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"We must make war as we must, not as we would like," observed the great British general Lord Kitchener after witnessing the carnage of World War I. Former Royal Marines commando Robin Neillands concurs in this often grim account of a bombing campaign that devastated much of continental Europe in the cause of destroying Nazism.
In this history of the Allied air war over Europe, Neillands maintains that the use of bombers as strategic weapons aimed at the enemy's ability to wage war--as opposed to purely tactical weapons aimed at enemy troops--necessarily involved the loss of civilian life and the destruction of nonmilitary targets, however unintentional. One such target was Dresden, a once-beautiful city that, some historians have protested, had no strategic importance and merely served as an example of what would happen to the rest of Germany should the fighting continue. Those historians are off the mark, Neillands counters: Dresden produced essential war materiel, such as military aircraft engines, shell fuses, and cigarettes ("a vital product for maintaining wartime morale"), and thus it was a legitimate target. So, he continues, were cities such as Berlin, Ludwigshafen, and Hamburg, the last the site of a firestorm that killed some 46,000 civilians. Their deaths were unfortunate, Neillands suggests, but necessary in ending Hitler's regime and in inaugurating an era in which total war is unthinkable.
Neillands rightly observes that most histories of the Allied air war in Europe present either the English or the American side, and he does a good job of weaving both accounts, drawing on official histories and the memories of veterans (including some German fliers) alike. More detailed and technically inclined than recent work by Stephen Ambrose and other popular writers on World War II, his book makes a useful addition to the historical literature. --Gregory McNamee
Book Description
The Bomber War is the book about the brutal war in the skies during World War II and the dedication and heroism of the airmen who paid the ultimate price for victory. The bomber campaign against Germany is one of the most contentious of World War II. Was anything achieved by the deaths of thousands of German civilians - many of them women and children? Or were all means justified against Nazi Germany?
Acclaimed historian Robin Neillands examines every detail of the Allied campaign led by British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur "Bomber" Harris: the strengths and fundamental flaws, the technical difficulties and developments and, above all, the day-by-day, night-by-night endurance of the crews flying to the limit in discomfort and danger, facing flak and enemy fire. Personal experiences of British, American, Canadian, Australian & other Allied fliers are a key part in this account, along with those of German airmen & civilians.
Though The Bomber War discusses Guernica and the destruction of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it concentrates on the European theater, on Germany's air war against the Allies - over Warsaw, Rotterdam, London and Coventry - which led to the fierce Allied raids carried out against Cologne, Hamburg, Berlin and the Ruhr and - most notorious of all - the tremendous firestorm unleashed on Dresden in the final months of the war. Robin Neillands also examines the complex moral issues involved in the air war, and of the case made against "Bomber" Harris. This is an important and timely addition to the history of armed conflict; the age of free-fall bombs may have passed, but many veterans - on both sides - are still alive to state their case, and to tell a new generation what their war like.
Customer Reviews:
Allied Strategic Bombing in WWII-with all the Warts on!.......2007-06-13
Prof. Neillands does an excellent job setting the props, introducing the actors and explaining the plot of that incredibly tragic drama which was Allied strategic bombing in World War II. If there are compliments to be rendered or blame to be assessed he doesn't shirk at the task. Rich in data yet compelling in pace, Prof. Neillands kept my interest at a level I seldom reach with nonfiction.
There are those who will still castigate him for his defense of Air Marshal Harris. Having been in the military myself, I understand the limitations of command. As far as bombing Dresden is concerned, there is very little doublt but that Harris and Spaatz were following orders. Therefore, the blame must rest higher.
All in all, I would place this in the top ten of all WWII nonfiction I have ever read. If you have a choice of books on the Strategic Bombing Offensive, please consider the late Robin Neilland's book first.
Four and 1/2 Stars.......2006-11-22
I just wrote a long review & my computer crashed before I could submit it, so I'll be brief. Yes, the book is pro-Bomber Command, but theirs was a remarkable story & they did, after all, win. The first person narratives are fascinating, and the author gives due credit to the USAAF 8th Air Force. The 9th Air Force is stiffed, which is fair because the author tells you that he is going to stick to strategic bombing, but surely more could have been written about the 15th Air Force?? I also thought the Halifax and its pilots were given a bit short shrift, but the author gets kudos for being fair about the B-24, and giving its pilots their props. Neilland is not a "professional" historian, but is more or less a professional military history writer, and he writes lucidly and compellingly. Definitely recommended for the WWII buff, especially if you have not given enough due to Bomber Command. I think one of the author's theses, that he is seeking to exonerate Air Chief Marshall Harris, is successful, even on the Dresden bombing. I also think the author's criticisms and conclusions about strategic bombing are fair and well-put.
Long, interesting book.......2006-09-28
Took a bit to get through this book. The information provided regarding the tactics and technology used during the various phases of the war was well presented. It was very interesting to read how the human element played in the development of the tactics and testing of them.
The interviews and sections provided by various people was very interesting. The reports from those under the bombers, those who felt and experieneced the effects first-hand, were astonishing. These reports truely tell the tale. The crews accounts also were great, as those who were there are able to recount the sights, sounds, and experiences. We need to do more to document as much as possible of those in the skies before the generation is lost.
The ending of the book where he seeks to defend the Dresden raid wasn't really in line with the rest of the book. I enjoyed the blending of historical facts, numbers, and personal accounts throughout, but the ending didn't quite fit as he devoted an awful amount of time and effort to Harris.
Overall a good addition to anyone's collection of WW2 bomber library.
Good story, poorly edited........2006-09-21
The story was very good and engrossing. It is well written. The author starts out with a thesis and sets out to support it. It is shocking how many men went to their deaths daily in the bomber war over Europe. Given the very close accounting kept of current skirmishes, I think it would have been truely appalling, though informative, if everyone knew exactly how many people were being killed every day during World War II.
However, I do find the book to be very repetitive and I have never seen a professionally published book with more typographical errors than this one. Editing and proofreading were lacking.
Thoroughly Researched - Highly Illuminating.......2006-05-10
Four stars for this thoroughly researched and eminently readable book. It is also pleasing to note on this page that veteran flyers and relatives of such find this book to be accurate and respectful.
Neillands uses a wide variety of documents to examine the way strategic bombing developed as a tool of warfare, describes how technology evolved and likewise traces the way in which the allies constructed their policies on this aspect of the war. It is all fascinating.
One thing that Neillands always does very well is the incorporation of veterans' recollections into his work. This is accomplished without appealling to emotion and depicting images of blood & guts like in Ambrose's books, that goes without saying. Rather he simply relays the stories of men getting on with their jobs and leaves the reader to construct his/her own emotions.
Morality? Civilians died in their tens of thousands, but all war is immoral.
The late Robin Neillands does have a tendency to be a little repetitious in his books, and I do feel that a couple more maps night have been useful here - hence one star docked. Nevertheless, this book is a significant achievement and quite rightly champions the crews who died and endured.
Finally, post-war the politicians involved in developing bombing policies and directives (including Churchill) failed to put their hands up when the accounting was done, allowing the prosecutors, men like Harris and his crews to shoulder the opprobrium.........things don't change. That Churchill refused to sanction a campaign medal for Harris's men of is a black mark against his name. Fighter Command received due adulation in 1940, it is a scandal that Bomber Command have not been sufficiently honoured
Book Description
A gripping account of the everyday heroism of British bomber crews in 1943 - the year when Bomber Command believed it could win WWII by bombing alone. In 1943 the RAF began a bombing campaign against Germany, the like of which had never before been seen. Over the next twelve months, tens of thousands of aircrews flew across the North Sea to drop their bombs on German cities. They were opposed not only by the full force of the Luftwaffe, but by a nightmare of flak, treacherously icy conditions, and constant mechanical malfunction. Most of these crews never finished their tour of operations but were either shot down and killed, or taken prisoner by an increasingly hostile enemy.
This is the story of the everyday heroism of British bomber crews in the days when it was widely believed that the Allies could win the Second World War by bombing alone. Kevin Wilson has interviewed hundreds of former airmen about what their lives were like in 1943: the stomach-churning tension of flying repeatedly over hostile territory, the terror at being shot down or captured, and the peculiar mixture of guilt and pride at unleashing such devastation on Germany. Their stories are woven together here to form a comprehensive and gripping account of what it was like to be an airman at the height of the bomber war.
Book Description
The second volume in this study assesses how, from the autumn of 1943, technology further aided the Luftwaffe's night fighter force while the intensity of RAF strikes against German oil and manufacturing targets, and also eventually against Berlin itself, increased. This resulted in a climactic battle of attrition for both sides in the night skies over the Reich. The author relates the development of both US escort strategy and the German principle of deploying µmass-against-mass' which resulted in some of the most ferocious air battles of the war in late 1944. Just as the Allies believed that air superiority had been won, the Luftwaffe introduced its revolutionary new jet fighters. Dr. Price relates the story of the strategic air offensive over Germany from both the perspective of technology as well as from the gripping and often tragic accounts of those of both sides who fought in this epic campaign.
Customer Reviews:
Nice, But Overpriced.......2006-10-06
Alfred Price is a leading author on the Allied bombing campaign over Germany in World War II. As such, it is always working looking at any work on the subject that bears his name. However, I agree with an earlier reviewer that this book falls more in the category of "well presented coffee table book" than a must read for historical research. So for a reader with a more casual interest in the topic, I can recommend this book, however it is overpriced at its list price. Wait until it goes on the discount table then buy it at half price. It would be a good value then.
One of the Best Books I've Seen on the Subject.......2006-04-22
This book is one of the best I've seen describing the air war in Europe. It is the second volume in the overall work. It:
Is Beautifully Illustrated, both photos and drawings Is Well Written Has Reports from German pilots as Well Discusses the Evolving Technology Covers Weapons that Came too Late.
This second volume covers the end of 1943 to the end of the war. This is when the RAF and the US 8th Air Force finally hit their stride in bombing Germany. The tonnage dropped and the increased accuracy was finally able to deliver what the air oriented generals has been promising since the beginning of the war.
The air generals had been saying that there was no magic target, no single target that would win the war. They were wrong. The magic target was fuel. By the end of the war the Germans had plenty of aircraft. But almost no fuel. Pilots were going into combat with very few hours. This was not unlike the British pilots during the Battle of Britain, but the British got better, and the Germans got worse until the end.
This book was first written in the 1970's when it was possible to talk with a lot of the German flyers who were still alive. It has been re-written to reflect later research and re-printed for this edition. It's an excellent read.
some 35 year old texts are not worth reprinting.......2005-10-25
..I thought this title would be worth investigating. Frankly it is not - the treatment is disappointing to say the least - this is over-priced (!!) slim 'coffee table' tome. There is little evidence of new research & data. The 'enhanced illustrations' are mostly Tullis profiles lifted directly from the Jagdwaffe series..large photos reproduced over an entire A-4 side are blurred & indistinct...if you know nothing at all about the subject it might be worth looking at..otherwise avoid.
Book Description
Sir Arthur Harris - Bomber Harris - remains the target of criticism and vilification by many, while others believe the contribution he and his men made to victory is grossly undervalued. He led the men of Bomber Command in the face of appalling casualties, had fierce disagreements with higher authority and enjoyed a complicated relationship with Winston Churchill. Written soon after the close of World War 2, this collection of Sir Arthur Harris's memoirs reveals the man behind the Allied bombing offensive that culminated in the destruction of the Nazi war machine but also many beautiful cities, including Dresden.
Customer Reviews:
An Insider's View of Allied Strategic Bombing.......2007-04-08
Revisionist historians may point an accusatory finger at Sir Arthur Travers "Bomber" Harris, the man who orchestrated the strategic bombing of Germany by the RAF during WWII, because of the substantial civilian deaths it caused... But given the deliberate establishment of German military and industrial installations in heavily populated areas and the lack of technology that would allow today's precision bombing of targets, this is precisely what crippled the German war machine and shortened the duration of the war (and, by consequence, the Holocaust). This is the story in Sir Arthur's own words, which allows the reader to enter the mind of a towering figure in RAF history and take an insider's look at the decisions, the dilemmas, and the person behind them. It's a bit specialized, of course, so if you're looking for a general book about WWII (or even WWII in the air) look elsewhere. But if you have an interest in the RAF strategic bombing campaign that helped bring Germany to its knees, this is a tremendously informative and fascinating book!
A personal account - a very personal account of bomber war.......2005-01-06
This is a nice piece dating from 1947. It is a frank and personal account. Harris is an overconfident victor of WWII, and he is not ashamed of telling his view of how he (almost) won the second world war, singlehandedly. When this book was written, the concept "politically correct" had not yet been coined, and today Harris would be in trouble with his language: Germans are idiots, and so are the French. The civil servants in the Air ministry and Ministry of aircraft production are bunglers. Colonial crankshots from all parts of the British Empire do get some credit, and Harris is fond of the Americans, and only rarely is he calling them morons. Harris was trained at Staff college, but he despises the cavalry mentality that was ingrained in the education. Interservice rivalries are given a frank expose, with the Admiralty playing the part of the villain. Harris completely ignores scientific advice and is not able to understand anti-submarine uses of bombers; to him it only diverts his resources from offensive that will break Germany.
Harris is a field commander who does not delve into deep discussions about morality of war or impact of his operations. It remains a mystery why Harris thought that RAF area bombings could destroy the German morale, because he had witnessed himself that the London blitz or Coventry bombing did not have the desired effect on the British morale.
Harris is fond of quoting Albert Speer to show how much damage bombing did to German war effort. But Harris is extremely selective, so it is good to quote other comments by Speer, for instance on attacks on ball bearing industry: "But already in the connection of the first attack enemy made a crucial mistake: instead of concentrating his efforts on ball bearings, it divided its forces... and what is more important, the British continued their haphazard attacks on German cities..." Ball bearings had been pinpointed early on as targets of primary importance, but Harris overruled those incompetent idiots of the economic warfare office. He claims to have known that the attacks would be useless, but his reasoning proved all wrong after the war. In 1944, Speer "thanks" Harris indirectly: "bombings on economically critical targets are clearly planned by men who understand German economy... We are clearly lucky that the enemy has been insane not to carry out its own policy." This means that British area bombings of 1942 and 1943 had been rather inefficient and only intensified American bombing in 1944 of critical resources started to have effect on German war effort.
It is curious that the British only sent a dozen men to assess bombing damage in Germany after the war: they had, after all, lost 50 000 men in the skies of Germany. When discussing German civilian casualties, Harris distances himself by quoting US Strategic Bombing Survey figure of 300 000 (many others put the figure at 600 000). On the whole the neglect of effects of bombing is amazing. To quote Harris: "The RAF was not in a position to judge the result of its main offensive in the light of a sufficient body of indisputable evidence". RAF "measured" the success of bombing by the the number of bombed-out people, or acres of destroyed build-up area. The Americans later perfected this approach in Vietnam: because bombing damage could not be assessed, they just reported the tonnage of bombs dropped.
Harris claims that he could have forced Germany to surrender by air power alone, if only he had been given 4000 heavy bombers. Harris completely ignores the aircraft building effort. The fact is that the Bomber command never grew big because the Germans kept shooting down heavies at the same rate as the British build them. The idiots at the Ministry of Aircraft Production did supply some 7000 Lancasters, 7000 Halifaxes, 10 000 Wellingtons (and 7000 medium Mosquitos), yet Bomber command never had more than 1600 planes at any one time.
Harris had some very profound views of the future of warfare. He understands that bombers are historical relics, and the future belongs to missiles. This is a rather brave comment from a man who created a major bomber force to a win a war just a few years earlier. Many later writers, including Denis Richards but surprisingly excluding the official RAF historians, rely on Harris's memoirs as their main guidance in bomber war histories.
review of Harris' autobiography.......2004-02-16
One of the most controversial figures of the Second World War was an african who sunk more German battleships than the Royal Navy, did as much to win the Battle of Britain as Fighter Command (but lost more men in the process), and killed over 50,000 of the enemy in a single night.
What interested me most was the thoughts of such a commander. It's not only Air Marshalls who strive hard, have to overcome obstructive idiots who are supposed to be helping you, and when you've succeeded, get it in the neck from those you've most benefitted. It is clear his main enemy during the war was useless bureaucrats. High up on his list was top brass at the RN with their battleship mentality, and requests to divert money and bombers to some of their more pointless tasks (as he saw it). He showed disdain also for the army's cavalry mentality, but probably most of all he hated pointless civil service delay during war-time:
"After the war, Albert Speer, [...], was asked to what extent the loss of records affected efficiency in production. He replied "On the contrary, the loss of records led to a temporary loosening of the ties of bureaucracy. We very often received the message 'Administrative building burnt out, production continues at full pressure.' " Perhaps our own problems could have been solved as expeditiously by a few bombs on the appropriate Government departments."
Unexpected attacks that hurt him more though were those from the floor of the House of Commons, and Fleet Street; he didn't have to wait till the end of the war to learn that his efforts were considered offensive by many, as he acknowledges in the title of his book which is to some extent an account of his life as well as of the bomber offensive itself.
At least two of his brothers had been considered more promising than him, and though born (in 1892) in England, he had chosen to become a Rhodesian. Resisting intense pressure from his father to join the army, at sixteen he accepted a ticket and a fiver and went off to become in turn a gold miner, farmer and driver, and loved the life. Returning from a trip into the bush he heard of the outbreak of WWI and took the last available position in the 1st Rhodesian Regiment: bugler. He soon took part in the greatest marching performance of an infantry brigade in English military history, and after they had: "...defeated and collected the Boche ... I sailed for England determined to find some way of going to war in a sitting position. I thought of the cavalry but I had no faith in horse warfare. The Gunners were full up. I thought I would learn to fly; even before the war I had toyed with the idea of joining the R.N.A.S. and might have done so if it had not meant becoming a professional sailor. I therefore joined the R.F.C."
Openly admitting to help from a highly-placed uncle, he was appointed a second-lieutenant on probation, and soon formed a squadron for home defence (one of his men shot down the first Zeppelin) and for defending artillery spotters in France.
Staying in the R.A.F. after the war his liking for a warm climate took him to the Middle East. Amidst terrible privations and shortages mostly due to maladministration, he tells us how he was involved in the bombing of "Irak" (or "Mespot" as they called it).
Just before WWII he was in Palestine. It seems the rules for the British there were:
"...you must not get rough, no matter how rough the "enemy" is... My advice to all young commanders in all services is, whenever you see any prospect of being called out "in aid of the civil power" in any part of the world, to get the hell out of there as quickly and as far as you can. If you fail by being to soft you will be sacked; if you succeed by being tough enough, you will certainly be told you were too tough, and you may be for it."
He raises a number of interesting points in his account of the war itself. He ascribes the German decision to stop the Blitz to their very high loss of bombers due to crash landing at night on their return to base; the industrial haze of the Ruhr defended it from effective raids in the first part of the war; the field of "Operations Research" grew out of the need to answer questions on the effectiveness and strategy of raids without being able to run controled experiments. Notable in his absence from the book is Leigh-Mallory who, in his biography, was described has having organised the bombing of the French railways before and after D-day, which Harris discusses as his own work.
The effectiveness of Bomber Command rose exponentially towards the end of the war; it is not well-appreciated how incredibly accurate, even at night, the Lancasters and Mosquitos became. A great fan of the Americans, Harris obviously regarded them as rivals, and he points out that they also opted for carpet bombing; it produced a firestorm in Tokyo. He doesn't mention though that American day bombing damaged the German war effort in the air as well on the ground.
Another German veiwpoints on Harris' work from the book:
Speer: "Owing to their greater effectiveness, night attacks caused considerably more damage than day raids... by reason of the fact that the superheavy bombs caused shattering damage to [the synthetic oil plants]."
Harris suffered less for his efforts than Oppenheimer, though his reputation fared worse. His regretless post-war return to his adopted Africa was probably accompanied by the thought that you can't expect thanks for a difficult and dirty but essential job well executed.
Spare me.......2001-04-11
Don't wanne even get closer to something remotely associated with "BUTCHER" Harris....
EVIL NEEDS SOMEONE TO DO ITS JOB ..........1999-12-07
Sometimes evil needs someone to to his dirty job. In war, there's no quarter given or taken. Arthur Harris was C-in-C Bomber Command in WW II, and he led RAF bombers to destroy German cities, with never regretting. In doing so, thousands (almost 50%) of RAF's aircrew perished or were taken prisoner, with what gain? Even today the answer isnot clear. What is clear to me is that Harris never once lost his sleep for the thousands of people (British and German) that his orders sent to die, always under cover of "Orders are orders". He apparently felt joy doing his job.
Average customer rating:
- Concise history of British and American bomber war
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The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and the Allied Bomber Offensive 1939-1945
Robin Neillands
Manufacturer: John Murray General Publishing Division
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
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Europe
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ASIN: 0719556376 |
Customer Reviews:
Concise history of British and American bomber war.......2005-01-06
This is a balanced account of Allied bomber war. Both RAF and USAAF contribution is considered. It rightly concentrates on Germany, because the pre-war doctrines of strategic bombing were put to practise above Germany. This concentration lets him to condense the war to manageable 400 pages, while including many reminisences by those involved: both commanders, pilots, navigators and gunners, and he also lets German fighter pilots and flak gunners as well as bombed civilians to speak.
Neillands tries to understand the bombing effectiveness, unlike Harris, who preffered to bomb cities because they were large enough targets to hit with lousy navigation aids. Neillands spends a lot of time discussing morality of area bombings, but very little on alternative ways of fighting the war: heavy bombers are accepted as the main fighting vehicle of bomber war and no alternatives are considered or cost-benefit analyses tried. Yet USAAF 10% losses per mission (which translates to 12% chances of surving 20 mission tour of duty) and even the 4% RAF losses (with 30% chance of finishing 30 missions) should have made somebody think about alternatives (like Mosquito "light" bomber which could carry the same bomb load as the B-17 "heavy" bomber, but with 0.2% loss rate).
Neillands has the tendency to repeat selected topics so many times as to drive the reader furious. His favourites: 88 mm flak gun was an excellent anti-tank weapon; bombing accuracy in cloud-covered Europe under enemy fire is worse than in training bombing in sunny Texas; losses are prohibitive in daylight bombing without fighter escort. These comments and many others appear 5-10 times in the book. 50 pages could have easily been culled by removing repetition.
On page 387 Neillands commits a statistical fraud when discussing losses: assumably he tries to soften the allied losses by quoting side by side the Luftwaffe fighter command losses. These two, however, have very little to do with each other: Bomber command and the 8th USAAF were minor contributors to German fighter losses, compared with the Eastern front. Early in the bomber offensive Germans lost one fighter for two heavy bombers, which in economic terms was a bargain: two shot down fighter pilots who could often parachute to safety of fatherland, vs. 20 airmen who either died (only 20% survived, based on Neillands's scattered statistics on the topic), or were captured and imprisoned. 8 aircraft engines destroyed against two. Towards the end of the war the situation developed into parity: one fighter for one bomber.
Neillands spends a lot of time speculating whether bombers could have won the war without ground forces, and he believes that Harris and Arnold could have done it. But then, on page 396, he refutes his own argument: "Germany was still fighting in 1945, and fighting hard." which means that the infantry had to invade Germany to end the war, and the "bomber dream" of winning the war from the air was just a dream.
Despite these deficiencies and shortcomings Neillands's book is clearly the book of choice on bomber war. It may be complemented by Arthus Harris's memoirs "Bomber Offensive". A book to be avoided at all cost is Denis Richards's RAF Bomber Command.
Customer Reviews:
A good introduction about bombers in World War II.......2007-06-23
I read this book, here in Brazil.This book has many photos; all of them black & white photos.This book is also short, concise and easy to read.The failures of this book are small.One of them is to remember the route whom permited England has so many aircrafts, donated by USA.An scale of this route was Brazil.About the real military results of this offensive so expensive in money, lives,etc. for the bomber offensive, this book is also weak.This is a good and concise introduction, not a book for experts.
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