Book Description
To some, Robert E. Lee is a beloved general, held in the highest regard. To others, he is one of history's most paradoxical heroes. He fought passionately to defend his homeland and was one of the nation's greatest soldiers, yet his name is often inextricably linked with slavery and secession.
In 1861 Lee was Lincoln's first choice to lead the Union troops in the Civil War. But a strong loyalty to Virginia held Lee back. Instead he chose to become the commanding officer of the Confederacy. Lee had great success in battle by spitting his forces and unleashing suprise attacks. His victory at Chancellorville, where his troops soundly defeated an enemy twice their size, remains the most astonishing.
However, only when he surrendered in 1865 did the nation understand the kind of man Robert E. Lee truly was. He was kind and loving, giving all of himself to a reconciliation between the North and the South. In this meticulously researched biography, James I. Robertson explores the life of one of the most revered -- and misunderstood -- Civil War Generals.
Customer Reviews:
I have read this book..........2007-01-22
and heard the author speak today at the 200th anniversary of Robert E Lee's birthday. What hero worship? What aggrandizing? Robert E Lee, himself, would have blushed! James I. Robertson is more of a minister than a historian... his religion is Lee, his analysis is flawed. Lee was not raised by Washington, George was dead in his grave 8 years before Robert E. Lee was even born. Lee was a reaction. A reaction to his father, Harry 'Light-Horse' Lee; a fabuluous military man in his own right, with a penchant to trust too much; especially, George Washington, who advised him on property speculations, which ultimately left Harry Lee broke. Harry, like Washington was a Federalist, a believer of a strong central government. Robert was taught to despise his father, by anti-federalists, who couldn't stand the idea of "America," were threatened by it, and were ultimately destroyed... a confederacy of weakness against a Nation of strength. ( See: Light-Horse Harry Lee and the Legacy of the American Revolution (Paperback) by Charles Royster if you want to read the facts)
A solid intermediate biography of Robert E. Lee for younger readers.......2006-05-16
There are a couple of interesting things about the cover of this juvenile biography of Robert E. Lee. First, the complete title of the book is "Robert E. Lee: Virginian Solider, American Citizen," and the sub-title James I. Robertson, Jr. picked set up an ironic juxtaposition. Because Lee considered Virginia to be his country, rather than the United States of America, he turned down President Abraham Lincoln's offer to become the commander of the Union armies, choosing instead to side with Virginia and the Confederate cause. Consequently, Lee's fame as a solider was in part because he decided he was more of a Virginian than he was an American. There is the additional irony that at the end of his life, after the Civil War, when he was no longer a soldier, he was not exactly considered an "American citizen" by the North. The painting of Lee that appears on the cover shows him in the dress uniform of a lieutenant of the engineers in the U.S. Army, when he was in his mid-twenties, several decades before he made his fateful decision. So the cover does take a step or two back from the picture we have of Robert E. Lee as the commanding general of the Army of Northern Virginia.
The paradox of Lee is that we consider him to be our greatest military commander even though he was on the losing side of the Civil War. The only other general from the "other" side that I can think of who has anything close to that level of respect would have to be Germany's Erwin Rommell from World War II, whose Afrika Corps had a reputation comparable to that of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. We tend to think of such men as existing independent of the ideologies of the nation's for whom they were fighting. Robertson deals up front with that idea, noting that on the one hand Lee is a beloved general, held in the highest regard to such an extent that he has practically become an American saint, while on the other his name is inextricably linked with the issues of secession and slavery associated with the Southern Confederacy. Robertson's introduction begins by touching on Lee's greatest military triumph at the Battle of Chancellorsville, where he defeated a Union army twice his size by dividing his smaller force in two, but most of the focus is on the Lee legend that exists today.
Eight of the ten chapters in this book focus on Lee during the Civil War: (1) The Making of a Soldier covers how the son of "Light Horse Harry" Lee graduated second in his West Point class of 1829, married Mary Anne Randolph Custis, and served with distinction during the Mexican War in what proves to be the chapter's longest section. (2) Nation Versus Country begins with Lee being appointed superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and his confirmation in the Episcopal faith, and ends with his wife inheriting the Custis estates in Arlington, his role in the capture of John Brown at Harper's Ferry, and his resignation from the U.S. Army on the eve of the Civil War. (3) Rocky Path to Army Command is one of the most interesting chapters because it reminds us that Lee did not start off the war as a commander, but rather as President Jefferson Davis' confidential military adviser. It was not until June 1862 that Lee was place in command of troops, with low expectations exemplified by his nicknames as "Evacuation Lee" and "Granny Lee."
The Lee that history remembers emerges in the next chapters. (4) Brilliance in the Field shows how Lee bested General George B. McClellan, the overly cautious commander of the Union's Army of the Potomac in the Seven Days' Campaign, and his replacement John Pope at the Second Battle of Manassas (a.k.a. Bull Run, but I go with the belief the winning side gets to name the battle). Robertson underscores the importance of General "Stonewall" Jackson to Lee's successes. (5) The Bloodiest Day is about Lee's first invasion of the North and the Battle of Antietem (a.k.a. Sharpsburg), and the slaughter of Union troops at the Battle of Fredericksburg. (6) Loss of an Arm contrasts Lee's greatest military achievement at the Battle of Chancellorsville with the devastating loss of Jackson. (7) Gettysburg explains Lee's desperate gamble in invading the North a second time, focusing on how he came to order Pickett's Charge, his biggest military mistake.
The next two chapters play out the end of the war, as Lee once again becomes the "King of Spades." (8) Forced on the Defensive looks at how General Ulysses S. Grant forced Lee's army to move backwards to protect Richmond. (9) From Siege to Defeat begins with Lee's entrenchments along the Richmond-Petersburg line and ends with the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House when Lee's starving troops were surrounded by several Union armies. (10) National Symbol is the final chapter, which details what Lee did after the Civil War in becoming the president of what was then Washington College and what is now Washington and Lee University, and covers how his death in 1870 brought on national mourning.
This is a solid intermediate biography of Lee for younger readers, which goes to pains to explain the major battles he fought during the Civil War. The book is illustrated with dozens of black and white etchings and photographs from throughout Lee's life. Robertson also wrote a similar biography, "Standing Like a Stone Wall: The Life of General Thomas J. Jackson," which would certainly provide a nice complement to this volume (Robertson also has written an adult biography of Jackson, "Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Solider, the Legend").
A Solid Biography Written for Younger Readers (12 and up).......2006-03-17
Part of the books for young readers put out by this publisher, this is a fairly short and not filled with complexity. Having said that, this is also a very well researched, very well written biography of General Lee. It is profusely illustrated, particularly the Civil War years which generated a lot of photographs.
All in all, this is an excellent short biography. I recommend it for not only young readers (Grades 6 up) but for anyone wanting a fairly quick biography that captures the essese of the mas as well as books several times this one's size.
Book Description
In a groundbreaking, comprehensive history of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat from Gettysburg in July 1863, Kent Masterson Brown draws on previously unused materials to chronicle the massive effort of General Robert E. Lee and his command as they sought to move people, equipment, and scavenged supplies through hostile territory and plan the army's next moves.
More than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains and tens of thousands of livestock accompanied the army back to Virginia. The movement of supplies and troops over the challenging terrain of mountain passes and in the adverse conditions of driving rain and muddy quagmires is described in depth, as are General George G. Meade's attempts to attack the trains along the South Mountain range and at Hagerstown and Williamsport, Maryland. Lee's deliberate pace, skillful use of terrain, and constant positioning of the army behind defenses so as to invite attack caused Union forces to delay their own movements at critical times.
Brown concludes that even though the battle of Gettysburg was a defeat for the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee's successful retreat maintained the balance of power in the eastern theater and left his army with enough forage, stores, and fresh meat to ensure its continued existence as an effective force.
Customer Reviews:
Great book on the aftermath of Gettysgurg.......2007-06-08
This book has far more detail on the events of Lee's retreat and Meade's pursuit after the Gettysburg battle than any other book I have read. It gives a lot of reasons why Meade was not able to quickly pursue and re-engage Lee before Lee crossed the Potomac. There is also a lot of insight into what Lee hoped to accomplish with his invasion of the North, and why Lee considered it worthwhile, even with his defeat at Gettysburg.
Lee's Highest Achievement.......2007-02-20
Like many of the other reviewers here, I am in awe of the detail here regarding Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. More than any other campaign of Lee's, this movement revealed his true abilities. The most difficult operation for any military organization is retreat. Lee conducted a masterful retreat. Mr. Brown illuminates this in painful detail, right down to the placing of skirmish lines and Lee's minute orders to his commanders.
Unlike some of the other reviewers, I do take exception to the idea of the entire ANV operation in Pennsylvania being a great raid as novel. This has been advanced by several other historians for some time. What is done here in this book, however is to detail just how much it was a foraging raid done on an army scale. He actually lists the CS regimental seizures down to individual horses and curry combs. He then notes Federal messages regarding the clothing, toys, etc found in captured or broken down CS wagons. All of this provides plentiful evidence that the ANV's primary mission was foraging with a major battle being secondary at best.
The maps and illustrations are good, the prose is readable, and though the detail at times can be mind numbing, the book remains a fast read. Mr. Brown has taken a subject covered almost to overkill and written something fresh and thought provoking. As noted above, anyone (like myself) who had been a critic of Meade's for failure to bring Lee to battle on advantage will likely change their mind after reading this evidence. Meade's people were in worse straits than the retreating CS forces due to logistical failures. His cavalry was worn and poorly supplied, it actually can be considered a minor miracle they were as successful as they were in their pursuit. The pursuing Federals had to follow through areas repeatedly stripped of food and supplies by the retreating CS forces. Conversely, the CS forces as they contracted became stronger (relatively) while the Federals became more strung out. Mr. Brown's illustrations of the strength of CS defenses at Falling Waters and Williamsport highlight the correctness of Meade's decision not to attack with his strung out forces before it was too late.
This book does a great service to a largely ignored aspect of the Gettysburg campaign. I do agree that Gettysburg was not the decisive point in the East and also that in a logistical/strategic sense Gettysburg was a victory for the CS. The ANV survived and despite the irreplaceable manpower loss, gained enough materially wise to last until homegrown resources could sustain it further.
This book is well worth the price. It is an eye opener and knocks some traditional historical concepts on their butts. Mr. Brown has done history a great service with this book.
Gettysburg - The Rest of the Story.......2006-10-07
Most accounts on the Battle of Gettysburg give limited coverage to R.E. Lee's retreat from Gettysburg.. The text notes "The idea for the Pennsylvania campaign arose many months before. It was born in a desperation caused by the looming collapse of the Army of Northern Virginia if it remained in war-ravages central Virginia without adequate food and supplies for its men and fodder for its horses and mules." Consequently, from the moment that Lee reached the Maryland side of the Potomac River the countryside was scoured by Confederate quartermasters and commissaries of subsistence for food, fodder and supply. Interestingly, "The effort to obtain food, fodder, and equipment would never stop; even the three days of battle at Gettysburg did not interfere with it." The author, Kent Masterson Brown, addresses in detail the acute logistical problems attendant to Lee's army's retreat from Gettysburg with the critical supplies that had been foraged.
The text is broadly arranged into three sections: 1st disengagement at Gettysburg and crossing the South Mountain range; 2nd travel to Harrisburg and Williamsport; 3rd defense of Williamsport and Falling Waters, Virginia then travel to Staunton Virginia. "A slow, fighting retreat sounds simple in theory, but it is extraordinarily difficult in practice, particularly with a large army burdened by enormous trains." The trains were more than fifty-seven miles of wagon and ambulance trains plus ten of thousands of livestock. The text gives excellent, brief narratives of Lee's army's travels to the Potomac River, the cavalry attacks on the trains plus the engagements of the rear guard troops as Meade attacked.
Most interesting is Brown's accounts of attending to the sick and wounded. Those that could walk accompanied the trains while other wounded rode in ambulance wagons if available. However, for those seriously ill or wounded or who lacked transportation, surgical teams were ordered to stay with them. For example, of the 1,300 wounded in Johnson's Division, 446 were left behind. Ever effort was made to care for the sick and wounded whether they could travel or had to be left behind. Protecting the trains was exceedingly difficult; the escorts suffered along with the helpless wounded.
The entire army was in Hagerstown by the morning of 7 July. The author notes that"The movement of Lee's army from the morning of 5 July until the afternoon of 6 July was one of the most critical episodes of the retreat from Gettysburg, although it was far from being filled with battle action." "Lee's slow march and bold rear guard on 5 July had a profound effect on Meade and his lieutenants." Next Lee had to set up strong defenses until he could make arrangements for crossing the Potomac River. Using the ferries at Williamsport was exceptionally slow so that Lee's defenses must hold until he could build a pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. By 10 July the Williamsport defense line was almost ready, but Lee had limited time to cross the Potomac. The last person crossed the pontoon bridge on 14 July. The text narrates Meade's attempts to engage Lee and prevent his army from crossing the Potomac. However, the text concludes that "....there was nothing Meade could have done to prevent Lee from winning the race to the Williamsburg defense line or holding it."
Once across the Potomac River, The Shenandoah Valley served as the corridor for Lee's army's evacuation. The problem now was to take care of the sick and wounded and get them to the General and Receiving Hospital at Staunton, Virginia. Staunton was soon overrun with sick and wounded soldiers. The text provides a brief but excellent account of this phase of the retreat.
President Lincoln blamed Lee's escape on Meade's slow response. While Meade undoubtedly could have done better, Brown notes Meade's army "was in a desperate condition, many artillery batteries could not accompany their corps while his horses and mules pulling many of the guns and caissons were so exhausted and weakened by excessive campaigning and lack of forage that they collapsed...." Throughout Lee's retreat, Meade had critical supply problems that limited his response.
The author concludes "Although the battle of Gettysburg was indeed a Confederate loss, the invasion of Pennsylvania may not have been. In fact, Lee successfully brought his army and all its trains across the Potomac River. In the process, he managed to get out of Pennsylvania and Maryland more than forty-five miles of quartermaster and substance trains filled with impressed stores." One can only speculate on how, or if, the Army of Northern Virginia would have survived without these supplies. Lee's very successful retreat maintained the balance of power in his theatre of operations.
This is an excellently researched work; Kent Brown uses much previously untapped source material. This book is the major source of information on the retreat from Gettysburg and will be of interest to all serious students of Civil War History.
Retreat from Gettysbury: Lee, Logistics, and the Pennsylvania Campaign.......2006-08-06
A must read for anyone how has intrest in the Gettysbury Campaign. The Author Mr. Kent Masterson Brown has capture every detail of General Lee's Retreat. He capture many details that other authors have never mention such as how General Lee went about evaucation of the many field hospitals. The again is a must read for everyone with a Logistics background.
a compelling lookat a neglected aspect of the Gettysburg campaign.......2006-06-13
Kent Masterson Brown's treatment of the Army of Northern Virginia's retreat of the after the bloody battle at Gettysburg is meticulously researched, and fills a notable gap in the literature on the campaign. The story focuses on the retreat of the ANV, and the strategic decisions made by the Southern leaders, rather than that of their adversary the Army of the Potomac. To some degree this is as it should be; Lee arranged the retreat masterfully and restored the balance of power between the armies in a matter of days, while Meade, commanding the Union AoP, was content to cede the initiative, and eventually allow his enemies to escape.
Meade was unable to capitalize on the tactical victory at Gettysburg in a way that more thoroughly relentless, risk taking generals such as Grant or Sherman would have. Brown speaks to both the skill of Lee's command in arranging the retreat as an aggressive rear-guard action (keeping Meade uncertain of his intentions), but also the hesitancy and trepidation with which Meade pursued him. One of the great what-ifs of the war imagines a more aggressive Union commander attempting a counter-punch to break the retreating ANV decisively.
Brown argues that Lee's ability to manage the logistics of the retreat, namely to return to Virginia with enormous stores of livestock and supplies foraged from Pennsylvania, turned the Gettysburg campaign from a tactical defeat into a minor victory. But this argument I believe entirely overstates the importance of logistics and supply. Although it's true as Brown argues that the escape of the ANV with its supply trains full allowed the army to continue the war re-sustained, the loss of such a large part its the manpower and the officer corps at Gettysburg would eventually prove decisive. But the argument that the logistical aspect of the campaign turned a strategic disaster into a strategic success is certainly provocative, at the very least demonstrates fresh thinking about the campaign.
A masterful, compelling book.
Average customer rating:
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With Sheridan in the Final Campaign Against Lee
Frederick C. Newhall
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The Union Cavalry Comes of Age: Hartwood Church to Brandy Station, 1863
ASIN: 0807127566 |
Book Description
After enlisting in the elite Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment of the Army of the Potomac, Frederick Newhall (1840-1898) quickly rose to company commander and eventually to provost marshal and assistant adjutant general at Cavalry Corps headquarters. There, riding alongside Major General Philip H. Sheridan- the dynamic, inspirational bantam who led the Union cavalry to glory in 1864 and 1865-Newhall witnessed the inner workings of Union cavalry operations and many of the important events that spurred the end of the Civil War. A highly intelligent observer, he published the details of his experiences in 1866, before time could dull his memory. This new edition of Newhall's memoir, carefully edited by Eric J. Wittenberg, makes his revealing eyewitness account widely available once again.
Newhall had both Sheridan's ear and confidence during the campaign from Petersburg to Appomattox in April 1865. He was sent by the general to convey information directly to Ulysses S. Grant and George Meade, and he was present with Sheridan during Lee's surrender to Grant at Appomattox Court House. Loyal to the last, Newhall vigorously defended Sheridan's controversial relief of Major General G.K. Warren from command of the Fifth Corps after the Battle of Five Forks on April 1, 1865.
Wittenberg has carefully transcribed and annotated Newhall's original text, adding maps, photographs, a preface, a biographical sketch of Newhall, an order of battle, and a selected bibliography. He also includes the text of a pamphlet that Warren printed defending himself and criticizing Sheridan, and Newhall's response to it.
An enlightening insider's view of Union leadership during the Civil War's denouement, Wittenberg's excellent edition of Newhall's lively and descriptive commentary rescues an important and informative perspective from the vault of history.
Book Description
Generally regarded as the most important of the Civil War campaigns conducted in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, that of 1864 lasted more than four months and claimed more than 25,000 casualties. The armies of Philip H. Sheridan and Jubal A. Early contended for immense stakes. Beyond the agricultural bounty and the boost in morale to be gained with a victory, events in the Valley would affect Abraham Lincoln's chances for reelection in the November 1864 presidential canvass.
The eleven essays in this volume reexamine common assumptions about the campaign, its major figures, and its significance. Taking advantage of the most recent scholarship and a wide range of primary sources, contributors examine strategy and tactics, the performances of key commanders on each side, the campaign's political repercussions, and the experiences of civilians caught in the path of the armies. The authors do not always agree with one another, but, taken together, their essays highlight important connections between the home front and the battlefield, as well as ways in which military affairs, civilian experiences, and politics played off one another during the campaign.
Contributors:
William W. Bergen, Charlottesville, Virginia
Keith S. Bohannon, State University of West Georgia
Andre M. Fleche, University of Virginia
Gary W. Gallagher, University of Virginia
Joseph T. Glatthaar, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Robert E. L. Krick, Richmond, Virginia
Robert K. Krick, Fredericksburg, Virginia
William J. Miller, Churchville, Virginia
Aaron Sheehan-Dean, University of North Florida
William G. Thomas, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Joan Waugh, University of California, Los Angeles
Customer Reviews:
Nice collection of essays on the 1864 Shenandoah Valley battles.......2007-04-22
This is an interesting collection of essays on the Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. Gary Gallagher has pulled together a set of essays that, even if they sometimes contend with one another, helps the reader get a better understanding of the 1864 conflict.
The dramatic personae in this action include Lee's "bad old boy," Jubal Early, the combative but capable Confederate commander, versus Phil Sheridan, the hyperactive cavalry commander given charge of the Union forces in the Valley. Key players on the Union side: John Crook, leader of the "Army of West Virginia," William Emory of Sheridan's army, the cavalry (Torbert as head, with Merritt and Custer, and Devin as key subordinates). On the Confederate side: infantry commanders such as Gordon, Rodes and Ramseur and cavalry leaders Lomax, Munford, and Rosser. There was a lot of talent on each side, but Early's army was heavily outnumbered (maybe 40,000 troops under Sheridan and 14,000 or so under Early). Such numbers presaged an almost inevitable defeat of Early, with as combative a Union general as Sheridan on the other side (it can safely be said that prior Valley commanders such as Patterson, Hunter, Sigel, and so on may well have wasted such an advantage; Sheridan, despite his flaws as a combat commander, was unlikely to lose under such conditions).
What is nice about this volume is that the authors of the individuals chapters try to assess what actually happened and how good (or bad) commanders actually were, rather than repeating commonly understood judgments. What about the "Woodstock Races" after the Confederate cavalry's disastrous defeat at Tom's Brook? Confederate ineptitude? Or Union overwhelming force? What about Early versus Sheridan as commander of an army? Gallagher's chapter addresses this in a sensitive manner.
At Cedar Creek, what happened? Did Early's so-called "fatal halt" lose the day? Or were the Confederates so outnumbered and outgunned that--aside from total incompetence in Union leadership--they simply could not triumph? Another essay explores the generalship of the 6th Corps commander, Horatio Wright. The conclusions is that he did a good job as commander after the surprise attack while Sheridan was absent and may not have received the credit due him. Still, his performance in other venues in the Civil War was uneven. Here, however, he probably deserves good grades.
And so on. The essays in this volume provoke some thinking about the Valley Campaign of 1864. This is a good work to look at. The chapters are somewhat uneven (as to be expected from an edited volume), but--all in all--this is a useful examination of the subject.
Great Essays on the 1864 Confederate Collapse in the Valley: Early v. Sheridan .......2006-11-06
Another one of Gallagher's collection of great essays of a campaign while touting the greatest historians on the subject. The authors in this case cover the 1864 Valley situation from Early's arrival to save Lynchburg to his run at Washington to Sheridan's final mobilizing drive that is momentarily derailed by Early's great shock attack at Cedar Creek that crushes the unprepared Federals. But of course, the Union's regrouping at Cedar and counter attack virtually destroys Early's army. The essays cover the key battles and strategies including the make up of Early, Sheridan and a respectful view of the not so flamboyant and thus unappreciated General Horatio Wright who held things together at Cedar Creek when Sheridan arrived on the field. The latter part of the book also includes the social effect the war had on its population particularly as the means to feed the Confederate war machine was destroyed as part of the grand union strategy. Early and the Confederate Army no doubt fought heroically enough to challenge the record of Stonewall; however, they were literally overwhelmed by numbers and better horses and equipment. Of course, once confident, Sheridan keeps the pressure on with his young lions, Custer, Merritt and Torbet. A grand example of that is Robert E. L. Krick's essay on the battle of Tom Brook between the Confederate and Union cavalry that is extremely one sided, resulting in a total crushing of the Confederate horse. It's amazing that the Confederates were able to reorganize and launch what was at first a highly successful attack at Cedar Creek 10 days later. This recovery and attack is a tribute to Early, who unfortunately used his infamous tongue lashing too harshly afterwards demonstrating one of his worst character flaws. The other great aspect of these talented authors is their research, which is so impeccable that they sort out the historical misrepresentations and get to the truth of the matter, albeit at the expense of some such as John Gordon, the great fighter and embellisher. The only negative, I wish there was a summary of the battles in date line fashion along with a map that showed where all the key battles were fought. I also wish the summary of the situation prior to Early's arrival included a discussion of General "Grumble" Jones battle of Piedmont where he lost his life trying to stop General Hunter's attack of the valley. As an additional note, these fine historians get together almost every summer and provide excellent tours of the valley, a treat worth considering.
Another volume in a good series.......2006-06-12
This book of essays covers aspects of the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864. As is the case with all the volumes in this series, a number of military, social, and political issues are discussed. The essays are generally well-written and provide insights into some topics not evaluated in general histories of the campaign. Particularly good is the essay comparing the general performances of Sheridan and Early. One is left realizing that, given the resources available to each, Early actually did better than could have been expected and Sheridan made more errors than he should have. Worth the price of the entire volume, is the excellent biographical monograph about General Horatio Wright. This is the first attempt ever to provide a biographical sketch of this important but overlooked officer. The essay is balanced, well-researched, and very worthwhile to the serious student of this period.
This book is not for someone unfamiliar with this campaign but, as is the case with the rest of the series, is of value to the experienced Civil War reader.
Book Description
Under the fantastic set of circumstances at Harper's Ferry, the Confederates lost and the Union recovered a copy of Confederate battle plan Special Order 191.
"If I can't beat Bobby Lee with this piece of paper, I will be willing to go home," said Union army leader George B. McClellan upon reading the document. The rest, of course, is history.
Although many books have been written about the battle of Antietam, no book yet has been devoted exclusively to the lost order that resulted in Lee's failed invasion. With as much emphasis given to human foibles as to troop movements, this book will appeal to a wide audience beyond Civil War devotees.
Customer Reviews:
The South lost an order, the North an opportunity.......2007-02-16
Not exactly the most eloquent or impressive military account of an important phase of the Civil War ever written, but it gets the job done. Jarmann examines the events leading up to the battle at Antietam, beginning at September 9th with Lee north of the Potomac and stationed at Frederick, MD. He spends a great deal of time dealing with the situation at Harpers Ferry and the maneuverings of Franklin's Sixth Corps at Cramptons Gap on the 13th and 14th. The finding of Lee's "Lost Order" describing precisely his plans for splitting his army and the capturing of Harpers Ferry were found by Union soldiers near Frederick on the 13th and made its way quickly to McClellan's headquarters. McClellan knew exactly what he had and also, apparently, knew or should have known that quick action was necessary to strike Lee's army while is was still separated. But Little Mac was incapable of such a move. (Jermann criticizes Franklin for apparently possessing the same "slows" bug that infected McClellan.)
Jermann is very good at looking at some important details: McClellan's writing to Halleck about fog on the morning of the 16th preventing him from accomplishing much that day, for example: no one else seems to mention this mysterious fog and it didn't prevent the Confederates from getting that much closer to reuniting its army. Although Lee retreated with his army back across the Potomac after the major engagement on the 17th, Jermann does not see the Battle of Antietam as much of a Union victory - certainly when compared to what it could have and should have accomplished. Jermann's writing is okay, but rather artless ("The order reads as follows" is a typical lead-in to first-hand information). It's a better account of the lead-up to the battle than the battle itself, which he barely touches on. The chapter in which he defends Dixon Miles's actions leading up to the surrender of Harpers Ferry (Miles, who was killed, had his reputation ruined by the commission looking into the matter) is somewhat an anti-climax coming near the end of the book. There are lots of maps, which are helpful.
An interesting book that covers more Harpers Ferry than order 191 itself........2006-11-23
First off the title of this book is sort of a misnomer. If you are expecting a book dealing with order 191 and it's being lost then you're in for a surprise as the actual order itself being lost is covered only briefly in this book. Instead we get a rather nice book on Harpers Ferry, it's importance in the Maryland Campaign and a detailed look at Lee's plans to take it.
The book starts off a touch rough. In it's first few pages it insinuates that Little Mac could have taken Richmond on the Pennisula if Lincoln had simply sent him more troops. Then the book repeats as fact the old myth that Grant sent a silver serving set across the battle lines of Petersburg as a present to George & Sally Pickett on the birth of their son. That is just a fiction create by Sally Pickett in her writings after the war.
However after that the book settles down and what we have is a really well done telling of Lee's planning prior to the battle of Antietam and the siege of Harpers Ferry itself. This is an often just a side note covered by a chapter or two in most books, but here it's center stage and covered well. Men like Dixon Miles get a lot more coverage here and we find a nice in depth look at the man himself and how he viewed the events, being cut off from the outside by the Confederate siege.
If you're worried that this will be a dry study of the events like we often find in Civil War books don't worry. Donald Jermann shows he is a talented writer with a sharp wit. His humor really adds a nice touch to his writing and the book flows very well.
I recommend this book. It covers a not very often told part of the 1862 Maryland Campaign and does it with wit and clarity. I think most Civil War buffs will find it very worthwhile.
Interesting from Begininning to End.......2006-11-13
Imagine knowing the detailed plans of your enemy before a major encounter. That's the underlying premise of this fascinating story, written by a career military man.
This book is, first of all, a higly interesting and easily understandable account of a crucial set of events in American history. Even those who are not rabid history fans will be propelled along by the story and the clear writing. This book explains the intriquing and unique events that compelled the Confederate and Union forces to clash at Antietam - our country's bloodiest battle.
Unlike many historical accounts, especially those of our Civil War, this book is clearly written and easy to follow. The key characters are presented with irreverent tongue in cheek, and the many accompanying maps provide an understandable account of the chess board maneuvering of the North and South in the mountainous terrain surrounding Harpers Ferry and Antietam.
When you've completed this book you'll understand how the armies of the Civil War were organized for managment and for battle, how they treated the opposition with gentlemanly respect and near deference, how they gathered intelligence and communicated in the field, and how they often made winning or losing decisions based on imperfect information.
In the end, you'll see that the all-too-human and unpredictable behavior of key decision makers shaped the events that led to this avoidable and bloody conflict. It's quite a story.
good history.......2006-11-01
This is a well thought out narrative of the Maryland Invasion of 1862, Special Order 191 and the impact it had on the campaign. Donald Jerman is a military man and to a degree, he writes like one, which is to the reader's advantage. The author tells us everything we need to know, when we need to know it in an engaging witty style of prose. While conveying conveys an enormous, amount of information but keeping the reader up to date on the various fronts. This is no small achievement, as even a novice will understand what the delay at Harpers Ferry means to Lee at Sharpsburg.
Each day, from September ninth to the seventeenth is a chapter. Other chapters cover army organization, the nature of war in 1862, the inquiry into the surrender of Harpers Ferry, a good explanation on who "lost" Special Order 191 and a very good "what happened to them". Maps, the author and the publisher understand that a military history has to have them. They do an outstanding job giving us 37 maps, covering every phase of the campaign. These maps coupled with the daily chapter format and good writing keeps the reader in the picture. This is one of the better short Antietam Campaign books available. 320 pages may not seem like a short book but for the amount of ground covered, it is. This is very good for those that have not read a great deal about Antietam and a good general review for those that have.
Donald Jermann is a member of the "McClellan is a fool" school and this book will maintain his good standing. Mac is always wrong, Mac always misses opportunities, Mac is slow, Mac is cautious. This is the standard liturgy of complaints about McClellan and offers no insights into the situation or the understanding of the situation. The closest we come to that is a good review of Halleck's bungling and Lincoln's fears. For members of this school, all their ideas are reinforced and validated. For those that are reevaluating this idea, it provides a good review of their position.
The best book on the Antietam Campaign I've ever read.......2006-10-18
I've been a serious student of the Civil War for over 30 years and I thoroughly enjoyed reading "Antietam the Lost Order".
The author's unique and innovative writing style has resulted in a book that offers something for everyone.
The novice will appreciate that the author takes the time to explain the nature of warfare at that time, and provides an overview of intelligence operations, logistics, tactics, how armies moved and how they were organized (the term "Regiment" had an entirely different meaning during the Civil War than it has in today's Army).
The expert will appreciate the scholarly narrative and well thought out commentary that reflects the author's clear understanding and application of the strategic and tactical situations of the Antietam campaign.
Everyone will appreciate that the author does more than tell you where the armies moved, when possible, he points out if the road still exists and what it is currently called. He also makes extensive use of maps. There are 37 maps that graphically illustrate important features such as terrain, road networks (high speed avenues of approach), and the disposition and movements of troops (Order of Battle). Each map is numbered for easy reference.
Everyone will also appreciate the author's witty style. A reference to General Halleck provides a classic example "However, as so often is the case, having demonstrated his lack of capability in small matters, he was called to Washington to decide on large matters".
The book also contains 9 photographs, many of lesser known but important personalities.
The author provides far more than just a presentation of the Antietam campaign, leadership and lack of it is fully explored, the command structure of both armies is explained as are relationships between opposing generals. The implications of the loss of Special Order 191 are completely detailed and plausible scenarios as to who was responsible for its loss are provided.
Novice or expert you will enjoy this book.
Michael A. Hamilton
Major, CmlC, USAR, Ret.
Average customer rating:
- Gray Fox is superb. This book brings the past to life.
- Gray Fox
- Good chronology, but little more
- A brilliant man
- Ray's reviews
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Gray Fox: Robert E. Lee and the Civil War
Burke Davis
Manufacturer: Gramercy
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ASIN: 0517347725
Release Date: 1992-07-19 |
Book Description
An awe-inspiring epic masterpiece! Exciting biography of one of the monumental figures of the Civil War, told in a dramatic narrative that will sweep you into the flow of history. 7 maps. 21 photographs. 480 pages. 6 X 9.
Customer Reviews:
Gray Fox is superb. This book brings the past to life........2002-12-06
Davis is one of those rare authors who has the magical ability to to breathe life into the past through his writings. In addition to being a truly gifted writer, he is also an insightful and even-handed historian. Davis depicts Lee as a great, but not perfect general, as a complex figure who was willing to fight invading Northern armies, but who also hoped for an eventual end to slavery, as a man who while being vulnerable to pride sought the ideal of Christian humility, as kind and humane, but also willing to see men die in their thousands for the cause which he and they fought for. Moreover, while the book is written from the perspective of Lee and his army, the Northern side is still treated with respect and the same depth of understanding. Since many books on the Civil War are filled with hatred, blame, and arteficial and foolish one dimensional standards of morality, this is refreshing. I do not at all regret buying this book. I only regret that the author did not write more books. In addition to Gray Fox, I also highly recommend Davis's biography of Stonewall Jackson.
Gray Fox.......2002-12-02
An excellent read on the life of Robert E. Lee. Davis does an good job in portraying the general's life, not overloading the reader with details. Those who have read more detailed books on Lee might find this one lacking, but I believe it to be worth your time and would make an excellent addition to ones Civil War library.
Good chronology, but little more.......2002-06-11
I wouldn't say I disliked this book, but I did find it pretty short on both style and substance. It presents a good chronology of Lee's ACW campaigns, and might make a good prelude to a more detailed account if one wanted to get that chronology straight. However the prose is limp at best and details lacking. In his descriptions of the battles (especially) Burke Davis brings very little to life. For example, in the description of Chancellorsville, one never gets a sense that the battle is slipping out of Lee's control before his and Jackson's daring and innovative masterstroke changes the outcome completely.
Credit should be given for good use of excerpts from Lee's correspondance which paint a picture of a gentle and humane man doing his duty bravely despite a mounting sense of the long-term hoelessness of the situation. But, more interesting material can be found than this historical overview for anyone who wants something serious on the subject.
A brilliant man.......2002-02-06
Nicely written clear and concise facts from beginning to end. Burke Davis quotes and paraphrases several first hand accounts of civilians Confederate, and Union officers. Mr. Davis also recites several letters from General Robert E. Lee to family, Jefferson Davis, Confederate officers and General Grant.
The reading of this biography permeates vast knowledge of Robert E. Lee. Starting with his birth, education at West Point, emergence from the Mexican War, "with a reputation as the army's most talented young officer." Mr. Davis does a great job of conveying General Lee's concerns about the possibility of civil war. Robert E. Lee made the difficult decision to resign from the U.S. military. Here is a sample of General Lee's letter of resignation. "I have devoted all the best years of my life and all the ability I posed. During the whole time-more than a quarter of a century-I have experienced nothing but kindness from my superiors and a most cordial friendship from my comrades. To no one, General, have I been as much indebted as to yourself for uniform kindness and consideration. I shall carry to the grave the most grateful recollections of your kind consideration, and your name and fame will always be dear to me."
The book is worthy of reading I'll probably read it a few more times. Therefore five stars seems appropriate for a truly amazing book. This book is for folks from any geographical area. Whatever your race, creed, culture, religion is this book can be an enjoyable read. I leave you with one last quote this is Robert E. Lee's opinion of slavery. "There are few, I believe, in this enlightened age, who will acknowledge that slavery as an institution is a moral and political evil...I think it greater evil to the white than to the black race."
Ray's reviews.......2001-09-30
This is a 'must read' for all Civil War book worms. Not only does it show the true man, Robert E. Lee, but a fine, historical review of the entire war. Prepare yourself for the last 35 pages, as you will read the best account of the surrender at Appomattox that I have ever read by ANY author.
Customer Reviews:
Harmans real plan ar Gettysburg.......2005-11-18
Harman's major point is that Lee could not be so dumb as to order Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg--but that a masterful plan of the Southern Genius General went awry. The book is short of documentation in the historic record of this and pads the book with discussions of Napoleans' strategy, Gettysburg Day 1 and Day 2, etc. Essentially it is a "plausible" idea bereft of evidence. The book imho is but a southern apologist's unbelief that Lee could lose at Gettysburg and that Meade on that day outgeneraled Lee.
Troy Harman's Gettysburg.......2004-07-07
From the moment of its conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg has provoked endless controversy regarding its significance, the plans and strategies employed by the armies, the tactics, and the reasons for the result. It has been said that if a reader doesn't like a particular account of the battle, it is only necessary to read on to find a more appealing version.
Troy Harman is a historian and a ranger with the National Park Service at Gettysburg. He has intimate familiarity with the Battlefield and a thorough grasp of the literature on the Battle. In his book, "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg" (2003), Mr. Harman takes issue with what he terms the "affirmed version" of the Battle and offers what he believes to be a new and competing account. His account is well and lucidly presented and will provoke thought among students.
Mr. Harman argues that most students of the Battle have tended to focus on the details of the three days of fighting and have failed to understand the plan that the Confederate commander, Robert E. Lee, developed for the Battle and pursued during its entirety. According to Mr. Harman, Lee's focus throughout was on the heights of Cemetery Hill on the Union right. At the conclusion of the first day's fighting, the Confederates did not attempt to capture Cemetery Hill. But in the second day of fighting on the Union left, (Little Round Top, primarily) and in Pickett's Charge on the third day, the objective of Lee's plans, Mr. Harman maintains, was Cemetery Hill, due to its height, its control of the town and roads, and its vulnerability as a salient exposed to potential attack on three sides.
This is a challenging claim, particularly as it involves the second day of the Battle. Mr. Harmon argues that Longstreet's troops were to advance along the Emmitsburg Road, which essentially parallels the Union line and take Cemetery Hill, giving only slight attention to Little Round Top. Mr. Harmon argues that the objective of Pickett's famous charge on day 3 was Zeigler's grove on the right of the Union line rather than the more famous Angle and Copse of Trees.
There is a great deal to be learned from this, and from any attempt to revisit a received and too comfortably accepted account. But I think Mr. Harman tends to overemphasize the originality of his approach and to type-cast the account with which he takes issue. The basic points in Mr. Harman's approach, involving the alleged importance of Little Round Top, the advance of the Third Corps of the Union Army to the Peach Orchard, and the focus of Pickett's Charge have been addressed by many writers. These points are and will remain highly controversial, and Mr. Harman's understanding of each of them is shared with (and also disputed by) many other scholars. Mr. Harman's primary claim -- the importance of Cemetery Hill -- has also been addressed in a slightly different way in a book called "Last Chance for Victory" by Bowden and Ward which likewise challenges the received account of Gettysburg.
Mr. Harman also is too quick, I think, in forulating his understanding of the "affirmed version" of Gettysburg. Most of the accounts of the battle I have read take a more nuanced view than that indicated in Mr Harman's summations. They recognize, I think, the changing nature of the Battle and the choices these changes forced on commanders North and South. Lee does seem to me to have ordered a charge up the Emmitsburg Road, based on the faulty information he had about the size and position of the Union troops, but this plan had to change on the spot when Longstreet discovered the location of Sickles and his third Corps. Pickett's charge on the third day may well have had Zeigler's grove as its objective, but the fact remains that the Southern attack crested at the Copse of Trees, thus entitling it to its reputation as the "High Water Mark".
Mr Harman has taken a fresh, lively approach to the Battle which taught me a great deal and which will inspire the interested reader to learn more. It will instill in the reader a sense of fluidity and a reluctance to dogmatize over significant historical events.
The forest for the trees.......2004-06-08
Sometimes you can't see the forest for the trees. As an airline pilot, civil war buff, and trained historian I found Mr. Harman's thesis right on the mark. For years I've wondered why
no one else saw the obvious. As one reviewer stated, "it was the high ground." General Lee was a brilliant tactician and strategist whoes training in the Mexican War would have demanded the obvious-Take the high ground! Unfortunately, the fog of war trumped his plan. Read the entire book during a long layover in Chicago. Mr Harman walked, worked, and lived the grounds of Gettysburg-he knows his history well. Thank you.
Old Wine-New Bottle.......2004-05-01
Harmon's book is a repackaging of his thesis in his original book entitled Cemetary Hill-The General Plan was Unchanged. So if you have that book, you essentially know what he is talking about. This new book is a bit more polished. He presents an interesting theory, although unconvincing for me.
Finally, a book that uses realism to evaluate!.......2004-04-10
As an old Army Field Artillery Officer, I had always wondered why the obvious nature of the Cemetery Hill was never presented. It was the high ground for crying out loud! Anyone worth their salt would see the case presented by Harmon is long overdue. He did an exceptional job of presenting factual evidence, and did not present a tired rehashing of the same old "accepted story." It was an eminently readable effort. The next time that I travel to the battlefield I will have to meet this man for an autograph in my copy of the book. (Maybe they should read this one in the service schools too.)
Book Description
'It is well this is so terrible! We should grow too fond of it,' said General Robert E. Lee as he watched his troops repulse the Union attack at Fredericksburg on 13 December 1863.
This collection of seven original essays by leading Civil War historians reinterprets the bloody Fredericksburg campaign and places it within a broader social and political context. By analyzing the battle's antecedents as well as its aftermath, the contributors challenge some long-held assumptions about the engagement and clarify our picture of the war as a whole.
The book begins with revisionist assessments of the leadership of Ambrose Burnside and Robert E. Lee and a portrait of the conduct and attitudes of one group of northern troops who participated in the failed assaults at Marye's Heights. Subsequent essays examine how both armies reacted to the battle and how the northern and southern homefronts responded to news of the carnage at Frederickburg. A final chapter explores the impact of the battle on the residents of the Fredericksburg area and assesses changing Union attitudes about the treatment of Confederate civilians.
The contributors are William Marvel, Alan T. Nolan, Carol Reardon, Gary W. Gallagher, A. Wilson Greene, George C. Rable, and William A. Blair.
Customer Reviews:
ritcal essays by the Foremost Experts on Lee's Best Battle.......2001-07-14
A great collection of essays by those historians most familiar with the Battle of Fredericksburg. Burnsides excellent biographer, Wiliam Marvel, writes a very balanced essay on Burnside and his high command that was still full of McClellan political generals and some that were inept. Burnside shares blame for failed opportunities but was primarily let down by Franklin who proved to be incapable or neglectful in providing a strong attack on the Confederate right that was necessary to attack the heights of the town on the confederate left. The objective critic of Lee, Alan Nolan, writes an essay substantiating why this battle was Lee's greatest and how Longstreet was so capable that his great critic Douglas Freeman had to praise him. A. William Greene who spent many years with the park service at Fredericksburg (he's now at the new Pamplin Civil War Museum in Petersburg) writes of Burnside's last and lost attempt at continuing the campaign, the mud march. Difficult in bad weather but made worse by the political generals who contributed willingly to his failure. The other essays contribute to the realities of war, the carnage and the effect on Civilians and how the virtually destroyed Pennyslvania Division were later to shout "Remember Fredericksburg" at Gettysburg.
A correction for your on-line review........1999-02-24
Your review of Gallagher's book on the Battle of Fredericksburg has the date wrong. It was fought on Dec. 13, 1862, not 1863.
Book Description
Long after nearly fifty thousand soldiers shed their blood there, serious misunderstandings persist about Robert E. Lee's generalship at Gettysburg. What were Lee's choices before, during, and after the battle? What did he know that caused him to act as he did? Last Chance for Victory addresses these issues by studying Lee's decisions and the military intelligence he possessed when each was made. Packed with new information and original research, Last Chance for Victory draws alarming conclusions to complex issues with precision and clarity. Readers will never look at Robert E. Lee and Gettysburg the same way again.
Customer Reviews:
Houston we have a problem!!!!.......2007-09-21
I have read most of the reviews of this book and all are written so eloquently and with deep thought and meaning and fact based. I will get to the point. This book is a must. We can talk of Gettysburg until the cows come home and what if the scenerio to death. As a Woman with no children and never wanted children, I would have bore Lee 12 I loved him so much, but having said that. What a mess Gettysburg was. Yes you have to take into perspective the times and the comunication issues, or lack there of, but, in all reality, the fault I do believe does lie with the great one himself. Yes, I understand the vocabulary of the time, yes I understand that Lee was the epitome of what a true Southern Aristocrat consisted of, but just for a minute, try to imagine Nathan Bedford Forrest in that posistion. Do we really think that Nathan would have stated if at all practicable take that hill? Um,,NO. It would have just been take the damn hill. He would have been all over Longstreet as he delayed his assault. As much of a fan as I am of Longstreet, that was very questionable for me. And let us not forget my Louisiana Fightin Tigers who basically had the battle won the first day if yet they had the support that was needed.
If Lee was indeed sick at the time, who will ever know. Almost everyone dropped the ball on this three day battle, wether intentional or not. As I make my pilgramige to Gettysburg yearly and I walk Picketts charge, this plan, how ever crazy it may have appeared to everyone else, I understood. To cut through the middle and they almost made it. Poor Fella's.
Get this Book, it is great.
Interesting analysis of Lee's generalship at Gettysburg--but questions do remain.......2007-07-05
This book begins with a rhetorical question (page i): "'Do we really need another book about Gettysburg and Pickett's charge?'. . .. The short answer to that question is yes, another book is necessary." Why? The authors argue that Lee's battle plan at Gettysburg, in fact, was stellar and that defeat there was the result of many factors beyond his control (and some within his control). In short, they reject some of the recent revisionist histories of Lee's flaws as a general officer (e.g., McKenzie's "Uncertain Glory" and Nolan's "Lee Considered").
They note that he marshaled his forces well on the first day, as he seized control of the accidental encounter. By the end of the day, his forces had wrecked two Union corps (the First and the Eleventh). On the second day? They contend that his en echelon attack was perfect to confuse Union forces as the Confederate meat grinder continued, as the attack proceeded sequentially from their right toward their center, drawing in Union forces to meet immediate threats, only to have a follow up attack further down the line. Indeed, one can easily make the case that July 2nd, the second day of Gettysburg, was a great triumph for Lee and for Longstreet, whose First Corps did great damage to Union forces, even though outnumbered at most turns. Indeed, the second day at Gettysburg was one of Longstreet's best moments of the war (and he had quite a few good ones). But Hill's inept leadership of his corps led to a "fizzling out" of the en echelon attack (with some blame also attaching to his supposedly dependable division commander, Richard Anderson, who refused to send in additional brigades to continue the pressure on Union forces).
The third day. . . The charge by troops led by George Pickett, Isaac Trimble, and James J. Pettigrew, as we know was turned back with heavy casualties. The book places much of the blame at the feet of the officer Lee ordered to organize the attack--James Longstreet. And, indeed, this was not Longstreet's greatest hour.
In the end, according to the authors, Lee's generalship was sound and inspired, but he was undone by an enumeration of seventeen causes, among which were: poor selection of troops to lead the attack on July 3rd (many of these troops had been badly handled on the first day of the battle and were not in good condition to play such a role); Winfield Scott Hancock's stunning leadership on all three days of the battle; Longstreet's performance on the third day; Jefferson Davis, Confederate President, not forwarding several brigades of top notch troops from North Carolina to the Army of Northern Virginia; A. P. Hill's poor performance as leader of the newly created Third Corps; the breakdown of the en echelon attack on July 2nd.
As far as it goes, these arguments do make sense. However, Lee must bear considerable responsibility. After all, he was responsible for selecting the troops to make the charge on the third day; he had a record of high casualties among officers (replacing good officers with mediocre or inexperienced ones was, by this time, a way of life for his army) and troops by emphasizing aggressive tactics, thereby bleeding down his forces; too much of a "hands off" attitude when battle began (A. P. Hill was having a lousy three days; continuing to give him latitude was unwise, to put it mildly).
This is an interesting volume and is useful as a response to some overly critical revisionist critiques of Lee's generalship at Gettysburg and elsewhere. But to go to the other extreme, as the authors come close to doing here, is not the answer. Balance is what is needed in an examination of Lee's generalship. To be sure, he failed in a number of areas over time; he was also someone who could inspire his troops and pull victory out of hat looked to be defeat. Neither romanticization nor harsh critique serves Lee's leadership well. Balance. . . .
A classic!.......2007-01-05
This is one of the best military history books I've ever read. The authors analyze Lee's generalship and convincingly argue a number of controversial assertions. Specifically - that it was impractical and improper to send troops from Virginia to relieve Vicksburg. That Lee did not issue discretionary orders but rather orders with discretion that allowed the subordinate to decide how best to complete the task. That Stuart's ride around the Union army was therefore against orders. That it was originally intended as a ride THROUGH the Union army. That Ewell's orders were also not discretionary, so he too disobeyed orders by not capturing the high ground. That delays in Longstreet's deployment were reasonable and that his performance on July 2nd was superb. That a Confederate attack on July 3rd was the proper decision, but that the attack was not properly supported, and Longstreet's performance that day was poor. Bowden's Napoleonic expertise is very useful regarding staff work. Although many authors mention the problem, Bowden shows how Napoleon successfully used many times the number of staff officers that Civil War armies used, and he explains their functions. The authors also explain the en echelon attack on the 2nd, and show that it succeeded in drawing Union troops toward the early targets of the attack, making the Union line vulnerable elsewhere. They also show that the failure to extend the attack along the whole line resulted in the Confederate failure, and they explain who was responsible and why. The opportunity on the 2nd was great as Meade's shifting of troops had completely denuded some sections of his line. Although too much ink has obviously been spilled on this battle, you should not miss this book.
Fair and Balanced...Finally.......2005-09-08
This is an extremely well thought-out, annotated and bibliographed defense of Lee's actions at Gettysburg. It details the strategic and tactical thinking that Lee used to arrive at, then fight at, that particular spot in Pennsylvania. Lee is not completely absolved of blame for the Confederate loss, and ample credit is given to key players on the Union side (with some surprises). Great emphasis is placed on the shortcomings of Lee's lieutenants during those three days, however, and the book brilliantly details Lee's intended battle design. It's lengthy, but so engaging and readable that I was disappointed when it ended.
A Good Addition To The Gettysburg Library.......2005-05-10
I recently came upon this book in trade copy in a remainder bookstore and have enjoyed reading it.
From the other reviews here, one can fairly quickly see that by some readers this is a somewhat controversial book. Some have said it is pro-Lee, pro-South, and anti anything the authors don't agree with.
I'm essentially a Unionist, having members of our family perish as Unionists on the battlefield; I have a couple Civil War discharges on the wall, and also a G.A.R. medal that I cherish. So even though I am 'pro-Union' I can state unequivocally that I not only appreciate this book, but commend the authors for a large job well done.
Through much reading I've come to appreciate General Lee as not only a great man as a general, but an even greater man in general, and feel General Lee deserves a hearing such as this. I feel pleasure and honor that I visited Washington & Lee University to view Lee & Traveler's resting places.
And I know of few authors who do not somewhat 'fall under the spell' of the great person of history of whom they write. Still I would recommend this book to one and all.
I would think it best, however, for any reader coming to this book to have some background in Civil War history prior to their reading. Concerning this book, that would be my only suggestion.
All-in-all I think this is a very good book.
Semper Fi.
Book Description
The battle at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in December 1862 involved hundreds of thousands of men; produced staggering, unequal casualties (13,000 Federal soldiers compared to 4,500 Confederates); ruined the career of Ambrose E. Burnside; embarrassed Abraham Lincoln; and distinguished Robert E. Lee as one of the greatest military strategists of his era. Francis Augustín O'Reilly draws upon his intimate knowledge of the battlegrounds to discuss the unprecedented nature of Fredericksburg's warfare. Lauded for its vivid description, trenchant analysis, and meticulous research, his award-winning book makes for compulsive reading.
AUTHOR BIO: Francis Augustín O'Reilly is also the author of Stonewall Jackson at Fredericksburg: The Battle of Prospect Hill. He has written numerous articles on the Civil War and conducts extensive battlefield studies and tours throughout Virginia. He lives in Woodford, Virginia.
Customer Reviews:
Irritating and Dull.......2007-07-04
We have been reading books on the Civil War for years now, particularly accounts of important battles such as Shiloh or The Seven Days. Many of them have been of the same genre as The Fredericksburg Campaign, Winter War on the Rappahannock by O'Reilly. That is, detailed accounts of particular battles or campaigns as integrated into the broader context of the war. Sears's books, e.g. To The Gates of Richmond and Landscape Turned Red are exemplars of the genre. Hennessey's Return to Bull Run is a solid entry. Tanner's Stonewall in the Valley is another favorite of ours.
O'Reilly's The Fredericksburg Campaign is by far the dreariest, most unfocused, and annoying book of this type that we have read.
Mr. O'Reilly clearly sympathizes with the South. That is not, per se, what makes his writing style so irritating. What makes this aspect of his writing so annoying is that, like a handful of other southern-leaning modern writers, he is still fighting the war, not with rifles and cannon, but with adjectives and emphases. This unpleasant slant permeates the book, leading to an implicit theme that is not otherwise supported with evidence or balance. We'll give just a couple of the more striking examples here.
In the chapter on the sack of Fredericksburg, O'Reilly discusses Union General Sully's entering his sister's home--she and her husband were Confederates--and using it as his headquarters, standard practice during the war on both sides. There was no damage at all done to the house. However, we had to read this paragraph twice to be sure that this was the case. O'Reilly tells the story in terms of (characteristic northern) "outlandish mischief"...which Sully did not commit...against the house of a "d___ rebel!" which he "[broke into]"...by climbing through a window - because the door was locked. We're told, with no source cited, that Sully did not mean to protect the house, but used it only for his own comfort. O'Reilly tries to add some "humor" by relating the story of Sam, a house "servant" (the term slave is virtually absent from the book), who jokes along with hooting, "grinning onlookers", in an Amos-and-Andy accent, at Sully's entering through the window.
Along similar lines, O'Reilly slants his abundant, and frequently grotesque, descriptions of battlefield death shamelessly. Consider these typical descriptions of northern deaths, taken from a desultory re-reading of Chapter 10: "one shell struck a man in the back, cut him in two, and sent his entrails flying" (page 303), "Blood and brains were scattered everywhere" (page 309), "A shell had eviscerated a Union soldier, `and...set fire to his clothing...his corpse lay slowly cooking'" (page 312). Contrast these with a southern death that O'Reilly chooses to detail, that of General Maxcy Gregg (page 443). He "struggled in silent agony" as fellow officers and a distant kinsman prayed and kept a vigil. Gregg, we learn, passed away after a touching reconciliation with a magnanimous and spiritual Stonewall. He "looked very handsome" in death.
George Romero deaths for northerners. Edmond Rostand deaths for southerners. Invariably? No. But overwhelmingly, as if the author delighted in the overwhelming northern carnage.
However this heavy-handed southern sympathizing is merely annoying. What makes the book incomparably dreary is O'Reilly's un-integrated, virtually interminable, cataloguing of particular troop movements. Good books of this genre, e.g. those by Sears, present a cogent account of the battle or campaign as a whole, spiced with significant anecdotes and enriched with telling accounts of the experiences of individual soldiers or regiments. O'Reilly, by contrast, seems simply to tell the story of each individual regiment in more-or-less chronological order, without attention to relevance for a thesis. And, after the first few dozen pages of this, one recognizes an odd narrative formalism into which these accounts are fit: commander initiates the attack, anecdote about the commander or the regiment, quirky banter about doom and duty among the soldiers, up and out of the millrace ravine or the unfinished railroad or wherever they'd been protected, the nightmare of entering the field of battle, details of one or two grisly deaths, attack failed. Repeat. And repeat. And repeat...
We are interested in the Civil War, having read at least twenty books on the topic over the past few years, so we're glad to have this resource on the details of the battle on the ground. But the recitation of such details does not constitute an integrated, coherent, lucid account of the Battle of Fredericksburg. O'Reilly has done a service by extracting these stories from letters, memoirs, regimental histories, and other sources. But they belong in a (long) appendix, or in a companion volume. We had to refer, repeatedly, back to Catton, MacPherson, and Foote to get a clear overview of the structure of this battle into which to integrate O'Reilly's overabundant details.
We're going back to Sears for Chancellorsville. Although we don't have a specific recommendation, we recommend looking elsewhere for a thoughtful account of the Battle of Fredericksburg.
William Dale
David S. Ross
An excellent American Civil War Battle book.......2007-05-18
I'm in the middle of reading this work, but I can already highly recommend it for anyone interested in exploring the Battle of Fredericksburg in great detail (one of my great-great grandfathers was living there at the time). An outstanding author, Mr O'Reilly was recommended to me by a volunteer researcher working with the National Park Service in the area. I heartily second this recommendation.
A excellent, detailed account of the battle.......2007-05-08
This book is an excellent and very detailed report of the battle of Fredericksburg. It is not a good book for someone who is interested in a simple overview of the battle, but to someone interested in the details of what happened at Fredericksburg and why the events unfolded as they did, it is an excellent reference. I believe that this will be the definitive book on Fredericksburg for many years.
I was very pleased how it shows that the plans of Burnside were not as myopic as a lot of current history buffs seem to think. Burnside actually achieved a number of positive accomplishments in the battle, including stealing a march on Lee and breaking Lee's lines in Jackson's front. The book makes clear that to a large degree that there is plenty of blame to go around for the defeat at Fredericksburg. People such as Halleck, Lincoln, Duane, Franklin, Smith and others all had a major hand in the defeat, and most of them had reasons to attempt to lay the entire blame at the feet of Burnsides. While no one can defend Burnside's later obsession with Maryes' Heights (which is covered in wonderful detail in the book), and in the final analysis the blame for the final result is with the general who planned the battle, which Burnsides freely shouldered, this book shows that at least in its initial conception his plans were not the ravings of a lunatic.
I believe it is only through looking at the details and accounts written at the time of the battle that a more true picture can be seen, and this is what I believe O'Reilly presents.
Burnside
Very nice.......2007-01-15
It was a Christmas gift and the person we gave it to was very happy.
Thank you!
Steve.......2006-11-10
Having the absolutle pleasure and honor of meeting Mr. O'Reilly, and having a tour of the Slaughter Pen f
Civil War Virginia: Battleground for a Nation
Standing Like a Stone Wall: The Life of General Thomas J. Jackson
General A.P. Hill
Stonewall Jackson: The Man, the Soldier, the Legend
Reading the Man: A Portrait of Robert E. Lee Through His Private Letters
