an interesting book that one wishes it had been two or three times longer. As a general introduction to Heidegger's life and thought, however, it can only take one so far, and those wishing for a fuller treatment would be well advised to take a look at the present equally lucid and stimulating study by Dreyfus.

He explains that he has limited detailed treatment of 'Being and Time' to Division I of Part One (i.e., the first half), because he considers this "the most original and important section of the work, for it is [here] that Heidegger works out his account of being-in-the-world and uses it to ground a profound critique of traditional ontology and epistemology" (p.vii). Division II, though containing important material, is marred by "some errors so serious as to block any consistent reading" (p.viii), though it is taken up in a 57-page Appendix.

In his brief but extremely interesting Introduction, Dreyfus sets out to answer the question, 'Why study Heidegger?' If I have understood Dreyfus correctly, what he seems to be saying is that Western thought has been fundamentally in error since the time of Plato : "Plato and our tradition got off on the wrong track by thinking that one could have a theory of everything.... Heidegger is not against theory. He thinks it powerful and important, but limited" (p.2).

Heidegger, in other words, although accepting a reasonable use of reason, has seen through the folly of that worship of reason which leads to its unreasonable and excessive use. Dreyfus tells us that Heidegger seeks to clear away five main false assumptions :

1. Explicitness. "Heidegger questions both the possibility and desirability of making our everyday understanding explicit" (p.4). There are and always will be many things in life that cannot be made explicit, that cannot be explained, that are not amenable to "critical reflection," things, for example, such as human skills.

2. Mental Representation. "Heidegger questions the view that experience is always and most basically a relation between a self-contained subject with mental content (the inner) and an independent object (the outer)." For him "there is a more fundamental way of being-in-the-world that cannot be understood in subject/object terms" (p.5).

3. Theoretical Holism. Heidegger "insists that we return to the phenomenon of everyday human activity and stop ringing the changes on the traditional oppositions of immanent/transcendent ... subject/ object ... explicit/tacit ... etc." (p.6).

4. Detachment and Objectivity. "From the Greeks we inherit not only our assumption that we can obtain theoretical knowledge of every domain, even human activities, but also our assumption that the detached theoretical viewpoint is superior to the involved practical viewpoint" (p.6). Heidegger, following the insights of Nietzsche, Peirce, James and Dewey, denies these assumptions.

5. Methodological Individualism. Heidegger, "in his emphasis on the social context as the ultimate foundation of intelligibility [shares with Wittgenstein] the view that most philosophical problems can be dis(solved) [sic] by a description of everyday social practices" (p.7). In other words, they are pseudo-problems.

If Heidegger were only clearing the ground of 2,500 years of sheer wrongheadedness, he would of course still be an extremely important and valuable thinker. But, as Dreyfus explains, he goes further, for "he has a positive account of authentic human being and a positive methodological proposal for how human being should be systematically studied" (p.8). His influence, which today extends into many areas, has been and continues to be enormous as more and more specialists and experts and technicians of every kind begin to appreciate the fruitfulness of his way of thinking in contrast to the often dismal results produced by their own.

Heidegger's 'Being and Time' is a notoriously difficult book, and Dreyfus' commentary is to be welcomed as the first study that succeeds in making it both intelligible and exciting, even to the non-specialist reader such as myself. As one of the clearest accounts of Heidegger's thought to date, it belongs in the library of anyone who is at all interested in this revolutionary and amazing thinker.

For those concerned with "living life at its best".......2000-09-18

I got to this book after reading "Disclosing New Worlds" by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert L. Dreyfus, a very profound work that tries to recover our abilities to make sense of each of us as historical beings, helping us to "live life at its best."

Reading Being-in-the-World has had a great impact on the way I now understand our everyday life in terms of the practices that we pick up -as Heidegger puts it- from the society we are brought up in and not in terms of abstract theories that try to relate our specific actions to mental states. As a management consultant, it guides me away from trying to specify precisely, say, the 'things' a salesman should say and do in a conversation with a client. I'd be better off if I can find another salesman that exhibits the results I'm interested in, and managing a "learning-in-action" program, so that the first salesman learns from the more experienced salesman. As a father, it guides me away from getting my son to hold on to vast amounts of information -the purpose of our modern educational system- but to situating him in an environment where he can pickup successful practices for dealing with diverse situations- including technical and interpersonal problems.

Being-in-the-World was not an easy read for me, since my background is in Computer Science and Management (I had to do some research in the philosophical traditions and problemas that Heidegger was attacking). However, Dreyfus' commentary is most relevant to people in Computer Science and Management - guiding them away from the utopias of Artificial Intelligence and Decision Support Systems.

I recommend this book to anyone willing to make an effort in understanding one of the deepest thinkers on what it means to be a human being "living life at its best."

The essential companion to the challenge of Heidegger.......1999-11-02

I am amazed that this book has not been reviewed. For 30-odd years Hubert Dreyfus has been the beloved guide to Heidegger and Continental philosophy for thousands of undergraduate and graduate students, first at MIT and then at Berkeley. This book is constructed from the courses he taught on Heidegger's work, Kierkegaard, and especially that difficult centerpiece of Heidegger's opus, Being and Time. For the beginner and the expert, he opens Heidegger's questions and claims in distinctive, poignant, simple, accessible ways. I cannot imagine attempting to grasp Heidegger's thought without Dreyfus at my side. Dreyfus' account shows Heidegger in the middle of the struggle with those who came before him as he attempts to make sense of the question of what a human being is. I strongly recommend this book as a helpmate. If you are interested in confronting Heidegger's thought and work, get and read Dreyfus.

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PHENOMENOLOGY RADICALLY CHANGED THE WAY I CONCEIVE OF EXISTENCE
A philosophical classic
The Philosophy of Relevance

Being and Time
Martin Heidegger
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ASIN: 0060638508

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One of the most important philosophical works of our time -- a work that has had tremendous influence on philosophy, literature, and psychology, and has literally changed the intellectual map of the modern world.

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Need to learn german language........2007-09-26

I think that this is the most important work into XX century philosophy. But if you really want to understand "Sein und Zeit" is very important that you read the book in Heidegger's maternal language: german.

Disappointed with service........2007-06-14

Within minutes of entering the order, thinking I had not yet done so, I emailed the company asking to delete this order. I received no reply. Book itself is excellent; unfortunately I ordered it twice, and this agent failed even to respond to my request [I admit AFTER I mistakenly entered the order] to delete.

PHENOMENOLOGY RADICALLY CHANGED THE WAY I CONCEIVE OF EXISTENCE.......2007-02-28

BEING AND TIME is about the Being of beings, about the existence (or "ek-sistence," as Heidegger would put it) of what "is," of the being in time of phenomena. It's a very scholarly book. Heidegger himself describes his method as phenomenological. Phenomenology, obviously, is the study of phenomena, but that tells us little unless we inquire into the nature of the phenomena themselves: What ARE they? The "language" of phenomena allows things to make sense in the "logos" of Being, which is called ontology. In BEING AND TIME, phenomena are what presently appear by way of the logos (i.e., by way of the understanding word of Western thought ever since ancient Greek philosophy). The history of the word, of the logos, lies in something that Heidegger calls "Da-sein," which refers to the questioner himself, the being who poses the question of Being, a being who is t/here in the clearing of existence that time reveals as "care"--care for its own being. Now, in relation to phenomena, Heidegger requires us to question what we mean by "world." According to him, phenomena don't exist "out there," outside of our understanding, outside of language and the logos; rather, it's the understanding--the language, the logos, the thinking--that gives them their everyday existence as meaningful entities, as things that "signify." Things are "significant," and, in so signifying, come into the clearing of relevance, that is, of existence. Heidegger's phenomenology begins with "everydayness." A scientist or philosopher who wants to study human existence might start with a conception of man that is theoretical and/or categorical, such as man as zoological being or rational animal. But a phenomenologist, at least a Heideggerian one, starts with something that comes BEFORE such theoretical views of what a human being is. Everydayness is the way we experience the world in our most primordial mode of existence. This does not mean that we are studying "primitive mindsets" the way anthropologists do. Rather, we are asking about what is basic both for primitive man and for the most sophisticated person in so far as both are Da-sein (both are there sharing the "Sameness" of Being). By "Being" Heidegger does not mean some supreme Being like God. Neither does he mean beings in the sense of "things," although he sometimes uses the word in that sense. Fundamentally, he means the being OF beings, their "is-ness." There is an ontological distinction between a being thought in terms of "a thing" and Being thought as the Being OF those things.

One Amazon reviewer criticizes Heidegger for never providing any real world examples in BT. Admittedly, some of the concepts he deals with are general in so far as they are also the most fundamental. But Heidegger also explores real life situations, simple, basic things like hammering, driving a car, entering a room, viewing a work of art, running into a friend in public, experiencing phenomenological time on a road trip where different people experience the "length" or duration of the trip differently, and therefore time differently (for one person the trip seems to take forever, while for another it goes by relatively quickly), while a clock records the same length of "objective" time passing for all of them. This is an example of the difference between the way phenomenologists conceive of time and how scientists think about and measure it. Heidegger draws a similar distinction for space. For example, say someone is intently looking at a painting, absorbed by it. That same person is wearing glasses (or today it might be contact lenses). The person completely forgets about the glasses or contact lenses. They are simply absorbed in the painting. Phenomenologically speaking, that painting is nearer to the being of the person who is looking at it than the glasses/contact lenses are. To a scientist this conception of space is nonsensical; a scientist will tell you that the glasses/lenses are closer to the subject and to prove it the scientist will measure the distance. This calculating of exact distance comes limping behind primordial existence. Calculation is derivative and founded upon the priordial phenomenal structure of Da-sein's already being there. Another example Heidegger gives is walking down the street and spotting a friend striding towards you. At that moment, your friend is closer to you than the pavement right under your feet. I like to give a similar example. You're walking down a crowded city street. You spot somebody you know, who is standing twenty feet away. That person you spot who is twenty feet away is closer to you than a stranger walking right behind you whom you don't even notice. Remember, phenomenology deals with your immediate existence, not with "objective reality." Dasein is "in each case mine."

Primordially, phenomenal entities don't occur individually as though, say, a chair or table existed in a complete vacuum all by itself. Rather, phenomena are always part of a total context of relations. This "referential context" Heidegger defines in HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME as "basically correlations of meaning, meaningful contexts" (p. 203). This "referential context" constitutes an important concept in BEING AND TIME and should be thought of in terms of the phenomenal understanding of space and time we already described. In everydayness, individual entities exist within and emerge from the total meaningful context, which is not static but dynamic. The referential context doesn't exist "out there" in an objective sense. Rather, it is an intrinsic aspect of our being there in a world to begin with. For instance, signs refer to other things and, as being-in-the-world, we understand them because we already exist within the context of referential relations that are meaningful. Phenomenally, the "worldhood" of the world is made up not of objects but of these referential relations that allow objects to have meaning AS what they ARE (table, rock, tree) to begin with in our pre-reflective, pre-ontological involvement with them, an involvement that is posible only because of this initial circumspect discovery of whatever the specific phenomenon IS due to its being within the referential context, which is what equiprimordially first endows language with meaning (a single word is possible only based on the prior disclosedness of the total referntial context of pre-ontological meaning). Phenomenologically understood, the world is not primarily an assemblage of things; neither is it simply "nature." It isn't the realm of physics or biology. These things are secondary and even tertiary modes of experiencing and understanding the world founded upon our primary way of being. Rather, while not thematically or explicitly obvious to it, everydayness is comprised of references that allow things to exist as phenomena--that is, as the phenomena they ARE, MEANINGFUL entities. In a definite sense, world is what happens "between" or "among" entities, and it is this "among" that makes individual entities what they are. It's not a matter of positing a hammer and then adding nails to the hammer and shelves. World isn't a mere manifold or conglomeration of physical things. Instead, it's the REFERENCES among things that gives things significance, and these references exist because there is a being, Dasein, which we ourselves are, for which the being of entities is a concern, and they are ultimately of concern because of Dasein's concern with its OWN existence. Hence CARE appears as an important constituent of world. Objects such as specimens that are isolated for scientific or theoretical research are always already founded upon the referential context that we always already dwell in in everydayness and care. The scientific/theoretical attitude is not our primordial way of being; it's not phenomenologically primary. Scientific/theoretical modes of experiencing reality, such as mathematical calculation or exact measurement (e.g., the division of time into seconds, minutes, etc., or the precise measuring of distances) are derived from our more basic everyday encounter with phenomena, which at first is very different from the theoretical viewpoint of philosophy or the objective calculations of science. Our primordial way of determining distance and time is rather "rough and ready" and has nothing to do, at least initially, with quantitative precision. Philosophy gave birth to science, but according to Heidegger philosophy has been corrupted by science where the being of beings is concerned. Heidegger's thinking seeks independence from any sort of objective calculation. Science deals with beings, not with the being of those beings as philosophy, in the form of fundamental ontology, should. Western philosophy, in accord with science, posited that bodily presence and/or physical extension in space had primordiality. This had led to a "crisis" in philosophy and in the sciences in general. Thinking didn't seem to be properly grounded in what was most basic to human existence. Thinkers such as Kierkegaard and Husserl had been trying to "ground" thinking, but it was Heidegger who finally laid bare that ground, combining Husserl's phenomenology with Kierkegaard's call to authentic existence. What is most basic and primordial is not a being's bodily presence or its extension in space but the BEING of that being, the BEING of anything in general. Heidegger doesn't deny or refute science. His aim is rather to "inquire into the ontological possibility of how the sciences have their source in Dasein's state of being." That is, how is it that science exists AT ALL as a possibility--as a way for us "to be"? How did science emerge out of our primordial being?

To get at what is primordial, Heidegger explores simple, nontheoretical, common ways of being, what we've called "everydayness." For instance, he discusses tools (equipment) because work (considered broadly so that even opening a door or getting into bed or any use of entities is understood as work) is the primary way we encounter and indeed discover the world. A hammer is primarily not simply this mere thing with bodily presence. In terms of the existence of this phenomenal entity called a "hammer," bodily presence is not the most basic thing about it. It is not primarily a substance, or a thing extended in space, as Descartes would have said. Rather, the primary being of the hammer as a phenomenal entity (i.e., in its significance as a hammer) lies in hammering. In the everyday work-world, the hammer exists as a meaningful phenomenon through its USE. Relative to the total referential totality, its phenomenal "involvements" (the "towards-which," "with-which," "for which") are what make a hammer what it is in its BEING. But it could never be free for this being without that being who uses the hammer, the being of DASEIN, who has a "there" in which the hammer can be what it is. The hammer by itself has no "there" in which it can be. Everything that is "ready-to-hand" has meaning only from within this relational context of lived experience--the work itself and all the understanding assignments and connections it entails. If you are building a bookshelf, the hammer exists (i.e., has meaning) in relation to the nails and boards and indeed to your whole working environment, which is in turn oriented toward what you want to accomplish, a "what-for" and ultimately a "for whom" (for Heidegger, the world is anything but impersonal). It's the referential context--the worldhood of the world--and not any individual thing within that context, that is primary. Here we spot the problem that Heidegger had with Husserl, who often started his phenomenological reductions by isolating objects and therefore not acknowledging everydayness, the primary way that objects are encountered via our concern with them within the referential context. Instead, Husserl starts from a theoretical standpoint that for Heidegger is simply not primordial, not basic, not "the ground" that phenomenology should lay bare. By so doing, Husserl passes over the worldhood of the world and thus also the primary phenomenological structure of existence. That is, by passing over the original structure, Husserl also passes over the possibility of encountering the being of beings. Heidegger studies beings as they exist in our everyday lives, in the most primordial way of encountering, discovering, and knowing things, because this primary encounter is what originally occludes the being of beings. To approach the being of beings we must first be able to see how it is that it gets obscured in the first place (in everydayness), and then further obscured by theory and science. For all the complexity of his writing, Heidegger's goal is to get you to see and think about very basic structures and modes of existence--things that are so close to us that we overlook them.

While it was Husserl who developed the phenomenological method of reduction, Heidegger believed that Husserl missed the opportunity for reawakening the fundamental question of being to which phenomenology provides a path. As for the phenomenological method itself (and it is primarily a method, a way of approaching pure existence), it requires a special and systematic approach toward phenomena so that we gain access to the things themselves as they show themselves in themselves from themselves. Even if you could deny that the external world is really as you perceive it or that it exists at all, nobody can deny their own PERCEPTIONS, whether they be imaginary or otherwise, and it is this direct accessibility to the irrefutable phenomenal "world" of our own immediate experience that phenomenology explores. In this sense, even dreams, hallucinations, and things we imagine cannot be denied their existence; they are real and true as phenomena. Because phenomenology deals with immediate experience, it is "I myself" who have access to that experience. We are each our own best phenomenologist. Notice also the implicit Cartesianism here, an aspect of Husserl's phenomenology that Heidegger spends time "destructing." In any case, the phenomenological method lets us discover ontological structures so basic to our being that we live our lives totally overlooking them just as human beings have been overlooking them for all history (though according to Heidegger the Greeks, particularly the presocratics, came close to uncovering being).

Perception and reflection, says Husserl, are acts. For instance, I can think about (reflect upon), a chair or a table, or even upon an abstract idea or concept that is not part of the "external" world, so that every reflection has its object, whether real or ideal, about which the reflection is properly and intentionally a reflection. Phenomenology requires us to step back to grasp not merely the primary objects of everyday reflection but to catch reflection itself in the act of reflecting and to examine this act as well as its object in its phenomenological structure so that the "object" of phenomenology is not merely this or that external entity or immanent idea but rather the phenomenon itself in its being as it emerges from the intentional act of reflection/experience, in order to see how it comes into being as what it is in pure givenness. But Heidegger points out the subject/object dichotomy explicit in the above. He supersedes Husserlian phenomenology by locating something more fundamental: being-in-the-world. Heidegger wants you to see not merely the world, but the worldhood of the world. Not just what things are, but THAT they are and how it is that they are.

BT explores the Cartesian dichotomy that served as a foundation for Husserl's thinking and of modern metaphysical thinking in general: the distinction between inner and outer, the idea that consciousness is something immanent "inside" us while the world is "outside," and how the two come together in transcendence. Heidegger argues that mind and body--our being and the existence of the world--aren't separate things that must be put together; rather, they are together to begin with and it is only upon this primordial unitary PHENOMENOLOGICAL structure of existence that the Cartesian duality is founded. Heidegger does not so much refute Descartes as he grounds Cartesian--and indeed all--philosophy in an underlying structure that is more basic than anything hitherto imagined. Heidegger will show you how this dichotomy between inner and outer is deceptive, how it is more properly founded upon Da-sein, whose basic mode of existence has the ontological structure of being-in-the-world, which is the invisible and indeed indivisible structure of existence, prior even to the Cartesian subject. This a priori unitary phenomenal structure (and what Heidegger ultimately means by "world" is phenomenological) underlies the concept of mind/body (subject/object; form/content) that tries to explain existence in terms of the metaphysical bifurcation that creates a gulf between immanent consciousness and external reality, between us and the world. For Heidegger, the world isn't what's "out there." Rather, world is the "there" that being discloses (thus we are dasein, which is German for "there-being"). For Heidegger, the phenomenon of everydayness is more original than traditional metaphysics or science, and hence prior to the subject/object distinction, which, as theory, is possible only on the basis of this prior everyday way of existence. Now at this point some might raise the following objection: the brain is literally inside the body; therefore isn't it simply an empirical fact that our consciousness or mind must be inside us and indeed that that is the case and in a physical sense? My rejoinder is the following: picture a vessel, say a box, with something in it, a sweater, book or any other object. That sweater is inside the box, and yet both the box AND the sweater are "out there" in the world that is seemingly outside of you and is also empirically outside the box. But aren't both box and sweater part of the same world as you and your consciousness? Doesn't the box simply delineate A REGION of the world which is actually NOT outside or separate from the world? The sweater is not in any sense outside of, beside, apart, or even distinct from the world just by virtue of the fact that it is inside the box. Similarly, our mind might seem to be apart from the world by virtue of being inside of us, but is it really beside or apart or distinct from the world? Now that's an ontic way of thinking about it; the real trick is to understand it ontologically--not in terms of physical space but phenomenological space. According to Heidegger, our consciousness isn't primarily inside us in everydayness but already "out there" interacting with the world to begin with. In a very real sense, consciousness IS the world because without the MEANINGFUL referential context of worldhood there could be no world, at least not as a phenomenon. The referential context assumes the existence of understanding and understanding assumes a conscious being. (I should note, however, that Heidegger avoids traditional terms like "mind" and "consciousness." I'm using them here as a sort of shorthand, but strictly speaking I should be saying "Dasein" and "being-in-the-world," etc., except that I don't want to assume too much prior knowledge of these terms by the reader.) It's not so much that theoretical thinking or the scientific way of understanding the world are wrong; it's that they are secondary phenomena that emerge from our everyday way of being in the world, and what Heidegger leads us back to, both through his brilliant dismantling of the philosophical tradition and his examination of everydayness on his way to a discovery (or rediscovery) of being, is this everyday way of encountering the world.

What is the world? Heidegger answers this question in one of the most fascinating explications I have ever encountered in all my years of reading. He ends up showing nothing less than the basic structure of our existence, not in an evolutionary sense (by going back in time to trace how we evolved and from what, or how we were first created), but rather how it is that we exist right here right now and at all times. The fundamental structure of existence is grounded in time, but Heidegger offers a novel way of thinking about time. Time can never be measured by any clock. Time is something that first of all must be lived. We ARE our own time. I won't go into it now, but the idea of time is inextricably bound with the notion that we realize our own existence by being finite. We can't understand time in a phenomenological sense without taking death into consideration. Death and "the nothing" play a major part in Heidegger's thinking, though his thinking is ultimately not nihilistic. Anyhow, this is the problem with starting to explain Heidegger: I can go on and on, but will force myself to stop. I haven't even gone into the main part of Heidegger's thinking, such as his conception of history and his analysis of authentic and inauthentic existence. But by now you should at least have a clue about how to approach Heidegger. You can disagree with him, of course, but certainly the people who claim that his writing is vague and unclear just don't know what they are talking about. I can finally say this with certainty. Of course, phenomenologically I can't deny the existence of the vagueness these people experience/perceive, but they shouldn't blame it on Heidegger. To really study Heidegger is to learn to understand just how clearly he saw things and how lucidly he explained them.

One last thought. Although both atheists and theists can, to a point, safely approach BT, Heidegger's "destruction" of Descartes' work on immanent existence and external reality got me thinking about the Cartesian idea of God being the uncreated substance that exists independently of his creation, so that we have a structure that posits a creator separate and distinct from his creation, and conversely a creation (world) that is external to (albeit dependent on) the creator who made it--and in much the same way that Descartes describes the world being outside of and apart from our own mind as existing subjects. The res cogitans (the thinking thing) is distinct from the physical thing of external reality that is merely extended in space (res extenso). These entities are so distinct to Descartes that, according to him, the mind can exist even if there were no world at all (hence the Cartesian correlation between mind and spirit). To Heidegger, the notion that mind could exist without world is absurd since to him being and world are indivisible aspects of existence. Our being is Da-sein, which means "there-being" or "being-there," and THERE implies a world. The sense I have now is that, if God exists and is conscious of both his own existence and that of his creation, he would inform existence in a way that goes beyond the mere physical act of creating an external reality. What would properly exist would not be the creation outside of him but rather the phenomenon that exists by virtue of his apprehension of it. Otherwise, as Heidegger says, there would be no existence at all without Da-sein. Then again, if God exists, he is Da-sein also.

A philosophical classic.......2006-11-16

Martin Hiedigger is one of the most controversial philosophers from the 20th century. Certainly at the very least a very dark shadow is cast over him by his association with the Nazi party in the 1930's, as well as several dispicable actions which he deserves infamy for, most notably his cruel actions towards his benefactor and mentor Edmund Husserl, himself one of the finest philosophers of the 20th century.

Added to this is the terrible obscurity of much of Heidigger's tortured writing. Like many German philosophers he seemed to not take much care with clear and logical expression, something more valued in the UK and the English speaking world. Sometimes the works of Heidigger can seem as impenetrable as the Amazon rainforest.

However, with some patience, Heidigger in my view is saying something deep and profound in Being and Time, as well as his other works. He does, despite his shortcomings, deserve to remain considered a great philosopher, not for how he behaved, but for what he thought.

Being and time is probably his most important work and is basically an attempt to rethink the problem of human existence after the collapse of religious belief and metaphysics. What meaning can ultimately be given to our existence in the world? What point do we start from, if God doesn't exist?

It is hard to pin down Heidigger in terms of religious belief, and it could be said he might be trying to work out a philosophy of Being and existence which will make it possible for us to regain the wonder of existence held by the ancient Greeks like Parmenides or Heraclitus, without falling into dogmatism. The starting point for Heidigger is our temporality, that is, the fact we exist as beings in time. There is no flight from our world to another world where there is no time; to properly understand ourselves philosophically we must take our temporality as a given. There is no static humanity; hence no essence preceding existence. The second key point is the giveness of the world, and the third is being human, we are always concerned for this world and the things in it. All these three things are integral and one; none can exist without the other.

Our fundamental mode of existence in this world is one of 'care.' Because of our concern for other things and people, the world is not a formless nothing but instead reveals itself as something 'present to hand', something which arouses our interest and curiosity. This basic fact of our existence is what creates the impulse to wonder, and hence our impulses to religion, to philosophy, and to science.

Another critical idea in Heidigger is our relation to death. Because we are concious of our death, we know our being is finite and is completed by death. However, to Hiedigger it is vitally important we don't run away from our mortality but accept it and make it a part of who we are; our greatest possibility is our possibility not to be.

Of course Heidigger's thought is immensely complex and there is more to it than just these ideas. While we may criticize his existential analysis of our being, in my view his insights are very interesting and still worth considering, and it will be some time before the meaning of these thoughts become entirely clear.

The Philosophy of Relevance .......2006-11-04

As philosophy spirals into irrelevance and vacuousness with the analytic dominance, Heidegger's Being and Time is more important than ever. If Kant gave us a Medusa with an iron rod rammed through as a transcendental ego, Heidegger presents us with living, breathing humanity. There can be no doubt that this is among the most important books of the 20th century. Those who deny this are almost invariably the ones who don't understand it.

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Best Introduction to Derrida
Metaphors on the Margin
Metaphor in the text of philosophy
Reading Derrida...
Interesting but hardly radical

Margins of Philosophy
Jacques Derrida
Manufacturer: University Of Chicago Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0226143260

Book Description

"In this densely imbricated volume Derrida pursues his devoted, relentless dismantling of the philosophical tradition, the tradition of Plato, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger—each dealt with in one or more of the essays. There are essays too on linguistics (Saussure, Benveniste, Austin) and on the nature of metaphor ("White Mythology"), the latter with important implications for literary theory. Derrida is fully in control of a dazzling stylistic register in this book—a source of true illumination for those prepared to follow his arduous path. Bass is a superb translator and annotator. His notes on the multilingual allusions and puns are a great service."—Alexander Gelley, Library Journal

Customer Reviews:

Best Introduction to Derrida.......2005-12-27

Jacques Derrida is the most significant philosophical figure in what is too blithely referred to as poststructuralist thought. An amazon.com review is not the place to go into a discussion of whether Derrida is "right" or "wrong," but he is indisputably one of the most important postmodern philosophers, and an awareness of his thought, however cursory, is indispensable if you are serious about philosophizing.
Margins of Philosophy is, I believe, the best introduction to Derrida's work, containing some of his most significant and far-reaching essays. Especially worthwhile are White Mythology and Signature, Event, Context. Derrida's thought is far-reaching and wide-ranging (he has even written on a photo-novel of women making love), and Margins of Philosophy represents only his most important thoughts in the realm of philosophy. For his reactions to literature, I recommend Acts of Literature and Dissemination. However, it has been said by Eagleton that deconstruction is like that drunk at the bar who tells the same story every night, and for many (most) people, one volume of Derrida will be a lovely sufficiency.
Derrida can be tough going, even if you are familiar with his antecedents; however, it is far from impossible to understand him. I recommend reading a given essay twice, then going through a third time underlining important parts, then reading it another two times and attempting a paraphrase. If you go through this admittedly arduous procedure, you will find you understand what he is talking about quite well, even if you don't read too much philosophy. Remember: don't give up the first or second time through. The pieces won't start falling together until a bit further down the line.

Metaphors on the Margin.......2004-07-26

Jacques Derrida has provided us with an important text whose central concern is, arguably, "metaphor". In leaving the reader discover the details of how philosophy exists within the margins of its own discourse, I want to simply and briefly map out a number of, what may be called, "conceptual metaphors", that I have found captivating, intriguing and useful (for my own quest for difference).

To start with, there is "differance", and the reason why it can be treated as a conceptual metaphor is that it cannot be approached directly. As Derrida's interest is in helping us discover 'a new play of opposition, of articulation, of difference' (p. xxviii), namely "differance", we are however precluded from posing, let alone answering, the question "What is differance?". This is because it is 'neither a word nor a concept' (p. 3), has 'neither existence nor essence' (p. 6), is 'irreducibly polysemic' (p. 8), a 'temporisation' and 'spacing' (p. 9), and is that which 'produces differences' (p. 11). It can therefore only be approached metaphorically, in its use as a tool operating on the margins of language and discourse for understanding difference in other authors (especially Hegel) and (of course) Derrida himself!

"Differance" is by far not the only conceptual metaphor in this text: there are additional ones, which are in a way, related to "differance" and thus provide additional clues for getting closer to understanding its purpose and function. In particular, the Hegelian conceptual metaphor "pyramid" (an inspiration for Mark Taylor's text 'Altarity') operating on the margins of signs and difference, in addition to that of "vibration", as the movement of idealisation. Further, there is a useful parallel between de Saussure and Rousseau as regards "language", and an account of its "interweaving" with other threads of experience, a conceptual metaphor found in Husserl. With Benveniste and Aristotle, Derrida deals with the issue of "category" as 'one of the ways for "Being" to say itself or to signify itself' (p. 183) in its relation to "thought". Next, he gives an account of the nature of philosophical text and in discussing Aristotle and Bachelard among other thinkers, explains the role of "metaphor" as 'the manifestation of analogy' (p. 238) in carrying and emitting meaning - hence its important role in the logic of (philosophical) discourse. Finally, in discussing Valery, Derrida tackles the conceptual metaphor of "source" in the sense of origin and grounding.

Overall, although it is a difficult text, it is captivating and must be read several times (ideally in conjunction with the French text) so as to (progressively) discover the multiple nuances and conceptual connections that Derrida is making in a style that decidedly relies on metaphor and différance. It is an important reading for anyone concerned with the notion of difference and its workings through and with language.

Metaphor in the text of philosophy.......2003-09-19

In the 1980s, White Mythology was required reading for Yale lit-crit majors. It is an incredible tour de force so rich that its overwhelming in the initial read. How was it possible to write this (and how was it possible to translate?) The inescapability of metaphor, metaphor not just in, but constituting the text of philosophy, the false privileging of metaphysics over rhetoric are made stunningly evident -- if not plain -- here.

Reading Derrida..........2003-01-31

Begin with "Tympan", it's designed to serve as an introduction to the ten essays which follow and, despite a lot of word play, Derrida does mention most of the themes informing this collection (philosophy's attempt to master its domain, Hegel as the philosopher of limits, the threat metaphor poses to philosophical discourse, etc).
Read "Differance" next (it's probably the single most famous thing Derrida has ever written). After declaring the thought of difference to be crucial to our intellectual epoch (he mentions Saussure, Nietzsche, and Freud before taking up Heidegger's notion of ontological difference) Derrida proposes the nonword/nonconcept of "differance" to go them all one better. This is a dazzling essay, but if it leaves you more exhausted than exhilarated, then Derrida just isn't for you.
Essay #2 is a dense and convoluted discussion of the metaphysics of presence in Aristotle and Hegel. Skip this.
Essay #3 is a surprisingly interesting investigation of Hegel's semiology (of all things). Derrida demonstrates that Hegel's disdain for non-phonetic scripts (say, hieroglyphics) is not just a quirk, but is crucial to Hegel's entire philosophical project.
"The Ends Of Man" is a classic example of 1960's French anti-humanism. It's essentially an attempt to rescue Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger from their existentialist interpreters. Another very famous piece (and rightfully so).
Essay #5 is a sort of Cliffs Notes version of OF GRAMMATOLOGY; it deals with the denigration of writing in the thought of Saussure and Rousseau. Very readable.
Essay #6 is all about Husserl's theory of signs and I found it incomprehensible.
Essay #7 concerns itself with to what extent the grammar and syntax of a particular language influences what can be thought in that language. Recommended, despite the opacity of Derrida's criticisms of Benveniste.
"White Mythology" is the longest and most demanding essay in this collection, so leave it for last. I'm not even going to venture a comment on this one.
Essay #9 meanders quite a while before it gets around to illustrating Valery's low opinion of philosophy, so be patient.
The book wraps up with Derrida's notorious reading/misreading of that wonderful little book, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS. This modest essay launched a feud between Derrida and the American philosopher John Searle. Much ado about nothing, I say.

Interesting but hardly radical.......2002-01-16

One could open up this review by pointing out that the book being reviewed is not a "coherent" work in the conventional sense of the term but this would be playing into the hands of the deconstructionist. Perhaps it is best to phrase one's comments in such a fashion as to avoid the need for anything more-than-average coherence in a review. "The Margins of Philosophy" is an interesting work by this academically controversial author. Generally speaking--and what more can one do in a review--Derrida's readings are heavily influenced by Heidegger's statement that what an author keeps silent is as important as what he states. This is asserted almost immediately in the introduction as Derrida lets us know that what philosophy (and philosophers) have pushed to the margin in their work is very important to explore since its unveiling will de-center the work. Put differently, every writing undercuts itself in the end. In a series of separate, but linked essays, Derrida goes on to demonstrate how this sort of thing happens in Hegel, Saussure, Benveniste, Heidegger, and others.

I am not the first to point out that Derrida is a perceptive, subtle reader with a very keen eye for the hidden details. "White Mythology" is an interesting discussion of the role of metaphor in philosophy and its consequences for philosophy. I am also not the first to complain that Derrida's taste for exegesis runs towards the extravagant and excessive. The aforementioned essay spans 65 pages for reasons that otherwise escape me. There is also the more serious problem in Derrida that his keen eye is not keen enough and he is too clever by half in his explication. At one point in the work he connects the greek word for intuiting (ie. seeing with the soul) "theorein" with the desire for death. Strictly speaking this is a conflation of the desire to be a god with the desire to be unconscious (a leftover from the decay of romanticism?). An elementary reading of Plato's Phaedrus makes this clear. His obsession with the "metaphysics of presence" is also a problem for the work, as he hitches his interpretations to this dubious construction and the interpretations ultimately suffer for it. This is not to say that there isn't much of philosophical interest in the work for Derrida gives the reader much to chew on. He reminds us that any serious reading of a text must devote itself scrupulously to the whole of the text and not just to those parts which we think are interesting. Though, perhaps, not the best place to start one's study of Derrida it is certainly worth a serious read if only to understand what some of the shouting is all about.

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An interesting guide for new readers and non-specialists.

Superb

An Excellent Introduction

The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy)

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ASIN: 0521385970

Book Description

Martin Heidegger is now widely recognized alongside Wittgenstein as one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century. He redefined the central task of philosophy as the investigation of the nature of being, and has exerted a profound impact on literary theory, theology, psychotherapy, political theory, aesthetics, environmental studies, as well as mainstream philosophy. His thought has contributed to the recent turn to hermeneutics in philosophy and the social sciences, and to current post-modern and post-structuralist developments. The disclosing of his deep involvement in the ideology of Nazism has provoked much debate about the relation of philosophy to politics. This volume contains both overviews of Heidegger's life and works and analysis of his most important work, Being and Time. In addition there are discussions of Heidegger's thought in relation to mysticism, traditional theology, ecology, psychotherapy, and the philosophy of language. The volume also contains the first in-depth study of what has been called Heidegger's second greatest work, the Beitrage zur Philosophie.

Customer Reviews:

Fairly Helpful.......2006-06-12

This is a competent guide for new students of Heidegger, though it is necessarily crude to have to simplify and reorganize his thinking. The chapter death, time, and history is probably the most helpful, for it is some of Heidegger's most challenging material. Also included are essays on Heidegger's thoughts on psychotherapy, ecology, Buddhism, and technology. Although the essay on Heidegger's politics is fairly amateurish. An average text on the whole.

An interesting guide for new readers and non-specialists........2001-10-09

THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER. Edited by Charles Guignon. 389 pp. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1993 and reprinted. ISBN 0-521-385970-0 (Pbk).

This excellent collection of articles for students and the general reader contains, in addition to an extremely clear and useful 40-page introductory overview of Heidegger's thought and career by Charles Guignon, the following thirteen pieces:

1. The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project - DOROTHEA FREDE; 2. Reading a life : Heidegger and hard times - THOMAS SHEEHAN; 3. The unity of Heidegger's thought - FREDERICK A. OLAFSON; 4. Intentionality and world : Division I of 'Being and Time' - HARRISON HALL; 5. Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger - ROBERT J. DOSTAL; 6. Heidegger and the hermeneutic turn - DAVID COUZENS HOY; 7. Death, time, history : Division II of 'Being and Time' - PIOTR HOFFMAN; 8. Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy - CHARLES B. GUIGNON; 9. Heidegger, Buddhism, and deep ecology - MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN; 10. Heidegger and theology - JOHN D. CAPUTO; 11. Heidegger on the connection between nihilism, art, technology, and politics - HUBERT L. DREYFUS; 12. Engaged agency and background in Heidegger - CHARLES TAYLOR; 13. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language - RICHARD RORTY.

Although many of these contributors are distinguished Heidegger scholars, most do seem to have successfully pitched their discussion at a level suited to the non-specialist, and although this book is by no means a 'Heidegger Made Simple' (a certain amount of background in both philosophy and Heidegger would be useful) most readers should come away with an enhanced understanding of Heidegger and a desire to know more. The absolute beginner, however, might prefer - after reading Charles Guignon's Introduction, and before plunging into the articles - to read a more extended general introduction such as George Steiner's 'Martin Heidegger' (1987).

Besides helping the general reader and non-specialist, the Companion will also be of use to more advanced students as providing a conspectus of recent developments in the interpretation of Heidegger, and here the inclusion of Zimmerman's excellent article is both gratifying and noteworthy. Too often, books about Heidegger completely overlook the fact that many of the most brilliant minds in Asia have spent the last two thousand years pondering some of the very same problems that exercised Heidegger, and that a knowledge of their thoughts about such matters as Being or Time can sometimes help us to better understand Heidegger.

Readers, for example, might take a look at Book 11 of Dogen's 'Shobogenzo,' UJI (Existence-Time or Being-Time), or at such works as Graham Parkes 'Heidegger and Asian Thought' or Richard Mays 'Heidegger's Hidden Sources : East Asian Influences on his Work' (see my Listmania List 'Understanding Heidegger' for details). Dorothea Frede, in her 'The Question of Being,' asks (without answering) the question : "What led to the "breakthrough" that provided Heidegger with the clue for attacking the question of the meaning of being in a new way . . . ?" (page 51). Who knows? Might it have been Asian thought? It certainly begins to look so.

The Companion also includes a List of contributors, a Chronology, a curiously organized 22-page Bibliography of both German and English works (which would have been easier to consult if the items had been spaced) and an Index. It is well-printed in a large, clear font on excellent paper, is bound in a sturdy glossy wrapper, and comes with a glued spine. Well organized and well produced, The Companion becomes a fitting addition to the distinguished Cambridge series and should be of interest to all serious students of Heidegger.

Superb.......2000-05-11

A simply excellent collection of articles on Heidegger, covering a broad spectrum of subjects ranging from Heidegger's views on technology, ontology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, theology and nihilism to art, morality, nazism, and language.

Guignon has compiled essays that are of good philosophical quality yet understandable (a big problem when it comes to some of Heidegger's own writings).

An Excellent Introduction.......2000-01-06

As a student, I found this book to be an extremely helpful introduction to Heidegger's philosophy. I get much more out reading Heidegger now than I did before having read this book. It is a well organized, clearly written, and scholarly collection of essays, which explicate major themes in Heidegger's works. I recommend it to students and laymen.

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Philosophical Hermeneutics
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Manufacturer: University of California Press
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ASIN: 0520034759

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude

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How I know Heidegger was an egomaniac
World-Forming and Not Having a World--From Dasein to Animal
My candidate for the follow-up to Being and Time

The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude
Martin Heidegger
Manufacturer: Indiana University Press
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ASIN: 0253214297

Book Description

ñIn this text, which is crucial to understanding the transition from HeideggerÍs earlier to his later thinking, readers will find a helpful overview of HeideggerÍs conception of metaphysics . . . a brilliant phenomenological analysis of boredom . . . an investigation of the essence of life and animality . . . and an analysis of the structure of the propositional statement . . . î „Review of Metaphysics

ñThis authoritative translation is essential to any Heidegger collection.î „ Choice

ñWhoever thought that Heidegger . . . has no surprises left in him had better read this new volume. If its rhetoric is ïhard and heavyÍ its thought is even harder and essentially more daring than Heideggerians ever imagined Heidegger could be.î „David Farrell Krell

ñThis is an important addition to the translations of HeideggerÍs lecture- courses . . .î „International Philosophical Quarterly

This work, the text of Martin HeideggerÍs lecture course of 1929/30, is crucial for an understanding of HeideggerÍs transition from the major work of his early years, ¸Being and Time, to his later preoccupations with language, truth, and history.

Customer Reviews:

How I know Heidegger was an egomaniac.......2004-02-03

The beginning is like an introduction to beat all introductions. This book has no index, but there is very little in these lectures that an index could pick out as an adequate description of any of the topics covered in the book. Pages 375-376 have a glossary, with some complicated words and phrases like "time as it drags," but with no attempt to locate where to find such topics in the text of these lectures from 1929/30. The Glossary is a guide to the translation, and people who have a favorite German word can check for the English word that is a most likely translation. You are more likely to think there are some totally unlikely translations, if you only speak English, like "resolute disclosedness: Entschlossenheit."

Martin Heidegger is great, and you can't understand how he is great unless you comprehend the major problem in this book: boredom. Page 112 is devoted to smoking a cigar, and it is not just any cigar. Smoking is studied as a social activity in which he watches himself taking part in a ritual that eventually leaves him empty because his entire life depends on what he thinks, and certainly "not of viewing it in terms of isolated incidents, but of understanding it in the context of the whole situation of the evening, of sitting together, of making conversation." (p. 111). The social casualness is in sharp contrast with his desire for some enthusiasm for himself.

"It--one's own self that has been left standing, the self that everyone himself or herself is, and each with this particular history, of this particular standing and age, with this name and vocation and fate; the self, one's own beloved ego of which we say that I myself, you yourself, we ourselves are bored." (p. 134).

People who find Heidegger thrilling might find it interesting that there is very little information about other philosophers in THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF METAPHYSICS: WORLD, FINITUDE, SOLITUDE, Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. At the beginning, "In Memory of Eugen Fink" by Martin Heidegger, 26 July 1975, pictures Fink at this course listening "with thoughtful reticence" and later "repeatedly expressed the wish that this lecture should be published before all others." (p. v). Philosophers mentioned in the text only get a few lines. Novalis has his name in the title of section 2 on page 4, but he only gets quoted for eleven words: "Philosophy is really homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere." (p. 5) Then Aristotle gets quoted with three Greek words that seem to mean "Poets tell many a lie?" (p. 5).

When Heidegger gets to God on page 19, it just seems to be trouble. "Then philosophy too would have become utterly superfluous, and especially our discussion about it. For God does not philosophize, if indeed (as the name already says) philosophy, this love of . . . as homesickness for . . ., must maintain itself in nothingness, in finitude. Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance." Heidegger opposes Descartes and theology since "It, and with it all philosophizing of the modern era since Descartes, puts nothing at all at stake." (p. 20). Heraclitus is praised as a sign that "The philosophers of antiquity already knew this and had to know it in their first decisive commencements." (p. 22). Plato gets credit for the distinction "between being awake and sleeping. The non-philosophizing human being, including the scientific human being, does indeed exist, but he or she is asleep." (p. 23). "Hegel (to name a philosopher of the modern era)" is mentioned without a quotation or even a footnote, "but merely as an indication that I am not inventing a concept of philosophy here, nor arbitrarily presenting you with some private opinion." (p. 23).

Chapter Three of the Preliminary Appraisal, justifying the inclusion "of Comprehensive Questioning Concerning World, Finitude, Individuation as Metaphysics" (p. 24) is back to the basic views about philosophy of the Greeks. Heraclitus and Aristotle are considered "by way of an elementary interpretation of the concept of truth in antiquity." (p. 30). Books were not published by big printing firms, like they are now, especially after "Aristotle died around 322-21 B.C." (p. 35). The Aristotelian treatises were not collected for study until the first century B.C., long after Plato and Xenocrates established the main topics as disciplines: logic, physics, ethics. (p. 36). Many of Aristotle's treatises did not belong within those topics, and Heidegger calls them "Aristotle's philosophy proper." (p. 37). But there have been many approaches since then.

"Through Christian dogma, ancient philosophy was forced into a quite specific conception which maintained itself throughout the Renaissance, Humanism and German Idealism, and whose untruth we are slowly beginning to comprehend today. The first to do so was perhaps Nietzsche." (p. 42).

With so few philosophers being mentioned, I was surprised to find in section 14 "The concept of metaphysics in Franz Suarez and the fundamental character of modern metaphysics." (pp. 51-55). Considering Kant and Aquinas not as important as the questions raised by this Spanish Jesuit in the 16th century, "who must be placed even above Aquinas in terms of his acumen and independence of questioning." (p. 51). While "Suarez sides very positively with Thomas Aquinas" (p. 53), "it was precisely Kant who placed the possibility of metaphysics in doubt." (p. 54). Bouncing back to reality, "We see most clearly at the place where modern philosophy explicitly begins, in Descartes, but especially in Fichte." (p. 55). The Preliminary Appraisal ends with section 15, in which the possibility of "being gripped by a metaphysical question" (pp. 56-57) sustains the book. The shift to Part One is called "Awakening a Fundamental Attunement in Our Philosophizing." (p. 59). The contemporary situation with the opposition of life (soul) and spirit in four philosophers leads to "All four interpretations are only possible given a particular reception of Nietzsche's philosophy." (p. 71).

World-Forming and Not Having a World--From Dasein to Animal.......2001-08-29

These 1929/30 lectures represent a stunning use of phenomenology as it probes into the nature of the philosophical bindingness to nature (as self-arising into presence "ousia"). Philosophy is understood to be the ongoing response to homesickness (as denominated by the poet Novalis). As such a response it is unique in its form of questioning and in the way it receives "answers" from the giving/receding orders of nature and their elusive ground. Philosophy is also infused with an attunement that compels it to return again and again to the questions concerning worldhood, finitude, and solitude; questions that goad it forward and backward simultaneously. The act of philosophy drives us out of our everydayness, "For in it there becomes manifest something essential about all philosophical comprehension, namely that in the philosophical concept, man, and indeed man as a whole is in the grip of an attack--driven out of everydayness and driven back into the ground of things" [Wesentliches alles philosophischen Begreifens, dass der philosophische Begriff ein Angriff ist auf den Menschen und gar auf den Menschen im Ganzen--aufgejagt aus der Alltaglichkeit und zuruckgejagt in den Grund der Dinge]. Boredom, rather than anxiety, is now seen to be the fundamental mood that governs our Dasein (human being in the world). Heidegger unfolds the complex interplay of the modes of boredom and their special ways of illuminating worldhood. Boredom is seen as one of the ways of time's withdrawal into a kind of tarrying that is nowhere and everywhere, but bereft of full worldhood. Animals, while open to their environment [umwelt] do not have a world [welt]. Yet animals live in their own way within a disinhibiting ring that opens them to their release into their species-specific environment. Here Heidegger's descriptions of the animal forms of not-worldness represent a major achievement in helping beings-with-selves become aware of the unique forms of openness of other living beings. As humans we are called to project ourselves into the difference between the various things in being, on the one hand, and the Being of all beings on the other (his reiteration of the ontological difference). This is certainly one of the most important series of lectures in Heidegger's career and the translation is a fair and compelling one. For those who only know "Being and Time" or some of the late essays, this text will come as a surprise because of its masterful and careful phenomenological descriptions of nature and the forms of openness that it contains.

My candidate for the follow-up to Being and Time.......2001-04-14

I always see talk of the successor book to Being and Time. Some say the Kantbook, some say Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), etc. Let me propose The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Because it was originally a lecture course, it is much more accesible than Being and Time, but it really continues the preoccupations of that book. In B&T, anxiety was the mood through which Heidegger discovers revelations of the Being of beings. Here Heidegger pushes on to a new "attunement": boredom. We think of boredom as something about which there is almost nothing to say, and it would be easy to joke about someone going for hundreds of pages on boredom fulfilling his own prophecy, but Heidegger's reflections on boredome as revealing aspects of Being and Time is about as profound as you can get. This is a great book. Maybe because it didn't even appear in German until 1983, it hasn't had as much attention as other works, but anyone interested in Heidegger (which ought to be equivalent to saying anyone interested in philosophy at all) should get to know this work.

Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale Nota Bene)

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...whatever you say, Martin...
Invitation to Being
great translation
A lucid discussion of 'being'
The Easiest to Read & Most Interesting Heidegger Book

Introduction to Metaphysics (Yale Nota Bene)
Martin Heidegger
Manufacturer: Yale University Press
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Binding: Paperback

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Customer Reviews:

...whatever you say, Martin..........2007-06-03

This book is interesting, but also frustrating. On one hand, Heidegger offers some fascinating reflections on the preSocratic philosphers' doctrines, with quite profound and highly original insights. His questioning of being is penetrating, and certainly gives food for thought. But on the other hand, it lacks clarity, just as most of Heidegger's work I have encountered. Surely a philosopher should, yes, seek depth in his thought, but not at the expense of basic clarity. Furthermore, his criticisms of previous Western reflection on being smack of intellectual arrogance (sorry Martin!). I mean, he seems to expect us to accept that everyone since Plato was wandering around blindfolded until he (Mr Heidegger) came along to tear the wool from our eyes and bring us face to face once more with the question of being. And on what grounds does he ask us to accept this? A few (dodgy) etymological derrivations! This is, to be generous, a somewhat biased reading of philosophical history. If Heidegger really was the future of metaphysics (as he thought he was) I would have taken up crochet long ago (or something else equally un-philosophical). But happily, he is not. So do I recommend this book? Yes and no. Undoubtedly, it raises interesting questions and it is a good way into Heidegger's philosophy. But as an attempted answer, or even a proposed approach, to the question of being, it is deeply unsatisfactory.

Invitation to Being.......2006-06-25

"Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" (1) Martin Heidegger, the most poetic and controversial philosopher of the 20th century, cuts straight to the heart of the matter with this very question. The heart of metaphysics is its very ability to question the extra-ordinary - a questioning that is entirely impractical, for "You can't do anything with philosophy" (13). Philosophy as questioning means being in a way that is fundamentally cut off from the technological and scientific tendency towards instrumentalization that has been so endemic in the modern world. This questioning points to the fact that it is in language that we are made and in language the we come to be; in language we come to Being.

But, what does it mean to be? This is an ancient question, but it is a question that during the modern era has been entirely lost from the realm of the philosophical. In an almost religious manner, Heidegger claims that we have quite literally "fallen" from the ancient Greeks, who were able to ask that question with all its force and come to recognize in that question a raw reality: truth is about revealing or "unfolding". This "unfolding" that truth *is* should be spoken of as light. Human-Being, then, is a coming into the light that the question of Being is.

One can easily become lost in Heidegger's dense, poetic prose. Yet, as one reads what he has to write about language and how we find ourselves *in* it, one begins to suspect that the sheer elegance of his writing is intentional: its goal is to wake us from our modern slumber and get around to asking that fundamental question again. Otherwise we risk falling into the insanity of nihilism that Nietzsche (whom Heidegger engages throughout the work) noted: seeking beings in the oblivion of Being (217).

In this question of Being, however, Heidegger wishes to inscribe the historical becoming of humanity as essential our own being. In this work, the historical becoming of a people - their Dasein or "being-there" - points briefly to what Heidegger calls the greatness of National Socialism: the meeting of the human and the technological. Heidegger's brief involvement with the Nazi party in the early 1930s, when these lectures were originally delivered, has haunted his legacy ever since. The Nazis appeared in the early 1930s to give a promise of destiny to the devastated German people and Heidegger, for a time, bought into it. For some, this taints all of Heidegger's insights about the nature of human becoming as it asks the question of Being; I do not. At the very least, Heidegger's praise for the party early on certainly points to the compelling and potentially seductive nature of the promise of historical becoming as one's being.

Heidegger is often criticized for being elliptical in his writing, but this criticism is superficial. Heidegger is as much a poet as anything else, and reading him means less reading word for word what he has written and more a simple listening for the question of Being.

great translation.......2006-02-27

The translators have used an excellent editorial apparatus for this text. I can see how it would be a great starting place for studying Heidegger, but without knowledge of German and ancient Greek it seems like it would be hard to understand some of his arguments, if not most of his wordplay. Heidegger has a certain romantic charm, with his quest to get back to the originary. However, one can get a sense of how wild his line of thinking is when you look at his translations of ancient Greek passages ... they are very bizarre (as he himself acknowledges). His entire project of studying being, and in this text, his focus on such grammatical elements as the copula, from which he unearths insights (supposedly) receives an excellent critique by Theodor Adorno in Part II of Negative Dialectics. Heidegger makes an excellent priest or priestly philosopher, but beyond that the value of his work is open to questioning, if not criticism. The way he takes a few statements that a reader can sympathize with and then attempts to draw rather ridiculous conclusions and how he leaps from analysis to a supposed conclusion should not be accepted without some critical scrutiny. He seems very much to be delivering sermons, not lectures.

A lucid discussion of 'being'.......2005-09-27

First let me set the expectation right because the title lends itself to expectations quite varied from the intent and purpose of the book. This book pertains to ontology rather than metaphysics in a wider sense. (Ontology is regarded as one of the branches or subjects of inquiry comprising metaphysics).

And this is in no way a textbook on metaphysics or an introduction to the subject of metaphysics (I picked it up when I did not know who Heidegger was and wanted a quick introduction to 'metaphysics' about which I was hazy then. But I ended up loving this book for a different reason).

This however does not discount the value of the book. The book asks and seeks to answer the question 'Why are there beings rather than nothing?' (in the older transaltion -- beings = essents). It then moves on to the questions like what is Being, what is the meaning of Being, what are the limits of Being, what are the etymological origins of Being (not the etymology of the word, but of the concept - including Greek and Latin equivalents) etc.

The book explains the sense of 'limitedness' latent in the concept of Being through etymological connections with terms like polis, for example.

In the last chapter, Heidegger dileneates Being from its four boundary conditions - thinking (as contrasted with existing), becoming (changing into another being), appearance (being as perceived by another being) and ought (abstract goal for being).

This book clarifies many essential concepts like the ones mentioned in the previous paragraph by delineating them from a lot of muddle that has been written about them by many other philosophers. If there were to be an alternative title for this book,'The Concept of Being' captures it best.

The Easiest to Read & Most Interesting Heidegger Book.......2003-04-04

What a great book. I may of read about 4 to 5 Martin Heidegger books & this book flowed because it was more easy to read. Well, the first part of the book was easy, got a little lost in the "Being As Thinking" section. Heidegger's philosophy, minus the so-called "Certain Influences", helped me give up my Platonic ways of thinking. Heidegger starts off trying to ask the most basic axiom "Why are there BEINGs at all instead of Nothing" goes through a brief history of the main words, tears the words & main question apart, & puts the words & question back together again in a more "Primate", "Basic", or "Historical" understanding. Then he explains how BEING turns into BECOMING (how things change), APPEARANCE (how things influence our senses), THINKING (How & what we think about our experience), & the OUGHT (The way things "Should" or "Could" BE). Basic conclusion: Western Philosophy started out correct with the pre-Platonic philosophers asking what BEING was & then after Plato the debate became about mind over matter while losing the original meaning & questions about BEING (Reality). A Must Read!

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