Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?

Customer Reviews:

As Above..........2006-12-25

Not much to say. Please see the review by Tunde Santa and specifically read and read again (if needed) sentence #1.

For those who don't want to pay $200.......2006-10-01

A new Suvarov book in English covering the same general topic is coming out soon at a paltry $30 or less - "The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II".

Here is the publisher's blurb:

Using new documents and reevaluating existing material, The Chief Culprit analyzes Joseph Stalin's strategic design to conquer Europe and his support for Germany, which helped bring Hitler to power and sustained him. Stalin's strategy leading up to World War II grew from Vladimir Lenin's belief that if World War I did not ignite the worldwide Communist revolution, then a second world war would be needed to achieve it. Stalin saw Germany as the power that would fight and weaken capitalist countries so Soviet armies could sweep across the European continent to the Atlantic.
Viktor Suvorov reveals how Stalin conspired with German leaders to bypass the Versailles Treaty, which forbade German rearmament. Secretly, the Soviet Union trained German engineers and officers as well as provided bases and factories for war. In 1939, the nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany allowed Hitler to proceed with his plans to invade Poland, fomenting war in Europe. Stalin emerges as a diabolical genius consumed by visions of a worldwide Communist revolution at any cost, the leader who wooed Hitler and Germany in his own effort to conquer the world.

The author debunks the myth that the Soviet Union was a victim of Germany's aggression. Instead, he insists that Stalin neither feared Hitler nor mistakenly trusted him. Suvorov argues that after Germany occupied Poland, defeated France, and started to prepare for an invasion of Great Britain, Hitler's intelligence services detected the Soviet Union's preparations for a major war against Germany. In 1940, Germany drafted a preemptive war plan, which it launched in June 1941, the invasion of the USSR.

Enjoy!

finally the truth has been published.......2006-02-27

The facts in this book are NO surprise for us in East Europe - we always knew about it - only the stupid left wing influenced useful idiots in the west, believed that " uncle Joe " is a wonderful person,and communism is " progress " and to this very day the very same " useful idiots " in the west
still hold their beliefs that communism is great, and only
the nazis are evil....good old double standard, hipocracy.
When comparing the number of people killed by these two systems
even an idiot should note - the communists have murdered over
240 million men,women,children, young and old alike - merely to steal ALL their properties * ( in Hungary for example the communist party members have murdered people for their houses, and as soon as the owners were removed - shot,hanged,beaten to death - these " left " wing communists have moved into the houses of their murdered victims... The so called nazis are innocent
little lambs in comparison to the crimes of the communists.
If we in east Europe would rate the two systems,on how terrible
they are - on a rate of 1 to 10, we would rate the communists
a 100 ! off the scale of evil, while the nazis might get
a mere 1 on this scale. ( after all - 240 million butchered and murdered victims compared against a documented loss of prisoners of 36,000 people in Auscwitz for example seems like a joke )
If evil could be measured in height - the communist party should
tower 200 miles high in the sky,the nazis should have a one floor
apartment building. It is worth to note, Pres.Tony Blair two weeks ago came to Hungary to participate in the reelection campaign of the local communist party....for this the communists paid him 40,000 euros....Now in East Europe we know Tony Blair
is a cheap man and a cheap politician...selling himself to the communists for a mere 40,000 euro cash payment...We are deeply
dissappointed in the west, and we are happy that a RUSSIAN author
finally published the facts about the EVILS of communism.
To hell with the double standard and hypocrasy of the lying westerners. I wish the communists should " get " them all
at the end...then they can experience the " progressive "
system of communism in person of all these " useful " idiots in
the west. Hurrah for the author for publishing the truth -

The History Book of the 20th Century.......2005-11-20

It is safe to assume that if you have not read Viktor Suvorov's Icebreaker (or, at least, are not familiar with his ideas), you don't understand the last 85 years of the world history.

Viktor Suvorov was trained as a military intelligence officer at the time when soviet military intelligence was the best in the world (probably still is). In the late seventies Suvorov defected to England, where he wrote several books about soviet army and intelligence. By all accounts (friends and enemies alike), Viktor Suvorov possesses encyclopedic knowledge about military theory and history, particularly the history of World War II. His knowledge and analytical ability are astounding.

Published first in the eighties, Icebreaker was the first in Suvorov's series of historical books. By the year 2000, it was translated into 27 languages and published more than 100 times. Icebreaker is a book about communist preparation and execution (however poorly, but not for the lack of trying) of the biggest crime in the history of mankind, World War II. Because of that, in addition to its historical value of showing communist conspiracy as a true cause of WWII, Icebreaker is probably the best, most convincing anti-communist book ever written. Suvorov neither uncovers any secrets, nor does he simply catalogue the crimes. He analyzes communists' own words and innumerable well-known facts to show communism as the darkest, most evil episode in the human history.

Before you start reading this book, however, keep in mind several important things.
First, this relatively small book is an overview of many very complex political, historical, and military events. The most important of the ideas had been expanded by the author in his later books (see below). The sheer number of dogmas and controversies Suvorov takes head on is mind-boggling, and this is why the author must occasionally abbreviate his arguments. As a result, the book may seem cursory to unprepared readers.
Second, Icebreaker was written in Russian and intended for Eastern European readership. In order to be immediately understood, the book does assume certain cultural background, i.e., familiarity with the history and cannibalistic rituals of communist regimes. I am not implying that western readers will not understand the book, to the contrary, I think that an interested western reader will benefit enormously from reading this book.
Third, Icebreaker, when it became available, was an instant tremendous success in the former USSR and all Eastern Block countries. In Eastern Europe Icebreaker became de facto 20th century European history textbook and the basis of common popular understanding of the events leading to WWII and its immediate aftermath. It would be foolish to disregard the opinion of people who actually lived through the events.

Some reviewers accuse Victor Suvorov of being a "Hitler apologist." This preposterous statement was fabricated by the soviet special services for western use. In Russia KGB mostly emphasized Suvorov's disloyalty to the regime and, therefore, his general untrustworthiness and never mentioned "his love of Nazis" as a critical argument. They knew it would never fly in Russia because Russian readers never sensed even a whiff of sympathy toward Nazis in the book. (Majority of people, by the way, doesn't realize how much perception of German fascists in the United States and England differs from that in Europe and Russia). I personally don't see how Suvorov's argument that Stalin killed more people than Hitler (and intended to kill a lot more) makes Hitler a hero. Generations of western intellectuals made careers out of spreading KGB lies, but, unless, of course, you hope to secure a tenured position, there is no need for you to repeat this nonsense. It is shameful. Please, don't do it.

Some reviewers seem to be hung up on BT controversy and such. Icebreaker is full of technical information, and some details may be proven inaccurate by further research. This "bait and switch" trick is used to make people judge the whole book by comparing width of tank treads. Please remember that this book is not about military technology, although it is described in great detail and used often to prove author's position.

There are at least five other successful history books written by Viktor Suvorov where he greatly expands and clarifies some of the main themes of Icebreaker:
1. Day "M": When did WWII begin? (a detailed account of Soviet preparations for the war),
2. The Cleansing (a very convincing explanation for the events known as "senseless decimation of Red Army officer corps before the war"),
3. The Suicide (an interesting exploration of Hitler as military leader and the myth of German readiness for the war in the East),
4. The Last Republic (in depth analysis of the geopolitical plans and intentions of the Soviets between the World Wars),
5. The Shadow of Victory (documents Marshall Zhukov as a monstrous war criminal that he really was).
As of now, I have not been able to find any indication of these books published in English.

Currently there is only one used copy of Icebreaker available for $450, and none of Suvorov's other history books are available in English translation. The content of Icebreaker alone is not sufficient to explain this virtual prohibition of the book, which is a very unusual and extraordinary measure for a modern western society. There is no question that Icebreaker is a controversial book: the whole libraries of western historical analysis of WWII are shown as garbage. Still, this is not enough. The explanation may be that the book gives detailed description of the process used by the professionals to analyze political and historical events using widely available, open-source information: Icebreaker is written as an intelligence report and presents a clear application of the intelligence analytical process. This book may teach you how to think. Now, that is dangerous. Combine it with the powerful anti-communist thrust of this book, and... Oh, well, some things cannot be permitted.

Accessibility?.......2005-11-17

I am giving this book 5 stars not because I read it but because those whose opinions I value and trust have read it and are praising it. However, my biggest gripe is that if this is the important book of the 20th Century, why the hefty pricetag? A book that is being touted as the most important book of the 20th Century should be accessible to all - rich and poor and everyone in between. Otherwise, how does the publisher and author expect this book to educate the masses? I know I don't have $450 to spend on a book, I only have the means to pay for such things as dental work, medical expenses, food and rent, you know, the luxuries of life in America. The very fact that this book is so expensive only serves to discredit it, but I still won't lessen the stars I am giving it because what's in it might be worth learning, if only I were rich!

The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (2nd Edition)

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Lucid Analysis
Excellent
Stellar

The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (2nd Edition)
P.M.H. Bell
Manufacturer: Longman
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0582304709

Customer Reviews:

Lucid Analysis.......2005-04-08

This concise and very well written book is thoughtful distillation of the enormous literature related to the onset of WWII in Europe. The simple question, who started WWII, has a simple answer. It was Adolf Hitler. The simple answer obscures a whole series of considerably more difficult questions. How did a marginal figure and 4th-rate ideologue like Hitler come to rule the most powerful state in Europe? Why wasn't there more initial resistance to Hitler? What was the role of the Great Depression? To what extent did the post-WWI settlement lead to WWII? What was the role of the Soviet Union and Stalin? Many other questions arise. Bell deals with many of these issues in a series of well crafted chapters. The book opens by framing the issues, including a short but worthwhile discussion of historiographic issues, follows by discussing underlying factors such as ideology, economics, the role of the depression, the roles of the military postures adopted by the major actors, and then concludes with a nice narrative of the outbreak of war. Bell very intelligently extends his narrative beyond 1939 to the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, pointing out that it is these later events that allow assessment of the role of key ideological factors in the coming of WWII. This book is worth reading just for the chapters dealing with the consequences of the Great Depression. A theme throughout the book is the limited options possessed by the leaders of France and Britain. Given their internal political situations, some form of appeasement was inevitable, though consistently unpalatable. I have a couple of minor complaints. I don't think Bell deals with the uncertain nature of politics in the Weimar Republic. Hitler's accession to power was not inevitable. While some form of reactionary German government bent on reversing the settlement of WWI was probably inevitable, it could have been one dominated by more traditional conservatives. This type of leadership would have been amenable to the type of accomodation and diplomacy attempted by Chamberlain and the French leadership. It is clear also, in retrospect, that few in Europe really understood the depth of the Nazi racial preoccupations and their bizarre model of history, a tragic though understandable mistake.

Excellent.......2000-10-22

Bell does a fine job of looking at just what brought about the Second World War. He explains its connections to the Great War, by first discussing the idea of a Thirty Years War, and by then examining how the first war and its results brought about the second. Bell also provides readers with the roles and views of the various ideologies and the many desires for and against war, and also the many strategies involved with each of the main players. An excellent book for anyone wishing to better understand the differing forces and actions which brought about this war.

Stellar.......2000-03-15

This is a great book everyone should read, I salute it.

The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Origins of Modern Wars)

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First rate history for the non-specialist.

The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (Origins of Modern Wars)
Akira Iriye
Manufacturer: Longman
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ASIN: 0582493498

Book Description

Professor Iriye analyses the origins of the 1941 conflict against the background of international relations in the preceding decade in order to answer the key question: Why did Japan decide to go to war against so formidable a combination of powers?

Customer Reviews:

First rate history for the non-specialist........2005-03-17

Akira Iriye is Charles Warren Professor of American History at Harvard University, and is a noted historian of international institutions. This 1987 book is a well organized and well edited introduction to a complicated subject, the origins of what the Japanese call The Pacific War, and which we know as WWII in Asia and the Pacific.

The book's organization is straightforwardly chronological. His account of these years is less dramatic but easier to follow than that of John Toland in "The Rising Sun", even though Toland is a better writer than Iriye. Iriye has the advantage of having that period as his primary subject, whereas Toland was laying the groundwork for a dramatic account of the war itself. And Iriye takes pains to explain his conclusions in several different ways, a habit no doubt learned from teaching college undergraduate students, who are the primary target audience of this book.

Iriye clearly describes the step by step process by which Japan entrapped itself in a net from which it was in the end only able to escape by engaging in a suicidal war. He shows how extremely naive Japanese political and military leaders were to think that they could overturn the existing order in Asia without serious consequences. Ironically, most of them - Konoye, Tojo, Yamamoto, and others - could see the trap they were heading into, yet believed that there was no way out that would not be a disaster for Japan, and that war was the only way to preserve Japanese honor. Contrary to some impressions, Japanese at the highest levels of leadership knew very well that Japan was no match for the United States militarily. But things had deteriorated to the point that even the Atlantic Charter, a precursor of The United Nations, was viewed by the Japanese leadership simply as a declaration of war on Japan by the Anglo-American powers.

Iriye leaves little doubt that once Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Hitler and Mussolini in 1938, FDR and his cabinet - Hull, Stimson, Knox, Acheson - saw war with Japan as inevitable. Their only goal was to try to gain time in order to avoid having to fight in both Europe and Asia at the same time. In the event, of course, America did both. A major irony of Japan's joining the Axis powers is that it provided none of the benefits Japan had hoped to gain from the alliance, while at the same time it ended all possibility of a rapprochement with Britain and the US. Japan had literally backed out onto a tree limb and then proceeded to saw it off.

Iriye delineates the development of China's influence on American policy in the Far East. By the late 1930's, China was clearly identified in the eyes of the American public as the victim of unjustified Japanese aggression. This was indeed an accurate assessment of the situation, but the strength and emotion with which it was held by the American public gave the Roosevelt administration very little room to maneuver with Japan, even had it been inclined to do so. Any accomodation in China that would have left Japan a way toward "honorable" retreat would have been seen by the American public, no less than Chiang Kai-Shek, as a complete betrayal of China. This was the trap Japan had entered when the Japanese government allowed the Japanese Army to turn the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge into an excuse to invade China proper, from which there was no escape other than through total war with America.

Japanese public opinion also played a role in polarizing events. Tojo even started contingency planning for riots should Japan decide to bow to American will and withdraw from China. And the fear of assassination by nationalistic fanatics in the Japanese Army was an ever-present factor in the decision making of the Japanese political leadership.

Did FDR cook up a conspiracy to lure the Japanese into attacking Pearl Harbor? Iriye thinks not, and gives pretty good reasons for his opinion, the most convincing one being that by the summer of 1941 the American political and military leadership knew from the broken Japanese diplomatic code that war with Japan was inevitable. No conspiracy was needed to precipitate war - it was just a matter of time before the Japanese would attack.

In a nutshell, according to Iriye's analysis, Japan had three alternatives open to it by 1939: 1. Withdraw from China and suffer the consequences: Loss of prestige, power, resources, and military position; 2. Follow a policy of "perseverance and patience", passively waiting for the unlikely chance that events would eventually turn in a direction more to Japan's advantage; 3. Take the offensive immediately, while Japan still had sufficient oil reserves to support aggressive naval operations, and before the ABCD powers (America, Britain, China, and the Dutch) could further prepare themselves. In the end, option 3 seemed the most preferable of three bad choices.

Iriye ends on an optimistic note, saying that the period from 1931-45 was an aberration in the history of Japanese-American relations. One certainly hopes that he is right.

The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm

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A unique work with a message for us in today's world
"We were to learn what total war means"
"History will be kind to me for I intend to write it."
The Tragedy
Drift to disaster

The Second World War, Volume 1: The Gathering Storm
Winston S. Churchill
Manufacturer: Mariner Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 039541055X

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Winston Churchill was not only a statesman and leader of historic proportions, he also possessed substantial literary talents. These two factors combine to make The Gathering Storm a unique work. The first volume of Churchill's memoirs, this selection is broken into two parts. The first, "From War to War," consists of Churchill's critical observations on the settlement of World War I and its place in the causes of the Second World War. The second volume contains letters and memoranda from the British government--of which Churchill was part--as the country plunged unprepared into war. This stands as the best of history: written as it was made, by the man who made it.

Book Description

The step-by-step decline into war, with Churchill becoming prime minister as "the tocsin was about to sound."

Download Description

The first volume of Churchill's Noble-Prize winning six-part chronicle of World War II. THE GATHERING STORM depicts the rise of Hitler and the indifference of the leaders of the European democracies to the clouds of the gathering storm. Churchill incorporate contemporary documentation and his own reminiscence in this opening memoir.

Customer Reviews:

A unique work with a message for us in today's world.......2006-12-20

This is the first volume of Churchill's Noble Prize winning six part chronicle of World War II. The Gathering Storm depicts the rise of Hitler and the indifference of the leaders of the European democracies to the clouds of the gathering storm. Churchill incorporates contemporary documentation and his own reminiscence in this opening memoir. Churchill was a great statesman with great literary ability - a winning combination. The Gathering Storm a unique work and has a message for us in today's world.

Read and reviewed by Jimmie A. Kepler

"We were to learn what total war means".......2006-10-05

Churchill gathered his researchers and secretaries and wrote an account of the events of World War II. These memoirs would span a work of six volumes, and added with his other literary achievements win for him the Noble Prize in Literature. The 'Gathering Storm', Volume I, starts with the end of World War I..the war to end all wars..and concludes on May 10,1940 with Germany's invasion of the Low Countries(Holland/Belgium) and France. May 10 was also the day that Neville Chamberlain resigned as Prime Minister and Churchill was asked, by the King, to form a new Government...in effect becoming the new head of Government or Prime Minister.

This is a work that is well worth reading. The contents and wisdom are just as relevant today as then. Churchill was relentless in his opinions, good and not-so-good, and did all in his power to try and stem the coming war. He had the advantage of being in the early government as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915. Driven into the wilderness years by forcing the Darnanelles,..a plan he still maintained would have worked if not for the 'timid observationists'..he would still keep active in governmental affairs and had enough connections to keep up-to-date with current events. Chamberlain, in 1939, would put him back into the Admiralty as First Lord..ironically going full circle back to his old office. Now with victory and hindsight, he was in the enviable position to see and write about the events that took place, and what could have happened if certain plans had or hadn't been implemented.

Churchill states that all the trials he went through prepared him for the great task of war. Had he remained in office, the position of Prime Minister would never have come his way. He would have been swept out of office with the failed administration. Those 'invisible wings' of fate were watching out for him. He was freed from party antagonisms and with six years of warning, about the oncoming events, no one could reproach him. What he had warned about was now real and the future was not certain. Churchill felt he knew a great deal about it all and was sure he could not fail. As Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, he now had the power to direct the whole scene. That was one of the areas I felt he craved more than any. The power to move the action forward on the offensive instead of always on the defensive.

Churchill wrote of the events that were transpiring with Germany's disregard for the Treaty of Versailles, Locarno and the failure at Munich. The rise of Hilter and his ascension to Chancellor, the absorption of Austria, the neutralization of Czechoslovakia, and the fall of Poland. The timidity of England and France to respond to the treaties and strike a blow for freedom in retaliation. He doesn't hold back his opinions and what he felt should have been done. As First Lord of the Admiralty he pushed for taking the port at Narvik Norway and found this plan changed from a sea strike to a failed pincer attack. He watched with frustration the failed, yet fortunate, attempt to tangle and embed the war on the Norwegian front. It was fortunate because shortly the war was to break full upon the Western Front and all was needed there. Norway ended the twilight or false war and moved the events forward into an all out compaign of total war.

The face and technology of war has changed over these many years. I doubt we'll ever see countries signing peace documents on battleships again. Unfortunately the reality is that war is still very much alive and with us. These facts alone make these volumes important reading. Possibly the most important aspect is that we can learn from a great man's experiences and hopefully not repeat the past. Well worth adding to the library.

"History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.".......2006-09-04

And he did. This compulisively readable account of Europe between the wars and from 09/39 to 05/40 covers European diplomatic history, shifts in British politics, Britian's unwillingness to prepare for war, Hitler's rise to power and German re-armament. It ends with the invasion of France/the Low Countries and Chuchill's ascent to Prime Minister of a National Government. For all it's readablity and heavy use of documentation and primary sources, this is still a memior and sometimes self-serving.

The Tragedy.......2006-07-22

In his preface Churchill states that one day president Roosevelt asked him for suggestions as to what the war should be called. He replied at once " the Unnecessary War "

While hindsight is always 20-20, it is impossible to read this brilliant account without coming to the conclusion that Churchill was giving way to understatement. The absurd idiocies of the governments of the victorious Allies of The Great War from 1918 to 1939 were so blatantly appalling as to be beyond belief.

To name just one, there was strong pressure in the British Parliament and Press to have France, in the interest of fair play (?) reduce its army by half and allow Germany to double its own.-- As Hitler was rallying millions to his banner.

The chapter on Hitler is perhaps the best. To quote Churchill again: " When eventually he came to power there was no book (Mein Kempf) which deserved more careful study from the rulers, political and military , of the Allied powers. All was there . . . "

But the Allies, embroiled with their own party strifes, took little notice.

Juncture after juncture, The Second World War could have easily been avoided. Repeat, easily.

For readers only familiar with Churchill's reputation as an orator, this is a chance to get to know why so many justly regard him as one of the greatest prose writers of the 20th century.

Furthermore, neither Hitler, Roosevelt, nor Stalin had the means or inclination to give an insider's first rate account of the war. Here you will see it from the summit, blow by blow.

It is indeed a tragedy, but one superbly told.

Drift to disaster.......2006-07-03

This is the first volume in a six-part work covering World War Two. It's best looked upon as Churchill's war memoirs rather than an attempt at a definitive history of the conflict. Of course, Churchill was a major figure in the war, and therefore cannot be regarded as a dispassionate analyst: he was far too close to the events and lacked the research that subsequent years have provided. All these observations are truisms, but it's worth stating that the reader should expect a very personal and Anglo-centric account.

This first volume covers the period from 1919 to the fall of the Chamberlain Government following the disasterous campaign in Norway in 1940. A major chunk of the book is taken up by Churchill's account of the faults and consequences of the Versailles Treaty, the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing threat to peace. There is very little on events in the Far East. There's not much either to throw doubt upon Churchill's role as the unheeded herald of the menace posed by the dictators, but he does have the grace to concede that the trials of World War One and the horrendous losses suffered in that war had scarred deeply the collective psyche. The reluctance to re-militarise can be better understood in that context.

Events have since shown of course that few politicians have the courage either to act contrary to what they perceive as public sentiment, or to clear their minds of preconceptions when all the evidence does not suit them. Either of these traits on their own are problematic, but it seemed that both were working at the same time in the inter-war period, to disasterous effect. As Churchill points out, few (including those on the Left) demurred from the prevailing wisdom: this must be borne in mind when British politicians of all types during the post-war period posed as implacable pre-war anti-appeasers.

Of course, few of the democracies were without these traits, and few come out of Churchill's account with total absolution - barring perhaps Czechoslovakia. Even Poland took part in the post-Munich dismemberment of that country. Churchill's account is of a tragedy, but not one which started in 1919. Rather the "peace" between the two World Wars was nothing more than a pause in the greater tragedy of twentieth-century history.

His account is passionate, lively and accessibly written. As I stated above, not one for a student wanting a definitive story, but is nonetheless gripping.

G Rodgers

The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War (Studies in Military & Strategic History)

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A superior book

The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933-39: A Study in Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War (Studies in Military & Strategic History)
Joseph A. Maiolo
Manufacturer: Palgrave Macmillan
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0312214561

Book Description

This book is an original study of the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the context of the ongoing debate about Anglo-German relations and the origins of the Second World War. Drawing on wide range of sources, the author casts new light on the diplomacy leading to the Anglo-German Naval Agreements of June 1935 and July 1937, and explores the crucial connections between naval intelligence, war planning and Admiralty policy. The author suggests that the Admiralty's response to the Nazi menace was far more rational and more complex than previous studies suggest.

Customer Reviews:

A superior book.......2007-06-12

Joe Maiolo really got the ball rolling with this book. Andrew Gordon's 1988 book on Rearmament and the Admiralty was a cry in the wilderness. Maiolo's very good book began a process of reevaluation of 1930s British defense policy that is still in motion. My only real criticism of the book is its less than stellar organization and prose style. Paragraphs are occasionally dull and sentences unclear. But this book is a treasure-trove of important information and interpretations.

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Liberating!
Against tthe Banalization and Routinization of Cruelty
the normal as demonic
A sociology of modern evil
Simple and very important book

Modernity and the Holocaust
Zygmunt Bauman
Manufacturer: Cornell University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0801487196

Customer Reviews:

Liberating!.......2007-01-27

This is arguably the most helpful book I have ever read. Bauman is a fascinating person and a profound thinker. He lived in Poland under the Nazis and then the Communists. He fled to Jeruslem just in time for the 6 Days War. He spent his career as sociologist in the rusted out industrial town of Leeds producing a noteworthy tome or two. Then in quasi-retirement, he started cranking out astonishing works geared toward wider audiences on the most vital matters of contemporary existence. He hit his stride in "Modernity and the Holocaust." Bauman's methodology is what makes his work so remarkable. The audacity to even attempt it is incredible. He combines sociology with modern history and a quite distinctive moral philosophy. His moral philosophy is the key. He takes seriously the problem of the origin of human moral behavior. (Simply taking this problem seriously is awe-inspiring.) Most modern moral philosophies ignore this matter altogether (which is no coincidence). The 18th century emotivist strand (Hume, Hutcheson, Smith) made the best stab at this vital question with the empirical postulate that all human moral responses begin with the feeling of sympathy (pity or compassion) for the observed suffering of others. Bauman nuances this with the twentieth century moral philosophy of Levinas who sees "ethics as first philosophy" meaning the sense of ought toward not harming others is pre-cognitive--being built into the species and manifested in the experience of a powerfully felt command not to kill when face to face with a suffering other (proximity). For Bauman, there is one over-ride factor that can pre-empt this built-in human moral responsiveness to others--the creation of some form of social distance. Spacial and temporal proximity to others who suffer (face-to-face) is sufficient to generate the experience of the command not to harm and the resultant moral behavior. Mitigating that proximity through the creation of physical, structural and imaginative social distance between the one who suffers and the spectator is the great secret of how human morality (sympathy) can be displaced and something else substituted. At this point, Bauman's sociological analysis enters in. The sociological analysis of the division of labor in bureaucracies (which increasingly sprawl everwhere as modernity advances)involves the diffusion of moral responsiblity among thousands or more ("not my job"), the temporal and spatial removal of the spectators/participants from the victims ("out there somewhere") and the substitution of pseudo gratifications (pay) and a pseudo morality (atta boys, awards, promotions)enable ordinary people to do extraordinarily evil things together (extraordinary in terms of sheer numbers of people and places made to suffer) AND AT THE SAME TIME FEEL MORALLY JUSTIFIED (by virtue of the bureaucratically substituted corporate pseudo morality-- recent talk of "corporate cultures of corruption" as in the CIA, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Republican Party are just the tip of the iceberg). The grip of bureaucracy spreads and deepens and as it does, the decent human feeling for the suffering of others (the human species' prime source of morality) gets increasingly diffused and replaced by the simulacrum of a morality. The third element of Bauman's method is history. He writes the history of what has happened to this human moral sense through the social, technological and economic changes of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Within this modern history of the decline of the human moral sense the Holocaust becomes what the city meant for Plato "the soul writ large." For Bauman, the Holocaust is "the modern soul writ large" for all to see. It is this crystal clear illumination and magnification of our modern selves that Bauman argues is inescapable. We can not help but look at ourselves in this mirror and allow that self-reflection (in the Delphic sense the beginning of all wisdom)to start taking its course in the hopes of some kind of genuinely human and humane moral reform. Bauman has no easy out and reading him can be exhausting and sometimes dispiriting. Even so, he argues that like the Germanic tribes at the borders were for the late Roman Empire or the black plague was for the Waning Middle Ages, the fact of the modern soul writ large in the Holocaust is like the discovery of nuclear weapons an inescapable element of late modern consciousness. For Bauman, "postmodern" simply means the "modern" seen in the full light of these and certain other inescapable historical facts. What Bauman has done for my study of history (ancient and early modern) is to allow me to look at the relationship between emotion (pity) and empire (techniques of concentrating and expanding power of others) in a wholly different light. When modern historians wrote off certain ancient or early modern historians as being "too rhetorical" or "too emotional"--that is where I dig in and start to analyse not only the emotional ancient but the anti-emotional modern disregard for the prime source of human moral response in light of how the creation of social distance in both cases works to advance the interests of those in power. With such a methodology, the "so what?" does not finally emerge in a few trite cliches in the concluding paragraph but it drives everything from the very first sentence, even from the title itself.

Against tthe Banalization and Routinization of Cruelty .......2006-10-02

This book provides a conceptual bridge between Hannah Arendt's famous "banality of evil" thesis and the more recent thesis presented by Giorgio Agamben that the concentration camp is the paradigm of political modernity. It has affinites with the post-holocaust ethics of Primo Levi and Judith Shklar as well. In the context of recent attempts to give torture and indefinite detention the imprimatur of law, Bauman's book serves as a reminder that formalizing or bureaucratizing these activities is not likely to humanize these practices-- for example, scientifically "humane" methods of execution or legally proscribed torture warrants-- but rather to erode moral resistance and sensibilities.

the normal as demonic.......2001-05-29

Zygmunt Bauman argues that the modern society we accept as normal and the highest form as civilization, contains the seed, soil and water of the Holocaust. He argues that the Holocaust is not an anomaly but a warning and sign of what we, as human beings, have become. The Holocaust would not have happened save for modern civilization. Technological know how is important, but not the only important factor.

Mass atrocity requires three things: that violence be authorized by a legitimate authority, that the violent actions be routinized, and that the victims be dehumanized. Bauman recounts the experiments of Stanley Milgram in support of his argument. I add that, after weeks of chanting "Kill, kill, kill" over and over, and of hearing the "enemy" described as "dinks", "slopes", "gooks", "japs", "women", "niggers" and "injuns", I was able to sit through a lecture on the "law of war" in which my medic class was instructed that one of our jobs would be to execute wounded prisoners. Yes, that's illegal, immoral, and something terrorists do. Military training works. (If you respond that "war is hell" and that such things are normal, think of the fuss we put up about how our prisoners are treated.)

Military training works because normal socialization prepares us for it. Society, Bauman writes, silences morality. Rather than supporting our innate morality, society replaces it, teaching us what is good and what is bad, who is good and who is bad. It divides the world into the "moral universe", relatively small, and the universe in which we are encouraged to to act with amoral abandon. Take, for instance, the example of "family values". The moral universe cannot shrink much further. Yes, we should obey the law, if practicable, but only until we change it to allow us to do what we want. We certainly aren't responsible for anyone outside the family. Family values? Christ pointed out that even the heathen support that.

The answer to the social design and engineering which created the Holocaust is, Bauman suggests, unconditional responsibility. We, each of us as a moral agent, are responsible for and to everyone regardless of whether we believe them to be good or evil. We and they are human. It's a tough sell, but Bauman's argument that the alternative led to the Holocaust and will lead to more similar atrocities is convincing.

Bauman makes his arguments without jargon, with style and passion. This is a most important and compelling book. If you're going to read only one book this year, make it this one.

A sociology of modern evil.......2000-11-24

Peruse any mega-bookstore for works on the Holocaust and you will likely find yourself in a section called "Jewish Studies" or "Holocaust Studies." This is indicative of a general attitude that the Holocaust was merely a gross aberration in the advancement of western civilization, that it is exclusively a Jewish problem or, at best, an anomalous eruption of the irrational latent in the German psyche.

In this stunning, bold, and original work, Professor Bauman challenges this conventional wisdom. The Holocaust is not the story of European civilization gone awry; rather it embodies the most salient principles of modernity itself. It was "horrifyingly normal."

The logic of self-interest, rational management, modern bureaucratic order, technological efficiency, the relegation of values to the realm of subjectivity, science as intrinsically instrumental and value-free: such are the values comprising the shared vision of western civilization set in motion during the Enlightenment. And Bauman identifies the sum of these values as the necessary (but not sufficient) cause of the Holocaust. The SS exploited the logic of rational self-interest by making the cooperation of prisoners a condition for self-preservation. Death camps utilized the applied technology of mass production and transportation. The Third Reich was the picture of modern bureaucratic efficiency. All of this was done by highly trained engineers, technicians and doctors within an ethical framework consistent with modernity's moral relativism. And each of these conditions is still present today. This is a sobering, thought-provoking study of the Holocaust and its haunting resonance with the values of modern thought.

Simple and very important book.......2000-04-05

This book explains "sameness" and "otherness", two powerful dimensions in contempt and values, so clear a five year old can get it. Zygmund also talks about doubt. An unpleasant state of mind seeking comfort and where this human machinery (doubt/comfort) is pushing most of us.

The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution (Canto original series)

Average customer rating:

German reaction to execution orders: a fascinating essay
Superb Summation Of Natural History Of The Holocaust!
Decision to Kill: How it was Taken.

The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution (Canto original series)
Christopher R. Browning
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

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ASIN: 0521558786

Book Description

The Nazi Holocaust haunts the modern imagination as one of the most compelling examples of the human capacity for organized atrocity on a mass scale. This authoritative account of the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy from 1939 to 1942 seeks to answer some of the fundamental questions about what actually happened and why, between the outbreak of war and the emergence of the Final Solution. Christopher Browning's account assesses the historians' interpretations and offers his own insights, based on detailed case studies that uncovered important and telling new evidence.

Customer Reviews:

German reaction to execution orders: a fascinating essay.......2004-04-29

There is one essay in this collection which finally answered some I questions I have always had, namely - how did the average German policeman, soldier or army major, react to the orders to kill innocent Jews? This essay is entitled, "One Day in Jozefow" and it held me spellbound. It details what occured on July 13, 1942, a day of executions under the command of Major Wilhelm Trapp. He gave orders to murder women and children with tears in his eyes and was later seen "weeping like a child".

His subordinates held him in contempt, especially since he was never seen at the shooting sites. He is quoted as saying, "If this Jewish business is ever avenged on earth, then have mercy on us Germans". There were sergeants who also requested to be excused from the firing squads, as the idea of slaughtering human beings proved too horrendous to carry out. The Germans who carried out the executions were given alcohol to help with their agitation. It was decided "intolerable" to carry out the slaughter while sober. Some ran into the forest to vomit, others were so wracked with nervousness, they misfired. At the end of the day, some 1500 Jews lay dead.

What is so compelling about this essay is that is explains how these German battalions were later able to round up Jews to the gas chambers with relative detachment; there was so much less participation or responsibility (compared to shooting)and the men had become desensitized. In fact, historians have shown that the camps were constructed largely to spare the German executioners the trauma of face-to-face murder.

What is fascinating is this: it has been long believed that Germans who refused to carry out executions feared for their own lives. Not necessarily true. When Major Trapp let his aversion to the killings be known he was relocated and later promoted. In the case of Jozefow, the men had the opportunity to withdraw from shooting. Why didn't they refuse? Because they did not want to seem cowardly and they wanted to be promoted. The ones who refused generally had businesses back home to rely on and didn't care about being promoted. And some did business with Jews, so their animosities were not inflamed.
This essay is riveting. I give this book 3 stars because the other readings are so dry, so long-winded, and so devoid of emotion, that you find yourself reading the same sentence five times. History MUST be exciting to read - otherwise, no one reads it, which is a dangerous thing indeed.

Superb Summation Of Natural History Of The Holocaust!.......2002-09-12

In an eight-essay series originally devised as lectures, the author takes the reader deep into the hearts and minds of the men who engineered and perpetrated the Holocaust. As in his earlier work, he argues persuasively and with an army of facts and figures that the decision to eradicate all of Europe's Jews from the face of the planet was an incrementally derived decision. This argument is very much like that made by Gerhard Weinberg in his massively documented history of WWII, "A World At Arms", although Browning's argument involves a much more detailed and substantiated thread of evidence and circumstance. Weinberg posited that it wasn't until the Wehrmacht began to have horrendous logistics problems early in the occupation of Poland, Latvia, and Estonia during Operation Barbarossa that they began to think in terms of a systematic and deliberate program of extermination of the Jews.

Until that point the Nazi command had been more favorably disposed toward using indigenous populations as slave labor and working and/or starving them to death, rather than killing them outright. Here too Browning argues about three key issues surrounding the decision to proceed with the Holocaust; first, that the Nazi hierarchy itself was divided in terms of strategy and objectives about the resolution of the "Jewish Question"; second, that it was seen as highly advantageous to the national socialist cause to employ their skills and labor as long as possible in support of the war effort, and finally, that the actual implementation of the fragmented policy was further fragmented and "ad-libbed" at the field level by local commanders or police authorities.

Browning uses a virtual flood of documentation and data to substantiate his various positions, and marshals a convincing argument on behalf of the notion that indeed the resulting mass murders of the Holocaust were more likely the production of a series of small but fateful conclusions made incrementally to solve immediate and pressing logistical and tactical situations the Nazi hierarchy faced at particular moments than it was the result of some long-standing grand and evil scheme to systematically annihilate the Jews. Of course, it is in one very real sense an academic issue, since all of the indigenous Jews (as well as everyone else in the areas of interest to the Nazis along the eastern front in Poland and the Ukraine already pre-designated as new settlement areas for Germans would die at the hands of the Nazi regime. The question at hand is whether the actual extermination of those individuals would be accomplished through slave labor, starvation, and exposure to the elements, or through more active and murderous intervention by way of the death camps.

One must also remember that there were also large numbers of German Jews being transported both within and without the country to concentration camps. The same issues of intent apply to them, as well. Certainly Browning's efforts here will not end the long-standing debate. It is, however, a critical contribution to informing the direction and future tenor of that argument. This is an important, provocative, and worthwhile book, and one anyone interested in understanding the details of the "natural history' of how the Holocaust actually came to transpire must read to understand the complexities, contradictions, and confusions abounding in both the record and in individual recollections about the time. I recommend this book, and hope it is much more widely read and appreciated.

Decision to Kill: How it was Taken........2000-06-20

Browning's book is one of the best books I have ever read about the Holocaust. It is a must for any researcher on this theme, new one or advanced. The most important topic of the book, dealt in several chapters, is the question of when, how, why and by whom the final solution command or order was taken.

Browning is very specific in his research. There are no guessings, though we can not escape from not being able to give final answer to certain details. He works with data of documents in trying to track how the decision to kill was taken. He is able to get to the point of saying the most probable dates for the final decision by Hitler.

The book presents some answers and alternatives to the question. It analyses 'functionalism' and 'intentionalism' and theories of historians like Arno Mayer, which by the way sufers heavy critics by Browning. You will surely refer back to this book after reading it when discussing the subject of the decision making process of the Holocaust.

Average customer rating:

Disappointing

A good introduction to a vast subject.

The Origins of the First and Second World Wars (Cambridge Perspectives in History)
Frank McDonough
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | History & Historical Fiction | Children's Books | Subjects | Books
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Back to the Front: An Accidental Historian Walks the Trenches of World War 1

ASIN: 0521568617

Book Description

This innovative new study analyzes the origins of the First and Second World Wars in one single volume by drawing on a wide range of material, including original sources. In concise, readable chapters, the author surveys the key issues surrounding the causes of both wars, offers an original and critical survey of the conflict of opinion among historians and provides a lively selection of primary documents on major issues. The result is a unique perspective on the origins of the two most devastating military conflicts in world history.

Customer Reviews:

Disappointing.......2007-10-18

It was easy to read - maybe too easy. I was expecting a more detailed and better organised book. I read history out of curiosity, but my curiosity about the origins of the two World Wars remains unsatisified.

A good introduction to a vast subject........2001-04-20

This is a very short book on such a huge theme...

The book presents the reasons for both wars as an strategic decision by the rulers of Germany. It makes a very good case, of the connection between the reasons for both wars.

Due to its size it is not very detailed, but still is very interesting. The author has included excerpts of historical documents that are related to the reasoning developed in the book.

Book Description

This groundbreaking study reveals the extent of British military planning against the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Second World War. These plans, formulated on the widespread belief that Soviet Russia was an active and willing partner in Adolf Hitler's war of conquest, were designed to bring the Soviets to their knees and deprive Nazi Germany of vital raw materials, especially oil. Churchill himself was one of the leading proponents of action that would have led to an Anglo-Soviet conflict even as the war with Germany raged on. Utilizing many never-before published documents, Osborn challenges conventional wisdom that Allied hopes were pinned on a Soviet entry into the war against Germany and proposes instead that, had the Nazis not successfully invaded France in May 1940, the Allies might well have launched their own offensive against the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet rumblings began shortly after the Red Army seized eastern Poland in September 1939, and became more strident after Joseph Stalin invaded Finland later that year. Truly serious planning did not take place, however, until after Stalin's disastrous war with Finland ended in March 1940. Immediately following the abrupt end of that conflict the Red Army sent substantial reinforcements to the Black Sea region, the area most threatened by Allied attack. In March-April 1940, the British undertook secret reconnaissance flights to obtain photographs of important targets inside the Soviet Union. The swift collapse of France in May 1940 insured that British bombers were not launched against these targets, but suspicion lingered between Britain and the USSR throughout the war, contributing to Stalin's refusal to believe Winston Churchill's warnings that Hitler was preparing to invade the USSR in 1941.

Customer Reviews:

Absolute Must for Politics 'n War Aficionado.......2002-10-02

This is simply a must-have book for the international military-political history fan. I thought I pretty much knew most of the political intrigue aspects of WW 2, but Osborn's revelations about the machinations involving Britain, France, Finland, Scandinavia, Turkey, Germany and the USSR are fascinating and will surprise many of my ilk.
The options for initiating hostilities with the Soviets that the British and particularly the French entertained had grave implications for the war and the subsequent history of the world. What if the "Allies" had gone to war with the Russians in 1939 in defence of the Finns? The dynamics of this scenario are potentially endless.
The belief that Russia was as grave a threat, if not more so, than Hitler's Germany, comes across very strongly in Osborn's "instant classic" work. Stalin's treacherous attacks on Poland, the Baltic states and Finland ranked him next to Hitler in the eyes of the world, and the fact that the USSR was supplying the Nazis with embargo-busting material shipments made the prospects of killing dozens of birds with one stone too tempting for many in the UK. Attacking Stalin's lair in Finland, the Crimea and the Caucausus were tempting goals for many who preferred fighting in someone elses' backyard instead of their own Sitzkrieg "front." The hypocrisy of the Allies in deferring conflict with the Germans in favor of the weaker Soviets did not go unnoticed but was overwhelmed by the fear of another WW 1 holocaust and the need to bolster morale by doing something.
The drawback of this title is its price, like many of the Greenwood titles. But it needs to be in your library.

Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War

Average customer rating:

Great Book On Little Known Subject
Superbly researched and carefully argued
Many assumed 'facts' went uncheck
Many assumed 'facts' went uncheck
Well-documented history followed by a bold assessment.

Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War
Stephen J. Morris
Manufacturer: Cambridge University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

Cambodia | Asia | History | Subjects | Books

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The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79

ASIN: 0804730504

Customer Reviews:

Great Book On Little Known Subject.......2003-11-14

Steven Morris's work on this book is amazing. I have such a better understanding of the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam from the early '70s to 1989. North Vietnam, China and the USSR are culpable regarding the victory of Pol Pot in 1975, and not American bombing as so many Stalinists try to claim. N. Vietnam had their eyes on Cambodia all along, but had to buy their time during the conflict with the U.S.

Superbly researched and carefully argued.......2000-04-19

This book is undoubtedly one of the few "must have" books on Vietnam and Cambodia. The author has produced a very carefully argued and superbly researched analysis of the Vietnamese relationship with Cambodia and the Vietnamese relationships with the Soviet Union and China. It shows how our conventional thinking in terms of states only pursuing their national security or economic interests doesn't explain why the Vietnamese and the Khmers Rouges each provoked their larger neighbors (The Khmers Rouges provoked Vietnam and Vietnam provoked China). The idea that the weak can provoke the stronger goes against our "common sense" understanding of how states behave, but it obviously did happen in these cases. Morris also has a very good writing style (I even found the more abstract conceptual discussion in the introduction and conclusion quite easy to follow) and the narrative flows quite nicely. He has also introduced the concept of "hyperMaoism" to explain the outlook of the Khmers Rouges, which is something that I find quite insightful. His research in Soviet archives also brought forth some fascinating revelations, regarding how little the Vietnamese leadership knew and understood about the motives of the Khmers Rouges leaders. And the Soviet documents also bring completely new information on how Vietnam's relations with China broke down during the 1970s. I had read every book published on the Vietnamese communists and the Khmers Rouges, but this book has taught me a lot that I didn't know. The tone of the work is quite dispassionate, and its approach completely objective, as Morris tries to get inside the thinking of all of the parties to the conflict. Highly recommended.

Many assumed 'facts' went uncheck.......2000-04-07

After so many years of digging through the Soviet archives, Mr. Morris forgot to double and triple check his supposedly 'facts' and got carried away with believing everything he read from the basements in Moscow.

The problem with Morris analysis is that it left out the Beijing angle. The Vietnam-Cambodian war was driven more from China than from Vietnam and the Soviet. The CCP has a lot of influence and control over this war which was barely accounted for in this book.

There's also another problem with an analysis based solely on ideological ground i.e. communist regime wages war because they can, because they are evil, warlike and undemocratic. Besides being not very useful in pedagogical terms, this of course left out the more important historical analysis that Vietnam and Cambodia has a long history of many small wars. And the Vietnam-Cambodian war could be viewed as an attempt to continue Vietnam's territorial expansion that began from the 17th century.

Mr. Morris assessments in the book should be read in light of his other 'hysterical' pronouncement of having found a document in Soviet archives showing that Hanoi had deceived on POWs. The timing of his finding was also perfectly coincide with an impending congressional vote on improving US-Vietnam relationship.

T.N.

Many assumed 'facts' went uncheck.......2000-04-07

Mr. Morris assessments in the book should be read in light of his other 'hysterical' pronouncement of having found a document in Soviet archives showing that Hanoi had deceived on POWs.

T.N.

Well-documented history followed by a bold assessment........2000-01-04

A scholarly analysis of the history behind the 1978-89 Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, followed by the author's brutally frank assessment of the consequences. As the author states, a final assessment is premature, but recent events do indeed cause the reader to wonder how long the Vietnamese will continue to be pleased with the tactics of its "clients". Readers will also want to review "Falling Out of Touch" by Goscha and Engelbert for another look at historical relations between the Vietnamese and Cambodian communists.

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