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- Watching History Repeat Itself
- An Indispensable History of Failed British Diplomacy
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The Appeasers
Martin Gilbert , and
Richard Gott
Manufacturer: Phoenix Press
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Kristallnacht: Prelude to Destruction (Making History)
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The Holocaust: A History of the Jews of Europe During the Second World War
ASIN: 1842120506 |
Book Description
Gilbert and Gott, as two young Oxford historians in 1963, wrote this compelling account of how a whole important branch of foreign policy was developed, how it was carried out, and why it was misconceived. The pre-war administration of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain ignored its advisors and pursued a policy of appeasement in the mistaken belief that it would cause an end to Hitler's plans.
Customer Reviews:
Watching History Repeat Itself.......2006-08-28
Gilbert -- in one of his earliest books -- gives a detailed analysis of how the world appeased the great dictators, the missed opportunities and the willingness to abandon allies in the face of adversity. What is particularly relevant is the extent to which history seems to be repeating itself today with the way in which Europe (and others) handle Iran. The tactics are the same -- on both sides.
An Indispensable History of Failed British Diplomacy.......2006-08-15
Many students of World War II and the interval between World War I and World War II have wondered how British diplomatic policy could have been so disastrously wrong about Hitler and Nazi Germany, and how that policy could have been maintained and pursued in the face of so much evidence that Hitler was an evil, dishonest and unprincipled negotiating partner, and bent on war, despite his protestations to the contary.
Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott set out to answer that question in 1963, at a time when the immediate passions of World War II had cooled, but when the question, then unanswered, was fresh and vital, and they succeeded brilliantly. What they show is Neville Chamberlain and his ministers in close detail, what they thought and why they thought it. This book achieves what it sets out to accomplish: it explains in careful detail the origins and practice of British appeasement in the run-up to World War II.
The authors make two primary points, one obvious and one more subtle. The obvious point is that Chamberlain's government (and the Conservative Party more generally) was so eager to avoid another war that it simply ignored the abundant evidence that Nazi Germany was pursuing policies that were abhorrent to any constitutional democracy and that were bound to lead to another major European war. And in their ultimately unsuccessful effort to stave off war in Europe, there was virtually no step that Chamberlain's government would not take to attempt to mollify and curry favor with Nazi Germany.
The more subtle point is that, as the decade of the 1930s progressed, and particularly after Munich, the Chamberlain government either removed from government or ignored dissenting voices, and it also began to conduct its diplomacy almost in secret, bypassing the House of Commons and public opinion to the fullest extent feasible. And the more the Chamberlain government and its ministers pursued a go-it-alone, hothouse mentality, the more it became isolated from public opinion. No wonder that Chamberlain was unseated in 1940; the surprise is that it didn't happen sooner.
This sad story is all laid out it in great depth, literally on an hour-by-hour basis in the case of some of the major crises, such as Munich, and the Danzig negotiations of 1939. Beyond merely providing a chronology of these events, however, the authors provide the social and political context for the various events as they occurred, plus biographical sketches for some of the major actors within the Chamberlain Government.
For any student interested in the origins of World War II, this is, quite simply, an invaluable book.
Book Description
Since its original publication in 1996, this book has become an important classic account of the operations of Holland in September of 1944.
Despite a plethora of books on the Market-Garden Operation, most notably Cornelius Ryan's A Bridge Too Far, the German perspective has never been fully examined. After years of research, author Robert Kershaw has written a comprehensive account of the operation from the German point-of-view. Kershaw has completed exhaustive research of the few remaining German archival documents, corroborated by numerous eyewitness and diary accounts, including much previously unpublished material.
Why did the German soldiers fight so doggedly in Holland when the was was clearly lost? How was the Arnhem bridge so easily captured by the British? These and other crucial issues are examined through the eyes of the German participants, themselves, and a wealth of new comment and information brings the German perspective to life.
"before this book, German sources had never been adequately examined... The result is a compelling story, not just of the German reaction to the Allied attach, but also of the personal thoughts and experiences of men in Combat."--Marine Corps Gazette
Customer Reviews:
The one book on Market Garden you must have.......2007-05-18
Blow by Blow , Maps, Orbats,comentary by those that where there.
After reading this book I felt at first as if I had lost a Family Member.
It shows the British Airbourne to be a Fragile Human thing torn to bits frame by frame in front of my eyes , tear filled I was unable to close them. My own myths where shatered ,they were mere human beings not the gods I had always admired.I went the standard route Denile (nazi propaganda)Anger (so many brave young men and a Division gone)In the End I came to realise that in truth The first Airbourne stood higer shined all the Brighter for that very Fragility. The German reactions should be seen as one of the greatest acts of command and controll ever excersised on a modern Battlefield. Stop reading this and buy the book.....
An excellent history..........2003-08-01
For anyone interested in a comprehensive understanding of how the Market Garden campaign was fought by the German forces, this book is essential. It provides a thorough analysis of the units that fought the battle, their individual strengths and compositions, in addition to the roles they played in the actions at Arnhem, Nijmegen, and other sectors of fighting.
Kershaw's book is concise and objective. He clearly illustrates the actions fought, and draws sound conclusions on how and why German successes were achieved, as well as failiures. It is one of the best chronicles of battle at the Kampfgruppe level that this reader has encountered.
Numerous personal recollections are drawn upon, enlivening the academic recital of operational details. It is also supported by a generous selection of maps and photos that complement the text.
Detailed and very readable at the same time, it must rank among the foremost works on the battle for the crucial bridges targeted in Market Garden.
Fantastic Presentation of the German Viewpoint.......2003-04-27
The difficulty with reading Ryan's "A Bridge to Far" or Middlebrook's "Arnhem" (both excellent books) is you don't get the full sense of what's happening on the other side. It wouldn't matter so much in histories of many other battles, but Operation Market-Garden was notable for its confusion. As a result, the understanding of the whole story particularily benefits from the German viewpoint.
Kershaw takes a logical method of breaking the battle down into pieces, and has added new insights to each section of the battle. Some parts are slightly sketchier than others, but I suppose that's due to the lack of available information. The book also has several series of photographs, though Kershaw takes the somewhat annoying tack of describing each photograph in the text as well -- one picture is worth a thousand words. Lastly, the author disputes the theory that the British 1st Airborne would have held the Arnhem bridge if they had landed closer to it.
Eine Brücke auch weit.......2003-04-16
While Robert Kershaw's "It Never Snows in September" doesn't read like C. Ryan's "A Bridge Too Far", it is a wonderful complement and serious study. Kershaw's book details the Battle for Arnhem and associated actions of the Allies Operation Market-Garden from the German perspective. As such this book is in many way the mirror image of Ryan's book, told from the Allied side of the fence. Where "A Bridge Too Far" is wonderful literature on its own right, independent of its value as a historical work, "It Never Snows" is a more difficult read from a pure reading pleasure standpoint but is a WONDERFUL historical treatise. Kershaw uses both historical documents and first hand accounts from interviews of surviving German soldiers to weave an intricate story of the German's surprise to Market and subsequent response to Market and Garden that ultimately stop dead the push Monty thought could go all the way to the Ruhr and beyond to Berlin. While there are no real surprises in terms of the battle perspectives themselves the vantage point provided from looking back at the Allies rather than the traditional way (we Americans) look out at the Axis armies is very refreshing. Another aspect of "It Never Snows" that makes it a really nice piece of work is its thorough documentation of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps' role that was critical to the German blunting of Market-Garden. "It Never Snows" is possible one of the most thorough studies of the 2nd SS (aside from Michael Reynold's "Sons of the Reich") out there that is also enjoyable to read.
Certainly "It Never Snows In September" is not written a la Ryan or Ambrose - so if you need your history slick and stylish this is probably not for you - but it is readable and fun to read. Kershaw is a military man by training not a writer like Ryan or Ambrose and given that fact "It Never Snows" is actually a quite good read. It's not simple a dry treatise of facts, there is heart and sole. If you want to know more about Market-Garden and the Battle of Arnhem, and want to have fun learning about it, I suggest combining "A Bridge Too Far" and "It Never Snows in September" as a tag-team. These two books alone will give you your fix and them some. "It Never Snows" is currently out of print and getting a copy will cost you (unless you can find one in a library somewhere) but it's worth every cent!!!
An Excellent Battlefield Account.......2002-01-03
Although there are many books on the famous Operation Market-Garden in September 1944, It Never Snows in September is the best account in English that covers the German perspective on the battle. The author, a serving British army officer, delivers an excellent account that offers valuable insights from the enemy viewpoint as well as sound military analysis. Furthermore, the well-written narrative is enriched by excellent photographs (many from German collections) and detailed tactical maps. This book is a feast for military historians and deserves a place in any military library.
The book is divided into 27 short chapters that cover the period from 2 September to 4 October 1944. Three interesting appendices cover the German orders to 2nd SS Panzer Corps on 17 September 1944, a detailed German order of battle for the entire campaign and a casualty estimate broken down by sub-units. Kershaw's research into German sources is extensive and while it does have gaps, it provides far more detail than standard sources on the battle than journalistic accounts like A Bridge Too Far. For example, Kampfgruppes Spindler, the vital blocking force that prevented the British 1st Airborne from reaching its objectives in strength on the first day, is not even mentioned in Ryan's classic account.
Kershaw's view of the battle differs from most of the Allied accounts of the operation. In his view, "Allied historians have tended to blame mistakes rather than effective countermeasures in order to account for the failure." It was, "improvisation and rapid build-up of [German] force [that] blunted the attacks...German reaction times were astonishing." Certainly the ability of the German commanders to rapidly assemble effective battle groups from various odds and ends - including Luftwaffe ground troops, sailors and railway workers - and throw them into the battle was incredible, but it came at the price of high casualties. The untrained German kampfgruppes often suffered 50% losses in initial combat and these units had little ability to gain ground. Nevertheless, the rapid deployment of these hodgepodge formations frustrated the over-complicated Allied plan that had not allowed for any significant enemy action. Thus, Kershaw concludes that alterations to the Market-Garden plan, such as dropping the British 1st Airborne Division closer to Arnhem Bridge, probably wouldn't have changed the outcome very much.
Another unique aspect that Kershaw brings out is the huge command and control problems affecting the German response to a huge, unexpected airborne attack. The German chain of command in Holland was vague when the attack began and the Germans had made the amateur mistake of making the main north-south highway the command boundary; the British 30th Corps attack up this highway physically split the German forces. Lack of radios in most units forced the German to rely on telephones and runners, which made response times very slow and inhibited the flexible tactical style that the German leaders preferred. Officers were given ad hoc units and had to inspire untrained, often un-motivated troops to assault elite Allied paratroops that were dug-in. Coordinating the attacks to sever the vital Allied link on "Hells Highway" was very difficult for the Germans and their command and control deficiencies were a critical restraint on their ability to effectively counterattack.
Although the book overall is excellent, there are a few noticeable omissions and errors. In terms of omissions, the critical actions around Elst on 21-23 September 1944 are not detailed. How exactly did the Germans stop the final Allied lunge toward Arnhem Bridge and what exactly did the British do to try and break through? Interestingly, part of the initial contact between the British 43rd Wessex Division and kampfgruppes Knaust near Elst on the evening of 22 September 1944 is mentioned, but only concerning British casualties. There is no mention that the British ambushed and destroyed five Tiger tanks in that action. With the artillery, air and armored firepower available to 30th Corps, the inability to breach the German defenses at Elst deserves more attention in this account, particularly since the author cites the actions north of Nijmegen as decisive in determining the outcome. In terms of errors, there are some noticeable mistakes in the German order of battle, particularly concerning the Tiger tanks used in the battle. Only two companies of the 506th Heavy Tank battalion, with 30 Tiger II tanks, served in the later stages of the battle - the other company went to Aachen. Kershaw incorrectly identifies the "Hummel" company as part of the 506th, but it was actually an independent company with 14 Tiger I tanks. Panzer Company 224 had 16 ex-French Char B tanks, not 8 Renault tanks. The composition of the 10th SS Panzer is also overly-vague. The point is that the author's research is over twelve years old and new research in German archives have turned up information that clarifies and refines some of the data presented in this book.
Overall, this book provides a much-needed English language account of the German view of Operation Market-Garden. Many fine details that help to clarify the critical elements of the battle are presented here. Some of the author's conclusions, such as those attempting to develop lessons that might assist a NATO defense against a Soviet airborne attack, are no longer relevant but the details of this brutal, exhausting, nerve-wracking, too-close-to-call battle provide their own lessons. This book belongs in any professional military reading list.
Customer Reviews:
the definitive book on Soviet disinformation.......2002-06-18
This 226-page volume of indexed and footnoted memoirs by former Czechoslovakian intelligence operative Ladislav Bittman contains the details of Soviet disinfomation methods, and describes the "purposeful and cunning games played in Washington to manipulate politicians, governmental bureaucrats, and the press". Chapter 1 is titled, "Recollections of a Former Perpetrator", but this book goes far beyond being merely a diary, in that the author outlines in detail the means and methods used by both sides during the height of the Cold War, and still being used today.
From the dustcover:
- The author, former Deputy Director of the Czechoslovakian Disinformation Department, reveals how the Soviet disinformation game is played.
- He discloses how, why, and when specific US, European, and other national leaders have been maligned unintentionally by distinguished free-world media representatives who have been cleverly misled.
- This exciting and authoritative book reveals that the spectrum of KGB active measures is much broader, and their operations more skillful, harder to detect, and far more dangerous than the Western world knows.
Book Description
"Aspiring thinkers require a stage for their performance and an audience to help give their actions distinction and meaning. To be made durable and influential, their charismatic stories have to be framed by supporting ideals, practices, and institutions. Although the biographies of the Empire's most famous thinkers have a comfortable platform in modern Russia's printed record, scholars have yet to explore fully the intimate context surrounding their activities in the early nineteenth century. There is, as a result, a certain homeless quality to our understandings of Imperial Russian culture, which this history of one extremely productive home will help us correct."--from The House in the Garden
The House in the Garden explores the role played by domesticity in the making of Imperial Russian intellectual traditions. It tells the story of the Bakunins, a distinguished noble family who in 1779 chose to abandon their home in St. Petersburg for a rustic manor house in central Russia's Tver Province. At the time, the Russian government was encouraging its elite subjects to see their private lives as a forum for the representation of imperial virtues and norms. Drawing on the family's vast archive, Randolph describes the Bakunins' attempts to live up to this ideal and to convert their new home, Priamukhino, into an example of modern civilization. In particular, Randolph shows how the Bakunin home fostered the development of a group of charismatic young students from Moscow University, who in the 1830s sought to use their experiences at Priamukhino to reimagine themselves as agents of Russia's enlightenment.
Some of the story Randolph tells is familiar to historians. The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, whose early philosophical evolution Randolph describes, was born at Priamukhino, while the radical critic Vissarion Belinsky claimed to have been transformed by his experiences there. When Tom Stoppard sought to portray the spiritual history of the Russian intelligentia in his recent trilogy, The Coast of Utopia, he chose Priamukhino as the scene for act 1. Yet Randolph's research allows us to watch this drama from a radically different perspective. It shows how the culture of Russian Idealism--so long presumed to be a product of alienation--actually relied on the support provided by the cult of distinction that the Russian government had built around noble homes. It also allows us to see the other actors and agents of private life--and most notably, the Bakunin women--as participants in the creation of modern Russian social thought. The result is a work that revises our understanding of Russian intellectual history while also contributing to the histories of women, gender, private life, and memory in nineteenth-century Russia.
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- View of Russian culture from the top
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Fatal Half Measures: The Culture of Democracy in the Soviet Union
Yevgeny Yevtushenko
Manufacturer: Little Brown & Co (T)
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ASIN: 0316968838 |
Customer Reviews:
View of Russian culture from the top.......2003-11-07
This book starts with a poem, "Half Measures," which pictures Russian society in 1989:
"on the brink of precipices,
because we can't jump halfway across.
Blind is the one / who only half sees / the chasm." (p. v).
The poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko was involved in the cultural struggles in the Soviet Union primarily in the defense of other writers who had offended the government's sense of order. "Aggressive anti-intellectualism most often comes from those who are not quite intellectuals." (p. 171). His belated defense of Osip Mandelstam's poem about Stalin was that "He simply could not resist crying out like a child." (p. 265). The Prologue starts with a telegram to Comrade Brezhnev in August 1968, when Yevtushenko was 35 and had written the poem, "Do the Russians Want War?" which became a popular antiwar ballad. As an author maintaining his belief in his work, he wanted Brezhnev to know that the Soviet tanks which rolled into Prague on August 21, 1968 had created a moral duty for him to express an opinion based on his personal reactions. "For me, this is also a personal tragedy because I have many friends in Czechoslovakia and I do not know how I will be able to look them in the eye, how I will ever dare to face them again." (p. 3). Short, as most telegrams are, it is followed by "Speech at the First Congress of People's Deputies (June 1989)" (pp. 5-11), which shows Yevtushenko as a representative from Kharkov, a university city in Ukraine, "where there is an intelligent working class and a truly working intelligentsia" (p. 8), trying to amend the Constitution to state:
"Citizens of the USSR, independent of their party, state, or social position, have only equal rights with all the other workers in the sphere of consumer services and health care. The existence in open or hidden form of privileged special stores, pharmacies, and hospitals should be considered an anticonstitutional violation of the principles of socialist equality." (p. 8).
Trying to convince the Party members that their exercise of power had been far too self-serving, he told them that they represented only "close to twenty million Party members in our country. But we have close to one hundred million adults who are not Party members!" (p. 9). Insisting that the Party's majority in the Congress of People's Deputies was far too proud of itself, Yevtushenko told them:
"Wasn't there that haughtiness, comrades, that Party self-congratulation and self-glorification, when the portraits of leaders, and the slogans "Glory to the CPSU" and so on contrasted with the killing of millions of workers, with personal corruption, with the collapse of the economy, with the death of our boys in Afghanistan?" (p. 9).
War is not the major topic in this book, but it has been a factor in the transformation of some individuals. I like the post-Chernobyl repudiation of "The criminal amateurishness of overblown authorities, who united in a mafialike conspiracy," (p. 68), like recent attempts to impose some lawful control seem to dominate most political thinking about that part of the world so far in this century. There are ten pages of Index for this book, and only 12 lines in the index are devoted to topics between walruses and the Warsaw Pact. My interest in his views on the Vietnam war are subordinate to his understanding that "Part of our youth does not believe the adults -- and we deserve that. The insufficient participation of young people in today's revolution is also our fault." (p. 28). I would blame it on a society which only instills entertainment values, so that any person who is not pleased with a present activity is expected to opt to do something else. "Some young people leave in the middle of the movie `Repentance.' As if to say, what does it have to do with us? But real culture requires a people to accept all its country's history, all its guilt. . . . The best segments of American society created a public outcry at home so that their troops had to get out of Vietnam." (pp. 28-29). This praises free world ethics, not our economics. There is a real danger of being overly hyper and having a fit, if too sensitive to incriminating outrageousness. "Many young people are embarrassed to show their feelings. They are afraid of being accused of sentimentality. . . . We hear more and more frequently about the inexplicable pathological cruelty of adolescents." (p. 29). The army is the perfect example of where any kid might want to escape from Yevtushenko's logic.
"Here's my hypothesis: if our self-genocide had not destroyed so many thinkers and harvesters, there might not have been the Chernobyl apocalypse, or the accident with the Nakhimov, or the explosions in the Arzama, or in Sverdlovsk, or the train fire near Bologoi, or the destruction of the Aral Sea. All this destruction was caused by the destruction of professionalism." (p. 68).
It is extremely difficult to believe how careless people become when they are responsible for doing things 24 hours a day while most of the world has far too little to do. The great part of this book is about the Russian cultural heritage. Tolstoy is described as hopelessly the same as his character Anna Karenina. "The deeply religious Tolstoy became anticlerical and he was excommunicated from the church for `heresy.' The religious Anna is choking on disgust for religious hypocrisy." (p. 270).
"Tolstoy had elevated the concept of `family' to a personal moral church, but became disillusioned in it, too, because under the scenery of so-called mutual respect he saw the death of love. . . . Almost all the faces that pass before her eyes irritate Anna before her suicide: `Why are they talking, why are they laughing? It's not true, it's all a lie, all deceit.'" (p. 271). "Tolstoy's rebellion began apparently right after the Crimean War, which transformed him." (p. 271).
Book Description
A prominent scholar here writes about two kinds of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian intellectuals: those with a passion for ideology (often the most extreme form); and those who, inspired by libertarian humanism, developed sophisticated critiques of ideology.
Book Description
Here is the whole sweep of the Soviet experiment and experience as told by its last steward. Drawing on his own experience, rich archival material, and a keen sense of history and politics, Mikhail Gorbachev speaks his mind on a range of subjects concerning Russia's past, present, and future place in the world. Here is Gorbachev on the October Revolution, Gorbachev on the Cold War, and Gorbachev on key figures such as Lenin, Stalin, and Yeltsin.
The book begins with a look back at 1917. While noting that tsarist Russia was not as backward as it is often portrayed, Gorbachev argues that the Bolshevik Revolution was inevitable and that it did much to modernize Russia. He strongly argues that the Soviet Union had a positive influence on social policy in the West, while maintaining that the development of socialism was cut short by Stalinist totalitarianism. In the next section, Gorbachev considers the fall of the USSR. What were the goals of perestroika? How did such a vast superpower disintegrate so quickly? From the awakening of ethnic tensions, to the inability of democrats to unite, to his own attempts to reform but preserve the union, Gorbachev retraces those fateful days and explains the origins of Russia's present crisis.
But Gorbachev does not just train his critical eye on the past. He lays out a blueprint for where Russia needs to go in the next century, suggesting ways to strengthen the federation and achieve meaningful economic and political reforms. In the final section of the book, Gorbachev examines the "new thinking" in foreign policy that helped to end the Cold War and shows how such approaches could help resolve a range of current crises, including NATO expansion, the role of the UN, the fate of nuclear weapons, and environmental problems.
Gorbachev: On My Country and the World reveals the unique vision of a man who was a powerful actor on the world stage and remains a keen observer of Russia's experience in the twentieth century.
Download Description
Here is the whole sweep of the Soviet experiment, as told by its last steward. Drawing on his own experience, rich archival material, and a keen sense of history and politics, Mikhail Gorbachev offers his rare perspective on a range of subjects concerning Russia's past, present, and future place in the world including the October Revolution, the Cold War, and key figures such as Lenin, Stalin, and Yeltsin. This book traces the arc of the U.S.S.R.'s development from the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 to its surprisingly swift and sudden collapse in the early 1990s. Gorbachev also constructs a blueprint for where Russia needs to go in the next century, suggesting ways to strengthen the federation and achieve meaningful economic and political reforms. Finally, he examines the "new thinking" in foreign policy that helped to end the Cold War and shows how such approaches could help resolve a range of current crises, including NATO expansion, the role of the UN, the fate of nuclear weapons, and environmental problems.
Customer Reviews:
"SECRECY" and it's Consequences...........2005-08-20
What I found most fascinating about this book was not
only the recent history of the
Russia and the U.S.S.R. undisclosed without a
veil of "cover up" and banded lies surrounding
this monologue, but the true honesty of Mr. Gorbachev.
I feel every American should read this book, and take note.
Why?
Because it seems our own Democracy here in America
has become veiled in this "so-called" secrecy,
starting with the CIA,
all the way up to the White House rafters.
Many of our own predicaments in our recent wars have
defined this secrecy and have not allowed us to escape
our own misfortunes in this country, namely the "Vietnam"
involvement, along with the misplaced "Iraq" involvement;
I mean, could someone please tell me where Osama Bin Ladin is?
What is going on?
And why was the post-911 covered up in a veil of secrecy
that still does not sit well with me, and virtually
hauled off to the dump?
Yes, "SECRECY" is what defines this book, and America still
has a lot of secrets of it's own, all under the disguises
of "Top Secret" and "National Security!"
Can our own leaders (Political and Presidential)
in the future be as honest as Mr. Gorbachev?
I hope so.
Greatest Vision of the 20th Century.......2005-06-04
I think simply that history has proven that Gorbachev's vision of a democratic USSR with a mixed ecomony was the correct vision. All the former Soviet Republics today are a mess. The legal framework under which the market ecomonies of the world operate did not exist in the former USSR, hence the lawlessness that has existed there since 1992. The destroyers of the USSR were the idiotic coup plotters who could not grasp the Soviet Union was not Bolivia and that a coup there had no chance of success. I think though Gorbachev is still in denial over the 1917 revolution. The greatest tragedy in Russian history was the overthrow of the Romanovs and the creation of the Communist state. With all it's problems Russia was the 13th largest Industrial power in the world. A responsible goverment could have made Russia into a constitutional monarchy and led the country to greatness. With no Stalin there never would have been a Nazi-Soviet pact and probably no WWII.
Anything by Gorbachev Should Not Be Ignored.......2002-03-11
To listen only to Ronald Reagan's avid supporters, one might conclude that his "Evil Empire" characterization of the Soviet Union and his massive military spending brought down communist rule, crumbled the Berlin Wall, ended the Cold War and saved the civilization from an inevitable conflict between the free world and its totalitarian enemies.
Not so, it becomes readily apparent in reading Mr. Gorbachev's book-length essay of his view of his country and of the world. His brief -- alas too brief -- history of that crucial time in the late 20th Century when he was General Secretary of the Communist Party, describes what happened while he was in the eye of the hurricane, when an upheaval in the Kremlin shook the world back to its senses. More important for serious students of history, Mr. Gorbachev tells why and how it happened.
When they came to power, he and his team knew that that the Soviet Union was feeble and that it needed a remedy; so they made a desperate grasp at "renewed thinking". They believed that by renouncing old beliefs and then by scraping away totalitarian decay they could bring about a cure. As history now knows, instead of a cure, they helped bring about its collapse.
"New thinking" gave birth to perestroika, a restructuring designed to save what Lenin had wrought. But then, the unexpected happened: a rebirth of nationalism stirred among the former Soviet Union's diverse ethnic populations. Finally, there was a simultaneous combination of rethinking, restructuring and nationalism which, like so many volatile chemical elements, resulted in the startling political implosion that brought the Communist empire to its knees.
It was not Mr. Reagan's threats, nor his Star Wars military program nor free-market competition from the outside world that changed history. Mr. Gorbachev makes a far better case that it was his administration's accurate diagnosis of the Soviet illness and their willingness to correct it from inside the Soviet Union which changed the history of the world, though in a way they did not intend.
After his too brief description of how he and his people tried to salvage the crumbing Soviet system, Mr. Gorbachev's writing bogs down. He ascends a pulpit and becomes a good-intentioned preacher, proposing non-controversial prescriptions for a better world. Disappointingly, in the latter part of his book he resorts to the obvious and falls back on over-used platitudes (such as:"we must advance through worldwide cooperation"). This section seems to have been written merely to puff out the work.
But, despite that minor short-coming, Mr. Gorbachev has earned and deserved his status as the dominant historical figure in the last quarter of the 20th Century. Anything written by him should not be ignored.
The Book Itself Is History.......2001-02-02
It was not that long ago when a person would have been thought foolish if they believed a former, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would be writing books for anyone who was interested. It also is not very long ago that a person writing about any one of the dozens of issues in this book, would have spent many, if not their remaining years in a Siberian Camp. Since Mr. Gorbachev became General Secretary in 1985 until he resigned as President in 1991, history has been made that will fill countless books for many years to come.
If there is one aspect of this book that I were to state as particularly fascinating it would be the transcripts from Politburo Meetings. Here are the same men expressing their thoughts in reality, when the same members of this inner sanctum of The Kremlin have been the foundation for spy and Cold War Novels for decades. If you are looking for "the evil empire", plotting the destruction of the West, you will be disappointed. The arguments and the positioning that continually deteriorate into political and personal feuds as the former USSR became the target of varied interests, reads like much of what we listen to and watch here with our elected officials.
Mr. Gorbachev is not an apologist for the Former Soviet Union. As someone who grew up with the USSR portrayed as the ultimate evil, the book requires a major change in perspective for the reader. A willingness to listen to a man that is extremely well informed, a Statesman, and a thinker far and away the superior to those who now rule the remains of the USSR, and its kleptocratic economy. I found his words to be remarkably candid when criticizing his own mistakes, and those of the USSR, and his criticisms of US Policy were more often valid than not. The world was divided into two camps with each side portraying the other as the ultimate threat for most of the 20th Century. The truth of course is never that simple. The stories shared by Mr. Gorbachev have another facet; they are absolutely terrifying at times.
It is not possible to comment on even a portion of his ideas. His writing is very dense, and takes getting comfortable with to complete the book. This may in part be due to translation issues, and there are footnotes where ambiguity may have been critical.
His narration of the USSR coming apart is not only fascinating, it was infinitely more complex than many care to recall, and the complexities are by no measure solved. The USSR was never a monolithic beast. It was composed of 15 distinct republics that were made all the more complex by forced immigrations, ethnic complications, and the arbitrary creation of borders. Borders that became not only critical but also disputed to the point of war, when the Union was dissolved.
During his book he covers the history of his country and the larger union, the problems then, and the challenges now. He also takes the reader through the removal of The Wall In Berlin, the first border disputes in Azerbaijan and Armenia, and all the drama of the Baltic States and their pronouncements of independence.
I certainly would not presume to rank what is important in this book, or what was of the greatest importance to Mr. Gorbachev. A critical passage for me was when he made the issues he spoke of personal for him, and those of his Countrymen.
He spoke of the sense of loss felt by citizens during the turmoil and breakup. He acknowledged why people on the outside may have their views, but as a private citizen he and many others had and do have their own. Because there is one fact you cannot get away from; the homes, countries, borders, and lives that were lead were the only life most had ever known. The times of the Tsars are none too fondly remembered either. So on the human level, not the handful that is destroying the remains, the pardoned thieves like Yeltsin and his Family and others, many miss the life they had. For many it was not only the life they knew, it was far better than the one they now live.
A remarkable opportunity to view History from a different perspective, by one of the men at its center.
From Russia with Hope.......2000-10-01
As a reader from the third world (or emerging market?) I wonder why Gorbachev is so popular outside Russia. Since his economics reforms didn't work and his political ones didn't make better either. I only regard the former Soviet Union or the Soviet Space a giant jigsaw puzzle of nations and peoples who look each other up. It's worth noting its China-like inward spirit looking to West as like as a menace. Indeed I agree with Mr. Gorbachev on the Russias's future as a great partner in the world political scenario. For those who are trying to find desperately out a third way for the real socialism it's a worth reading Renato Zanola
Book Description
Vladimir Ilich Lenin (1870 - 1924) led the first successful revolt against market-based liberal democracy and founded the Soviet State in 1917, serving as the new nation's chief architect and sole ruler for the next five years. This collection of primary sources allows readers to learn about Lenin through his own words and emphasizes Lenin's actions rather than his ideology. Jeffrey Brooks and Georgiy Chernyavskiy have translated newly available documents that make it possible to provide a more accurate portrait of a ruthless political strategist whose actions created a new political, economic, social, and cultural system that in its heyday challenged the military, technological, and cultural might of the United States. Document headnotes, a chronology, questions for consideration, and a selected bibliography offer additional pedagogical support and encourage students to analyze the actions and beliefs of a man who transformed world history and whose legacy continues to affect social and political movements throughout the world.
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German Writers in Soviet Exile, 1933-1945
David Pike
Manufacturer: University of North Carolina Press
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