Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

Book Description

Karl von Clausewitz's study On War was described by the American strategic thinker Bernard Brodie as 'not simply the greatest, but the only great book about war'. It is hard to disagree. Even though he wrote his only major work at a time when the range of firearms was fifty yards, much of what he had to say remains relevant today. Michael Howard explains Clausewitz's ideas in terms both of his experiences as a professional soldier in the Napoleonic Wars, and of the intellectual background of his time.

Customer Reviews:

Condensed Clausewitz.......2006-04-23

Years ago, I read a book entitled "On Strategy: a Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War." The author, Col. Harry Sumner, relied heavily on Clausewitz in critiquing the US effort in that war. Having been led by other military historians to believe that Clausewitz was more or less clueless about strategy, I was somewhat taken aback by Sumner's heavy reliance on Clausewitz.

Then came Desert Storm, and even my untutored eye could see that the US military had taken the teachings of "On Strategy" to heart. One could say that the US victory in Desert Storm was essentially "Clausewitzian". Maybe Clausewitz had been getting some undeserved bad press.

"Clausewitz: a Very Short Introduction" rehabilitates the Prussian officer's reputation, giving his biography and distilling his thought into a manageable amount of reading. Clausewitz was no armchair theoretician. He was a professional soldier who saw extensive combat during the Napoleonic Wars, and he knew what he was talking about. He may even be the first author to recognize Murphy's Law. He called it "friction," and he wrote that it plagued every sort of military endeavor.

For those of us who are unwilling to grapple with the unabridged Clausewitz, this little book is just what the general ordered.

Succinct, lucid, a good beginning........2005-04-27

Clausewitz is notoriously difficult to understand, according to Prof. Howard, because so much of what he wrote was not intended for publication. As Clausewitz himself stated, he wrote a "collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled." Professor Howard, the co-author of the standard English translation of Clausewitz, begins that distillation process in these few pages.

He first places Clausewitz in context, with a review of his family origins and military experience. He was commissioned as an officer in the Prussian Army at the age of 12, fought in his first campaign in 1793 at the age of 13 against the forces of Revolutionary France on the Rhine and then in the Vosges. In 1806 he was captured following the French defeat of Prussian forces at Auerstadt, a subsidiary of Napoleon's great victory over the Prussians at Jena. He then spent two years in captivity as a prisoner of war in France. When later the Prussian king allied himself with Napoleon, Clausewitz resigned from the Prussian Army and joined the Russian Army, where he participated in the Russian victory over Napoleon at Borodino. When the Prussian King, Frederick William III, eventually joined the Alliance against Napoleon in 1813, Clausewitz became an advisor to General Blucher during the Leipzig campaign, though still in Russian uniform. After being allowed by the King to rejoin the Prussian Army he became chief of staff to the Prussian III Corps, which acted as a blocking force at Waterloo. He then spent 12 years at the Prussian Army War College, where he spent much of his time writing his most famous work, On War. He died in 1831, at the age of 51, in a cholera epidemic in Breslau, where he had been sent to institute a cordon sanitaire to prevent the disease from spreading.

Clausewitz' ideas were formed in the cauldron of the transition from formalized 18th century warfare to the total war of the French Revolution and Napoleonic era. The successive Prussian defeats had a profound effect on him, stimulating a rethinking of the theory of warfare as it evolved in his lifetime. There is much debate about how much of his work applies only to the particular circumstances of his era and how much is applicable to warfare in general.

He is frequently contradictory and ambiguous, which is not surprising, given the extreme complexity of the human social phenomenon he is attempting to analyze. These are a few of his better-known concepts:

- the FRICTION of war (now often called the "FOG of war")
- successful warfare always involves a FIGHT, although paradoxically, an "unfought fight", such as the nuclear exchange that didn't happen during the Cold War, can have as much effect as an actual fight
- the necessity of attacking the enemy's CENTER
- the power of the DEFENSE
- the necessity of SUPERIOR FORCE for VICTORY
- the importance of MORALE
- the concept of WAR AS AN EXTENSION OF POLITICS

Prof. Howard provides a good summary of the way Clausewitz influenced the ideas and operations of the great wars of the 20th century - WWI, WWII, and the Cold War - and gives guidance for further study. He recommends in particular three books:

Peter Paret - "Clausewitz and the State"
Azar Gat - "The Origins of Military Thought from the
Enlightenment to Clausewitz"
Raymond Aron - "Penser la guerre, Clausewitz"

There is as yet no complete English translation of Clausewitz' works.

Highly recommended as an introduction to the study of history's foremost philosopher of warfare.

Cliff Notes to Clausewitz.......2000-08-11

Clausewitz is notoriously difficult for the novice to master -- some would argue that no one has ever entirely "mastered" Clausewitz. Be that as it may, a legion of frustrated amateur strategists can attest to the difficulty of picking up Clausewitz's "On War" and trying to read it through without a guide. In the "Clausewitz" volume in the Past Masters series, the novice as well as the experienced strategist can gain an introduction to the master's life, experiences, and writings that will make the first reading intelligible and that will serve as a quick review of Clausewitz's main concepts in a format that can easily be read in an evening.

Customer Reviews:

"Essential Military History Library" book.......2005-07-06

I thought I knew Clausewitz. I have an advanced degree in International Relations and Strategic Studies in a program that emphasizes Clausewitz's writings and general influence in its curriculum, including a close, semester-long reading and discussion of "On War" in its entirety. In addition, since graduating I've read several biographical sketches and insightful academic essays on Clausewitz and his theories by Michael Howard, Alan Beyerchan, Christopher Bassford, Barry Watts, and other noted Clausewitz scholars. The only reason I picked this book up was because of the glowing praise it received from Williamson "Wick" Murray, one the nation's most prominent military historians, in a military bibliography he compiled as part of a DoD contract. He listed "Clausewitz and the State" as one of twenty-five books making up "The Essential Military History Library." (To give the reader a sense, other books in this elite category include Thucydides' "History of the Peloponnesian War," Clausewitz's "On War," Tolstoy's "War and Peace," Grant's "Memoirs" and Churchill's "Life of Marlborough." Lofty company, indeed.) Given such a strong endorsement from such a qualified source, I felt compelled to add it to my reading list, although I was only expecting a "Clausewitz refresher." I was wrong.

Paret's work is a masterful mix of biography, philosophy and history, which combine to provide the reader insights into Clausewitz's character and theories like no other secondary work has or likely ever will.

The great feature of this book is the 360-degree view of Clausewitz it presents. Even with the best intentions, most biographers end up presenting an idealized view of their subjects. But the Clausewitz presented by Paret is entirely human. It's a tall task to get a twenty-first century American to truly understand an early nineteenth century Prussian, but that's precisely what Paret's book enables. The author includes a number of incisive quotations on Clausewitz from military performance evaluations, professional recommendations, book reviews of his work, and the diaries of leading socialites. Some are effusive in praise; others are quite denigrating. But nearly all capture the essence of a man of intense ambition and genius, but from a humble background, socially awkward and perceived (incorrectly) by the senior state leadership as a man with dangerously radical political tendencies. All of this combined to create a remarkable career given his social roots, but nevertheless supremely frustrating to a man of rare ability. The effect is similar to the character development of a great novelist. You begin to feel that you actually know Clausewitz, as though he were a close, life-long acquaintance. You begin to sense that you could accurately guess how he would react to any given situation. All of this is more than just interesting reading: it makes Clausewitz's theories and intentions much more understandable.

One of the most common complaints from Clausewitz critics and enthusiasts alike is that his original ideas and writings have been misunderstood and subsequently warped over the years. Even some of the philosopher's sharpest critics - most notably the British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart - have conceded that much of the destruction done in Clausewitz's name is attributable to those who misread his true point or, more commonly, never actually read "On War" at all except for a few phrases taken out of context. "Clausewitz and the State" was written as a companion to Paret's groundbreaking 1976 re-translation of "On War" and it should not be viewed as a substitute for that great work. Nevertheless, no serious student of war and peace will want to approach Clausewitz, his theories and his magnum opus without also closely reading this book. It is simply indispensable.

From Idealist to Realist.......2003-02-27

Paret argues that the great Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz was a realist with a life-long affinity to serve the nation-state and pursued a desire to understand this intricate and diverse concept. Clausewitz progressed from an idealized vision of statehood as a young man to a realist outlook in later life. This realism, argues Paret, is evident in Clausewitz's political writings as well as his mot famous treatise _On War_the ultimate extension of policy by concerted use of force. Yet it is the "Psychological and historical genesis" (p. 10) of Clausewitz's theories that Paret ultimately wants to convey. Paret concludes: "Clausewitz combined two very different callings-service to the state and scholarship-with remarkable success" (p. 436). Paret utilizes a contextual approach. Paret contends that in order to better understand Clausewitz's theories, the reader must first identify with the time frame that Clausewitz lived. Paret divides the book between biography and analysis of some prominent historical and political writings. Paret utilizes biography to illustrate Clausewitz's transformation from idealist to realist. Paret's analysis of Clausewitz's writings serves to show the differentiation between Clausewitz the political commentator and Clausewitz the military theorist. The printed materials available on Clausewitz are extensive though Paret leans more towards primary sources in this study. Besides the vast array of Clausewitz's own writings, Paret also makes extensive use of letters. Correspondence between Clausewitz and his fiancée/wife Marie v. Brühl and August von Gneisanau, collected in a plethora of German language sources are the most frequently cited. Paret makes it known, however, that new primary evidence dealing with Clausewitz is still surfacing though "widely dispersed." Source books and collections by Werner Hahlweg, Hans Rothfels and Walther Shering are also critically cited. It is obvious that Paret is enamored with Clausewitz and gives more than a sympathetic portrayal of his subject. Paret only passes lightly over criticisms of Clausewitz mainly the writings of W. Hahlweg and H. Rothfels and completely ignores the works of John Keegan and B.H. Liddle-Hart. Although the vast arrays of German language sources are impressive, they seem overdone for a book aimed at English speaking readers. As Paret mentions, this book provides an excellent companion volume to the M. Howard, P. Paret translation of _On War_ (Princeton: 1976) that is becoming a much-standardized text. Paret has succeeded in helping the reader to better understand Clausewitz by placing him in a contextual setting, especially his early experiences, influences, and education. Without a doubt, Clausewitz lived through some turbulent political changes in Europe between 1815-1831 and Paret illustrates this successfully. A major consensus seems to be that one can only understand Clausewitz by reading him. Paret certainly has created a thirst to do so in this book.

Illuminating Biography of Military Theorist.......2003-02-20

This book is a biography of a noteworthy but relatively obscure figure, Carl von Clausewitz, whose main claim to fame is having coined the famous dictum, "War is the Extension of Politics by other i.e. violent means" cited to by V.I. Lenin and others. This work, while dense and sometimes tedious in its explication of Clausewitz' views is fascinating in its description of its subject's life and times which facts serve to illuminate his ideas and their evolution.

Clausewitz was born into a middle-class family in Prussia in the late 18th Century. His father, not being a noble, was unable to retain his provisional officer rank of lieutenant he had achieved during the Seven Years War (known as the French and Indian War in the North American theater of operations). Thus a subtext of Clausewitz and his family's dubious pretentions to nobility that were finally "recognized" in the wake of his own and to a lesser extent his brother's-who also became a lesser known general-achievements.

Clausewitz and his older brother were farmed out to the military by their father in 1792 when Clausewitz was 12 years old as officer cadets during the Wars of the French Revolution and he served in the military throughout the entire Napoleonic period and thereafter rising to the rank of major general. It was this highly charged political atmosphere that conditioned Clausewitz' world view and made him-along with his mentor Gerhard Scharnhorst-realize that the old set piece notions of war which played out like a chess game held in a gentleman's club between rival aristocratic principalities were no longer viable. It also gave added fuel to his and the other "reformers" views that certain social changes were needed to neutralize the appeal of the French Revolution. Thus they called for the scaling back of aristocratic privilege and the building of a military based on broader nationalist and meritocratic bases. They also emphasized, ironically given the reputation of mindless obedience that Prussian militarism retained, the importance of inculcating troops with a spirit of self reliance which involved de-emphasizing dogma and promoting analytical thinking that could form the basis for decision making in unforseen circumstances of crisis. These ideas took on greater urgency after Prussia's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of Napolean in 1806 in a few weeks of fighting (when Clausewitz was taken prisoner and actually was granted an audience with the French Emperor)- a situation that ironically suggests the fate of France of 1940, but this in the era of horse cavalry!-resulting in Napolean and the Grand Armee marching triumphantly through the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. As a result Prussia was for a number of years reduced to a virtual vassal state of France, not unlike what Vichy France was to Germany a century and half later, and when war broke out again in 1812 it was forced to take the side of Napolean. This was deeply offensive to patriotic and nationalist advocates like Scharnhorst, Clausewitz and others like Field Marshal Gneisenau and ultimately Clausewitz decamped to Russia where he became involved with the "Russo-German Legion" which after Napoleon's reverses there was able to first convince the Prussian commander Yorck to switch sides and then Prussia-like Italy in WW2-to do the same. Clausewitz then went with the "Allied" armies all the way to Paris and thereafter fought in a rear guard action at Waterloo.

The sweetness of this victory for him and others (Sharnhorst having died on the field of battle in 1813) was muted by the extreme reactionary turn of the victors towards resurrecting old time aristocratic and monarchical privilege, something Clauswitz from his vantage point of a military instructor in Berlin saw as holding back both Prussia and Germany's social and political development internally towards becoming a modern nation state and only adding fuel to the fire of discontent throughout Europe. Moreover, his reputation as a bourgois, if not "liberal", reformer caused his career to stall. It was in this context, that returned to line duty, he died of cholera while observing the events of the revolution of 1830 in Poland.

The book's shortcoming is its dense style which makes its ideas less accessible than they could be. Moreover, the ideas of its subject could be elucidated better; the author relies too heavily on extended quotations from his subject's work. For example, an entire chapter of On War is reproduced with little gloss.

After having read this book, I saw a documentary about James Cameron's recent mission to the wreck of the battleship Bismarck and was able to appreciate its references to two of the heavy cruisers in that great warship's battle group: Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Finally, for what it's worth, we can speculate about what Clausewitz' view of later German military history might have been, but one conclusion seems inescapable: he would have found Hitler's invasion of Russia a collosal blunder breathtaking in its ingnorance of the lessons of history which resulted in a similar outcome that snatched defeat from the jaws of victory.

The Real Clausewitz.......2000-07-06

Clausewitz was not a god of war, nor an advocate of the waging of war for war's, or conquest's, sake. He was a thoughtful, experienced soldier who saw much service, wrote about his experiences and tried to improve the armed forces of his country, Prussia.

This exceptional book by Peter Paret not only gives interesting information on Clausewitz the soldier and the man, but also explains the interesting enigma that was Prussia before, during, and after the Napoleonic Wars. This is not a companion book to anything, but a well-researched volume that stands on its own as authoritative history.

Paret goes into detail on why Prussia was defeated, and its army destroyed by Napoleon in the cataclysm of 1806. Conversely, the thoughtful, professional soldiers who sought to rebuild that army, 'with vengeance very much in mind' are developed to the extent that they are perceived as human without the false front of a textbook.

Excellently reserarched from original sources and credible secondary ones, Paret also goes in depth to cover the Prussian 'War of Liberation' of Germany from the French, the liberation in large part meaning annexation by Prussia. Additionally, he also explains that the Prussian civilian population, somewhat a thing apart from the Prussian army, was persuaded, by force if necessary, to participate in the wars in 1813-1814.

This book goes a long way into explaining Clausewitz and his times, is worth favorable, consideration, and belongs on the bookshelf of every thoughtful student.

Provides an excellent start to the study of Clausewitz.......1999-02-19

Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln. That one line from Carl von Clausewitz's most famous work, On War, is the most often quoted and perhaps most misunderstood concept that belongs to the Prussian officer's theory of war. Clausewitz's ideas are complex and his writings require study and contemplation to understand, but for those who invest the time and effort the results will be that your view of war will change forever. Professor Paret's book provides a helpful aide to this understanding. While Clausewitz and the State is not light reading and a background in German or at least Napoleanic history is helpful, this book provides the basis for developing a fuller understanding of Clausewitz and his concepts. The Clausewitz that Paret introduces is hardly the stereotype Prussian marinet. He's a reformer and distinctly modern in his outlook. A career officer who joined a line regiment as a cadet at 12, saw his first action at 14 and rose to the rank of Major General, yet wrote of the profound sorrow he felt upon leaving home at such a tender age, Clausewitz put his sense of duty to the state, and by extension the Prussian people, before his duty to the monarch. Branded a radical his career suffered, but he remained true to his convictions. The General Staff officers of the 20 July 1944 plot against Hitler can trace the roots of their decision to him. This book provides an excellent base from which to start in understanding the thoughts of this trully novel thinker. I also recommend a visit to the Clausewitz Page on the web. Read this book before you attempt to take on On War.

Average customer rating:

Biography on Clausewitz; what a concept!
Clausewitz, and the Wars That Made Him
The Story of a Military Man
A classic and highly scholarly study of military theory

Clausewitz: A Biography
Roger Parkinson
Manufacturer: Cooper Square Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Biographies & Memoirs | Subjects | Books

General | Historical | Biographies & Memoirs | Subjects | Books

Military & Spies | Professionals & Academics | Biographies & Memoirs | Subjects | Books

Life & Institutions | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | Arts & Photography | Subjects | Books
Similar Items:

Principles of War

ASIN: 0815412339

Book Description

This is the most detailed biography of Prussian general and intellectual Carl Phillip Gottleib von Clausewitz.

Customer Reviews:

Biography on Clausewitz; what a concept!.......2007-10-08

You'd think that a man who's philosophy on war is more read, quoted, and debated than any other would have had a biography done on him years ago, but that's not the case. Although many biographies on Clausewitz were published in German, especially in the late 19th and early 20th century, it's difficult to find anything in English. Hence Roger Parkinson's book truely does fill a gap in the literature, especially since Clausewitz' experience in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars affected the development of his own writings, such as "On War."

One of the reasons for the limited availability of biographies is the limited availability of sources. In his discussion of sources, Parkinson notes that personal information on Clausewitz is limited to the letters he wrote to his wife, and to a lesser extent to his friends and mentors Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. What this means is the much of the information on Clausewitz is inferred or drawn from secondary sources such as books on the Prussian reforms and/or reformists of the period; a movement in which Clausewitz was involved.

This is why my rating is 4 stars; not through any fault of the author's, but because the lack of primary sources does not allow a full exploration of Clausewitz as a person or his role in the Prussian and Russian armies. Unfortunately this means the book often tells Clausewitz' story via a military history of the battles in which Clausewitz is involved; the author adds as much as he can, when the information is available, as to where Clausewitz was, and his role, in a given battle, but in many cases this means one is reading another straight forward history of a given campaign or battle.

Having said that, this does allow a perspective on Clausewitz and his writings. Just knowing about his involvement in specific battles against the French in the Revolutionary Wars, Jena-Auerstadt, Napoleon's Russian Campaign, and the Waterloo Campaign allow some understanding into his thinking.

The bottom line is that this book must be read by someone who is interested in Clausewitz' writings. It adds substance to Clausewitz the man and not just the philosopher on war.

Clausewitz, and the Wars That Made Him.......2007-10-06

This is a wonderful and lively biograpgy of a man and the tumultuous times he lived in. To many readers Clauswitz might seem just the author of a somewhat dry and theoretical treastise on warfare. A sort of modern update on Machiavelli's THE PRINCE. This work shows him to be something much more than that. Clausewitz expereinced the full extent of the Napoleonic Wars, both as a field and staff officer. Therefor, he was in a unique position to understand and to later write about the conduct of war.

Clausewitz saw first-hand the castastrophe of his country. Prussia had done relatively little in the earlier wars of the French Revolution. By staying neutral Prussia should have observed and studied the new systems of warfare that were being developed by France and Napolean. Instead a rigid adherence to the older theories of Frederick The Great were maintained, forgetting the fact that the great King himself would have adapted to circumstances. The Prussian army of 1806 has been described by some as a museum piece.

When Napolean finally turned against Prussia that year Clausewitz would see first-hand how ill prepared his nation was. Present at Jena-Auerstadt, he witnessed how incapable the Prussian army was against the new flexible tactics and formations of the French. Resounding defeat brought his spirits low, and even though personally he did well, this biography shows that Clausewitz was of a brooding and withdrawn nature. He became obsessed with revenge against Napolean. Soon he fell in with the influential reformers of the Prussian army. Gneisenau, Schernhorst and Stein all knew Clasewitz well, and he became one of those men behind the scenes working with these great people.

This biography brings all these famous people who interracted with Clausewitz to life, and shows what exciting and difficult times he lived in. As Prussia slowly rebuilt after the crushing defeat of 1806 Clasuewitz became increasingly desperate to see his nation take the field again against Napolean. Prussia's king, the conservetive Friedrich William III had other notions. While desiring to ride his kingdom of French domination, the king did not wish to change his government. Aware that the army desperately needed reforms, he resisted the ideas of Clauswitz and others who wanted a greater citizen invovlement in Prussia's military. To the King such ideas were dangerous to the Hohenzollern monarchy which relied upon the time honored principles of central rule. Clausewitz and the reform group were desperate to implement these changes. Only by mobilizing the general populace could Prussia ever hope to ride itself of Napolean.

As the years past and opportunities came and went, the vacillating Prussian king grew ever more resistant to change. When Napolean demanded a Prussian contingent for his invasion of Russia in 1812, the king meekly consented. The reformers were outraged. Disqusted, Clausewitz quite the Prussain service, much to the kings annoyance, and sort employment with Russia. Here he was in an excellent position to analyize the 1812 invasion. Clausewitz observations on the strategies, the Tsar, and the feuding Russian generals and staff provide for much fascinating reading. Present at Borodino he participted in some of the horrific fighting of that great battle.

Later he followed the French retreat and would suffer great personal hardships from the Russian winter. His services were instrumental in bringing York's Prussian coprs over to the Russian side in the treaty of Tauroggen, which again almost went against his king's wishes. Reluctantly, the Prussian king would throw his lot in with the Russians against Napolean, but he never quite forgot Clausewitz's impertinance! Clauswitz would partake of the campaigns of 1813-14, and would take a major part in the Waterloo campaign of 1815.

This biography proivides a fascinating look at a very complex individual. It also shows a Prussian/German perspective of the Napoleonic wars not often seen in English. This is a very readable and exciting work. The author really gets into the people and times, and he provides first-rate descriptions of many great battles of the period. We find interesting portraits of all the famous personages in Prussian at the time, including Friedrich William III, Blucher, York, Schonhorst and Gnesenau. The author concludes with a summation of Clausewitz famous work "Vom Kreig" - "On War", used by political theorists to this day. A first-rate and highly readable biography of a fascinating time in German history. Should be in every Napoleonic library.

The Story of a Military Man.......2003-07-17

This book follows the action of the Napoleonic wars, where Clausewitz spent most of his life and his energy. Parkinson motivates Clausewitz's famous, later work, 'On War', by telling us of a man obsessed with fighting for the Fatherland against the French. As the pages turn, the reader empathizes with the Prussian Junker, who has trouble talking to women and even more hardship trying to reform the Prussian army. The final chapter concerns itself with 'On War' and its misinterpretation in the many wars following its publication. Parkison has a fluid writing style which makes the reading fast.

A classic and highly scholarly study of military theory.......2003-02-13

Clausewitz: A Biography by biographer Roger Parkinson relates the life and work of German officer and military theorist Carl Phillip Gottleib von Clausewitz (1780-1831) who is perhaps best known for his historic contribution to military studies titled "On War." Scrutinizing Clausewitz's life and ideas in the keenest detail, Clausewitz: A Biography is a classic and highly scholarly study of military theory, as well as a straightforward and very strongly recommended presentation of a great leader's life.

Clausewitz's on War: A Biography (Books That Changed the World)

Average customer rating:

Clausewitz's on War: A Biography (Books That Changed the World)

Manufacturer: Grove Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

Strategy | Military | History | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0802143636

Clausewitz, Philosopher of War (A Touchstone book)

Average customer rating:

Awful translation

Clausewitz, Philosopher of War (A Touchstone book)
Raymond Aron
Manufacturer: Simon & Schuster (Paper)
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Biographies & Memoirs | Subjects | Books

Military Science | History | Subjects | Books

General | Arts & Photography | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0671628267

Customer Reviews:

Awful translation.......2005-10-30

Not even Raymond Aron's crisp clarity can survive a translation so doughy and poorly edited. Read this work in French, if you can. Every page of the English translation reminded me of the aphorism, "Ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas francais" (What is not clear is not French).

Aron has useful things to say, and his original work (Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz) received many accolades from his fellow 20th century analysts of life, politics, and war. Unfortunately one may read a 25-page chapter of this atrocious translation and end up thinking, "OK, Aron has just spent 25 pages arguing that Clausewitz did indeed mean it when he said, 'Defense is the stronger form of war.' " The reader would have been prepared to stipulate that 24 pages earlier, just to make the turgid and repetitive prose stop.

All this said, I must confess that I found even the French original a bit too extended in its treatment of such key Cold War subjects as "Defense: Did Clausewitz really mean it?" Confusion on this head is induced not by Clausewitz but by the unique features of global thermonuclear war, as conceived by Cold War strategists.

Thus the question that weighed on Cold War thinkers was what "defense" really amounted to, and not so much whether Clausewitz was, in truth, favorably disposed toward what HE thought constituted defensive warfare. From this standpoint, Aron's analysis of Clausewitz is a classic representation of a particular school of Cold War thought. Partisans of this school essentially chose to ignore Clausewitz's key corollary to the aixom that defense is stronger -- which was that defense could not achieve decision, and had to be followed by a transition to the offense at some point.

If it interests you to read an elegantly ordered argument for the "ignore-the-offense" school of Clausewitz's interpreters, then by all means, investigate Aron's treatment. If you don't have the means to read it in the original French, however, make sure you have plenty of ibuprofen to see you through.

Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini

Average customer rating:

Masters of War: Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini
Michael I. Handel
Manufacturer: Frank Cass & Co
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Biographies & Memoirs | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

Military Science | History | Subjects | Books

General | Arts & Photography | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0714640875

Clausewitz's 'On War': A Biography: Books That Changed the World (Unabridged)

Average customer rating:

On War - The Historian's View
Execellent Service

Clausewitz's 'On War': A Biography: Books That Changed the World (Unabridged)
Hew Strachan
Manufacturer: audible.com
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Audio Download
Similar Items:

ASIN: B000TK5CDG

Customer Reviews:

On War - The Historian's View.......2007-09-30

Professor Hew Strachan's Clausewitz's On War is a worthy companion to the "Books that changed the world" series. His biography of Clausewitz and his magnum opus describe well the complexity and evolution that existed/developed in both author and work through the Napoleonic wars and up to Clausewitz's death in 1831.

Professor Strachan is of course the author of the current standard work on the First World War and his obvious effort to comb through and digest a work like On War is impressive.

Clausewitz attempted to accomplish two very ambitious goals in On War, the first was to write an art of war for his own epoch, and the second was to construct a general theory of war which would be able to cover all wars. This lends a certain duality to the work and promotes analysis from at least two distinct perspectives. The problem is of course that some parts are more heavily influenced by the Napoleonic art of war theme and others by the general theory of war theme. Parts of the Napoleonic art of war theme are still applicable today, but one must of course take Clausewitz as a man of his times who was writing to an audience of that time, not to us today. In normal historical works it is up to the reader to judge what is still relevant, but with Clausewitz this becomes even more difficult since the general theory comes also into play and has to be judged on its own merit. .

Strachan has attempted to do justice to both themes and in addition take on the necessary topics of the difficulty of translation from the original early 19th Century German and the book's unfinished condition. Overall I think the historian's view predominates which is to be expected. My only point in this regard is that if a great theorist (instead of a great historian) had written this book it would have been different, not necessarily better, but different.

Several points that really stand out for me:

First, the concept of "absolute war" can be seen as a Weberian ideal type, or as something "complete in itself" that "belonged in the real world" (page 148). This second concept sees war as a separate entity, that is no longer subordinate to politics but reacting to its own laws, possessing its own "Geist". That is capable of becoming in effect autonomous, like the Thirty Years War, a social phenomena propelled by ever increasing levels of hatred fuelled by seemingly limitless and lawless violence, The total destruction of a resisting society/community.

Second, the influence of Clausewitz on the course of the First World War has been hotly debated since the 1920s. Strachan argues that Clausewitz was saying that should the initial campaign fail, a war of attrition is called for, but I can't help but see this more in terms of war's reciprocity, that is Clausewitz arguing the defense, attrition being a means in which the defence gains time, preserves itself and attains its "negative purpose" by various ways. One must also remember that Clausewitz writes that, "One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place, but had merely been offered. In that case, it will be argued, the strategic planning of these engagements, rather than the tactical decision, should be considered the operative principle." (Book 6, ch 8). For the mature Clausewitz, the theorist, the political purpose would dictate whether the war should continue after the culmination point had been reached. For Clausewitz, the patriot of 1807 war was more the means of retaining his country's lost honor and independence. Strachen notes that it was this Clausewitz who inspired the Nazis, but his political writings and Book 6, Ch 26 (The People in Arms) would also inspire any national liberation movement fighting a foreign occupation.

Strachan concludes his chapter "The Nature of War" with, "Those who blamed Clausewitz for the slaughter of the First World War were not guilty of finding things in the text of On War that were not there", which of course leaves the actual question of influence open. That question in my mind concerns more how Clausewitz was posthumously interpreted by Moltke; Schlieffen, Goltz, and others.

Third, Strachan describes Clausewitz's concept of theory well, "The role of theory was to elucidate events, and so reason alone was insufficient. Detailed military history s required to evaluate an understanding of the true nature of war . . . Theory has to be concrete and circumstantial, not dogmatic and prescriptive. (page 41).

Finally, Strachan makes very important points concerning the relationships between "tactics" and "strategy" and "politics/policy" and "war". By avoiding the intermediate concept of "operations" as existing between tactics and strategy, a conscious decision of Clausewitz's according the Strachan, he was able to avoid "an obstacle to conceptual clarity" (page 110). Also in regards to the two ways that the German Politik can be translated into English, Strachan points out that in On War Clausewitz deals with policy as representing all the interests of the political community (Bk 8 Ch 6B), but also in his analysis of the campaigns of 1814 and 1815, saw French party politics as having a negative influence on Napoleon's decisions (pp 164-5). In other words in strategic theory terms war's subordination to politics can be either rational and "subjective" as in policy, or irrational (in terms of military force being an instrument) and "objective" as in politics. This is important to keep in mind when considering Clausewitz's continued relevance, since we can see the collapse of the publically proclaimed policy goals in the current Iraq war as being replaced by domestic US political considerations and interests (party politics and their associated investors).

Some points that Strachan makes I find stimulating in that they invite discussion. For instance he criticises Clausewitz on his handling of logistics, arguing that Clausewitz believed "that war had been liberated from logistics . . . Book 5 treated the 1812 campaign in Russia, a country too backward to sustain a large army by requisitioning, as exceptional, whereas in Book 6, on defence, took the same campaign as characteristic. This was a contradiction which he never reconciled . . . Clausewitz's determination to set strategy free from its logistical constraints was reflected in German planning in 1914 and in 1941, with terrible consequences" (page 122).

Napoleon had been able to use requisition to supply his armies, which is Clausewitz's point, that being that this ideal type of warfare had achieved this, but this was not something that could be assumed in the future, since it had not always been that way in the past. Strachan mentions 1914, but not 1940 where the German Army was able to cover even greater distances in the West and defeat the allies whereas logistics had been one of the reasons for the lack of German success in the West in 1914. As to Russia being an "exception" in terms of logistics, there is a reason for this, as Clausewitz writes, "It is rare after all, for an army of 300,000 men to advance for 650 miles on practically a single road, to do it in countries such as Poland and Russia, and just before the harvest" (book 5, ch 14). In fact such a feat doesn't come up again until 1941 (Russian-gauge rail lines having replaced single roads), if one discounts the German advance into revolutionary Russia in 1918. Strachan's "contradiction" doesn't seem like a contradiction at all, but rather a switch in emphasis, for logistics Russia is an exception since "Russia is not a country that can be formally conquered . . . Only internal weakness, only the workings of disunity can bring a country like that kind to ruin." (Book 8, ch 9). So instead of Operation Barbarossa in 1941, Lenin in a sealed train in 1917 would be the Clausewitzian method of dealing with Russia as an enemy. It is this very strong defensive status that Russia enjoys that allows for such analytical diversity and leads various elements/means/methods of defense characterised by the campaign of 1812 to be "characteristic". Also Clausewitz repeatedly mentions that it was Napoleon's failure to prevent the wastetage of his army on the advance (that would include logistics) that led mostly to his failure in Russia (Bk 3, Ch 12, Bk 5 Ch 14). Linking Clausewitz to 1941 is dubious in my view given what should have been seen as a flashing red light in regards to defeating Russia in a single campaign through exclusively military means.

Something I did find a bit of a disappointment was Strachan's handling of Clasusewitz's concept of the balance of power (pp 164-5 and in On War, Bk 6 Ch 6). He provides no analysis of the situation in August 1914 from this perspective, and what better historian to do so than Hew Strachan?

One point needs to be kept in mind throughout, when reading Hew Strachan's great biography, or Michael Howard's Clausewitz - A Very Short Introduction (which I also recommend) or On War. As Herbert Rosinski wrote in the 1930s:

"Clausewitz grasped the idea of war as a coherent, continuous whole, directed to the complete overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance. This brilliant inspiration transformed his investigation from the naive brilliance of his earlier studies into the philosophical profundity of his mature work. Yet this very conception of the "military act" as a continuous, coherent whole - the truth of which he found confirmed by the concrete example of Napoleonic strategy, but which he did not deduce from it - was to lead him into a perplexity that later military thought completely ignored and that forced him in the last resort to emancipate his theory from the "Napoleonic " model altogether.

"For Clausewitz never forgot that this coherent form of strategy directed to the overthrow of the enemy's power of resistance, although it formed the realization of the "innermost nature" of war as an "act of violence," was by no means universal to war; it represented, on the contrary, a highly complex from of warfare, dependent for its realization on a number of presuppositions, which had been found combined only on very rare occasions in the course of military history. He believed in the essential superiority of that form of mobile, decisive warfare reintroduced by Napoleon; but he never lost sight of the fact that the indispensable conditions for it might again some day no longer exist, less rational forms of warfare besides the ideal"Napoleonic" type . . . and to set in its stead an infinately wider and more elastic theory, capable of embracing every conceivable form of war or strategy."

The German Army, 1966 Edition, pp 110-111.

Execellent Service.......2007-09-23

The book arrived quickly & in first rate condition. It is an excellent book and the seller is first class!

Average customer rating:

CLAUSEWITZ, A BIOGRAPHY
Roger Parkinson
Manufacturer: Wayland Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: B000VGA5F8

Average customer rating:

Clausewitz: A Biography.
Roger. Parkinson
Manufacturer: Cooper Square Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: B000QXIEHW

Average customer rating:

Clausewitz: Leben und Werk
Wilhelm von Schramm
Manufacturer: Bechtle
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

German | Foreign Language Nonfiction | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books

History | German | Foreign Language Books | Specialty Stores | Books

Nonfiction | German | Foreign Language Books | Specialty Stores | Books

All German Books | German | Foreign Language Books | Specialty Stores | Books
ASIN: 3762803706

Books:

Books Index

Books Home

Recommended Books