Book Description
This Special Edition of The Art of War by Sun Tzu presents this timeless classic in two forms:
Section I contains the complete thirteen chapters of Sun Tzu's masterpiece in Chinese together with the English translation of Lionel Giles without notes or commentary. This presentation avoids the objection that commentary tends to clutter and obscure the clarity of thought of the ancient military genius.
Section II contains the complete translation by Lionel Giles including his extensive introduction and the fully annotated text with explanatory notes and critical commentary. His Introduction includes an historical account of Sun Tzu's work, evaluations by and of early Chinese commentators, an essay examining the traditional Chinese attitudes toward war and a bibliography that details Giles' source materials. The text in this section includes critical commentary and notes by both the Chinese historians as well as by Giles himself.
Lionel Giles, as the Keeper of the Department of Oriental printed Books and Manuscripts of the British Museum, was uniquely qualified to translate and explain this great classic Chinese work to Western readers. First published in 1910, Giles' translation is widely considered to be the definitive English version.
Other Special Editions in this series which deal with the subject of warfare and strategy include:
The Art of War By Mao Tse-tung - Special Edition
The Art of War By Baron De Jomini - Special Edition
The Art of War & The Prince By Machiavelli - Special Edition
Customer Reviews:
The Best !!!.......2007-07-12
This is the best edition of Sun Tzu's "Art of War" I have ever seen. It solves all the problems of reading this classic masterpiece in translation. If you wish, you can just read the first part, the straight translation, which is decorated with the Chinese characters at the beginning of each chapter. Or, if you really want to understand what Sun Tzu wrote, in context, you can read the second part that contains Giles' annotation and comments by several ancient Chinese scholars.
There is no doubt that Sun Tzu was a military genius and that his book has a well-earned reputation as the best (in addition to being the first) treatise on warfare ever written. This book is so important; in terms of its historical relevance, philosophic world-view, strategy instructions and what it has to say about human nature; that I feel it ranks among the dozen or so best books in the world.
The Art of War.......2007-07-12
The Art Of War is one of the oldest books ever written, yet it is still used today.The Art of War is one of the most famous studies of strategy and has had a huge influence on Eastern and Western military planning, business tactics, and beyond. The book had possibly influenced Napoleon and even the planning of Operation Desert Storm. it has 13 very interesting chapters.
The Art of War helps focus problems in such a way they can be solved sistematically. It is important to keep in mind that it's better to beat the enemy without fighting.
It is an amazing book. Try it!
Excellent Edition - A Masterpiece.......2007-07-12
This particular edition of Sun Tzu's Masterpiece is excellent. It presents the Chinese text together with the plain translation and then it presents the full Giles translation, with the complete set of notes and annotation. It doesn't get any better than this.
Over the years, Sun Tzu's book has received a great deal of attention for a reason: Sun Tzu was a military genius. His rational approach to warfare has been a model that has been applied to all manner of activities and, simply because it is rational, it has generally been helpful. But, make no mistake, the real subject is warfare.
From the outset, Sun Tzu's message is that war is too serious to treat lightly. It is destructive and costly to all involved. A good general, according to Sun Tzu, is one who can win by peaceful diplomacy, and intimidation if necessary, but who minimizes the inevitable casualties and destruction by applying force only when and where it will accomplish the objective. Sun Tzu makes a great deal out of obtaining and using intelligence, spies, and every available resource to the best advantage - which is invariably to bend the enemy to your will without unnecessary death and destruction.
This particular edition, with its full set of explanatory notes tucked away in the second part of the book, provides a better feel for Sun Tzu's message than any of the plain, unexplained versions. It provides the background necessary for understanding the full extent of Sun Tzu's genius. After you think have mastered the message and begin to re-read the plain translation in the front of the book, you will appreciate having the insight of the scholarly Lionel Giles just a few pages away.
Excellent Edition !!!.......2007-07-11
This particular edition of Sun Tzu's Art of War is really excellent. It contains three separate copies of Sun Tzu's book:
1. The original Chinese text (in modern simplified Chinese characters),
2. A facing version of Lionel Giles' superb translation into English (without notes or comments) and
3. The complete Giles Translation with an extensive introduction and notes throughout the text that provides detailed insight into the meaning and intentions of the text.
Lionel Giles's translation is the gold standard for Sun Tzu. His deep understanding of ancient Chinese culture and his own roots in Western culture gave him a unique opportunity to bridge the gap and present native English speakers the opportunity to really understand and appreciate the mindset of this voice from antiquity.
Of all the versions of Sun Tzu's book on the market, this one is undoubtedly the best. The scholarship and detail to attention of this edition pays the respect and gives the credit to the great work that it deserves. Other, abbreviated, versions of Sun Tzu's book have their place, but not for those who actually want to understand the lessons of history that have been passed down through the centuries. The meaning of the text, after 25 centuries, requires the perspective of an oriental scholar with Giles' credentials. It is unlikely that the bare English translation, without notes or commentary, can convey to a modern reader the real meaning and intentions of a 2,000 year old Chinese genius.
This edition has both impact and insight.......2007-07-11
Of the several available editions of "The Art of War" by Sun Tzu, the Giles translation is clearly the best. This edition, which contains two separate versions of the Giles translation, one with and one without commentary, resolves the main sticking point with other editions. They either just give the stripped down version or the fully annotated version.
When I first discovered "The Art of War", it was the full Giles translation. As most students of philosophy do, I found it fascinating. After reading it several times, and appreciating the explanations in the running commentary, I began to think that I really understood what Sun Tzu was saying and began to feel that the commentary had become cumbersome. Consequently, I obtained a different translation, with no notes or commentary - a booklet really - which simply didn't have the flavor of the Giles Translation. Finally I found a copy of the Giles translation, without the notes and commentary, which I could read and enjoy without being put off by the interspersed commentary that I had begun to find distracting.
Needless to say, I ultimately found it difficult to read the uncommented version without feeling a need to refer to Giles' notes in the full version, which I had given away. When I discovered this edition, I immediately understood that I wasn't the only one who appreciated not only Giles' scholarly translation but also his insight.
This version: The Art of War by Sun Tzu - Special Edition; is the one you want. Otherwise, you will be missing out on the impact of the unadorned translation or the insight of one of the world's great oriental scholars.
Book Description
Tactics of the Crescent Moon comes none too soon for deployed U.S. service personnel. Little, if any, of their battlefield intelligence has been tactically interpreted. U.S. analysts are generally more interested in the enemy's strategic or technological capabilities. Even if those analysts did want to tactically assess the information, most lack the infantry and historical background to do so. This book fills that void. It reveals—for the first time in any detail—the most common small-unit maneuvers of the Iraqi and Afghan resistance fighters. Its author is a retired infantryman and recognized authority on guerrilla warfare. He has traveled the world extensively and still trains active-duty U.S. units.
Tactics of the Crescent Moon could save many lives (if not turn the tide of war) in the Middle East. It is a heavily researched, well-illustrated, and spell-binding account of how Muslim militants fight. While the book delves mainly into their tactical method, it also uncovers their cultural orientation. This nail-biting nonfiction covers events as recent as 15 September 2004.
Customer Reviews:
Understand what we're up against.......2007-02-27
If you want to truly understand how difficult it is to fight and win in the Middle East, then this book is required reading. Far too often we get watered-down information out of the press and on the Internet but the tactics of our Eastern adversaries go unmentioned. We know of suicide bombs, but where did this tactic originate? Which group in the Middle East is the most proficient at close-range combat? Where does Al Qaeda excel and what is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard? Are Sunni and Shia groups always adversaries, or will they work together when faced with a common enemy?
This book gives countless examples of diffent tactics in different areas of the world from Afghanistan to Chechnya to the Levant. It illustrates the strengths of our adversaries and addresses our own weaknesses as a "Western" army. Finally, Poole makes recommendations on how we can win this fight through better light infantry tactics and restrained use of preparatory fire and air power.
It is in my opinion the best book yet on this "4th Generation" warfare. It is an outstanding read and will make you an expert amongst your friends when discussing the current state of military affairs in the Middle East.
After reading this book I sent it to my old ROTC school.......2006-11-28
I would highly encourage any person who is Battalion staff or lower to read this book. All Army and Marine personnel should read this book on the jet flying them to Iraq or Afghanistan. This book will give a typical soldier or marine a good snap shot of how the Eastern combat mind thinks. Also, unlike much propaganda to the contrary, the Islamic soldiers fight using Eastern techniques. There is more hand-to-hand fighting than in the past. American's just can't call in their massive fire support because the targets may not be easy to hit.
This book is great for privates, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. I don't know if the advice will be taken if it's read at the level of battalion or above. That is where the "rubber no longer meets the road". The staff disconnect from the soldiers begins.
For all war fighters this book is a must read. All ROTC departments, Marine, and Army infantry should have this book as required reading.
A must read for those who leave the wire.......2006-11-21
During seven months in Falluja in 2005 I spent approximately 150 days in the city. The history alone in this book showed us just how much we may have been underestimating our enemies, and that if they followed their classical influences they could have done much more damage.
The history is priceless dating back to influences of the Samarai and how it came to bring the original Middle Eastern assassins, and how today's suicide bombers are like those in the past, only they have explosives instead of knives, and do not need as much skill.
John Poole had spent close to 30 years in the Marine Corps leading men as both a gunnery sergeant (when enlisted) and a Lt Colonel (when commissioned). He saw Vietnam first hand, and left feeling that he could have done more for the men he'd led. Although the officers that are in charge of teaching battle field skills are not fast to accept his methods the men on the ground who deal with the enemies in the streets of Iraqi cities know he is right.
Timely and practical.......2006-11-10
As a retired military officer, I think highly of Poole's books, including this one - he provides practical information that could save lives if they were required reading for our troops being sent to Iraq and Afghanistan.
All warfighters should read this.......2006-09-15
This book should be read by a variety of folks that desire to understand even a little bit more about what is happening and happening to US in the middle east. It is not a book that spends countless pages complaining about the state of union. This book will enable the tip of the spear as we are so fond of referring to our fighting forces, concise and credible information with regard to the mindset of their opposing forces. I have been told over and over, that you cannot defeat an opponent unless you understand how he/she thinks. It does shed some light on how the military-industrial complex is steering the people of many countries wrong by proposing extensive, expensive weapon systems that separate the men from the battle and advertise a zero loss of life war for our side. (Both sides should just throw rocks, it'll be simpler) And above all it mentions the one issue that is generating higher and higher turnover rates, ARMCHAIR war fighters, and the military personnel system, that rewards compliance and not innovation, that condones individualist and fails to properly reward teamwork. Battles should be fought from front to back and not the reverse as we are doing. I recommend this book to all, and not just to those in uniform.
Book Description
This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.
Customer Reviews:
Some good information, but lacking in many areas.......2006-08-14
The book does provide detailed footnotes as it is a series of essays where the writer of each "chapter" presents their viewpoint and analysis. However, this book provides no tables or charts to support any of the analysis or discussions presented. It would have been very helpful if there were a table or chart comparing each nation's "innovation" in each category described in this book, examples: armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier development, etc.
What is most lacking in this book it that it focuses primarily on the US, Britain, and Germany, limited on Japan (amphibious assault and aircraft carrier development but nothing on their armor and combined arms tactics) and nothing significant on France, Italy, and Russia, who are mentioned merely in passing. This is the most glaring weakness of this book. Russia developed the T-34 tank, had a sizeable navy, large industrial base, naval infantry, paratroopers, cavalry, and actually trained with the Germans in the 1930's. The Italians were on the winning side of World War One, developed a large navy, their own tanks, and an ambitious goal to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, but they too are not mentioned.
It is important to learn how each of these major combatant nations developed as each had their own policies that led to successes and failures. An example is in amphibious landings, where the writer presents a view that the US was the most developed in the world during the interwar period. If that is the case, then why didn't the US attempt an amphibious assault prior to 1943 and why were the casualties so high in the first assault experienced at Tarawa? If the US was amphibious warfare strategy and doctrine was the most developed, then why did the British conduct the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 as a rehearsal, wouldn't the US have enough experience in northern Africa, Sicily, and Anzio in 1943? The writer's claim is not supported through citing successful battles or numbers of equipment produced.
Another question is why weren't the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians mentioned or compared to in amphibious warfare? If Italy wanted to control the Med, wouldn't they have developed some type of doctrine or equipment? The Germans thought about invading England, what kind of equipment did they have and how would they have executed the invasion? The Russian Naval Infantry, what was their doctrine? The Japanese amphibious landing is well researched and presented, but again, no tables or charts are presented to summarize the writer's viewpoint.
Russia's development during the interwar period is very critical as the equipment developed during the period was superior or at least equal to the German equipment. The T-34 tank's only weakness in 1941 was the lack of radio equipment along with the doctrine of dispersing the tanks instead of massing them into large formations. If one reads other WW2 history books, one learns that the Germans were only able to defeat the T-34 tank in 1941 with better unit maneuver and with greater numbers. German anti-tank weapons had no effect with the German tanks undergunned and under ranged. The largest caliber on a German tank in 1941 being the short barreled 75mm mounted on the Panzer MK IV and the StugIII (which was an assault gun found in anti-tank battalions).
Another glaring omission in this book is there are no discussions on anti-weapons or counter munitions designed to defeat the innovations being developed in the interwar period, the lone exception being the torpedo and US artillery proximity fuses. There are no discussions on the bazooka, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, shaped charges, depth charges, or anti-aircraft guns. Obviously the Germans had planned for anti-aircraft defense, otherwise they would not have developed the 88mm gun nor would have the deployed it so close to the front line troops. Rommel was able to repulse the British armor counterattacks at Arras, France in 1940 only with the 88mm anti-aircraft gun. This experience influenced him to utilize this weapon in a dual purpose anti-tank role in the desert. The British had attacked him in Arras with heavily armored Matilda tanks, armed with a 2-pound anti-tank gun, but no high explosive rounds against infantry. These cases are extremely relevant and important discussions into the interwar period.
Why did the British choose not to equip their tanks with HE rounds? Why didn't the Germans equip their Panzer MKIV and StugIII tanks with long barrel 75mm guns from the start? Why didn't the Russians equip their early T-34 tanks without universal radios (only the platoon leader had a radio)?
How was the Sherman tank developed and doctrinally planned to be utilized, a vehicle with an underpowered 75mm gun, prone to catching on fire, and a narrow track base not suited for cross country mobility (as described in the book Death Traps, Belton Cooper)? At the end of WW2, the US might have gotten directly into war against the Russians? How would the Sherman tank fared in the vast Russian muddy steppes and marshes and no highways? The Germans learned the hard way fighting against the T-34 an incorporated many of the features (wide track base and sloped armor) into the Tiger and Panther tanks. Was the Sherman tank designed to be an infantry support vehicle with anti-tank battalions designed to defeat enemy armor? What calibers of weapons were they equipped with and how were they to be employed? None of these questions are answered in this book.
Overall the book does provide some information that is interesting, such as the German night bombing tactics, use of the Stuka dive bomber to provide precision bombing, and the lack of reliable and powerful aircraft engines that prevented German strategic bomber development. However, the lack of direct comparisons (such as comparing the T-34 vs the Panzer Mark IV vs the Sherman Tank in armor thickness and armament range, penetrating power), lack of tables (such as showing the range and capacity of the Japanese aircraft carrier vs the US and British), charts (comparing the number of tanks and tank regiments fielded by Russia, Germany, England, France, Italy, US, and Japan in 1939), and complete omissions of the Italians and Russians is glaring and detracts to what could have been a well rounded and educational book.
Given the Editors' strong professional and education backgrounds, expected a lot more information from this book. Recommend borrowing this book from the library rather than purchasing it.
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.......2005-08-26
This book is a necessary for those who want to understand the relationship between development of technology and military innovation. It is not an easy book to read, but contains tremendous amount of information along with accurate historical records. Must for military tacticians and historians alike.
Essential Addition to the Study of the Inter-war Period.......2005-01-15
The acclaimed scholarly team of Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett have edited an anthology of essays encompassing the technological innovations in weaponry during the 1920's and 1930's. These innovations span the research and developments of all the major belligerents that play a major role in the coming global conflict. Each scholar was instructed to compare and contrast his or her topic country with two other countries making this work not only a significant contribution in and of itself, but also a vital comparative study as well. In addition, the researchers were asked to structure their essays around three concepts: the strategic framework of the period, the organizational factors of the institutions under study, and the doctrinal framework of the services. Many of the contributing factors to victory and defeat in World War II are covered within the pages of this important work. Williamson Murray takes a look at "Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences," and "Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences." Richard R. Muller examines "Close Air Support: The German British and American Experiences, 1918-1941." Geoffrey Till discusses "Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies." But perhaps the most important chapter is Allan R. Millett's "Assault From the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the Wars-the American, British, and Japanese Experiences." Millett compared the development of amphibious doctrine in Japan, Britain, and the United States. The author concludes the U. S. led the way in amphibious warfare doctrine, initiating combined arms operations between air, sea and land that would prove to be a critical advantage in the pacific campaign. According to Millett, Japan started out impressively as was evident by its ever-expanding Pacific empire in the 1930's. Since every landing force became an isolated island garrison, however, Japan's whole amphibious program literally faded away. Great Britain, on the other hand, never had the economic resources necessary to implement a successful amphibious program. Millett concludes that factors such as budget and innovative foresight are vital contributing factors in technological innovation. The author is also quick to point out that in many cases, new weapons become obsolete as soon as hostilities begin. Generally, books of essays are usually disjointed and inconsistent. The guidelines and structure the editors have chosen have tied all the chapters in this book together nicely. This is arguably the best work on the inter-war period to emerge in years. Highly recommended.
Great historic analysis on military innovations.......2001-09-18
It is a very good review on how things developed between world wars. It provides a good insight of the thinking of the different countries and how they coped with their doctrines and how much they took an advantage of the WWI experiences.
I am rating 4 stars because actually I would like much more information rather than 30 pages on each subject.
Readable and Good.......2001-07-15
This is an anthology of various articles. Generally anthologies are the pits as they tend to lack a central them and the quality will vary. These articles are generally by the authors and as such they are of an even standard.
There are a number of chapters that discuss a range of issues from the use of Tanks to the development of the Aircraft Carrier.
The book is interesting although the area covered is naturally enormous and the amount of space that can be devoted to complex subjects is naturally limited. Despite this most of the essays are interesting and not only for what they say. In the first essay about the development of armored warfare by way of an aside the writer attacks Gueridian as a sycophant and also as a person whose reputation was largely the result of self publicity. Later the English theorists Fuller and Liddell Hart are critiqued as presenting overly schematic histories of the First World War which warped the truth to fit in with their own theories. Interestingly the essay then goes on to suggest that the first world war infantry battles were so complex that even now we struggle to understand them and for that reason it was no surprise that Douglas Haig had the problems that he did.
All in all an interesting book although again very much a starting point for the issue it covers.
Book Description
A monumental, groundbreaking work of history that shows how technological and strategic revolutions have transformed the battlefield—from the Spanish Armada to the War on Terror— and how mastery of these innovations has shaped the rise and fall of nations and empires
In War Made New, acclaimed author Max Boot explores how innovations in warfare mark crucial turning points in modern history, influencing events well beyond the realm of combat. Combining gripping narrative history with wide-ranging analysis, Boot focuses on four “revolutions” in military affairs and describes key battles from each period to explain how inventions ranging from gunpowder to GPS-guided air-strikes have remade the field of battle— and shaped the rise and fall of empires.
Bringing to life battles from the defeat of the Spanish Armada to Wellington's victory at Assaye, War Made New analyzes the Gunpowder Revolution and explains warfare's evolution from ritualistic, drawn-out engagements to much deadlier events, precipitating the rise of the modern nation state. He next explores the triumph of steel and steam during the Industrial Revolution, including the British triumph at Omdurman and the climax of the Russo-Japanese war at Tsushima, showing how it powered the spread of European colonial empires. Moving into the twentieth century and the Second Industrial Revolution, Boot examines three critical clashes of World War II—the German army's blitzkrieg, Pearl Harbor, and the firebombing of Tokyo—to illustrate how new technology such as the tank, radio, and airplane ushered in terrifying new forms of warfare that aided the rise of highly centralized, and even totalitarian, world powers. Finally, in his section on the Information Revolution, Boot focuses on the Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq war, arguing that even as cutting-edge technologies such as stealth aircraft have made America the greatest military power in world history, advanced communications systems have allowed decentralized, “irregular” forces to become an increasingly significant threat to Western power. BACKCOVER:
Advance Praise for War Made New
“Max Boot traces the impact of military revolutions on the course of politics and history over the past 500 years. In doing so, he shows that changes in military technology are limited not to warfighting alone, but play a decisive role in shaping our world. Sweeping and erudite, while entirely accessible to the lay reader, this work is key for anyone interested in where military revolutions have taken us—and where they might lead in the future.”
—U.S. Senator John McCain
“While much has been in written in recent years about the so-called `Revolution in Military Affairs,' Max Boot is the first scholar to place it within the broad sweep of history, and in the context of the rise of the West in world affairs since 1500. In so doing, he not only tells a remarkable tale, but he compels us all, even those obsessed solely with contemporary military affairs, to ask the right questions and to distinguish what is truly new and revolutionary from what is merely ephemeral. He has rendered a valuable service, and given us a fascinating read at the same time, so we are doubly in his debt.”
—Paul Kennedy, Professor of History at Yale University and author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
“War Made New is impressive in scope. What is equally impressive is its unique interpretation of the causal relationship between technology, warfare and the contemporary social milieu. This is a superb thinking person's book which scrutinizes conventional historical wisdom through a new lens.”
—Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (ret.), co-author of Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
“Max Boot's book takes hundred of years of tactical battle history and reduces it to an incisive narrative of how war has changed. By providing such a coherent view of the past, he has pointed us toward the future. What is doubly impressive is how he draws surprising, fresh lessons from wars we thought we knew so much about but in fact didn't.”
—Robert D. Kaplan, author of Imperial Grunts
Customer Reviews:
Not just history, but analysis and insight.......2007-09-03
Max manages to well capture the balance between seeing the forest at the same time as the trees. Further, by extrapolation, he offers insight as to what the forest will look like in the future. I thought the book was excellent, and should be good reading for any military officer. I am a retired military officer, and have seen all the changes from the middle of the Cold War to Gulf War II. It's a completely different ball game, and Max covers it well. {To the detractors; all books have factual errors. Look to the forest, not the trees, or you miss the point of the book.)
War Made New.......2007-05-26
Absolutely excellent. Completely objective presentation. Fabulous survey of how technological and tactical changes affected western history.
Don't Bother With This Recycled NeoCon Drivel.......2007-05-08
[Update: If you are thinking about buying this book, PLEASE CONTACT ME!!!!
As a courtesy, I copied Boot on a letter to the LA Times that pointed out a series of factual errors and inconsistencies in a May 31, 2007 column he wrote about achieving "Victory" in Iraq by firing purportedly "aged" US Army Generals. (Boot's underlying premise is that there is nothing wrong with the NeoCon policies that put our troops in harm's way without enough personnel, equipment or support -- it's those "old fud" Generals who are to blame!
(I'm not making this up! That actually is Boot's theory.)
Boot responded like the Proverbial Scalded Cat, and in classic NeoCon style, e.g., claiming not to have made any mistakes; claiming that pointing out his glaring factual errors was an "ad hominem attack"; and generally displaying all of the NeoCon hubris that is getting US military personnel killed and wounded every day in Iraq.
It would be hysterically funny were it not for the fact that most people can't see through the tactics that Boot and the other NeoCons use -- including, most prominently, ignoring demonstrable facts that don't "fit" the ideological theories they are pushing.
Really, before you buy this drivel, email me and I'll send you a copy of Boot's emails. They will give you a taste of his "reasoning" and disregard for the truth.]
In my view, Max Boot is an example of the kind of NeoCon thinking that has gotten us into this generation's quamire. Boot is, basically, a liberal arts major with no military experience, and without the insights that such experience might bring.
In "War Made New," Boot "re-cycles" (a politer word than "steals") ideas have been around for years, and which have been expressed more clearly by a number of other military intellectuals and historians. Further, Boot repeatedly gets minor facts wrong, e.g., he claims that the WWII-era Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker Hurricane were both "all-metal" fighters. (The Spitfire was; the Hurricane wasn't -- which is obvious even from pictures of the latter if you know what you are talking about.) These small discrepancies add up, and you ultimately realize that Boot is merely repeating the thoughts of others.
Boot's final/main contention, that there has been a major shift to "Information Warfare," is not borne out by the "facts on ground" in Iraq, and has never been tested in combat. The US military's new smart bomb/high technology theory of warfare has never been used against an opponent with the ability and resources to counter/exploit the obvious weak points in such systems.
To give but one example, which Boot doesn't have the knowledge or experience to discuss: Our JDAMS smart bombs work using GPS signals for guidance. Question: What happens if our opponent has the capability to jam GPS signals, or knock out the GPS satellites (a technology that China is working on)? Answer: The US is left with a pile of "dumb" bombs, and a force structure that is too small to use them. Result: We lose, despite all of our Gee Whiz weaponry.
Let's face it: NeoCons like Boot work for the military-industrial complex that sells these very expensive Wonder Weapons. He has about as much intellectual credibility as, say, Douglas Feith and Paul Wolfowitz. So save your money, and read authors who know what they are talking about.
Neil
[P.S. In candor, Boot pointed out that I originally had "Feith" as "Fife." I thanked him for pointing this error, but admitted that I had trouble telling the "NeoCon Intellectuals" apart, given that they all used the same "reasoning," e.g., "Cut The Facts To Fit The Theory."
Onward, to Victory! NEOCON INTELLECTUALS TO THE FRONT!]
enjoyable, informatiive read.......2007-05-01
I must say, I found this book interesting. I am not a military expert, but I believe his basic premises are correct. This is a journey through the effects of technological advances in warfare and the corresponding effects on society. No section is so long that it becomes boring. I found the whole thing engrossing and hard to put down. I recommend it!
RMA for the masses.......2007-04-24
A decade ago, the defense policy community was a buzz about an emerging "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) - a discontinuous change in the nature of warfare generated by the information revolution whose potential was so clearly demonstrated by the overwhelming advantage that precision guided munitions and operational awareness conferred to US forces in the Gulf War of 1991.
Today, the increasingly low-tech, irregular nature of the current Global War on Terror and, more recently, the frustrating experience of counterinsurgency in Iraq, have seemingly diminished the importance of the RMA and discredited its most vocal proponents. This is unfair and unfortunate as the notion of periodic, major transformational change in military technology and operational capabilities is certainly sound. Moreover, it is a concept that anyone serious about military history or international affairs ought to be familiar with and consider seriously. There is no better introduction to the topic than "War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today" by Max Boot.
There are several reasons to recommend "War Made New." To begin with, author Max Boot is a superb talent and, in many ways, was the ideal person to write the first general overview of the RMA concept and a sampling of the many historical case studies that support the theory. As a long-time lead defense reporter for The Wall Street Journal, Boot possesses a sophisticated understanding of current defense policy and national security strategy. Better yet, he writes with the same engaging and lucid style of other defense journalists that have written best-selling full-length books, such as David Halberstam, Tom Ricks, and Neil Sheehan. Prior to "War Made New," the RMA had been a subject only written about by academics and policy wonks. This book should take the RMA and the classic RMA case studies to a mainstream audience.
The book is broken up into five parts. The first three parts review distinct RMAs from the past half-millennium. In "The Gunpowder Revolution" Boot covers the dramatic increase in the destructive capacity of gunpowder weapons that emerged in the late 15th century, the tactical changes developed by the Dutch and perfected by Gustavus Adolphus during the Thirty Years' War to maximize the rate of fire and overall impact of hand-held and mobile artillery firepower, and the parallel creation and stunning growth of standing professional armies throughout Europe during the period that led to the first stage of western imperialism in the 18th century. The author uses the examples of the British defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588), two major battles of the Thirty Years War (1631-32), and a less familiar episode in British India (1803) to illustrate how and why technological, doctrinal, and organizational change had profound impact not just on the course of a battle, but the outcome of war, the development of societies, and the fate of history.
The second part addresses "The First Industrial Revolution" where Boot covers engagements as diverse in time and place as the battles of Koniggratz in the Franco-Prussian War (1866), Omdurman in modern-day Sudan between the British and the native Mahdi Army (1898), and the shocking Japanese naval victory over the imperial Russian fleet at Tsushima (1905). The period between 1850 and 1914 is generally seen as the "railroad, rifle, and telegraph" RMA and Boot generally adheres to that thesis, although he stresses that the advantages conferred by early industrial technology were by no means the sole property of Western European states, a message that applies to any technological revolution that spawns an RMA.
The final historical part covers "The Second Industrial Revolution" and addresses the dramatic and non-linear changes that occurred during the interwar period in land warfare with the advent of armored warfare, at sea with the ascendancy of aircraft carriers as the new capital ship of fleet engagements, and in the air with advent of strategic bombing. The case studies that Boot writes here on the German invasion of France (1940), the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor (1941), and the US air campaign against Tokyo (1945) have long been the staple of modern RMA theory.
These first three parts account for nearly three-quarters of the book. Each case study is crisply written and makes a compelling point. That said, Boot offers no radical reinterpretations of what an RMA is or in anyway fundamentally challenges the conventional wisdom that developed amongst RMA proponents during the 1990s. Many of the case studies he provides have been written about extensively before and make essentially the same arguments. Boot's main value added is the fluidity of his prose and how he ties five centuries of history into one coherent and convincing argument.
The final two parts of the book covers the present and future. The fourth part addresses "The Information Revolution" and, unlike the first three Revolutions, is entirely focused on one nation - the US victory in the First Gulf War (1991), the US invasion of Afghanistan (2002), and the US invasion of Iraq (2003). Here, Boot focuses on the conventional aspects of each engagement where US firepower and advanced technology played a decisive role in defeating enemy forces. He concedes that much of the advantages of information age weaponry has little relevance to the messy, day-to-day conduct of counter-insurgency, but spends little time pondering if and how the information RMA has any relevance to current low intensity operations around the world.
The final part offers an overview of "Revolutions to Come" and highlights the military potential of cyberwarfare, nanotechnology, robotics, and the military use of space. This section reads like grist for a science fiction book and should prompt analysts to reflect on how future technology may impact the conduct of military operations decades from now.
Despite the broad historical and technological sweep of Boot's case studies, he consistently stresses five points. First, despite the focus on technology in the subtitle and the role new technology plays in every chapter, Boot stresses that technology alone does not and cannot make an RMA. True discontinuous change is driven by the combination of new technology with new tactics and organization, thoughtful leadership, and perhaps most importantly, an efficient and effective centralized bureaucracy able to nurture and promote innovation. Second, Boot cautions that nations ignore RMAs at their peril. Every major city-state or nation-state that failed to embrace and support new military technology, doctrine, and methods have seen their relative position in the international balance of powers significantly diminished. Third, mastery of an RMA may convey distinct battlefield advantages, but ultimate victory or defeat hinges on wise political decisions and diplomacy. Fourth, the military advantages to a nation in excelling in an RMA are enormous, but history has demonstrated that it is very difficult to maintain a lead for long. Competent and resourceful competitors will learn and adapt, and are quite likely to take fuller advantage of more recent developments in technology and operations. Finally, Boot notes that the pace of innovation is speeding up. In the past, an RMA could take several centuries to completely unfold. Today, it is likely to happen in several decades.
In sum, military transformation and the RMA is a concept informed readers of history and current events ought to be well acquainted with. There are certainly many divergent, but credible and thoughtful opinions on the matter. "War Made New" is no doubt sympathetic to the RMA argument and clearly sees former secretary of defense Rumfeld's military transformation push as the correct and necessary path for present-day policymakers to pursue. Whether today's intelligence analysts and operators accept all, part, or none of the RMA concept is not nearly as important as more fully understanding the theory, the many historical examples that purport to support it, and how and why it may impact contemporary or future military operations. There is no better place to start than Max Boot's "War Made New."
Average customer rating:
- Calculations are only as good as your numbers
- Pants on fire?
- Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed.
- Very Interesting
- History as Science Fiction
|
History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
Anatoly Fomenko
Manufacturer: Mithec
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
 Chinese
| Ethnic & National
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Irish
| Ethnic & National
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Japanese
| Ethnic & National
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Women
| Specific Groups
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Augustine, Saint
| ( A )
| People, A-Z
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Doctors & Medicine
| Humor
| Entertainment
| Subjects
| Books
Lawyers & Criminals
| Humor
| Entertainment
| Subjects
| Books
Love, Sex & Marriage
| Humor
| Entertainment
| Subjects
| Books
Assyria, Babylonia & Sumer
| Ancient
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Early Civilization
| Ancient
| History
| Subjects
| Books
General
| Ancient
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Historiography
| Historical Study
| History
| Subjects
| Books
General
| World
| History
| Subjects
| Books
General
| Asian American
| United States
| World Literature
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Asian American
| Poetry
| United States
| World Literature
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
French
| Erotica
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Victorian
| Erotica
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Epic
| Poetry
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
German
| Poetry
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Russian
| Poetry
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Spanish
| Poetry
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Chinese
| Classics
| Literature & Fiction
| Subjects
| Books
Conspiracy Theories
| Current Events
| Nonfiction
| Subjects
| Books
War on Drugs
| Crime & Criminals
| Nonfiction
| Subjects
| Books
English (All)
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Arabic
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Armenian
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Czech
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Greek
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Hungarian
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Japanese
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Korean
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Norwegian
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Persian & Farsi
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Polish
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Portuguese
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Romanian
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Russian
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Swedish
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Turkish
| Foreign Language
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Science
| Dictionaries & Thesauruses
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Online Research
| Genealogy
| Reference
| Subjects
| Books
Native American
| Earth-Based Religions
| Religion & Spirituality
| Subjects
| Books
General
| Science
| Subjects
| Books
General
| History & Philosophy
| Science
| Subjects
| Books
History of Science
| History & Philosophy
| Science
| Subjects
| Books
Magic & Wizards
| Fantasy
| Science Fiction & Fantasy
| Subjects
| Books
Sailor Moon
| Popular Characters
| Children's Books
| Subjects
| Books
Pilates
| Exercise & Fitness
| Health, Mind & Body
| Subjects
| Books
History
| Fashion
| Arts & Photography
| Subjects
| Books
Look Inside Fiction Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Nonfiction Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Reference Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Religion & Spirituality Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Romance Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Science Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
Look Inside Science Fiction & Fantasy Books
| Trip
| Specialty Stores
| Books
All Titles
| Qualifying Textbooks - Fall 2007
| Stores
| Books
Similar Items:
-
History: Fiction or Science? Chronology 2 (Chronology)
-
History: Fiction or Science? Astronomical methods as applied to chronology. Ptolemy's Almagest. Chronology III
-
Discovering the Mysteries of Ancient America: Lost History And Legends, Unearthed And Explored
-
Before the Pharaohs: Egypt's Mysterious Prehistory
-
They Cast No Shadows: A Collection of Essays on the Illuminati, Revisionist History, and Suppressed Technologies
ASIN: 2913621058 |
Book Description
Recorded history is a finely-woven magic fabric of intricate lies about events predating the sixteenth century. There is not a single piece of evidence that can be reliably and independently traced back earlier than the eleventh century. This book details events that are substantiated by hard facts and logic, and validated by new astronomical research and statistical analysis of ancient sources.
Customer Reviews:
Calculations are only as good as your numbers.......2007-08-03
Yes, we can all agree that mainstream history is nearly 100% BS due to politics, economics, ego, problems with dating techniques, and various conspiracies. Agreed. But, I've been researching the distinct possibility that human history (in terms of civilizations) are much more ancient than we've been told, so coming across this book was very interesting to me. I wondered how Fomenko could be wrong (if at all) because he is very persuasive in his presentations. Then it dawned on me. If at previous times in prehistory, due to the various catastrophies that are well documented (comets, asteroids, planetary disruptions, plasma discharge, pole reversals, etc) the Earth was in a different position in relation to the sun, different tilt on its axis, different orbit, different rotation (in terms of velocity and DIRECTION), and the continents were in different positions, then would this not cause the ancients to see the sky (constellations) differently? In other words, is Fomenko making erronious assumptions about the physics of the Earth in pre-history, which then corrupt his data with regards to dating the relevant astrology? The last event to seriously disrupt our planet occured roughly 3500 years ago, according to other good researchers, so is it possible Fomenko has been confused by this? The vastly different physics of our planet in the not so distant past may explain this confusion, which is not to say the "mainstream" version of history is correct; on the contrary. I am not an expert in these fields, but wanted to see if this idea could spark discussion.
Pants on fire?.......2007-07-19
Will people ever read before spamming? Yes, Jesuits could not rewrite world history alone, they had help. Anyway, Dr Prof Acad A.Fomenko does not point to jesuits as the driving force of world wide history manipulation in published volumes 1,2,3;, actually he barely mentions the poor devils. Check it with 'Search inside' feature, please. China is rarely mentioned either, in fact, Dr Fomenko is completely eurocentric. Right, his theory contradicts all mainstream schools of history, because in their actual state they are all built on blatantly erroneus chronology. You don't need a mysterious cabal (conspiracy) to falsify history, the falsification is its modus operandi. It is inherent to history(ians) to falsify (distort) events, as it is inherent to humans to boast as it is inherent to power (authority) to legimize itself by referrring to glorious past made to its own order. Dr Prof Fomenko and team have identified scores of instances of such manipulation in Russian, European, etc.. history, and delivered valid statistical proof thereof. His own 'reconstruction' is completely another story. Forget c14 as a valid method of dating. W.Libby has initially discovered a brilliant method of INDEPENDENT dating. Too bad, c14 method has become a joke after a forced marrige with dendrochronology with consensual chronological scale inbuilt. Radiocarbon method can't stand blind tests, but is so very productive as a rubberstamp.
Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed. .......2007-04-09
There is no doubt that history as most know it is a sham, & institution's version of History both University & Church is fradulent & inaccurate. Everything was established with an agenda, The real "Dark Ages" are now when we have access to incredible amounts of information past authorities & more important 'common folk' didn't have but our institutions & educators are slow to evolve because of what has ignorantly & arrogantly been taught for too long. This is on many subjects not just Chronology.
For anyone to question "Why would a Mathematician have anything credible to say of History?" The answer is from Dr. Fomenko's preface in the book: "It would be worthwhile to remind the reader that in the XVI-XVII century Chronology was considered to be a subdivision of Mathematics." These volumes could possibly be some of the most important works to date & should be read by everyone with an interest in History, especially professors & educators who have a duty to the public. I have read both books & must say that 'Chronology 1' has some very eye opening & revolutionary information. Even if these volumes are part true the implications are profound & opens the doors to further investigations & questions which must be done. I speak several different lanquages & must say the logic Dr. Fomenko uses with "inflection" of words & words being read from left to right in one region & right to left in another then written backwards, the removal of vowels & get down to basics of words, or different cities & locations having the same name etc. is correct. Vowel usage has always been optional & varied, actually complicating linquistics & study. The first thing one has to understand is that words never had a fixed spelling in history like we do now, the spelling of words was mutable & regional, as well as names & titles of people were vast, varied & changed, NOTHING WAS FIXED or understood linear. Matters of Life & Death as well as financial profiteering yesterday & today were & are made with ignorant, illogical & conspiratorial views of history & reality, it's time people get closer to the Truth & society collectively grow up.
Very Interesting.......2007-03-07
It is a good proposal and I believe it will mature into something even better in the future. I think it deserves to be read.
History as Science Fiction.......2007-01-10
Anatoly Fomenko has written a very intriguing book, full of pictures, charts, and computer 'proof' of his thesis: backwards of AD900 we don't really know what happened or when. Between AD900 and AD1600 there is more certainty, but there is still a lot of fuzzy ground, and things don't get reliable until we get past the 1600's where the printing press made it very difficult for the perpetrators of this timeline manipulation to change anything that had been committed to print. The Dark Ages did not happen. Books were burned for a reason. One organization has doubled the actual length of its existence by expanding the real chronology. Read why.
I had always wondered why Christ died about AD33 and yet men waited until the 11th century to form the Knights Templar, the Cathars, etc and go after the Holy Land by force. Why the 1000 year gap? Turns out there wasn't more than a 10-12 year gap and he proves it using astronomy. This also implies that the planet is not as old as we have been told, and current Christian and other creationist scientists are already championing that idea without being aware of Fomenko's book. The two groups, creationist scientists and the Russian mathematical analysts corroborate each other. Fascinating.
Of course, all this flies in the face of what we have been told traditionally is the 'proper' chronology of western civilization, and most readers will experience 'cognitive dissonance' in reading this book. It means that our history going backwards from AD1600 becomes progressively more incorrect and unreliable until it cannot be trusted at all... in the space of 700-800 years.
Naturally, the curious, open-minded reader will want to know WHO did this, WHY, and did any of the events we think of as really ancient ever happen?
Dr. Fomenko is a respected scientist/mathematician at Moscow State University who has already answered these questions to the satisfaction of his initially skeptical colleagues. Most of them are now believers, a few still refuse to believe (the usual diehards), and of course the western press has ignored Fomenko's work -- for obvious reasons when you read the book. The ones who perpetrated this chronology ruse have a lot to answer for. They are still with us. That's why this book is a well-kept secret.
I gave the book a 4-star rating because I was unable to check out some of his claims; those I checked were as he said. But if even 1/3 of his claims are true, this punches a big hole in what we think is our history, the meaning of western civilization, our educational process (for repeating the ruse as gospel), and the trustworthiness of the organization that perpetrated this ruse, well-intentioned or not.
This book relates to current research into a Young Earth paradigm, to John Keel's discoveries about our planet, and Fr Malachi Martin's insights (in his now out-of-print books). We are indeed sheep who are manipulated and kept ignorant -- for a reason. While knowing what these men have to say may be the "booby prize" (as in: 'what can you do with this knowledge?'), it will provide interesting reading. Didn't someone say: "...and the Truth will set you free."?? For you to judge if this book contains the truth.
Book Description
Presented here together for the first time are the greatest of the ancient Chinese classics of strategic thought: The Complete Art of War. Probably the most famous work of strategy ever written, Sun Tzu's Art of War has sold millions of copies in many languages around the world. Lost for more than 2000 years and only recently recovered, the Military Methods of Sun Pin (Sun Tzu's great-grandson) is a brilliant elaboration on his ancestor's work. Only The Complete Art of War brings the wisdom of these two ancient sages into a single volume and gives the reader a unique opportunity to master the essentials of Chinese thought on strategy, organization and leadership.
The Sun family writings on strategy have proven their value through the ages, and they continue to reward careful study. By unveiling the complex, often unexpected, interrelationships of armies locked in battle, they reveal the enduring principles of success in the struggle of life itself. With a practical index to the essential principles of strategy, and Ralph Sawyer's thoughtful chapter-by-chapter commentaries, The Complete Art of War is designed to bring the reader new insights into the nature of human conflict.
Whether it is playing the game of politics or building a successful marriage, closing a deal or managing a large organization, making war or even making peace, The Complete Art of War stands as one of the ultimate guides to a deeper understanding of human affairs.
Customer Reviews:
Excellent.......2006-01-01
Bought a copy. Lost it. HAD TO buy another to replace it. An excellent book, Sawyers commentaries modernize and place in context applicable to today's managers. Clearly a lot of work went into his explanations. A must have, must read, must study. Provided me with months worth of reading material at lunch.
The teachings of the greatest military geniuses of all time........2003-11-10
Sun Tzu collected his teachings into the ancient Chinese treatise on military strategy known as "The Art of War" about twenty-five hundred years ago. Afterward his teachings were passed down through the Sun family, or a group of disciples, who edited or expounded upon the original writings until they assumed their current form. Sun Pin was the great-grandson of Sun Tzu, and he used the teachings of his brilliant ancestor to develop his Treatise "Military Methods". This wonderful translation by Ralph D. Sawyer includes both of these ancient texts.
"The Art of War" has been studied the world over by military, political and business leaders seeking to understand the nature of human conflict in all it's forms. Although thousands of years old, the teachings of Sun Tzu remain relevant even today. The maxims of Sun Tzu have been applied by students of "The Art of War" to such modern conflicts as the Korean and Vietnam Wars.
Sun Tzu's teachings range from the seemingly simple, such as "Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests cannot advance the army", to the more complex and thought provoking, such as "In order await the disordered. In tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind." The manual covers such diverse topics as training, supplies, terrain, the seasons and the use of spys, and includes detailed commentary by China's greatest military leaders through the centuries.
"The Art of War" should be read by anyone who studies military history or strategy, and is part of the curriculum of many of the world's military academies. Studying the teachings of Sun Tzu can help you to form strategies for conflict resolution or negotiating in business, political or social endeavors through a greater understanding of human interaction.
Sun Tzu and Sun Pin are timeless.......2001-06-18
The Art of War is the oldest and best military treatise this world has seen. It is amazing how Sun Tzu can talk about strategy and warfare in thirteen short chapters. His book is just the best about competition and strategy. And now we get to Sun Pin, the military strategist. I have awesome respect for him. He was betrayed and mutilated by his best friend, and still, he survived. He defeated his nemesis in a great strategic way that Sun Tzu would have mostly likely done. These two are the best and if they were in this world today, they would won every war that we fight, by their ability to adapt. If you want to get Ancient Strategy and Chinese Culture, get this book.
Excellent.......2001-06-04
The publishing of both Sun Tzu's and Sun Pin's works together makes for a valuable purchase. I've found that this translation is also quite easy to follow, and the comments assist with interpretation. These works represent awesome insights into the nature of warfare.
suffering.......2001-04-20
The text does not remotely fill the entire page to lengthen the book and suggest a happier price. Sun Pin's addition is severely garbled because the original text was damaged and it's contadictory. The most likely reason that Sun Pin's methods were forgotten and preserved only in a tomb was because (GEE GOLLY) people believed it wasn't worth reading. The commentary uses the word obvious extremely often among various other uneeded lengthening exercises.The author describes himself as an imaginative entrepenuer.(Sun Tzu flirts with perfection)
Amazon.com
Edwards traces how computers have emerged as the dominant technology as a direct result of Cold War politics and the defense research it engendered. From the first use of room-size mainframes to coordinate missile systems, Pentagon research aimed toward complete computer control, including the budget-busting and ultimately impractical Strategic Defensive Initiative. Edwards relates how the technolog--which is now so open as to be nearly anarchic--began in strictly enclosed secrecy. The military computer goal of perfect "command, control and communication" systems was understood to mean communication only within a very closed world. Edwards' thesis is that this approach influenced the very structure of our modern computers.
Book Description
The Closed World offers a radically new alternative to the canonical histories of computers and cognitive science. Integrating political, cultural, and technological history, it argues that we can make sense of computers as tools only when we simultaneously grasp their roles as metaphors and political icons.
In this extended exploration of the relations of science and engineering to the evolution of modern society, Paul Edwards argues that what people have said, thought, and experienced through computers--as reflections of the nature of their minds; as solutions to political, commercial, and military problems; as icons of rationality--is as significant as anything computers have actually accomplished. Social and cultural context has shaped the growth of computer technology as much as it has been shaped by it.
Customer Reviews:
Missing the point?.......2000-10-16
While this is an excellent and sensitive overview of the history of computer science from a critical standpoint, it may miss the essential point.
This is that while the announced intention of Cold War data systems efforts was to indeed provide a logically closed structure that would ensure national security and a narrow form of economic growth (which excluded unions from power), as Edwards himself reveals, these systems in significant ways failed to accomplish their technical goals.
The problem is that people with the traditional liberal suspicion of computers miss either this fact or fail to grasp its significance. Edwards fails to grasp its significance.
What it means is that on the ground, in the apparently highly controlled mainframe computer rooms, a highly "open" and possibly even "green" for of chaos operated as software (in one noted example) bayed at the moon when it mistook the moon for a missile. This chaos was presented as its opposite in a rhetorical trick which conceals the labor, and in some cases the very existence, of software creation.
The troubling fact, invisible to humanists outside the field, is that the upper-level administrators of these systems did not really care that they did not work, as long as the public viewed them as a closed and working system. They'd also prefer to conceal the origins of the software that controls these systems in labor and in writing.
Edwards in the main fails to link this rhetorical sleight-of-hand to C. Wright Mills' work in which the general public is systematically deceived, and a white-collar class creates the tools of its own destruction.
The Sage air defense system did not work and did not, in fact, protect the United States from attack: what protected us from attack was the decision of men to back down from macho and nuclear-armed confrontation, including Eisenhower's decision to not back Britain, France and Israel in 1956's Suez crisis and Nikita Krushchev's decision to back down in 1962 over Cuba.
The real technical illusion is not that the closed world is "better than" the green world. It is to not fully close digital worlds but to present them as closed, and to prevent the rules of their closure from public oversight, and control.
Amazon.com
Marines are different: distinct not only from ordinary U.S. citizens but from the ranks of the army, navy, and air force as well. The difference begins with boot camp at Parris Island, South Carolina, where the history and future of the United States Marine Corps intersect in the training of every new recruit. In Making the Corps, Ricks follows a platoon of young men through 11 grueling weeks of boot camp as their drill instructors indoctrinate them into the culture of the Few and the Proud. Many arrive at Parris Island undisciplined and apathetic; they leave as marines.
With the end of the cold war, the role of the American military has shifted in emphasis from making war to keeping peace. "The best way to see where the U.S. military is going is to look at the marines today," says Ricks, as the other armed forces have begun to emulate the marine model. To understand Parris Island--a central experience in the life of every marine--is to understand the ethos of the Marine Corps. Ricks examines the recent changes in the Standard Operating Procedures for Recruit Training (the bible of Parris Island), which indicate how the corps is dealing with critical social and political issues like race relations, gender equality, and sexual orientation. Making the Corps pierces the USMC's "sis-boom-bah" mythology to help outsiders understand this most esoteric and eccentric of U.S. armed forces. --Tim Hogan
Book Description
Making the Corps visits the front lines of boot camp, Parris Island, South Carolina. Here, old values are stripped away and new, Marine Corps values are forged. Acclaimed military journalist Thomas E. Ricks follows these men from their hometowns, through boot camp, and into their first year as Marines. As three fierce drill instructors fight a battle for the hearts and minds of this unforgettable group of young men, a larger picture emerges, brilliantly painted, of the growing gulf that divides the military from the rest of America.
Customer Reviews:
An accurate description of USMC boot camp.......2007-10-07
This is a book about the third recruit training battalion of the United States Marine Corps boot camp at Parris Island, SC. As a former USMC recruit in that very same battalion, reading this book brought back a lot of memories. Some of which I had worked hard to forget, apparently: I laughed out loud several times and got dewy-eyed once reading this book.
If you've never had the pleasure of going through USMC boot camp, Making the Corps is an accurate description of what it's like. Ricks follows a platoon of fledgling USMC recruits from their disorienting night time arrival at Parris Island all the way through to their lock-step graduation. He also follows up with many of these same Marines during their subsequent service in the Corps, which makes for interesting reading. Ricks also compares USMC recruit training to that of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Unsurprisingly there is no comparison.
While the Marine Corps has slightly reworded a few stock expressions since my three-month training at Parris Island long ago, nonetheless every single detail Ricks recounts rings true.
On the one hand, I was happy to hear the Marine Corps has in fact beefed up recruit training and still maintains its emphasis on high ethical standards. (No matter what happens, I've always felt the Corps has a good heart, which accounts for its success.) On the other, I was amazed at how "lenient" things have gotten since my stint there. It's clearly still horrifying and grueling and transcendent. For example, the daily torture on "the quarterdeck", frequent trips to "the pit" for marathon platoon PT sessions, and being mercilessly bitten by sand fleas while standing at stone-rigid attention. But the good old-fashioned potentially lethal abuse by the drill instructors appears to have been "somewhat" curbed - (either that, or they made sure to get Ricks out of the way before the fun started).
As the Corps stationed me in Japan for several years, I agree heartily with Ricks' observation, "The culture that the Marines most resemble, oddly enough, is that of Japan. The Marines are almost a Japanese version of America - frugal, relatively harmonious, extremely hierarchical, and almost always placing the group over the individual" [page 199]. "The Marines ... are American samurai, in the way that they think of themselves and in the way they relate to their nation" [page 201].
My only critique of Making the Corps is Ricks' belaboring how Marines tend to view civilians as ill-disciplined and selfish. By Marine standards, civilians are. But while Ricks' analysis is correct, elitism can be an occupational hazard of any serious profession (lawyers, doctors, musicians, writers).
A well-written, accurate recounting of "Where It All Begins".
Just Like the Book.......2007-06-03
Before our son left for boot camp in 2004, the whole family read this book. In his first letter home, he said, "Mom, the first 24 hours were exactly like the book said it would be." I would say that's a great endorsement. Just a little outdated because it was written before the Crucible was added, but the rest is a great primer for recruits and their families. Very highly recommended by our Marine (now a Sergeant) son.
True Dedication.......2007-05-06
This book was a no nonsense look at the Marine Corp Basic Training. It showed the mental and physical hardships of each recruit who underwent platoon 8086. It is a great book for anyone who wants to join the corp it gives a realistic view of the inside of the Marine Corp. I would recommend this book to every man, woman and child of the USA.
Good Intro to Marines .......2007-03-20
The book narrates the story of platoon 3086. At Parris Island, SC, this platoon of roughly 60 men, undergoes training for 7 weeks in order to obtain the much yearned for qualification of "Marines." Every year about 320 platoons go through Parris Island (though with future cuts in the military, the number may be reduced significantly in the next few years). The young men come from all kinds of social, ethnic and family backgrounds, though the "proletarian" type abounds. The task of the drill instructors is to strip these kids of their individuality, of the "me" mentality, and to shape them into a cohesive unit, capable of sustaining the rigors of combat. The Marines try to instil values such as sacrifice, obedience, courage. The book also talks about the drill instructors, the real backbone of the Corps. The story of the recruits is interwoven with policy considerations, comparisons with the Army, the influence of James Webb and of the new commander.
Semper Fidelis - the structure and societal views of the corps.......2007-03-11
As a former active duty Marine who is currently in the reserves, I was excited to read this book, but perhaps it was to see what was missed more than relive the same experiences. Ricks does a great job of following the platoon through MCRD training (boot camp) and also does a great overview of the corps in terms of its own rich, eccentric and often times misunderstood culture compared to today's society and the youth that come from it.
You could never take the entire 12-week process and show every detail, but this is the first book that I feel does a good job of trying. From crying in their bunks at night to realizing potential they never knew they had, we follow a group of kids that start out together as nothing more than misfits of various race, religion and background and turn into a specialized team where "I" is nothing more than a letter in the English Alphabet that you avoid at all costs.
I felt Ricks did a fine job in showing how valuable the Corps values are. The happenings within this book are over 10 years old now and the "Nintendo Generation" as given way to a new one that is now fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
I could definitely relate to the honor and prestige that being a Marine on the "street" gave many of the members. From having police treat you slightly differently if you were pulled over for a speeding ticket to seeing the "kid made of water" who cried all the time end up having a successful career in the corps.
At times again, it seems dated with some of the outlooks and things that were happening around the world in 1995, but overall this is the best book for any prospective recruit to get. It will show you that you will sweat and bleed for that uniform, but it will also present to you challenges and rewards that you will never, ever find in the civilian field. MCRD was tough, but if you ask anyone who went through it if they wished it were "easier", their reply will probably be no. Teamwork, Hard work and perseverance are wrought throughout Ricks journey with this platoon, and in the end you may have a much better understanding of what the corps is all about. As a quote said in a movie once, "Its not just all John Wayne".
Book Description
The Tiger's Way: A U.S. Private's Best Chance for Survival is not just fun reading for novice riflemen; it is mission-essential information for all ranks and job descriptions. The U.S. military lost on the ground to Eastern guerrillas 30 years ago, and its tactics haven't significantly changed. The Tiger's Way shows how to reverse this trend at a most opportune time. Without better tactical technique at the individual and small-unit level, U.S. forces cannot project minimal force. Without minimal force, they cannot win the hearts and minds of the people. Without winning the hearts and minds of the people, they cannot win a guerrilla war. The Tiger's Way reveals—for the first time—the state of the art in technique for every category of short-range combat. It does so through 100 illustrations, 1600 endnotes, and 31 battledrills.
But the book will also help U.S. forces to suffer fewer casualties in a total war. As Western weapons systems have become more lethal, Eastern armies have turned to tiny, surprise-oriented maneuver elements. Most now give their lowest ranks both conventional and unconventional abilities. Until the U.S. military follows suit, its nonrates will have less field skill, initiative, and tactical-decision-making experience than their Eastern counterparts. That means they will be at a decided disadvantage in any one-on-one encounter and die unnecessarily every time their firepower fails. It also means that their commanders will have trouble winning a "4th generation" war. The Tiger's Way will have a profound effect on how foreign war and homeland security are conducted in the future.
Customer Reviews:
A fantastic implementation of Tokakure Ryu for the modern day.......2007-08-12
I have not finished this book, you should know. However, you should also know that this book made enough of an impression of me that I am writing a review before I have finished in violation of my own rules. I am an author myself and I value these reviews greatly - I wouldn't write if I didn't mean what I say.
This is a great book. In short, it takes the premises - as best we know - of Togakure ryu Ninjutsu and applies them to contemporary military arts. Squad mechanics - the focus of every lieutenant who has ever served - are the focus of Poole's tactical revision of the current philosophy of combat in the US military.
I am not a military man, but I am surrounded by them. I am a ninja, studying Bansenshukai Ninjutsu. We also have some Togakure ryu curriculum, and Poole hits hard on the right stuff. Early in the book he points out that the close combat ryuha are not his focus. Instead, he is looking at the understudied arts of Zanson, Intonjutsu, Shinobi Iri and Hensojutsu. This is a book about how to not fight if you don't have to.
Bujinkan Budo Taijutsu practitioners will argue that this `is not ninjutsu' because it isn't what Hatsumi teaches (in public anyway) but they would be wrong. The taijutsu that BBT teaches is just a small part of what the ninja represents, and this book covers practically everything else. Admittedly, the second chapter references books by Haha Lung and Ashida Kim, who are widely discredited. However, even quacks can have good ideas and Poole expertly extracts the choice tidbits. You will not be displeased.
good over view.......2007-05-13
This book is not a guide for people trying to get a grip on what is happening to our forces in Iraq. It is a good basic soldiers book that is made from many different types of 'field manuals', compiled and catagorized. Nothing new, but a good source for a yound Infantry NCO or Commissioned Officer who wants to keep his 'mind in the game'. Much of the information covers Infantry subjects, some of which is of no use in Iraq. However, we are a world-wide force and need to keep looking over our shoulder at the next conflict. The author speaks with some authority and it shows. As a graduate of the Infantry School at Ft. Benning (I wont say when) this book is a good refresher and contains some new information. If you go on patrol, regardless of you MOS or job title, this is a book you cna use.
Best book of it's kind........2006-11-29
John Poole has written a fantastic treatise on what will be needed to fight and win wars in the years to come. Though it makes for dry reading at times, this book is absolutely fascinating.It not only discusses enemy tactics, it recommends methods on how to develop ninjustsu-like tactics on your own. Spectacular book. A must-read for anyone in, or planning to join, the military. Top-shelf material!
An excellent book for warfighters.......2006-11-28
Readers of this book will look at the Army and Marines different. While the IG and other groups says they care about soldiers the readers of this book will actually care more about the thing that matters: YOUR SOLDIERS LIVES.
Here are two things a possible buyer of this book should consider. In WWII it was thought that the Japanese soldier was born in the jungle. Nothing could be further from the truth. Japan has as much Jungle as Oklahoma. What made the difference between the Japanese and American soldier was training. Their soldiers were taught stealth, hand-to-hand fighting, and all their other combat skills. Little noted in WWII was Japan won land battles against much larger American and British Armies in 1942. Only massive allied firepower turned the tide. Second, in Korea the UN forces often used the machinegun to excess. After a night of fighting the only result would be a few dead communist soldiers. Turkish soldiers, using eastern combat methods, had dozens of dead communists in front of their positions. All were dead by knife wounds.
If this book was followed the results would be nothing but positive things for the USA. First, we would have a better trained Army and Marines that would be able to handle the stress of combat better. We would have less dead men. Second, the Army and Marines could be smaller. We would have more warfighters but less of a logistics tail. Third, we would have less technological dependence. That means a savings of money.
I admire this book. John Poole goes through the combat tables and says what this reader long suspected; we often lose more men in combat with eastern armies. The only real reason we beat German forces in WWII is they wanted to be beat by us, the Soviets were their nightmare. Iraq could have had an eastern army but it was so over controlled and regulated by 2003 that nearly any good army could have taken them.
John Poole says that our infared night vision gear is of limited use. Tanks are not a great asset to any army. Good landmines and RPGs can take out any tank. The weird thing is the US Marines nearly issued the vast store of captured RPGs from Grenada to the Marines. The DoD killed this idea. The reason is American makes superior equipment and all that rubbish...
I really liked this book. This book should be required reading for any member on the House or Senate Armed Service committees. The trouble is our modern politicians are too busy trying to make the mothers of soldiers happy with training and not concentrating on the training of the soldiers to keep them from getting killed and accomplishing the mission.
This is the second book I've read from Poole in a week. It has been sent to my old ROTC school. Perhaps a future lieutenant can take wisdom from the pages of this book.
This book should be the vangard of the change needed in our Army and Marines. We need better training. We need soldiers who can take charge of the tactical situation. We need to get rid of the top-down structure that plagues the Army and Marines in tactical situations.
I wish some good soldiers, marines, and politicians could read this book and put it into use.
Until this book is followed our Army and Marines are little better than Activated Militia.
The Tactical Sphere.......2006-11-17
In our time, we are privy to scores of books, interviews, and op eds dedicated to the strategic sphere of military conduct. Most analysts, those types that enjoy their time on CNN, seek to explain American failures in Iraq and Afghanistan in purely general terms: lack of troops, lack of allies, lack of materials, lack of goals. And while these issues certainly deserve their proper analysis, their role in military failures are grossly exaggerated.
The truth, as the fella said, is in the details. John Poole's The Tiger's Way is concerned with just such details. Poole knows well the tactical sphere: that area where the average U.S. Army infantry private spends his time. He knows and understands the techniques used by "eastern" opponents against Western forces, and he is better at illuminating our vulnerabilities to those techniques than any author in the last 50 years. If this were simply a book on those techniques and exploits, it would be quite a triumph. But there's more.
This book focuses on why our techniques are failing, as well as how they might be tailored to fit in our current environment. Folks like Rumsfeld can talk "light, mobile, and fast forces" all they want, but without applying the dispersion techniques outlined by Poole, maneuver warfare will remain stagnant.
If you are a citizen seeking to better understand what our forces are doing on the ground, and how they might do it better, you should buy this book. If you're a soldier on the ground, you should buy two: one for yourself and one for your unit.
Book Description
On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.
Download Description
Two motives lead men to War: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of War, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilised nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, &c., and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other. Please Note: This book is easy to read in true text, not scanned images that can sometimes be difficult to decipher. The Microsoft eBook has a contents page linked to the chapter headings for easy navigation. The Adobe eBook has bookmarks at chapter headings and is printable up to two full copies per year. Both versions are text searchable.
Customer Reviews:
The Rapoport introduction ruined it for me.......2007-02-23
There is a reason that this is a classic. If I'm a teacher at a war college like
West Point , I can assign chapters
and test the students on the understanding of the material.
It is more in the western form of learning than Sun Tzu's classic.
Where does it fail?
Even at this time the "staff" type running of war
that defeated Napoleon was being used by joint European powers.
The running of a war has come to be viewed as like that of an effective business.
You even need a legal staff to deal with civilian complaints.
The modern mathematical approaches of games theory ( Rapoport ) for tactics and
systems theory ( Asimov ) for long range strategy are what spoil this book for me.
War as an object of nationalistic policy has been destroyed by science in our time.
The terrorists have tried to breath new life into the ancient war of faith
by killing their own people at a greater rate than they do the enemy.
Logistically that approach is destined to failure:
you just run out of soldiers fool enough to die for their god.
Carl von Clausewitz was sold on "genius" as the answer to war problems.
I think accounting ability may be as important.
An unwieldy translation.......2006-11-20
In a nutshell: Don't waste your money on this version.
The original version of this translation dates to just after the turn of the century, but the introduction and further editing by Anatol Rapaport (a biologist and a musician, not a political scientist or historian), make this a clumsy read at best and downright misleading at worst.
Rapaport, for being an editor of Clausewitz, was not a believer in the trinitarian system (primordial violence, non-rational actions, and rationality)- probably not a good choice for a work which owes as much as it does to the first and second Trinities (army, people, and government).
If this is the only one you can get, then live with it. The first chance you get, get the much clearer, much more straightforward Paret/Howard translation, which is the one that's actually taught at most service schools as well as in universities in their courses that use it.
A few translation suggestions.......2006-09-27
A few years ago, I translated the crucial first chapter of On War's first book from German into Portuguese. The results were then discussed vis-à-vis the Paret/Howard English version in our post-graduate program. Back then, I wrote a few additional comments in English about nuances of the Paret/Howard text [otherwise, very good], which - so I believed - seemed to dilute the depth of Clausewitz' exposition at key spots. These brief comments follow below, as I still believe they can be of some interest, particularly to those who meditate the relation between war and politics, and as they touch the very heart of Clausewitz unsurpassed insight into the nature of bellic conflict.
The first sentence is the Paret/Howard quotation; the second is the original German; and the third is how I would suggest it in English.
Title 26
* All Wars Can Be Considered Acts of Policy
** Sie koennen alle als politische Handlungen betrachtet werden
*** They [the wars of the previous paragraph] can all be approached as political actions.
§ 2
* If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but - as it conventionally is - as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more `political' than the first.
** denn betrachtet man die Politik wie die Intelligenz des personifizierten Staates, so muss unter allen Konstellationen, die ihr Kalkuel aufzufassen hat, doch auch diejenige begriffen sein koennen, wo die Natur aller Verhaeltnisse einen Krieg der ersten Art bedingt. Nur insofern man unter Politik nicht eine allgemeine Einsicht, sondern der `konventionellen' Begriff einer der Gewalt abgewendeten, behutsamen, verschlagenen, auch unredlichen Klugheit versteht, koennte die letzte Art des Krieges ihr mehr angehoeren als die erstere.
*** for if one approaches politics as the intelligence of the personified state, so it ought to be possible, among all constellations that its [the personified state's] calculus must consider, to understand those [constellations] in which the nature of all relationships also determines a war of the first kind. Only if one understands politics in the conventional [depreciative italics] view - as a violence-averse, cautious, devious, and even dishonest cunning - and not as a generic discernment; only then could the last kind of war belong more to politics than the first.
§ 3
*First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently.
** Wir sehen erstens: dass wir uns den Krieg unter allen Umstaende als kein selbstaendiges Ding, sondern als ein politisches Instrument zu denken haben; und nur mit dieser Vorstellungsart ist es moeglich, nicht mit den saemtlichen Kriegsgeschichte in Widerspruch zu geraten. Sie allein schliesst das grosse Buch zu verstaendiger Einsicht auf.
*** First, therefore, we see that we ought always to think of war as a political instrument, and by no means as an autonomous thing. And only with this kind of conception we will not contradict the entire history of war. It [this kind of conception] alone [my italics] opens the great book of proper understanding.
101 § 1
* ... a paradoxical trinity...
** ... eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit...
*** ... an amazing trinity...
§2
* The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.
** Die erste dieser drei Seiten ist mehr dem Volke, die zweite mehr dem Feldherrn und seinem Heer, die dritte mehr der Regierung zugewendet.
*** The first of these three dimensions is directed more to the people; the second, more to the commander and his army; the third, more to the government.
§3
* These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.
** Diese drei Tendenzen, die als ebenso viele verschiedene Gesetzgebungen erscheinen, sind tief in der Natur des Gegenstandes gegruendet und zugleich von veraendlicher Groesse.
*** These three tendencies, which appear just like many different codes of law, have their foundation laid deep in the nature of the object and, at the same time, may acquire variable magnitudes.
My final suggestion is that the name of Clausewitz' book in English should be "Of War", instead of "On War". This is not only a picky nuance: there is a wide and deep gulf between "Of" (`Von', `De') and "On" (`Über', `Super'), a gulf which has been overlooked even by the best philosophers - but not by Clausewitz in his title. Everyday language makes us used to mistakes such as "speak on something", "reflect on something", and truly, these things do not happen. We speak something, meditate/mediate a thought. Clausewitz speaks of war, and certainly not ON war; Jomini speaks on war: he is actually sitting ontop of it, and, really, knows too little to speak OF it.
Would-Be-Commanders Should Buy Other Books.......2006-09-18
If you are going into politics this book is for you. It is very abstract and rambles on for thousands of words in order to get to a single point.
If you are like me I read it, hoping to find great ideas about strategy, and how to best understand ways for armies to maneuver and defeat an enemy. Clauswitz, however, really did not fulfill my needs.
After reading other books titled "The Art of War" there are two that are better than Clauswitz, regarding operational strategy. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini's "The Art of War," and Sun Tzu's "The Art of War." These go straight to the point. Jomini's was written in the same era of Clauswitz. Like Clauswitz it discusses the principles and lessons of the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Unlike Clauswitz, Jomini discusses how commanders can best use specific strategies in battles, like flank attacks, the oblique order, convex order, etc.--Fun Stuff!
Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" is like reading Psalms (only with military themes)--it is most concise; with fewer words each passage inspires one's mind with creativity in understanding important principles of strategy (there was not much space anyway on bamboo for ancient Chinese philosophers to write long treatises, like that of Clauswitz!)
Much of the philosophies of Clauswitz are viable, but there is a foolish one that I must give criticism to. It is well known in military studies that the generals of World War I studied this book extensively. In "On War," Chapter XI, the author states, "Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then it is a ground for paying more respect for war...." World War I commanders must have really taken this to heart, because the Western Front must have been the most wasteful and unproductive meat grinder in the history of warfare. For example, Falkenhayn wanted to bleed the French white in the Battle of Verdun. He got his wish--a total of a million people died. What positive result did it get anyone? NOTHING! (I guess you can say there WAS more respect for the horrors of war, but what good did that do for millions of families which lost loved ones!) This Clauswitzian theme for bloodshed proved moot when in World War II armies followed a different theme: fight with as little casualties as possible.
Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!.......2006-09-09
-Everyone expressing a erudite opinion about Clausewitz or "ON WAR" has completely missed the point here.
-The question is NOT whether Clausewitz or "On War" is an essential read for everyone interested in military hsitory or military affairs. THAT is a moot piont to the Nth Degree.
-The REAL question IS - WHY would you pay $595.oo for a book that has the same identical information as another book for $30.oo ?!?!?!?
-That is the ONLY question regarding THIS particular version of "ON WAR".
-Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!
Books:
- The Blind Side: Evolution of a Game
- The Cancer Treatment Revolution: How Smart Drugs and Other New Terapies are Renewing Our Hope and Changing the Face of Medicine
- The China Study: The Most Comprehensive Study of Nutrition Ever Conducted and the Startling Implications for Diet, Weight Loss and Long-term Health
- The Complete Pinball Book: Collecting the Game and Its History (Schiffer Book for Collectors) (Schiffer Book for Collectors)
- The Epic of Gilgamesh: An English Verison with an Introduction (Penguin Classics)
- The Explorations of Captain James Cook in the Pacific
- The Gardens of Roberto Burle Marx
- The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million
- The Naval War of 1812 (Modern Library War)
- The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians (20 Volume Set
Books Index
Books Home
Recommended Books
- Pseudoscience and the Paranormal
- From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice, Commemorative Edition
- The Golden Age of Ironwork
- What's Wrong With Microphysicalism
- Batman: The Animated Series Guide
- First Aid for the USMLE Step 1: 2007
- Bulldog Champions, 1996-2002
- The New Yorker Book of Lawyer Cartoons
- Thomas Hacker and Associates: Architecture As Art
- Lady GI: A Woman's War in the South Pacific: The Memoir of Irene Brion
The Prince (Bantam Classics)
The Art of War & The Prince by Machiavelli
The 48 Laws of Power
Sun Tzu: The Art of War for Managers; 50 Strategic Rules
Book of Five Rings: The Classic Guide to Strategy
