Book Description
An innovative thinker tackles the controversial question of why we believe in God and how religion shapes our lives and our future
For a growing number of people, there is nothing more important than religion. It is an integral part of their marriage, child rearing, and community. In this daring new book, distinguished philosopher Daniel C. Dennett takes a hard look at this phenomenon and asks why. Where does our devotion to God come from and what purpose does it serve? Is religion a blind evolutionary compulsion or a rational choice? In Breaking the Spell, Dennett argues that the time has come to shed the light of science on the fundamental questions of faith.
In a spirited narrative that ranges widely through history, philosophy, and psychology, Dennett explores how organized religion evolved from folk beliefs and why it is such a potent force today. Deftly and lucidly, he contends that the "belief in belief" has fogged any attempt to rationally consider the existence of God and the relationship between divinity and human need.
Breaking the Spell is not an antireligious screed but rather an eyeopening exploration of the role that belief plays in our lives, our interactions, and our country. With the gulf between rationalists and adherents of "intelligent design" widening daily, Dennett has written a timely and provocative book that will be read and passionately debated by believers and nonbelievers alike.
Customer Reviews:
There Is More Than One Way To Drown Yourself........2007-10-02
Dear Narrow Minded Reader (Yes, You),
Please try to refrain from immediately smothering me with your certainty of your own unmistaken intelligence, whether it is of a scientific bent or a religious one, be kind enough to give me a bit of breathing room, and carefully consider my position. I have read this book (carefully) and found that doing so was essentially a waste of my time. I don't feel this way because I adhere blindly to any religious belief, I am open to any real empirical evidence concerning religion or anything else. My reason for dismissing this book is that it doesn't get down to the real issue that it rests upon. I am not referring to the fact that the book is merely a proposal for scientific study of religion rather than being such a study (there is no empirical evidence of anything in this book except the fact that Dennett is an uncompromising materialist). No, the issue I refer to is deeper than that.
The whole Religion vs. Science battle will never resolve itself into anything fruitful because it is fought on too superficial a level. The soldiers on each side merely fling at their opposition big gobs of reasoning that, however skillfully constructed, are completely ineffectual. No one is ever convinced by the opposing side. Why? Because they are reasoning from different premises. That's all reasoning is: the logical unwinding of certain premises. If one person is reasoning from a premise of materialism and another from a premise of spiritualism then they cannot possibly arrive at any common ground no matter how finely they reason, in fact, the more finely they reason, the further away from each other they will become. The real issue is where the premises come from. Why does Dennett hold and reason from premises of materialism? How did he come by these premises? How did his opponents come by their opposing premises? It is pointless to say that they each came by their premises through reasoning because that gets us nowhere, it only takes us back to the unanswered question of the premises they are reasoning from. The materialists will say that Dennett came by his premises through empirical evidence. But that is not true. I am well read in this area and I know for a fact that there is no empirical evidence that proves that consciousness and all religious content in consciousness have a purely physiological nature and explanation. I also know that there is no religious or spiritual-philosophy explanation for the human condition that answers everything. The only FACT here is that we all eventually run up against the UNKNOWN and that some people react to this mystery by leaning on spiritual premises and some lean on materialist premises and that they are both questionable and should be questioned. The fact of the matter is that unless we allow the unknown to simply be what it is then we come by certain unexamined premises which allow us to construct a reasoned-out world-view. These premises are unexamined because we acquire them on a sub-conscious level as an individual emotional reaction to the fact of the UNKNOWN. They remain unexamined because we don't know how to bring their formation process into consciousness and are too frightened to try to learn how. But this would be a task truly worthy of our greatest effort. Much more worthy than flinging fantasies at each other.
I am all for empirical research into the question of what role the brain plays in the formation of human beliefs. I am against Dennett's materialist assumption that the brain contains all the answers. I am also against an assumption that it doesn't. Can we possibly rid ourselves of our unconscious premises and dive open-mindedly into the UNKNOWN? Probably not. Forgive me, dear reader, for proposing something as mad as taking off your life-saver while you are treading fathomless waters. Forgive me. Yes, go ahead and fling another gob.
Under a Spell.......2007-09-27
This book really make pne think about how religion has been used by Europe as a tool of mass brain washing, especially to those of colour, to it to justifiy racism and slavery.
Philosophically Weak.......2007-09-19
In this book Daniel Dennett tries to answer the question, `Why are we religious?' Looking at the issue from the standpoint of evolutionary biology, Dennett hopes to explain the origin and endurance of religion naturalistically.
Personally, I'm not completely opposed to this kind of project, nor am I particularly concerned about the results. There is no reason for Christians to worry about theories which naturalistically explain the tendency for people to be religious. There are several reasons for this, not least of which is the fact that providing explanations of the origin of beliefs are not grounds for dismissing the belief. To make such a dismissal would be to commit the genetic fallacy. The rationality of any given belief must be analyzed on its own merits.
And this is what Dennett fails miserably to do, which would be fine except for the fact that he promises to do it. If Dennett were merely describing the ways religion could naturalistically arrive, then there would be no problem. But the book is not quite neutral on the subject, and it is clear that Dennett thinks that there are actually good reasons to reject religious beliefs. In one short section, Dennett takes on the task of refuting natural theology. Yet, even by his own admission, the section contains little or no reasoning- it only gives broad pronouncements. To introduce the section, Dennett writes,
"At long last I turn to the promised consideration of arguments for the existence of God. And, having reviewed the obstacles- diplomatic, logical, psychological, and tactical- facing anybody who wants to do this constructively, I will give just a brief bird's-eye view of the domain of inquiry, expressing my own verdicts but not the reasoning that has gone into them, and providing references to a few pieces that may not be familiar to many." [240]
Did you catch that? Dennett admits that he is not going to provide any reasoning, but merely pronounce his own verdicts on the matter! Why on earth should he do that? It's already clear at this point in the book that Dennett is an atheist, so we are already aware of his `verdicts.' What we need is some solid reasoning.
And of course, what he does offer us on this subject is extremely weak. He brushes off historical arguments, claiming that they are manifestly question-begging. Well, some of the most unsophisticated ones are, but this does not show that all historical argumentation is useless. Dennett apparently thinks that the only historical arguments are the ones of the fashion:
1. The Bible is God's word.
2. God makes no mistakes.
3. Therefore, the Bible makes no mistakes.
And, therefore (of course), we know that God exists, because the Bible tells us so! Of course these sorts of arguments are absolute trash, but what about arguments for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, which do not assume that the Bible is perfect but merely considers the books of the New Testament (and others) as historical sources. Dennett probably doesn't think that a good case for the resurrection can be made, but the point is simply that he cannot brush off all forms of historical argumentation as if there is nothing substantial to discuss.
Philosophy is actually Dennett's primary expertise, so we should expect him to be particularly qualified to discuss philosophical arguments for God's existence. Here, again, he falls far short. He brushes off the Cosmological Argument with simplistic objections like `What caused God?' Then he basically dismisses the whole argument as too `arcane' to bother with. He doesn't even do this much when discussing the Design Argument, which he claims to have covered `quite extensively' in his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, and he decides to merely provide a summary from that book rather than offer any reason for us to think that the Design Argument is flawed.
And that's all there is to say about that. Whatever the use of this book, it certainly provides no compelling reason to think that God doesn't exist.
Besides developing an account of the naturalistic emergence and evolution of religious belief, Breaking the Spell also attempts to address the question, `Is religion good for us?' Dennett admits that much more research needs to be done before conclusions can be reached, an admission that he makes concerning almost every topic and theory discussed throughout the entire book. Yet, despite the fact that the data is too limited and the variables too many to come to a conclusion on the matter, Dennett still seems, at least implicitly, to conclude that religion is bad for us, or at least is seriously problematic.
Dennett does get quite a bit right. He is right that we should not try to shield religious beliefs and protect them from skeptical or reflective inquiry. He is right that we should pursue a great deal of research into these topics. I am personally not afraid of such scrutiny of my religious beliefs. But Dennett has a long way to go if he hopes to convince me that religion is only a natural phenomenon.
A Very Human Book.......2007-09-12
What to add to the many excellent reviews already posted?
Not long before I read BREAKING THE SPELL I had lunch with a couple of friends who were exercised about the utter irrationality of some of the religious types they knew. They just couldn't "get" what religious belief and affiliation was giving these folks.
After reading BREAKING THE SPELL I felt I "got it." Religion is a "natural phenomena." Irrational belief structures make sense in the right context. And it's the context Daniel Dennett provides, the most important aspect of which is how our brains are put together. (Be sure to read Stephen Pinker's HOW THE BRAIN WORKS too.)
So despite the fact Dennett gets thrown in with the most radical of religion attackers, I believe BREAKING THE SPELL comes across with a far more compassionate approach.
I believe, too, that accepting why human brains "naturally" create folk and organized religions is a better platform for curtailing the many and obvious problems with religion -- especially the institutionalized lack of compassion for others -- than outright antipathy.
I've already sent copies to friends who've been deeply hurt by religion, especially American fundamentalist "Christianity." It's been healing for them.
Dr. Kirtland C Peterson
Often tedious but sometimes fascinating.......2007-09-05
This is a fascinating 200 page book trapped inside of a tedious 400 page tome. Dennett begins by offering some compelling possible analogies to religion, both positive and negative, and also quite a few interesting quotes. The material seems to get pretty thin rather quickly in the early going though, and I counted no less than four instances of Dennett saying "this is what this book is going to be about". Yeah, so get to the point already! His stated intentions of not wanting to bring down religion but instead open the religious up to the idea of scientific inquiry is not quite convincing. We ALREADY know what science thinks of religion, and Dennett himself is known to be quite hostile to even the notion of the "Prime Mover" of deism, to say nothing of the specialized God of Christianity. So he sort of comes off as a snake oil salesman with his analogy that maybe when the religious let go of that branch on the cliff, maybe they'll find that their feet are only inches from the ground.
The heart of the book is Dennett's "theory sketch" for a possible natural history of religions, mostly based on the science of self-propagating memes. This was by far the most engaging part of the book and I wish Dennett had actually made this the subject of an entire volume without the dishonest pretentions of trying to find common ground between science and religion that are present here.
Amazon.com
One of the best descriptions of the nature and implications of Darwinian evolution ever written, it is firmly based in biological information and appropriately extrapolated to possible applications to engineering and cultural evolution. Dennett's analyses of the objections to evolutionary theory are unsurpassed. Extremely lucid, wonderfully written, and scientifically and philosophically impeccable. Highest Recommendation!
Book Description
In a book that is both groundbreaking and accessible, Daniel C. Dennett, whom Chet Raymo of The Boston Globe calls "one of the most provocative thinkers on the planet," focuses his unerringly logical mind on the theory of natural selection, showing how Darwin's great idea transforms and illuminates our traditional view of humanity's place in the universe. Dennett vividly describes the theory itself and then extends Darwin's vision with impeccable arguments to their often surprising conclusions, challenging the views of some of the most famous scientists of our day.
Customer Reviews:
Complex and Entertaining.......2007-07-09
While Dennett comes off, at times, sounding pompous and headstrong, that may simply be because he is, in my opinion, correct about certain aspects of the human mind's ability to cope with conflicting beliefs. My personal religious beliefs aside, I do feel that, at a point, religion and evolutionary science do come into direct conflict. Some of Dennett's thoughts and ideas, in conjunction with Dawkins's ideas, can run a little wayward of what I would call science, but simply because the ideas are blended with speculation and opinion. For further reading on the evolutionary perspective of religious thought, I would recommend Scott Atran and Pascal Boyer. Again, I really enjoyed the book, my personal disagreements notwithstanding.
like good medicine.......2007-07-08
This is not an easy read. It's rocky, at times pedantic, somewhat oblique, and about as picky as a book on logic. Dennett has difficulty keeping the reader engaged in his point, as his examples tend to be somewhat obscure at times, and his verbosity often masks the clarity of his vision. I sometimes had to turn back to the beginning of the chapter to remind myself what he was trying to say. Luckily, he seems to understand this, and provides summary statements after each chapter -- good thing, because without these navigational aids, he can be difficult to follow.
However, what Dennett has achieved here will stand the test of time because it is USEFUL. He is able to look at all the objections to the theory of evolution by natural selection and take them apart logically, scientifically, and heuristically. These objections are not limited to the religious variety, but also include scientific backlashes to Darwin like those of Gould, Chomsky, and Kaufmann. In other words, if you want to understand the breadth and depth of Darwin's theory, this is a masterwork.
What it lacks is, unfortunately, what the back cover promises: a look at Darwinism in the light of ethics, morality, and culture. Sure, Dennett devotes a (delicious) chapter to the topic, invoking Nietzsche and Hobbes, and there are scattered sections in the book that are like mind candy for the intellectually thirsty reader. It's a good thing those brilliant sections are scattered randomly throughout the book, because they may be the only thing that keeps the general reader interested.
Unless you're a biologist or anthropologist, you may want to read something shorter and more to the point. This book is for scholars who want exactitude. And to those scholars, I say read this book as quickly as possible, because it's VERY hard to come back to after putting down for a week or so.
Unintelligent design explained.......2007-06-02
This book is a philosophical work rather than straight science, the author does an excellent job of looking at all the various species of darwinian theories and their mutations, from scientific,to pop culture to philosophical,and subjecting them to a harsh environment of critical thought and logic, so selecting out the fittest for survival at the end of the book.I may be a bit biased as I have come to the same conclusions as the author,that there is only one true version of natural selection that works with no god or intelligent design, nor any adaption via senses, or experience of any organism, it is pure random mutation followed by the environment killing off what is not the best,strongest or most efficient. It is certainly not the sort of touchy-feely stuff some people seem to seek to explain things, its cold and harsh,cruel and unforgiving, although the author keeps it less harsh that my own view of it, and rightly states in a way,that just because it is harsh,doesnt change the reality of how we feel it and percieve it, love is still love no matter its mechanical, survival,or other basis. If you feel that describing something like life or love in a cold hard scientific way will change your view of it ,ruin it for you, if you are that open to suggestion, dont read this book. If you want a great philosophical arguement to open your mind and cut through the B.S. and sugar coating,if you think in a scientific way, and yes it can be quite a harsh and cold look at things, then this book is an excellent read. The author has done an enormous amount of research and distilled it into one volume, and some of the arguements or view points will be unknown to most people,and quite useless in a way, but seeing so many view points is always good for anyone who likes to think deeply and be challenged. I didnt learn alot from this book that I hadnt already figured out for myself using common sense,yet really enjoyed it for its excellent arguements and insights, its enjoyable for the philosophical side even if you have no interest in the subject matter. Also highly recommended is the authors book on consciousness, although its fairly hard going as the concepts are alot harder to grasp than evolutions mechanisms.
Entertaining materialist philosophy.......2007-05-02
It is hard to imagine that a 600 plus page book on materialist philosophy could be entertaining and a fairly quick read, but it is. The tone is too dogmatic, and there is way too much space devoted to quibbling, but it is rare to find a book this informative and thought provoking.
Intellectually Stimulating.......2007-03-31
Darwin's Dangerous Idea is one of Daniel Dennett's more notable works, being a 1995 national book award finalist (as advertised on the cover). I'm not really sure why it didn't win though, because had I been on the panel of judges, I would probably have chosen it over the competition (whatever they were). The book thoroughly explains Darwin's theory of evolution with regard to biology (including its finer philosophical and technical details) and extends the theory even further to just about everything, including the universe itself. The basic premise being that complexity arises out of simplicity and this is precisely what it would take for anything in the known universe to be in existence today.
Dennett sees no contradiction for example, in how humans behave by explaining that memes (cultural elements) that influence our behaviours and which seem to have a far greater effect than genes on our future evolution are themselves merely products of genetic evolution. Think of it as many smaller cranes (tiny steps in evolution that build upon one another) building a better, bigger crane (i.e. humans capable of storing, producing and transmitting memes). As a philosopher, the man has a vast knowledge of science, biology and computer science, in particular. He is extremely well-read and explains his ideas with such lucidity, you'll be amazed at how he can actually get you to understand very complex ideas and examples.
I sometimes found myself unable to follow certain topics but every time, Dennett grabbed my hand and lifted me back into my seat of understanding with his natural flare of wanting more than anything, not to obfuscate in any way the message he is trying to get across. If only all educators were like that. He presents many examples and references from diverse fields in science and literature (e.g. Borge's Library of Babel) that will amaze and get you thinking. Dennett also critiques work by other scientists such as Stephen J. Gould and Noam Chomsky where relevant, to name just two. I learned a lot about science in general, not to mention artificial intelligence, architecture, philosophy and literature by reading this book.
The last chapter is very nice closure to his whole thesis. Despite being an atheist, Dennett does not see religion as completely evil and acknowledges the role it played (as a result of cultural evolution) that in some ways have benefitted mankind; not "spiritually" but at least in terms of comfort and artistic inspiration. At 586 pages, it is an extremely satisfying read. I'm eager to dig into his latest book, "Breaking the Spell" and one of his earlier works, "The Mind's, I" soon.
Amazon.com
Ever wondered who you are? Who you really are? This collection of writings and reflections by some of today's most notable thinkers is designed to enliven this most central, and most baffling, question in the philosophy of mind. In some ways, the questions posed and bantered about in this book are at the heart of all philosophical reasoning. They are the ultimate questions about the self. The Mind's I contains an astonishing variety of approaches to answering the question, "Who am I?" Between the covers of this book one encounters the literary erudition of Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges alongside the analytic rigor of John Searle. There are sophisticated metaphorical pieces (such as "The Princess Ineffabelle" by Polish philosopher and writer Stanislaw Lem), intriguing dialogues (like Raymond Smullyan's "Is God a Taoist?"), and serious but engaging philosophical essays from a host of thinkers (see Thomas Nagel's "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?").
Editors Hofstadter and Dennett--leading lights in the study of cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of mind--follow each selection with a short reflection designed to elaborate on their main themes. The Mind's I admirably broadens their fields to a more general audience. The book's essays are grouped into six categories, each successively raising the philosophical stakes by introducing new levels of complexity. Ultimately, one confronts some of the thorniest questions in modern philosophy here, such as the nature of free will, our place in the metaphysical world, and the possibility of genuine artificial intelligence. The book closes with a playful and perplexing piece by Robert Nozick, an adequate summation to The Mind's I. He writes, "Perhaps God has not decided yet whether he has created, in this world, a fictional world or a real one.... Which decision do you hope for?" --Eric de Place
Book Description
From some of the 20th century's greatest thinkers, essays on topics as diverse as artificial intelligence, evolution, science fiction, philosophy, reductionism, and consciousness With contributions from Jorge Luis Borges, Richard Dawkins, John Searle, and Robert Nozick, The Mind's I explores the meaning of self and consciousness through the perspectives of literature, artificial intelligence, psychology, and other disciplines. In selections that range from fiction to scientific speculations about thinking machines, artificial intelligence, and the nature of the brain, Hofstadter and Dennett present a variety of conflicting visions of the self and the soul as explored through the writings of some of the twentieth century's most renowned thinkers.
Customer Reviews:
Mine's Aye.......2007-02-21
Look if you're here, then you want this book.
You can't have landed on this page by accident. There is no search that does not include Dennet or Hofstadter or Dawkins or cognitive psychology or philosophy of the mind that brings you hear. So, yes, you want to buy this book.
Two of the most important advents in cognitive and evolutionary psychology take shape rather easily in these pages. The first is Dr Hofstadter PRELUDE... ANT FUGUE; the second is Richard Dawkins extention of genetic principles - to mimetic principles.
If you're new to the term, think "mimetics" is the genetics of "ideas." Why do some slogans survive? Why does some information survive? Why do some idea-conepts - capitalism, pop music, Dora the Explorer - survive in the hive of the Group Mind of society while other ideas - the pet rock, the betamax, the Edsel - die?
Mimetics is the study of the 'survival of the fittest' of ideas. It is the cognitive extension of natural selection.
Second, is meta-yet-unmeta presentation of Hofstadter's PRELUDE... ANT FUGUE. In a subconsciously self-aware narrative (best way to describe it), the story of Anteater and her relationship with an Anthill describes how the cognition and consciousness of the human mind may have arisen from the 'simple' electrical impulses of neurons firing.
The third critical piece of the triumverate of evolutionary cognition (in my opinion) is contained inside Daniel Dennett's book CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED. In that, he describes how external 'orientation events' might unify the random 'reactions' of a primitive organism to its environment, into a *conscious* pattern of response by organism to its external environment.
If you're new to these ideas, this place is a great place to start because - being a collection of essays - it can be read and pondered at a personal pace.
And the commentary provided ain't by no slouches either.
****The only caveat would be if you do have an expansive background in cognitive philosophy or evolutionary psychology - much of this work is reprinted from previous sources. Obviously, Dawkins and Hofstadter's most famous work is taken from their most famous books. However, the commentary and additional selections by the two authors is valuable to any student of this subject.
Tickle your philosophical funny bone.......2006-01-25
I first read "The Mind's I" in high school and regularly reread its various essays.
Even with a quarter-century of age, it hasn't lost any of its luster. Indeed, with advances in cognitive science and neuroscience giving more empirical underpinning to at least a few of the speculations in this book, its mental value has actually increased.
Although you may not agree with the philosphical angle of each essay, you won't be able to honestly disagree without having your own cognition and philosophical views deeply scratched and stimulated.
Brilliant, but Soulless........2005-08-30
The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self & Soul by Douglas R. Hofstadter
Douglas Hofstadter uses a combination of science fiction short stories and commentary to comprise a withering and devastating attack on the ego, soul, and afterlife. Hofstadter's thesis is that human beings are nothing but DNA propagation robots. He argues against the existence of a soul and against the existence of an after-life. He lets various Sci-Fi stories make his arguments for him. Taken alone, these stories are thought provoking. Taken together along with Hofstadter's commentary its like getting hit by the Mac truck of reality. If your religious convictions regarding the soul and after-life are tenuous, you may not want to read this book. You may finish feeling smug, soulless, and bitter.
Delightful Entertainment with Plenty of Variety.......2005-05-31
The book is an anthology of material excerpted from elsewhere -- each essay followed by "reflections" by Dennet and/or Hofstadter. There is plenty of variety, so I guarantee you will find some essays utterly delightful and entertaining -- wether or not you fancy yourself as one who would normally pursue philsophy of mind or epistemology. The "Princess Ineffabelle" is delightful in its poetry -- even for me, a lover of highly analytical discourse. "Is God a Taoist?" is a wonderful example of the socratic dialog -- but entertaining and insightful both as well (and also, as the "reflections" claim, even pious). "The Epistemological Nightmare" is just so many things -- including outright funny. Insights abound here too though -- especially in the "reflections". You think you are "the final aribiter" of what it is like to be you. You know what tastes good to you, etc. The editors show how this is not so unquestionably true. The very fact that we allow "evidence" to support our critiques means that, e.g. taste-testing failures of yours would have to discredit you. If you dis-allow that possibility from the start, you didn't have a test or evidence in the first place. I gave a bit of detail on "The Epistemological Nightmare", I know -- but this gives you a taste for how you will be simultaneously entertained (even to outright laughing), given insights, and prompted to think in ways you never would have thought of. There's plenty of variety to pick from in the book. Go anywhere, any time.
dated but still worth the time.......2005-05-06
This is a followup to Hofstadter's famous Godel, Escher, Bach (1980)(see my review). Like its predecessor, it is concerned mostly with the foundations of artificial intelligence, but it is composed mostly of stories, essays and extracts from a wide range of people, with a few essays by DH and DD and comments to all of the contributions by one or the other of them.
Much of it is very reductionistic in tone(ie, explain everything in terms of physics/math) but as Hofstadter notes, the quantum field equations of a water molecule are too complex to solve(and so is a vacuum)and nobody has a clue about how to explain the way properties emerge(eg, water properties from H2 and 02) as you go up the scale from the vacuum to the brain, so reductionism, like holism, requires a great deal of faith. There is not only the uncertainty principle, and chaos(eg, no way to predict how a pile of sand will fall) but the logically necessary incompleteness of math, which is now fused at the highest levels with physics(eg, string theory). Godels incompleteness theorem was a central theme of his first book.
This is really a psychology text, though perhaps none of the authors realized it. It is about human behavior and reasoning-about why we think and act the way we do. But(like all such discussion until recently) none of the explanations are really explanations. Nobody discusses the mental mechanisms involved. In fact,like most 'explanations` of behavior the texts here and the comments by DH and DD are often more interesting for what kinds of things they accept as explanations(and omit), than for the actual content. As with all reasoning and explaining one now wants to know which of the brains inference engines are activated to produce the authors biases and results. It is the relevance filters which determine what sorts of things we can accept as appropriate data for each engine and their automatic and unconscious operation and interaction that determines what we can accept as an answer.
Cognitive and evolutionary psychology are still not evolved enough to provide full explanations but an interesting start has been made. Boyer's `Religion Explained` shows what a modern scientific explanation of human behavior looks like. Pinker's `How the mind Works` is a good general survey. See several of the recent texts(ie, 2004 onwards) with evolutionary psychology in the title or the web for further info.
We now recognize that art,music,math,language and religion are all results of the automatic functioning of the inference engines. This is why we can expect similarities and puzzles and inconsistencies or incompleteness and often, dead ends. The brain has no general intelligence but numerous specialized modules or inference engines, each of which works on certain aspects of some problem and the results are then added. Hofstadter, like everyone, can only generate or recognize explanations that are consistent with the operations of his own inference engines, which were evolved to deal with such things as resource accumulation, coalitions in small groups, social exchanges and the evaluation of the intentions of other persons. It is amazing they can produce art or music or math and not surprising that figuring out how they themselves work together to produce overall intelligence or consciousness or choice is way beyond reach even 25 years later.
The article on Turing (and many others) left me thinking- 'Oh where is Wittgenstein when we need him!' Turing attended W's lectures on the foundations of math but he does not seem to have understood them(not surprising as almost nobody else did). As W so famously said, decades before this book was written--`Philosophy is the battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language`(or we might now say by the brain's inference engines) and it is a battle that DH and DD have lost. Wittgenstein is one of the most original and influential thinkers of all time but there is no evidence of this in any of the writings of either of them to this day. He explained in detail how the language games of simulation(eg, Turing test of computer thinking), imitation, pretense, belief, etc., are parasitic on knowing and understanding. We are told(p94) that we 'believe' in other minds( try disbelieving--eg, look at your child or even your dog and think `this is just a robot, or imagine you step on it's foot and it howls and you think `its doing that for the same reason noise comes out of the radio when I turn it on`) and that we treat others as black boxes--- but only the mentally ill or autistic do that(ask yourself how we know that). It is only computers that we treat as black boxes and about which we might have beliefs concerning their interior processes. DH stopped writing such books after this one but DD continues to this day to produce treatises full of the same basic confusions(as do thousands of others).
By far the best philosophical article in the book is John Searle's famous `Minds, Brains and Programs` in which he introduces the Chinese room argument, which shows why computer programs don't think(NOT why they cannot ever be designed to think--he continues to point out to this day that WE are examples of computing devices that think!). DD and DH offer superficial and arrogant criticisms but Searle is now widely regarded as the top living philospher and the Chinese room is probably the most famous philosophical debate of the last 100 years. It would have saved them alot of embarassment if they had just offered to let Searle coedit the book, or at least rebut their comments.
Nagel's lovely `What is it like to be a bat` shows that we don't have any idea what an answer is like, nor how to even try to find one. In this respect its quite similar to Searle's comments on AI--nobody to this day has any idea what a program mimicing thinking would be like, nor even how to go about making one. Some say neural nets and fuzzy logic are like the brain, but what is the evidence? Searle has made similar comments in his criticisms of those like Dennet, who claim to explain consciousness(eg, see `The Mystery of Consciousness`) and the same applies to free will, causality, perception etc. So far as I can see, neither this book nor GEB, nor any of their others, further the study of mind in any way. We did not then and do not now(ie, 25 years later) know how to conceptualize thinking(or consciousness, uncertainty, entanglement, wave/particle duality, free will etc) nor even how to recognize what such an explanatory concept would look like. But DD and DH did not get the point.
DH has new(since GEB) speculations on how music, art, math and programs may map onto each other but they don't seem to go anywhere. He has some new Q & A sessions, so extensively used in GEB, but they seem to leave only questions and on the key issue of how programs might be like thinking, the only convincing reply is that of Searle--we don't even know how to conceptualize the difference. So DH winds up just as lost as DD `Maybe, just like beauty, the sound `I` denotes nothing at all`(p456). If 'I' means nothing then so do all other words. DD says the Chinese room aims to refute materialism and that it fails as an argument because the room is too slow--both clearly untrue. And now, after 40 years of philosophizing(eg, in C`Consciousness Explained` and in `Freedom Evolves`), he repeats the same mistakes that Wittgenstein pointed out 70 years ago.
We ought to consider it extremely odd that any philosopher should think he can answer empirical questions. Thinking, feeling, perceiving, choosing, etc are phenomena of the world like any others and we can investigate them in various ways. But how can anyone investigate them by thinking? A philospher cannot answer questions about genetics, chemistry or physics, but when it comes to the realm of mind, consciousness, perception, free will, causality, reality, they feel qualified--why? Like all behavior, we now look at the operations of the inference engines to see why they make us think like this. Is it the operations of the intuitive psychology and social mind engines that forces them to deny the reality of the very things they are investigating(eg, thinking, consciousness, choice)?
DH makes a glaringly stupid remark --comparing LSD effects to a bullet through the brain(p412). By 1981 millions of people had taken LSD and there were hundreds of books and thousands of articles and numerous films showing that it was precisely its ability to specifically trigger emotions, memories, images, intellectual and visual fantasies etc that gives it such great power and interest.
They attempt(p403) an explanation of mirror reversal, but in spite of this and Ned Block's article(J. Phil p259-77. 1974) and even one by Feynmann, I think the only complete explanation is that found in the book and article by British psychologist Richard Gregory.
Because of the wide range of famous writers represented, this book is still well worth reading. Where else can you find Turing, Searle's Chinese room, Nagels famous `What is it like to be a bat?`and several xlnt selections from Sci Fi writer Stanislaw Lem?
Perhaps the bottom line here is that 25 years of research in AI and programming by tens of thousands of people with billions of dollars have failed to produce a program that can perceive and respond like a 3 month old baby, or a robot with the real world intelligence of an ant. Cognitive psychology is slowly exposing the inference engines that make it possible and one day,probably, we can mimic them with a program. Even so, it is not clear how to decide if it is thinking!.
Book Description
How are we able to understand each other in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, Daniel Dennett asserts in this first full scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.
The 10 essays included here represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought, push his theories into surprising new territory, and reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind
Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of Brainstorms and Elbow Room. A Bradford Book
Customer Reviews:
An intro to Dennett's thought on consciousness.......2006-01-25
Anybody who wants to seriously wrestle with Dennett's thought on consciousness needs to start here, then move to "Consciousness Explained," and from there to "Freedom Evolves." (It is an update of "Elbow Room," which means that can be skipped. And, although it has some germs of Dennett's thought, "Brainstorms" can also be bypassed.)
Does one have to have a philosophy course touching on intentionality before reading this book? No, not if one is well-enough read in philosophy, psychology or sociology in general to grasp the background of Dennett's ideas.
I rate this a star higher than most of Dennett's later work primarily because it is more introductory, and so we see less of Dennett tripping himself up or avoiding some of the logical conclusions of his speculations.
That said, Dennett is never dull or boring; agree or disagree, he will stimulate your thought.
Professor Dennett and his friends.......2003-05-10
I am a cognitive science doctoral student. I read this book with a basic background in Philosophy of Mind but without having read all of the main articles in the field.
First, the title... "The intentional stance." The uninitiated will not know that this refers to a subfield of the philosophy of mind called "intentionality." Does Dennett bother giving an overview of the field for those who are unfamiliar with it? No. He makes cute references to the main scholars in this field all over the place, and their main articles and results, etc., leaving all the readers who are not already familiar with his work in the dark. To a reader like me, this book is basically a conversation between Dennett and his friends. It's kind of hilarious to read actually.
Second, the book is completely unstructured. His second chapter presents his theory (again only understandable to those who have closely followed the intentionality debate before reading it), and beyond that, it's "All of Dennett's Thoughts in No Particular Order with No Conclusion."
So basically, this is academic literature at its worst. Only to be read by those who are obligated to because they are scholars in the field. I would have given it a 3 but I took a point off for nauseating arrogance and another point off for an equally arrogant lack of structure ("I am so important that they will read my book and SEARCH for the main points, because they have to!"). I guess there are a few new ideas in it, but Dennett's high falutin', extremely arrogant prose seems to be designed for his own pleasure and for the pleasure of his old boy's club of philosopher friends.
Personally I keep it next to my bed and read it before going to sleep. It's better than sleeping pills. Definitely recommended for the insomniacs.
My real recommendation is to take a serious course in intentionality before reading this book.
Ps - those who have read "Consciousness Explained" will find this book much worse. Consciousness Explained was equally arrogant (nice title) but at least readable by someone who is not already an expert in the field.
A Classic.......2003-02-16
I believe this work should be considered a classic given the enormous influence the articles in it have had on philosophy of mind, among other areas in philosophy. Much in here is stated more clearly about the Intentional Stance than it is in later works, such as Brain Children. That isn't a criticism. I think that around the time this work was published Dennett was more into legitimizing and explaining the Intentional Stance than into polishing up his account of mind. Indeed in later works, such as "Consciousness Explained" and "Kinds of Minds", he builds off the foundation he laid here to develop his account of mind more fully.
In IS, Dennett comments on just which philosophical schools he aligns himself with, for instance, interpretivism, methodological behaviorism, and functionalism. Part of the message to take home about exactly where he aligns himself is that it isn't really important to him. He lays his arguments down and lets others worry about whether that makes him an interpretivist or methodological behaviorist. A clearer statement of his position regarding categorization of his views can be found in the "Back to the Drawing Board" chapter in "Dennett and His Critics".
In later works, Dennett further clarifies in what sense the entities the Intentional Stance makes use of are real, entities such as beliefs and desires. The most important of these later works is probably "Real Patterns", which appears in "Brain Children". In short, beliefs are part of compression algorithms of behavior that has been subjected to radical interpretation (See Davidson) from the Intentional Stance. A compression algorithm is (you guessed it) something that compresses some series of data. For instance, imagine you wanted to print 1000 1's and you had a computer that understood a programming language that would allow you to do so. One way to output the 1000 1's would be to specify that the computer print 1 and to repeat this command a thousand times. This doesn't compress anything however. Instead, you might tell the computer to "print 1 x 1000". This program has far fewer bits than does 1000 1's. 1000 1's has 1000 bits; the program has around log (base 2) 1000 bits. Hence, because it has fewer bits than what itd output does, that program is a compression algorithm of what it outputs. I recommend reading Gregory Chaitin for further info on Algorithmic Information Theory. In "Real Patterns" (in Brain Children), Dennett makes nice use of the mathematical definition of randomness to define compression algorithms and to set a plausible standard for what makes something a useful abstract object and thus, in a sense, just as real as are all the other useful scientific objects. Much more can be said about this, but this is enough for now.
This book is an excellent starting point for future study. Dennett's writing is as always engaging, insightful, and fairly straightforward.
Customer Reviews:
science intersecting with philosophy.......2007-06-01
Philosophy is one of the oldest intellectual pursuits. Yet it is only in very recent times that science is starting to provide an underpinning. The status of this is argued in this book. With some of the latest results and trends in neuroscience as the talking point.
The book is formatted with 2 scientists providing views on consciousness, as gleaned from experiments. While the contrary opinions are given by 2 philosophers. With the scientists then given space to issue a reply.
Whatever your own positions on all this, perhaps you can appreciate the excitement in the air. For the first time, philosophy has hard experimental observations to cogit over. And the problem of consciousness is surely one of the fundamental unknowns in science.
Amazon.com
Consciousness is notoriously difficult to explain. On one hand, there are facts about conscious experience--the way clarinets sound, the way lemonade tastes--that we know subjectively, from the inside. On the other hand, such facts are not readily accommodated in the objective world described by science. How, after all, could the reediness of clarinets or the tartness of lemonade be predicted in advance? Central to Daniel C. Dennett's attempt to resolve this dilemma is the "heterophenomenological" method, which treats reports of introspection nontraditionally--not as evidence to be used in explaining consciousness, but as data to be explained. Using this method, Dennett argues against the myth of the Cartesian theater--the idea that consciousness can be precisely located in space or in time. To replace the Cartesian theater, he introduces his own multiple drafts model of consciousness, in which the mind is a bubbling congeries of unsupervised parallel processing. Finally, Dennett tackles the conventional philosophical questions about consciousness, taking issue not only with the traditional answers but also with the traditional methodology by which they were reached.
Dennett's writing, while always serious, is never solemn; who would have thought that combining philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience could be such fun? Not every reader will be convinced that Dennett has succeeded in explaining consciousness; many will feel that his account fails to capture essential features of conscious experience. But none will want to deny that the attempt was well worth making. --Glenn Branch
Book Description
Consciousness is notoriously difficult to explain. On one hand, there are facts about conscious experience--the way clarinets sound, the way lemonade tastes--that we know subjectively, from the inside. On the other hand, such facts are not readily accommodated in the objective world described by science. How, after all, could the reediness of clarinets or the tartness of lemonade be predicted in advance? Central to Daniel C. Dennett's attempt to resolve this dilemma is the "heterophenomenological" method, which treats reports of introspection nontraditionally--not as evidence to be used in explaining consciousness, but as data to be explained. Using this method, Dennett argues against the myth of the Cartesian theater--the idea that consciousness can be precisely located in space or in time. To replace the Cartesian theater, he introduces his own multiple drafts model of consciousness, in which the mind is a bubbling congeries of unsupervised parallel processing. Finally, Dennett tackles the conventional philosophical questions about consciousness, taking issue not only with the traditional answers but also with the traditional methodology by which they were reached.Dennett's writing, while always serious, is never solemn; who would have thought that combining philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience could be such fun? Not every reader will be convinced that Dennett has succeeded in explaining consciousness; many will feel that his account fails to capture essential features of conscious experience. But none will want to deny that the attempt was well worth making. --Glenn Branch
Customer Reviews:
Baffling........2007-08-04
It's absolutely baffling to me how Dennett's theory has been completely misunderstood and mis-characterized by his critics and some of his readers.
Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon that results from us being able, not only to see things and notice things, but to notice we notice. And we notice that too. We notice we see red, and this "noticing" is what we confuse as qualia. Of course, it's much, much more complex than this, and this is why he has devoted an entire book to it. Thus, people who complain that this book is too "long" or "wordy" also appear ridiculous under scrutiny. Does one really expect to properly lay the foundations of a consciousness theory in something shorter? It should also be emphasized that this is the foundations, not the explicit and detailed explanation of every inner working that gives rise to emotions. Thus, people who were looking for this impossible feat will also be disappointed.
My only criticism is that sometimes his treatment of qualia seems to dwell too much on the ineffable quality of it: no, I don't think we could ever describe red to someone who hadn't seen it before, but this isn't a proper problem for physicalism, if treated properly. Additionally, his Chinese room response is a bit more baffling than helpful.
A nice itnroduction to the scientific issue of consciousness........2007-05-19
Though it is a bit long, Consciousness Explained really does explain quite a bit about consciousness, putting forth a new theory of what, exactly, it is. Another book I highly recommend.
The Best Book on Consciousness I've Seen So Far.......2007-04-15
This book's great drawback is that it is probably overly long. I'm sure the basic ideas could have been laid out more succinctly with much greater verbal economy. That said, however, it is probably the case that there are few books out there which do a better job of deconstructing the idea of consciousness. This is a big debate, particularly among some philosophers, no doubt reflecting the tendency to want to believe in the specialness of consciousness. But it's Dennett's contention that consciousness is not so special after all, that it is a natural result of evolutionary forces and that it can be adequately explained in mechanistic terms, thus discarding the misleading "ghost in the machine" notion which seems to infect our thinking about mind at every turn.
Dennett's major antagonist in this debate has been John Searle whose Chinese Room argument has been deployed again and again to deny the possibility which Dennett is here asserting, that consciousness is basically a natural phenomenon (Searle agrees, by the way that consciousness is natural, while arguing against a genuinely naturalistic description). Dennett spends a lot of time exploring side paths and building alternative models for understanding consciousness as he works to get his reader to jettison old notions about the mind as an entity uniquely set apart from the things it attends to, what he calls the "central meaner" or the audience in the Cartesian theater (alluding to Descarte's insight that our mental life is qualitatively different from the physical world we encounter). Dennet builds his case by exploring recent research on brains and human behavior as well as by sketching out an evolutionary picture about how consciousness may have come to be. But he does not get around to dealing with Searle's Chinese Room argument until the book's end and then it is almost as though it were an afterthought.
It's the great strength of Dennett's book that, in fact, Searle's argument seems, by the time he comes to it, to be worth no more than that. Dennett rightly shows that Searle's argument fails because Searle insufficiently depicts the level of computer functionality required to generate and sustain a conscious mind. Where Searle, in his argument, notes that the simple mechanism of a look up table could not possibly constitute a program capable of creating mental life, Dennett rightly points out that this fails to address the problem since it is not a simple look up table that is at the heart of the claim of the AI people. If Searle's Chinese Room argument, constituted as Searle constitutes it, is inadequate for the purpose, this is yet to say nothing about the sort of system that would be required and is theoretically available. It is not a Chinese Room on the Searlean model that must be considered but, perhaps, using the same metaphor, a Chinese Building or a Chinese City. The capacity for sustaining consciousness would necessarily require a vast complex of systems and, as Dennett notes, it is this complex of systems itself, the full system, that would have to do the trick. Searle's argument says nothing about THAT model and so misses the point.
Dennett patiently explains how the systems would need to overlay one another and how this accords with the evolutionary evidence in the biological world as well as with the model of programs on computers which he likens to virtual machines on a platform of real machines. He carefully lays out the the way computers developed, as serial machines and proposes that since the brain is not a serial machine but a parallel processor, there would probably be the need to use the new parallel computing technologies coming on line as the platform, with virtual serial machines (their programs) running on them.
This is not a popular view in some quarters since the notion that we are merely machines is troubling to many. But Dennett does his best to defuse the notion while pointing out how the philosophical ideas of zombiehood and qualia really carry no water. He doesn't offer arguments so much as a debunking of these quaint notions with an eye toward opening us up toward the mechanistic model, dispelling our natural fear of embracing such a view. In the end he tells us there are no souls and no afterlife but that there's no reason this need scare us. And he gives us a basis for retaining a belief in a moral point of view despite this loss.
In all, this is a longish but excellent exposition of his profoundly materialistic ideas. One thing did strike me though and that was his overly clever swipes at political conservatism and the Reagan administration (he was writing this book during that era). At one point relatively early on he makes a somewhat snide backhand strike at what he obviously thinks is the low level of intellect to be found in the administration of that era, and punctures their seemingly foolish notion that cutting taxes will increase revenue. The Laffer Curve, which predicts just this result, is a hunk of hooey he suggests. Only one problem. The empirical evidence since those years is against his view. In fact government revenues did surge because the economy improved as a result of the Reagan tax cuts and they surged again when Bush II cut taxes early in his first term and again in 2003. Combined with the evidence of tax revenue jumps after the tax cuts of the JFK years, we are now 3 for 3 in terms of this argument. It just goes to show you that even smart guys like Dennett, who clearly has a strong handle on the idea of consciousness, are driven at times by their own biases and pre-existing beliefs.
SWM
Kick a rock!.......2007-02-26
The problem is that if you take a simple animal or machine, it won't be conscious. Make it slightly more complicated and it still won't be conscious. But as you make it more and more complicated there comes a point when it becomes conscious. This idea is very unsatisfactory. What actually causes this self-awareness?
Dennett overcomes the problem by arguing there is no mystery - we are simply not as conscious as we think! As the machine becomes more complicated it merely appears to be conscious, but consciousness doesn't actually mean anything. To prove this fantastic idea, he describes scientific experiments which show that consciousness is more mysterious than a layman would think. The book is worth reading for these insights, but he doesn't prove his case.
I was reminded of Dr Johnson's reply when asked about the theory of solipsism (the idea that nothing exists except your own thoughts). He kicked a rock and said "I refute it thus."
Only a very clever man could believe Dennett's theory.
The Introduction to Consciousness.......2007-02-25
"Consciousness Explained" is the best place to start if you want to begin the venture into this perplexing area. Dennett's books is well organized, well thought out, and does a wonderful job of explaining difficult concepts in a way that is interesting and relatively easy to understand.
Another reviewer titles his review "Consciousness Denied." That is a fair comment. Many people think that Dennett explains away consciousness, rather than explaining it. In fact, I agree with that critism myself -- I think. I tend to agree with John Searle (again -- think). The one star rating, however, is grossly unfair. Consciousness is a very hard problem, to put it mildly, and Dennett's reasoning and opinions are crucial for two reasons. First, they are very well thought out, and well expressed. Moreover, Dennett is one of the key writers in the area, and if you read anything else about consciousness, you will find references and responses to Dennett.
Other authors worth reading in this area include John Searle (no friend of Dennett), Susan Blackmore, Steven Pinker, David Chalmers, V. S. Ramachandran and Antonio Damasio.
Book Description
In the years since Daniel Dennett's influential Consciousness Explained was published in 1991, scientific research on consciousness has been a hotly contested battleground of rival theories -- "so rambunctious," Dennett observes, "that several people are writing books just about the tumult." With Sweet Dreams, Dennett returns to the subject for "revision and renewal" of his theory of consciousness, taking into account major empirical advances in the field since 1991 as well as recent theoretical challenges.
In Consciousness Explained, Dennett proposed to replace the ubiquitous but bankrupt Cartesian Theater model (which posits a privileged place in the brain where "it all comes together" for the magic show of consciousness) with the Multiple Drafts Model. Drawing on psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, he asserted that human consciousness is essentially the mental software that reorganizes the functional architecture of the brain. In Sweet Dreams, he recasts the Multiple Drafts Model as the "fame in the brain" model, as a background against which to examine the philosophical issues that "continue to bedevil the field."
With his usual clarity and brio, Dennett enlivens his arguments with a variety of vivid examples. He isolates the "Zombic Hunch" that distorts much of the theorizing of both philosophers and scientists, and defends heterophenomenology, his "third-person" approach to the science of consciousness, against persistent misinterpretations and objections. The old challenge of Frank Jackson's thought experiment about Mary the color scientist is given a new rebuttal in the form of "RoboMary," while his discussion of a famous card trick, "The Tuned Deck," is designed to show that David Chalmers's Hard Problem is probably just a figment of theorists' misexploited imagination. In the final essay, the "intrinsic" nature of "qualia" is compared with the naively imagined "intrinsic value" of a dollar in "Consciousness -- How Much is That in Real Money?"
Customer Reviews:
The Mystery of the Zombie Hunch.......2006-03-29
As the concept of the modular structure of the brain emerged, objections to the idea took the form of "Well, if my brain's made up of computers, somebody in there has to be in charge. It had better be me!" This comment, paraphrased from philosopher Jerry Fodor, typifies what Daniel Dennett has been contending with for many years. Although the "Cartesian theatre" notion, that the body was one aspect of our being and the mind another - "dualism" - has supposedly been supplanted, it has not lost its hold on our view of consciousness. We continue to insist, in some form or other, that "somebody, and it better be me" is inside our minds looking out at the world. Although we can't find that "self" in there, we have a hunch it's there.
When Dennett wrote "Consciousness Explained" in 1991, it seemed the "homunculus" representing our "self" had been laid to rest. This excellent collection of essays and lectures, is an update on that earlier work. As lectures, they have a conversational tone, yet impart many deep insights. Addressing consciousness through four major themes, Dennett shows us the project of eradicating "dualism" remains incomplete. Until that view of "self" is discarded, our understanding of consciousness will remain misleading.
The first theme he addresses is the "zombie". Philosophers have posed the idea that a duplicate person, identical to you in every way but one, is logically possible. The person would act as you act, talk as you do, have the same preferences and distastes. But it would not be conscious. This proposal presumes that something in you could be identified that is lacking in the zombie. For most of us, who still feel our "self" remains somehow separate within us, the logic seems reasonable. Dennett carefully examines the implications of the proposal, and dismisses it as modernised dualism. If a region of the brain holds the key to "self" it remains out of sight and undetectable.
Perhaps the most challenging segment of the book deals with "heterophenomonology". This tongue-twisting phrase refers to the methods used in cognitive science. Because consciousness is "often celebrated as a mystery beyond science" Dennett challenges researchers to take a step back from commonly accepted techniques. Become a "Martian" cognitive scientist to broaden the scope of the work. One facet of this approach relies on understanding what "folk psychology" is, then building from there. We prefer to believe that what we believe is entirely private and unaccessible. Heterophenomonolgy, he contends, will expose aspects of our consciousness we view as a "mystery".
One of those "mysteries" has been wrapped in the idea of "qualia". Probably one of the poorest concepts in philosophy, "qualia" are things said to possess "intrinsic qualities". When you carefully examine those "intrinsic" properties, they begin to fade and vanish. If "qualia" is in an object we see, such as colour, how can it change without our noticing? Tests of "change blindness" indicate we can miss much concerning "qualia". Even the philosophic community, Dennett notes, cannot agree on a definition of "qualia". Yet, like the homunculus in the mind viewing the world, it steadfastly remains in use. The author examines this idea further in relating the story of "Mary", the colour-deprived scientist.
In "Consciousness Explained", Dennett proposed the Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness and cognition. In this collection, he enhances the original concept. With no centre in the brain, consciousness necessarily must be a distributed process. The progress of imaging and other technologies have expanded our view of the brain's functions. Dennett argues that the brain is "fame" not "television". The process is one of competition for dominance, no matter how fleeting. The mind is not a "top-down" or "bottom-up" process, but a "sideways" one. Ideas, experiences and other informational bits jostle for "clout". It's not easy to shed the idea of a special "self" in your mind, but all that's going on in there is still you.
As usual, Dennett has challenged successfully the "established" views of consciousness. Clearly, he argues, consciousness is neither an arcane "mystery" nor beyond serious and definitive investigation. The mind-set erecting barricades using the bricks of "qualia" and the mortar of the "Cartesian theatre" can, and must be, overcome for serious investigation to proceed. Delicacy and care must be employed, but the prize is understanding. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
Not his best, but..........2006-03-14
This was certainly not his best book - a rather imperfectly thrown-together collection of material, and in need of some editing. But Dennet is truly one of the greats, and always worth reading. If you are a fan, you will certinly want to read this one, and probably own it too. On the other hand, if you haven't read his 'Breaking the Spell' yet, DEFINITELY buy and read that first - it is 10 times more exciting.
Most obstinate denial of the most obvious.......2006-02-08
The author fancies himself a Copernicus, by, similarly to the reversal of the notion that the sun revolves around the earth, rendering the notion of consciousness an "illusion" (last word, p.178). His ego is indeed enormous, my knowing of no other author quoting (p.45) and incessantly citing his own writing.
The notion of the sun revolving is an inference, from observing its change of position relative to the earth, and motion indeed is considered relative. But consciousness is not an inference. It is the most immediate phenomenon by which everything we know, or imagine, is manifested. Dennett persistently investigates distinctions in our brains, from dispositions to memories, often couching them in esoteric or otherwise unfamiliar terms, while sidestepping the simple fact that whatever the detailed particulars, all is presented to us through the medium of consciousness.
He puts great emphasis on the third-person approach, like questioning a subject about his perceptions, so as to discover misunderstandings about the inner workings of the mind, forgetting that all of these, whether actual perceptions or beliefs or else, are ingredients of consciousness. This his "scientific method", compared to first-person introspection, is the only approved one.
It is shared by others. Like Patricia Churchland, he has contempt for "folk" psychology, pitting it against favored "academic" (p.35). They also share a derogatory attitude toward dissenters, regarding them as reactionaries (p.8) or naysayers. The views are admittedly materialist, holding Cartesian dualism of mind and body "bankrupt" or a "disaster", as does John Searle.
Why? Descartes is not in line with their assumed all-inclusive scientific method, embraced also by philosophers, who traditionally delved deeper into issues of knowledge. I do so newly in my book and here wish to note that however physical inquiry progresses, consciousness, via which the inquiry is made, remains a distinct phenomenon.
Consciousness Explained stands up to scrutiny.......2005-08-21
This book is essentially a follow-up to the author's previous work Consciousness Explained. Dennett revises and builds upon the ideas he put forward in that book, and addresses some of the criticism that has been leveled against his theory of consciousness in the intervening years. He also reviews some of the development (or lack thereof!) in the study of and debate over the question of consciousness over the past few years.
As always, Daniel Dennett presents his ideas with great precision and eloquence. No other writer I have read does a better job of shedding light on the question of consciousness. As the author repeatedly cautions, much work remains to be done before we have a full understanding of how human consciousness works. But Dennett rejects the "Mysterian" view that consciousness is something special which by its very nature we can never obtain an understanding of using the scientific method. He puts forward a methodology for the systematic study of consciousness, and shows persuasively that it is a phenomenon just as open to scientific inquiry as any other biological function. One of the major themes in both Consciousness Explained and in this postscript to it is idea of "zombies", the subject of an old philosophical thought-experiment. The zombie is a creature indistinguishable from normal people but which has no internal mental life, no consciousness. As Dennett says he addresses the question of zombies reluctantly since it has been the source of so much confusion. He shows very clearly how the concept has little use in clarifying the question of consciousness. He also addresses the inevitable question of artificial intelligence and whether it is possible for "mere machines" to be consciousness. The answer turns out to be yes, since those conscious machines are us!
It would be best to read the author's previous book Consciousness Explained before reading this one.
Overlapping (& Redundant) Series of Lectures.......2005-08-13
My hope was that this series of lectures, which were partially reworked for the text, would present a more cohesive, sequential,less redundant, discourse on the issues. Examples are used, and reused, using identical text, which does nothing to advance or deepen understanding on the issues. Little reference is made to other major experts and their work in the field, except as a means for for highlighting the author's own views, and there is definitely an ego at work here.
Customer Reviews:
Thorough Account of Stages of Astral Mastery.......2006-04-29
I wish to differ strongly with Jonathan Livingston also. It is plainly obvious to me that Mr. Dennett's experiences are authentic, having done much development along these lines, over time, myself.
This is notably an intimate account of what one experiences during the stops and starts, lulls, and incredible accelerations, particular nuances and gradual transformations that occur when one takes on this type of development, as well as the methods for encouraging them.
His account is not sensationalistic. Even when describing his encounters with the wild inclinations of the "desire body", he makes note that he eventually transcends this stage, once he arrives at a point where much of this activity runs it's course and is replaced by more useful persuits that contribute to his spiritual growth.
Some of the most useful aspects of reading the book was to learn the author's means of not only differentiating between varying, and difficult to define, states of reality and consciousness one might encounter, but also how to use triggers and mechanisms to shift from one to the other, and to do so with skill and consciousness.
i would not say that the book is truly a beginner's book because it is written from the perspective of one who knows, instead of taking into account what the beginner's mind is really like when approaching this work. But not much would be required, through a bit of basic experience and research, to get to know what Mr. Dennett is describing.
suggested:
"Journeys Out of the Body" by Monroe
"Creative Dreaming" by Patricia Garfield
Carrington and Muldoon books
Laberge's lucid dreaming books
....and use of an accelerant breathing pattern. One takes the yogic "Corpse Pose", then begins the inhalation (mouth closed) for 4 counts, holding for 4 counts (throat open inside), then exhalation for 8 counts....done without strain in a state of relaxation, slowly and naturally, 21 times...the yogic breath pattern should be employed: fill lower belly first, pull belly in (without exhale), fill chest with breath, and then the shoulder space, letting shoulders rise upward (away from the lower body, not toward the ceiling). this is held four counts, then exhaled in the opposite progression for eight counts of the same length. "Spinning" sensations may occur, followed possibly by a quick loss of conciousness, then hopefully finding oneself out of the body!
Gnostic meditation (Samael Aun Weor school) and/or Zen meditation practice.
So far, i have only read two-thirds of Dennett's book, but am very anxious to see where he goes from here. Having been a dancer for 45 years, i know that the subconcious can take on incredibly intricate skills concerned with style, and the coordination of motor skills and reflex, just by passive observation of other dancers in motion. Reading a book like this, seems to do the same, when it comes to re-enlivening neurons, neccessary subtle and profound connections, and the inspiration that are so necessary to proficiency in the astral art.
A note from the author.......2005-09-15
Hi, I am the author of Out of Body Exploring. I want to respond to Jonathon Livingston's review. While everybody's entitled to their opinion, I would like to correct some errors. First, the book is 178 pgs, not 150. Second, while I do present some lucid dreams, the majority are genuine OBEs. I was able to get proof that I was out of body more than once. Finally, the methods I present are my own, and not taken from any other book. This book is the true story of how I learned to go out of body. It was hard at first, but after practice, I learned to maintain the out of body state. While out of body, I was able to visit deceased loved ones, learn about my past lives, explore the physical world and the astral planes, visit the Akashic Library and more. It was no dream when I visited my deceased mother and she took me on a tour of the heavenly realms. The best proof is to go out of body yourself. Nothing is more convincing (and a little scary) than looking at your body while you're standing outside of it! One time while out of body, I stood in front of the mirror and there was nothing there! Now that's a weird feeling. Anyway, my main reason for writing the book was not to get fame -- most people look at your like your crazy when you talk about this! I just think that going out of body is great fun and a spiritually transformational experience. I think it has the possibility to improve your lives both spiritually, physically and emotionally. There's an excerpt on my website if you'd like to learn more. I'll end this note with a wish and a blessing that you too will partake of the infinite joy, power and knowledge of the out of body experience!!!
Very disappointing..........2005-09-06
After having read so many positive reviews I was expecting much more from this book than it has delivered. What it basically contains is 150 pages of some half-assed mostly lucid dreams with the author's incoherent and off-topic remarks in between that hardly add to the clarity of his descriptions, but rather serve as a filler in an attempt to mimic other similar, but much more interesting and original books. The techniques themselves were laid out in the end on 7,5 (!) pages only. And even those are copied straight out of dozens other books on the subject.
All in all: this book is simply an account of half-assed lucid dreams that the author pretentiously tries to picture as full-fledged OBEs in an attempt to catch the fame. Definitely not worth your time and money.
An excellent account of OBE's.......2005-01-19
I ws prepared to be disappointed since I have read almost 200 books on this topic.But this was really excellent and his down to earth explanations, experiences and conjectures were very readable and helpful. His experiences matched some of my own which is always good to read in another's account.Thoroughly recommended!
Drawing upon hundreds of out-of-body experiences .......2005-01-11
An out-of-body experience is a kind of astro projection where the subject seems to leave their physical body and forays into a real of expanded consciousness, viewing their environment with an awareness that is both familiar and strange for extended periods of time. Preston Dennett began his explorations beyond the physical body some twenty years earlier in an attempt to contact his deceased mother. Drawing upon hundreds of out-of-body experiences (OBE) lasting anywhere from a few seconds to several hours, Dennett now shares his experiences and provides an instructive "how to" manual for others to go out-of-body themselves, while maintaining control and an awareness for extended periods of time. Out-Of-Body Exploring: A Beginner's Approach is a unique and enthusiastically recommended addition to personal reading lists and Metaphysical Studies reference collections.
Book Description
Can there be freedom and free will in a deterministic world? Renowned philosopher Daniel Dennett emphatically answers “yes!” Using an array of provocative formulations, Dennett sets out to show how we alone among the animals have evolved minds that give us free will and morality. Weaving a richly detailed narrative, Dennett explains in a series of strikingly original arguments—drawing upon evolutionary biology, cognitive neuroscience, economics, and philosophy—that far from being an enemy of traditional explorations of freedom, morality, and meaning, the evolutionary perspective can be an indispensable ally. In Freedom Evolves, Dennett seeks to place ethics on the foundation it deserves: a realistic, naturalistic, potentially unified vision of our place in nature.
Customer Reviews:
Slightly let down.......2007-08-23
I very recently became enthralled with evolutionary psychology after having enjoyed Pinker's "Blank Slate", Haidt's "Happiness Hypothesis" and Wright's "Moral Animal."
I bought "Freedom Evolves" while on vacation, when the store didn't have a copy of "Darwin's Dangerous Idea."
Given Dennett's sterling reputation, and craving a convincing and well-honed argument to back-up my intuitive sense that a hard determinist world view verges on lunacy, I came away slightly let down (although I enjoyed the book).
(The opening pages recount a very disturbing incident--which Dennett uses masterfully to frame his argument-- that I'd previously assumed to be urban legend. I find myself calling daycare to make sure my wife dropped the kids off safely. And, although I'm not typically characterized as compassionate, I can't help but be subsumed with compassion for this poor man whose tragic story Dennett recounts.)
Hopefully someone will further develop Prof. Dennett's argument for freewill/determinism compatibility, but in the meantime, I'm plenty content to breeze along with my ownintuitive (and admittedly unsophisticated)instinct that a deterministic world view is, from a practical perspective, absurd.
After all, the notion that determinism is the 'correct' stance is meaningless so far as its impact on ethics or our day-to-day lives. If one were to subscribe to determinism, he'd be lumped in with the sniping, whiny leftist lemmings who naively parrot the "more evolved" motto that we have "no right to judge" criminals and madmen (unless, of course, they happen to be baptists from the south).
By "absurd" I mean simply as follows: To argue (as some do) that we can't blame or praise someone's actions or hold him accountable for his deviant or illegal behaviors because his genes and unfortunate upbringing alleviate any moral culpability, is, at its root, to ignore the naked fact that natural selection also endowed me with genes and an upbringing. Only my genes and environmental influences (deterministically)instruct me to seek retribution for the bad guy's "blameless" deviance. If you can't blame him then you can't blame me for my desire to punish him either--neither of us are free to act otherwise.
Free will has price tag.......2007-04-30
If reality is deterministic, then can anyone seriously believe in free will.
In giving an emphatic "yes" Dan Dennett posits a philosophy which attempts to show that -- properly understood -- determinism does indeed reconcile itself with the notion of free will (ostensibly something non deterministic).
In laying out his thesis, Dennett draws from a variety of sources however, amazingly enough, not choas theory.
This isn't surprising because in his earlier Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Dennett confessed that he didn't understand physics.
Regrettably, this lack of knowledge has denied him an important additional method by which to reconcile the two phenomenon he purports to discuss. Though certainly not a panacea, choas theory does posit that in sufficiently choatic systems, periodic patches of order emerge.
The significance of this view is obvious when one is discussing a field so broad a free will.
When properly viewed it emerges that free will isn't free.
Where Dennett took the example of baseball player responding to a pitch, let us take the example of you saying hello to a friend. While it's true that your friend may respond by singing a song or doing a dance, the smart money is on the idea that you will get some type of greeting in response to your greeting. In other words, free will isn't free but rather yields responses that lie within a fairly predictable horizon of responses.
Another good
General
| Philosophy
| Nonfiction
| Subjects
| Books
The God Delusion
Letter to a Christian Nation
The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason
Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life
God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything
