The Rommel Papers (Da Capo Paperback)

Customer Reviews:

rommel papers .......2007-09-11

great book written from the surviving papers after his death there would have been more but a lot of his stuff was taken by the Nazis, and much more was lost to the US Army but his wife and son saved some and from this B.H. LIDDELL-HART was with the help of the wife and son to put his great skill as a battlefield commander in a new light A must read for any student of WWII also checkout ATTACKS by Rommel this book is about his time as a young lieutenant in WW I

Up there with the master himself.......2007-06-06

This is one of those books that made the shivers run down my spine while reading it. It felt like being right there in the thick of it with this amazing field commander. This man is a born leader and has the audacity and knighthood to fight an honest fight. He did what he believed was right and he is portrayed as human as possible in this text. War is a terrible thing, but it still is a part of our way of life. This cannot be denied! These memoirs are of the highest value and a must-read for anyone interested in the war in Northern Africa.

Fascinating!.......2006-12-31

This book is one of the best memoirs I have read. It is Erwin Rommel's account of the Second World War from start through finish. The best and most interesting thing about this book are Rommel's thoughts. He talks about all of his battles, and experiences throughout the war, but he weaves in personal things as well which make this a superb piece of writing. You will definately not be disappointed in purchasing this book. Anyone interested in Rommel, the German view of WWII, or WWII in general, should buy this book, hands down.

War as Only He Knew It!.......2006-02-11

Legendary Field Marshall Erwin Rommel narrates the war effort from the German point of view. Outnumbered, out gunned, but never out "generaled," Rommel explains both his early successes and ultimate defeat. His work is rightly considered a military classic and also provides a unique insight into the Nazi high command.

Rommel begins by talking about the victory in France. Utilizing superior tactics and equipment the Germans achieved in six weeks what they failed to accomplish in four years in World War I. The lesson is simple: Military planners should always plan for the next war, not the last one.

Then it was off to Africa. Rommel again outclassed his opponents until the material superiority of the U.S. and British destroyed any chance of success. He repeatedly decries his inadequate air support and lack of supplies. Only much later was ULTRA revealed to be the cause of much of his difficulty. (See, The ULTRA Secret, by F.W. Winterbotham, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974.) Read this section with a map of North Africa in hand!

Last, was his defense of Normandy. Knowing he would have only Goering's promises for air cover, the once foremost exponent of mobile warfare opted to defend at the shoreline in an attempt to force the Allies into a negotiated peace. Alone, with grossly inadequate supplies, and only a short time to prepare he orchestrated a masterful defense which well might have succeeded if Hitler had allowed him to fight his own battle.

Finally, after service in two wars, and fighting valiantly against overwhelming odds, Hitler gave him his "reward." In true Nazi fashion, he was "allowed" to commit suicide to save his family rather than face a Peoples Court.

This work shows how the Nazi high command repeatedly violated the Principles of War of Mass and Unity of Command with disastrous results. Furthermore, it shows how a dynamic leader can accomplish nearly miraculous results even against all odds. The fact he unwittingly served an evil regime in no way diminishes his greatness as a military leader. When the names of the great Generals of history are recited: Lee, Jackson, Forrest, Guderian, and Patton; Rommel's name is sure to be included. A true classic in military literature; 5 stars!!

Harold Y. Grooms

Great Insight.......2005-07-07

Very insightful and interesting look inside the mind of one of the greatest generals of WWII. He was a true soldier - it's unfortunate he was associated with Hitler and the Nazis. He may have been considered one of the greatest generals of all time if it weren't for the evil of the regime he fought on behalf of.

Worthwhile reading if you want to understand what "the other side" had to deal with during the war. It allows you to better understand the mind of the soldiers who believed they were fighting for their country without simpathizing with the Nazi government.

Rommel's support for the assasination of Hitler, while not proven, also offers an interesting perspective on how the army came to fear and distrust Hitler's intentions.

Inside The Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941-1942

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A unique "insder" look, with a bonus desert combat primer
An Indispensible Source

Inside The Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941-1942
Rainer Kriebel , and United States Army Intelligence Service
Manufacturer: Greenhill Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1853673226

Book Description

This book presents the battles of the Afrika Korps as seen through the eyes of a trained general staff officer, and provides key insight into a formidable fighting force at the height of its power. Kriebel's account highlights the German response to the Crusader offensive and analyzes the unparalleled genius and fatal flaws of Erwin Rommel's generalship. Exposes the secrets of Rommel's exemplary fighting force's success as well as the dangers inherent in victory.

Customer Reviews:

A unique "insder" look, with a bonus desert combat primer.......2003-03-28

Inside the Afrika Korps is a rare operational account of some of the battles in North Africa from the German perspective. The material covers the campaign in the fall of 1941 (the British "Crusader" offensive), the retreat of Axis forces out of Cyrenaica, and the counterattack in early 1942 back to the Gazala positions. During these battles, Kriebel was the senior staff officer of the 15th Panzer Division, one of the units in Rommel's Afrika Korps. As a key member of the forces under Rommel, Kriebel is in an excellent position to analyze both the decision making of Axis commanders as well as the combat performance of the fighting units. This is in contrast to the typical accounts of the desert theater, which rely heavily (indeed exclusively for many) on Allied reports. So, at the very least, Kriebel provides a unique account of some familiar engagements.

The book is divided into two sections. The first is Kriebel's coverage of combat operations from fall 1941 through January 1942. These operations include the opening Crusader battles (the British offensive to relieve Tobruk), Rommel's "dash to the wire", the subsequent retreat of the Axis forces out of Cyrenaica, and Rommel's counterattack through Cyrenaica back to the Gazala positions. Kriebel's description of combat is quite good, and he has a very interesting technical and tactical story to tell. He is conscious of the various effects of different types of weapons and units, and is clear in his explanations of use and usefulness. He is also very clear about what he thinks were the key events that shaped each engagement. For example, one battle went poorly for the Germans due to a failed recon mission. This is very "nuts and bolts" stuff...the very sort of stuff that cannot be gotten from any other source. As a result, the "inside view" of the battles of the Afrika Korps is fascinating.

In this section, Kriebel also takes the opportunity to assess Rommel's leadership. In short, he does not deify him. Instead, a frank analysis of Rommel's abilities and shortcomings is presented. For example, Kriebel directly faults Rommel for micromanaging Afrika Korps units, typically to the detriment of those units. By ignoring the chain of command, Rommel created confusion, issued conflicting orders, and made tactical mistakes that a commander more familiar with the particular tactical situation would not have. He also identifies key moments where Rommel misinterpreted or ignored intelligence reports about the location and intentions of Allied forces. This got him into trouble several times, particularly in his failed "dash to the wire". On the other hand, Kriebel credits Rommel for occasionally perosonally leading critical units and commanding loyalty, so although the assessment of Rommel shows his flaws, the final conclusion is that his leadership was a decisive factor in the successes (even in retreat) of the Axis forces in North Africa. In any event, Kriebel's picture of Rommel is undoubtedly more accurate than some of the traditional Western assessments that portray Rommel as an infallible god of war.

Throughout this section, Kriebel offers assessments of the situation on the ground (disposition and state of units), the supply situation, and the air situation. Thus, the book offers a rare view of how logistics, air power, and land power came together to dictate how operations went. The supply situation is particularly interesting, as both sides relied heavily on captured booty, and the vagaries of Axis supply shipments made consistent operations difficult (Kriebel seems very frustrated at times, recounting how pursuits had to be called off due to a complete lack of fuel). Editor Bruce Gudmundsson clarifies a few points here and there (particularly unit information) but for the most part his touch is not visible.

The second section is written by the U.S. Army Intelligence Service, and is titled "Artillery in the Desert". It is an analysis of Axis and British combat tactics and weaponry. Much of this is very straightforward, and is presented as sort of a manual on "how to conduct desert warfare". This includes everything from how to set up defensive strongpoints, how to employ FOOs, at what ranges to begin firing different types of weapons, and how to conduct (or defend against) an armored attack. Much of this is interesting, particularly to game designers, as it presents good detail on how to prepare for and carry out battle. However, some of it is quite fanciful, and is obviously the result of faulty intelligence that has not been revised. One strikingly absurd example is the claim that the short 75mm gun of the Pz IV had a maximum range of 9000 yards and that these AFVs were employed as "sniper tanks" at this extremely long range. While Gudmundsson apparently has edited the material, he obviously missed this mistake. Although the other information provided regarding tactics and practices of combat seem accurate, this problem should make the reader at least somewhat skeptical.

I enjoyed this book, mostly because of its "inside view" of the Axis forces. Although it can not be the "final word" on the winter 1941/1942 battles in North Africa, nor should it be the first book you read on the topic, it certainly should be the second one you read. The battles covered are familiar, but the perspective is unique, and so I recommend this book.

An Indispensible Source.......2000-05-11

I first became aware of the Kriebel manuscript when reading "Sidi Rezegh Battles, 1941" (OUP, 1957), the official South African account of Operation "Crusader". The text provides some vital insights into how and when the Afrika Korps made its transition to the Plains March style of formation, armored cars, tanks, armored personnnel carriers, towed howitzers, anti-tank guns, flak 88s, etc. during the interval between "Battleaxe" and "Crusader". This has not been widely reported in English, not even in Correli Barnett's provocative study of British generalship in the desert, "The Desert Generals".

The full manuscript has not been available to me before; the National Archives wanted $80 for a typescript copy a few years ago, and I could not afford that, unless I could secure viable commercial publication, which Stackpole beat me to. What the reader should understand is that German victory in the desert in winter of 1941 was not certain, and the eventual recovery was not certain either.

Kriebel gives the perspective of a detached staff officer analyzing a situation; he was the Ia (or first general staff officer)of the 15th Panzer Division, one of the principal units of the Afrika Korps, with operational planning authority, so he knows of what he speaks. The book takes the reader through a full narrative of the series of winter battles after giving one pertinent background, and then it analyzes significant factors contributing to success or failure, and provides rare portraits of Rommel and his three divisional commanders.

What more could you ask for in such a book?

Customer Reviews:

Rommel did also mistakes.......2006-03-16

Kenneth Macksey is not the kind of writer who will produce a repetition of existing arguments and bore the reader. It is true that he looks at Rommel with a very critical view but that is what I expect from an expert on World War II who is very accurate and does extensive research for his books. Don't let bad critics to keep you away from this book, because it's a terrific factual short account of Rommel's meteoric carreer and not an hagiography of the man. The photo captions are very informative and the maps are numerous and very good.

Rommel- Overrated.......2005-11-13

Anglo accounts of World War Two frequently sing the praises of Rommel and his victories. Reality? Rommel was second rate for the Germans, and got his job, and promotions largely due to propaganda reasons and friendship with Hitler.

While a tactical genius, and excellent at operations, his stratgic level decision making was poor at best... ignoring logistical realities and the larger strategic picture.

Rommel's job in the sand was to hold off the British- not conquor the Middle East. He failed, largely due to ignore logistics.

Macksey does an excellent job reviewing Rommel's life and accurately pointing out his strenghs and weaknesses.

If you are looking for a honest appraisal of Rommel, buy this book. If you a Rommel fan-boy, don't.

Military history at it's worst.......2003-01-02

In Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, Macksey (a British officer in WWII) continues his efforts to atone for British defeats in France and North Africa by painting the German military leadership as incompetent. This book is less of an objective review of Rommel's campaigns, but rather a poorly masked attempt to completly discredit any and all actions taken by Rommel in WWII. The strong bias in this account is evident within the books first few pages and continues throughout the volume. I have tried to read this book twice without success. The unbalanced nature of the account is so annoying that after my second attempt the book found it's rightful place in my circular file. Hence this review.

Avoid this one like the plague! There are too many numerous and well written accounts of Rommel's war record to waste time on this one.

The worst book ever written about Rommel.......2002-02-02

The reader should don a pair of waders before opening this book because of the amount of mud that it slings. This book has little to do with examining battles or campaigns, rather it is an exercise in character assassination. It is another entery in the author's ham-fisted attempts to convince the reader that Rommel was a sham, and a mendacious simpleton.

An Interesting Perspective.......2000-04-26

Kenneth Macksey, in his biography Rommel: Battles and Campaigns, is highly critical or Rommel. Macksey sees Rommel as a leader who changed little about his tactics from the First World War, despite massive technological changes. Macksey believed Rommel had a huge amount of luck in his battles. This differs from most historians' views, with David Frazer (Knight's Cross; HarperCollins) pointing out that war relies to a large extent on luck. There is also the cliché that `you make your own luck'. Macksey views Rommel's advance through France in 1940 critically, and is quick to move acclaim from Rommel to his superiors, fellow generals, and troops. Although Macksey does have examples to support this view, they are highly specific, and are lost in a general evaluation of Rommel's successes. Macksey sees Rommel's success in North Africa as due to the poor leadership of the Allied forces, not the skill of the `Desert Fox'. Frazer again has a different view, and states that in almost every single battle of his African campaign, Rommel was hugely outnumbered, but won some marvelous victories against vastly superior opposition. This was an interesting account, obviously from an anti-Rommel perspective, but giving excellent details on all of Rommel's battles, great maps and visuals as well.

Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 - November 1942 (Great Campaigns)

Average customer rating:

Small book but all good
A good perspective on the Italians in WWII

Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 - November 1942 (Great Campaigns)
Jack Greene , and Alessandro Massignani
Manufacturer: Da Capo
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 1580970184

Customer Reviews:

Small book but all good.......2002-03-02

This is the most information packed book I have ever seen on the desert war (and its from an IT perspective which makes it even more valuable). Its just a 272 page paperback but its full of pictures and maps and facts..facts..facts. It has pictures of many rare Italian equipments and covers the general trend of gun and tank development in the desert and its just packed with details like atrocities and friendly fire incidents in the desert. Also covers battle actions with OOB and action reports. Also of note is the bibliography which gives a one sentence synopsis of about 40 other desert war publications! I wish these authors would put out a large format book with high quality pictures like this! I highly recommend this book for anyone who is interested in the North Africa theatre from 7/40 to 11/42.

A good perspective on the Italians in WWII.......2000-06-12

The Italians, as one of the most-mocked military forces of the Second World War, rarely get the depth of treatment that their erstwhile German allies receive. This book focuses on discussing the war in North Africa from the Italian perspective, using Italian sources liberally throughout. Greene and Massignani give a good impression of the state of mind of the Italian soldiery in North Africa. Recommended.

Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein (Battle Orders)

Average customer rating:

Useful but slightly flawed
A Good Reference Tool, but little on combat support units
Close attention to details which changed outcomes.

Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein (Battle Orders)
Pier Paolo Battistelli
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 1841769010
Release Date: 2006-10-31

Book Description

In 1940 a British offensive in the Western Desert provoked a major Italian military disaster. By early February 1941 the whole of Cyrenaica had been lost, and German help became necessary to avoid the loss of the entire of Libya. On 14 February 1941 the first echelons of German troops hurriedly arrived at the port of Tripoli, starting the 27-month German engagement in Northern Africa. This book covers the complex and oft-changing organisation and structure of German forces in North Africa from their first deployment through to the conclusion of the battle of El Alamein, an engagement that irrevocably changed the strategic situation in the Western Desert.

Customer Reviews:

Useful but slightly flawed.......2007-09-28

This is another excellent Osprey publication. As an historical wargamer I have found the Battle Orders series of books to be extremely useful. Rommel's Afrika Korps is no exception. Following each of the German Panzer and light infantry divisions throughout the North African Campaign, this book gives the reader indespensible information on organization and equipment. The only thing that distracts is that the author chose to use the original German terms for units and equipment, rather than translating into English. While there is a good appendix in back that defines these terms, it makes the volume harder to use. I don't want to have to look up some obscure term only to find that it was the bakery platoon... Overall, I still highly recommend this book.

A Good Reference Tool, but little on combat support units.......2007-03-05

Despite its near-legendary status in military history, the actual organization and composition of the German Afrika Korps (DAK) in 1941-42 has rarely been discussed in much detail (an exception being work by George Nafziger). In Osprey's Battle Orders #20, Italian historian Pier Paolo Battistelli sets out to describe the organization, doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of the Afrika Korps. Overall, this is a very good volume and worth the price, but the Battle Orders series continues to suffer from lack of standardization. When you buy one of these volumes, you never know quite what you are going to get and Afrika Korps is no exception. First, the subtitle makes it unclear if it is covering the period from April 1941 or June 1942 to November 1942 - it actually begins with February 1941 and the bulk of the volume focuses on the first year of the Afrika Korps. Second, like several other volumes in the BO series, this volume does not provide a comprehensive order of battle for the Afrika Korps, so non-divisional assets are pretty much ignored. Despite this awkward structure, this volume does provide a very detailed look at the individual divisions that made up the Afrika Korps.

After brief introductory sections on combat mission and training, the author launches into a 30-page section on unit organization. This section consists primarily of line and block charts of the divisions in the DAK, as well as discussions of their evolutions. Several of the author's points are quite interesting. First, the divisions Germany sent to North Africa in 1941 were not elite formations, but rather ad hoc units just formed or put together from odds and ends; there was no standard organization for these units. Second, the requirements of desert warfare meant that the DAK had a much larger motorized component than a typical corps fighting on the Eastern Front. Unlike operations in Europe, the DAK could not use horses for logistics and foot infantry was near useless. Third, the DAK organized its infantry battalions with a much higher proportion of anti-tank weapons and heavy weapons than used in Europe. Some sub-units, like the motorcycle battalions (which performed superbly in the USSR in 1941) proved poorly suited for African conditions and were disbanded. Similarly, the divisional reconnaissance battalions proved far too weak for combat in North Africa and were significantly strengthened with other attachments.

The next 18 page section on tactics is supported by 10 maps (Ras el Mdauuar 30 April 1941; Sidi Rezegh 22 November 1941; Belhamed 1 December 1941; Benghazi 29 January 1942; flank march at Gazala 26 May 1942; El Mreir 21 June 1942; Alam Halfa 30 August 1942; 21st Panzer Division crossing the minefields 30 August 1942; 21st Panzer Division's defense of Deirel Taffa 30 August 1942; 15 Panzer Division at El Alamein 2 November 1942) and discusses the evolution of the DAK's tactical doctrine. While some of the maps are a bit complicated, they are well done and often display units done to battalion or brigade level. This section is fairly interesting and demonstrates that the DAK was capable of painful setbacks as well as great victories. The 13-page section on weapons and equipment focuses on tanks, infantry weapons, AT/AA guns and other vehicles used by the Afrika Korps. Unfortunately, this section is the most disappointing since there is no real discussion of artillery or engineer equipment, although they clearly played a major role at Gazala and El Alamein. The section on C3I is good, noting Rommel's dependence on SIGINT in 1941. The final sections on unit status lists armor strengths at various times.

This volume gives a good overview with some keen insight into particular aspects of the DAK, but it omits some important areas such as artillery, engineers, reconnaissance troops and supply troops. If just one of the many line and block charts had been deleted, there would have been space to discuss combat support units. Keeping in mind that the BO series has yet to produce a volume on Second World War German panzer divisions, the lack of regimental or battalion organization information is disappointing. Readers who are not familiar with German military terminology will find this book non-user friendly, since the author is a purist who prefers to use "Abteilung" to "battalion", "leichte" to "light", "nachricht" to "signal", "sanitats" to "medical", etc. In sum, this book is a handy reference tool for the military specialist or researcher, although it is far from comprehensive.

Close attention to details which changed outcomes........2006-11-05

Pier Paolo Battistelli's ROMMEL'S AFRIKA KORPS: TOBRUK TO EL ALAMEIN covers the changing organizational and approaches of German troops in North Africa from their first deployment on the continent to the end of the battle of El Amamein, which affected the outcome of the Western Desert. Charts and maps outline positions, forces, and engagements with close attention to details which changed outcomes.

Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory (Campaign)

Average customer rating:

Good Narative of the Battle
Good, but appears to gloss over US tactical mistakes

Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommel's last victory (Campaign)
Steven Zaloga
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 1841769142
Release Date: 2005-05-08

Book Description

The North African campaign of November 1942-May 1943 was a baptism of fire for the US Army. After relatively straightforward landings, the US II Corps advanced into Tunisia to support operations by the British 8th Army. Rommel, worried by the prospect of an attack, decided to exploit the inexperience of the US Army and strike a blow against their overextended positions around the Kasserine Pass. However, the Germans were unable to exploit their initial success, and later attacks were bloodily repulsed. The fighting in Tunisia taught the green US Army vital combat lessons, and brought to the fore senior commanders such as Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley.

Customer Reviews:

Good Narative of the Battle.......2005-09-02

At the beginning of the movie Patton he is shown at the site of an American defeat. This was Kasserine Pass. This was the first time that American forces came into contact with the Germans in World War II, and a lot of the American ideas were found wanting.

The battle itself was really quite simple. The Germans under Rommel were retreating from the British. The Americans intended to cross through Kasserine and block his retreat. Rommel decided to teach the upstart Americans a lesson and sent a force to attack the advancing Americans. This is sometimes called Rommel's last victory. The Americans were hurt badly, but because of Arnim's refusal to help and the advancing British, Rommel's forces could not exploit his victory.

The critical points about Kasserine were in the aftermath of the battle.

General Fredendall, the commander of the American II Corp had established an excellent reputation in training his men. Taking them into combat proved to be a different proposition. He was releived and replaced by Patton.

The British generals, especially Montgomery looked at the American defeat and developed the opinion that the American army was not good. At that time they were not as good as his 8th Army. But he forgot that his own introduction to combat had been at a place called Dunkirk. British General Anderson's performance was also found wanting and he was sidelined for the rest of the war.

Some American equipment, the 37 mm anti tank gun and the M3 medium tank were definitely found to be obsolete. The M4 Sherman tank was found to be the equal to what the Germans were using and the decision was made to put it into high volume production. The Army was very slow about improving the Sherman, the Germans went on to the Panther and Tiger.

A lot of the American armies organization, training and doctrine was found to be wanting and was changed. The American army in Normandy in 1944 was not the same as the one at Kasserine.

This small book is an excellent description of the battle. It's maps and drawings clearly illustrate what happened. Mr. Zaloga concludes that this was, in the end, not a defeat for the Americans. It's true that the Americans eventually stopped the Germans, but I think he is a British writer being gracious to the Americans. How about we conclude that this was an American defeat but not a disaster?

Good, but appears to gloss over US tactical mistakes.......2005-07-28

The battle of Kasserine Pass in February 1943 is typically remembered as both the initial baptism of fire of US troops in Europe in the Second World War and as a US tactical defeat that led to much-needed reforms - a theme that was well covered in Rick Atkinson's excellent "An Army at Dawn" in 2002 . However, in Osprey Campaign #152, veteran author Stephen J. Zaloga argues that, "contrary to the popular image, Kasserine Pass was in the end an Allied victory." This is a very hard-sell argument and if it was not a historian of Zaloga's caliber making it, this thesis would probably be dead on arrival. Zaloga argues that the tactical setbacks in the opening days of the campaign caused Eisenhower to heavily reinforce the US II Corps in Tunisia and then ordered it to adopt a more offensive posture than had been contemplated before the German attack, which then led to the quick collapse of the Axis position in southern Tunisia. Zaloga makes a decent case, but in the end it is not that convincing - the plain fac ts about US and German comparative losses in the campaign are rather difficult to get around and still claim that the affair was a US triumph. Indeed, Zaloga's subtitle - "Rommel's last victory" - seems to refute his hypothesis that Kasserine was a US victory. Nevertheless, Zaloga's narrative is clear and well argued as usual, and this volume deserves its place on the bookshelf with Zaloga's earlier volumes.

Zaloga's opening section on the background to the campaign in Tunis and Operation Torch is clear and succinct. The section on opposing commanders - never Zaloga's forte - is a bit weak, particularly in that the focus is mostly on army-level commanders, rather than the actual tactical commanders (for a campaign that essentially only involved a couple of divisions on each side). However, the section on opposing armies is very good and Zaloga covers a great deal in these eleven pages (although the Allied OB is only 5 lines - Zaloga might have listed some of the non-divisional tank destroyer units at least). Zaloga's section on opposing plans is also excellent and highlights both the arguments and disunity in the Axis command that led to a muddled operational plan as well as the failure of Allied intelligence analysis that predicted a German attack elsewhere. Indeed, Zaloga highlights that the availability of Enigma-derived information about German planning led Allied intelligence officers to discount other tactical reporting - today, we would call this a problem in intelligence fusion, where information from one preferred source is allowed to drown out other equally valid sources. Poor intelligence analysis about the location of the expected German attack, combined with inadequate forces and a faulty US tactical doctrine meant that US forces would fight under severe handicaps when they first met the Wehrmacht. The volume also includes five 2-D maps (the strategic situation in Tunisia, 10 February 1943; preliminary moves in central Tunisia, Jan-Feb 1943; rival Axis plans; Operation Wop, 16-23 March 1943; US II Corps in northern Tunisia, April-May 1943) and three 3-D maps (Sidi Bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943; Kasserine Pass, 20-22 February 1943; El Guettar, 23 March 1943). The volume also includes three excellent battle scenes (the charge of 2/1st Armored at Sidi Bou Zid, 15 Feb 1943; 10th Panzer Division at El Guettar, 23 March; Operation Flax: the Cap Bon Massacre, 22 April 1943) by Michael Welply.

Zaloga's coverage of the initial fighting around Sidi Bou Zid is a bit skimpy and he seems to avoid any criticism of the extremely inept US tactical leadership in this first battle. Zaloga notes that German panzers moved to "silence" US artillery - in fact they overran and destroyed the 2-17th Field Artillery. He says senior US commanders "were wary" of the first reports of the attack - in fact, Eisenhower was goofing off with his staff at the time. Nor does Zaloga mention the fate of the 168th Infantry Regiment which was left isolated in the hills near Sidi Bou Zid - both battalions attempted to escape but about 1,800 US troops were captured in the process. In a matter of one day, the Germans had eliminated virtually an entire US reinforced brigade, at slight cost to themselves. Furthermore, Zaloga makes little mention of the uneven performance of US troops in this first fight - with some fighting heroically but others running or refusing to fight. All in all, the US performance at Sidi Bou Zid was very poor - but this is not entirely evident in Zaloga's account.

The section on the actual fighting in Kasserine Pass is good, emphasizing both Rommel's failure to settle on a single tactical objective and the chaotic Allied efforts to stem the German breakthrough. At this point, Zaloga probably should have started to wrap the volume up, since he had covered the actual Kasserine Pass fighting, but instead he chooses to cover the US role in the final stages of the Tunisian Campaign in the last third of the volume. Zaloga essentially ignores the Commonwealth forces in this last stage - they actually formed the bulk of Allied forces in Tunisia - and focuses only on the US II Corps, which presents an incomplete and rather unnecessary wrap-up to the campaign. In particular, Zaloga points to Patton's success at El Guettar on 23 March 1943 as the "US Army's first victory over the Wehrmacht ." However, Zaloga does not mention that the US 9th Infantry Division suffered over 3,000 casualties in the next week around El Guettar without achieving much and Major General Ward, commander of the 1st Armored Division, was wounded in close combat. If El Guettar was a victory, it didn't trouble the Germans much. Zaloga seems to want to avoid criticizing the US conduct in this campaign, but that is rather difficult and the idea that it was a victory is a stretch.

Average customer rating:

Great Detail
Accurate, concise and well written story
I was VERY Impressed by this book
I was not impressed by this book
A well crafted story

Rommel's Greatest Victory
Samuel Mitcham
Manufacturer: Presidio Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0891417303
Release Date: 2001-01-09

Book Description

Erwin Rommel's distinction of being an admired Nazi is owed in part to his brilliance as an old-fashioned soldier and in part to his turning against Hitler late in the war.

Customer Reviews:

Great Detail.......2007-02-27

This book covers Rommel's start in Africa until the takeing of Tobruk in 1942.It's a shame it does'nt go further.It provides vivid detail at the tactical level.Indepth research & written in an exciting manner,it is almost impossible to put down.I read almost all of it in one night.The maps are drawn out well to follow the text.One of the best I have read on the Africa battles by far. Excelent,A great buy!

Accurate, concise and well written story.......2006-06-05

I must say that I'm a fan of Mr Mitcham's books and I have read almost all of them, because they have some important strong points: the are detailed but not to the point of being boring, they adopt the correct military terminology avoiding mistakes common to other books, they have excellent narrative which keeps my interest throughout and the are products of long and scholarly research. All these virtues are evident in this book also which is the only one available dealing with the important battles of Gazala - Tobruk in 1942. Mitcham tells the story in a simple but exciting way. He gives a short introduction to the North African campaign and then proceeds with the plans of the two armies and the role of the personalities involved. The battle narrative is very good and it oftens go down to the battalion level, without losing the big picture. The book has enough maps but their quality could be better. There is also a section of black and white photographs and some useful tables of orders of battle.

I was VERY Impressed by this book.......2004-01-14

I was really unsure about buying this book based on a review I saw here but decided to take the plunge and am I glad I did! I am a Wargamer and Scenario Designer and I was concerned by the remarks about the map. If it hadn't been mention I wouldn't have noticed the problem. But what I found very important to me was the level of detail about EACH unit available, down to the Battalion level, German tanks available at various stages of the battle by type and Division, and a well organized Index that allowed me to look up direct references to units I wanted to place or locate at various points in time. This book is helping me make a great computer Wargame that other people will enjoy and learn about history through.

I was not impressed by this book.......1999-10-22

For a professor of history, this is an average book that is rather non-scholary. Apart from the appalling photo captioning and poor maps, the text is little more than a rehash of existing literature, adding little to the body of knowledge on the fall of Tobruk in 1942. I would have though that such an esteemed author would have had his work peer reviewed, but obviously not. For those already familiar with Tobruk and seeking a mediorce account- this is your book.

A well crafted story.......1999-02-05

Not much can be added to the previous review from Amazon.com. I found this book easy and enjoyable to read. The author offers a well presented and researched account of Rommel's capture of Tobruk in 1942. It shows Rommel at his best although he was hepled at times by the Allies lack of understanding of all-arms combat. It shows Rommel was also extremely lucky on occassion but he was a commander who led from the front and took advantage of these lucky breaks.

The only faults I could find with this book were the maps and some incorrect captions to some of the photos. I felt that the maps could have provided more detail. I hate reading about a location in the narrative but not being able to find it on the relevant map. The author provided numerous maps throughout the narrative but they could have been on a higher standard. I noticed two incorrect captions to the photos, one showing a Panzer MkIV with a 75cm main gun but labled as a Panzer MkIII and another photo listed as a British Valentine tank but which is a Cruiser MkII or MkIII.

Book Description

- Stunning collection of photographs
- Comprehensive color record of the uniforms and equipment

Customer Reviews:

excellent summary on history and soldiers of the afrika korp.......1999-01-30

this book gives an excellent history in detail of the german army's campaign in north africa from 1941-1943. The details about the uniforms, soldiers and interviews with Afrika Korp veterans gives the reader an insight of what is was like to be in North Africa. This book was very well researhed and a must for all military historians. This book is a must have for historians and would be valuable in a University history class setting as a reference; due to its excellent research and subject knowledge. A must have book for all historical collections.

The Fall of the Fox, Rommel (World at War)

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The Fall of the Fox, Rommel (World at War)
G. C. Skipper
Manufacturer: Childrens Pr
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: School & Library Binding

Europe | History & Historical Fiction | Children's Books | Subjects | Books

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Kasserine: The Battlefield Slaughter of American Troops by Rommel's Afrika Korps

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Did the American Army do anything correct here?
Did the American Army do anything correct here?
Same Old Song

Kasserine: The Battlefield Slaughter of American Troops by Rommel's Afrika Korps
Charles Whiting
Manufacturer: Scarborough House
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

Book Description

The full story of the massacre of youthful innocents, sacrificed by military incompetents.

Customer Reviews:

Did the American Army do anything correct here?.......2003-07-05

Charles Whiting is an established author, with many fine books to his credit. His accounting of the Battle of Kasserine Pass leaves much to be desired though.

The book starts off describing the American Army coming to Britian and the tension that existed between the two armies. In writting; "The British thought the Yanks hopeless", he contrasted the spit and polish of the Brits with the Dough Boys. Mr. Whiting goes on to say that the U.S. soldiers were overweight, ill-trained and ill-disciplined. He makes comments like this about these men throughout the book. While it cannot be argued that at that time our troops lacked many qualities, his consistently negative remarks makes you question why we are not now speaking German. The British soldiers are shown to be the opposite of this, in fact the heros of the story.

Mr.Whiting also tells of the personal female aid to General Eisenhower, (Kay Sumersby), and gives many details of their relationship. There is implication of a sexual encounter between the two. While this may make interesting reading, it is not of the content that I would prefer in a book of this title.

The book goes on to speak of the Torch landings, and of the difficult time that was had with the nuetrality of the French in North Africa. There is good detail here; to a topic that is easily overlooked.

Mr. Whiting then speaks of the confusion and ineptitude of the American command staff, giving ample criticism to General Frendendall. This is well founded. Frendendall's horrible leadership can bear the brunt of the blame for the fiasco. But Mr.Whiting focuses too much on rheteric - "..Youthful innocence sacrificed at the altar of the God of war by incompetent, complacent old men, who lived on to die in bed." - and not to the tactical and strategic blunders that lead to the downfall in this battle.

The entire content is devoted to bashing Americans that were in the battle, and not to the challenges they faced. 'The Army was soundly routed, with many units just giving up', could be said of this battle. It could also be said of the inexperienced Eigth Army of Britain as it was chased across the North African frontier by Rommel, just a year earlier. A "green" army will have these setbacks. This is not noted here, but was reflected in Field Marshal Montgomery's memoirs of this battle.

While there are some notes regarding the German's superiority in equipment - the Mark 4 and Tiger tanks in paticular,- he did not elaborate on any other possible outcomes if confronted with an experienced enemy, with tactical air superiority, and being led by Rommel from the front. The conclusion of this battle was pre-ordained by the circumstances present at the time, not just the cowardice of the American troops involved in the battle.

There could be no better place for this to happen. The Americans needed to get a 'Bloody Nose'. It instilled changes in the way Americans fought the war, trained for the war, and led the war. The loss of a pass in Africa does not hold the same importance as it would have, say, if it had been on Normandy Beach. Of course I mean no disrespect to the brave that died there; I just think that Mr. Whiting has overdramatized the defeat that we endured.

Overall, the book reads well, and the research is well documented. There are ample pictures to see the equipment involved as well as to get a feel for the terrain in North Africa.

Kasserine, The Anatomy of Slaughter, is not a 'dry' book, as some historical accounts may be, but is fluid and well written. The conclusions drawn for the debacle are what is wrong.

Did the American Army do anything correct here?.......2003-07-05

Charles Whiting is an established author, with many fine books to his credit. His accounting of the Battle of Kasserine Pass leaves much to be desired though.

Overall, the book reads well, and the research is well documented. There are ample pictures to see the equipment involved as well as to get a feel for the terrain in North Africa.

Kasserine, The Anatomy of Slaughter, is not a 'dry' book, as some historical accounts may be, but is fluid and well written. The conclusions drawn for the debacle are what is wrong.

Same Old Song.......2000-04-17

Charles Whiting has a very low opinion of the High Command of the U.S. Army. In all of his books that I've read, he tells variations of the same story: the incompetence of senior American officers leading to the sacrifice of G.I.s. The Battle of Kasserine Pass in early 1943 should give Whiting the perfect opportunity for developing his theme: this first major encounter between U.S. forces and Rommel's Afrika Korps was badly botched by the Americans. But I finished the book not much wiser than I started about what exactly went wrong. Whiting seemed to be attributing the defeat to the alcoholism of the general commanding the American II Corps. A far more nuanced and balanced analysis of the battle is provided by Martin Blumenson in his book. The Blumenson volume is out of print, but, if you want to understand the complexities of the defeat at Kasserine, find it.

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