Book Description
The publication of The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road in 1972 marked the birth of the "new military history", which emphasized military organization--mobilization, pay, supply, morale and, above all, logistics--rather than military "events" such as sieges and battles. Constantly cited since its first publication in English (with translations into Spanish and Dutch), this revised updated second edition includes new sources and references but otherwise remains faithful to the original edition. First Edition Hb (1972): 0-521-08462-8 First Edition Pb (1975): 0-521-09907-2
Customer Reviews:
Spain at War.......2006-02-06
This is an internationally-renowned study of Spain's Flanders Army during the 80 year effort to suppress the Dutch Revolt. And justly famous it is too - due to the depth and care with which the anaysis is done, as Parker covers all the logistical problems encountered by early modern Spain, inlcuding finance, supply, recruitment, morale - pretty much everything you would need to know about the difficulties of military organisation in the period.
As such, the book opens a window on the problems mounting any type of large-scale operation by the early modern state: far from being a modern professional fighting force the Flanders Army was a collection of nationalities with which the Spanish government more often than not had to coax or encourage to fight on its behalf - a task complicated by the distance of the Netherlands from Spain and by the constant financial strains faced by the Spanish treasury.
Given such problems, it was a considerable achievement to keep the struggle going for so long, especially bearing in mind other challenges faced by the Spanish Empire, and it does give a lesson on how difficult it was (and remains) to maintain an effective military presence in a country far distant from home and whose inhabitants do not wish you to be there. A lesson which it seems is repeatedly forgotten.
G Rodgers
The last hurrah before Rocroi.......2002-06-13
This is one of those magnificent books for the specialist that stay below the radar of a general readership in History. The short narrative of the attack on the fortress of Maastricht is the stuff of martial legends, and worth the price of the book. G. Parker has become the foremost historian in English of Spain in 16th & 17th Century and specifically of the 30 Years War. This splendid monograph is the gold on the background of the Tercio's banners.
Book Description
Praise for Meeting the Fox
"Orr Kelly has dramatically brought to life the desert war by masterfully weaving the view of higher headquarters with the pathos of the foxhole. Meeting the Fox takes the reader on a gripping journey from North Africa's beaches and drop zones, the practically forgotten disaster at Sidi bou Zid, to the final battles in Tunisia. Meeting the Fox is destined to rank among the best narrative histories on the American experience in North Africa."
-- Patrick O'Donnell, author of Beyond Valor and Into the Rising Sun
"An almost bullet-by-bullet, shell-by-shell account, Meeting the Fox offers riveting personal experiences from those who fought the Axis forces during the desperate campaign for North Africa."
--Gerald Astor, historian and author of A Blood-Dimmed Tide and The Greatest War, Vols. I—III
As their unproven commanders struggled to match wits with the wily Desert Fox, 100,000 poorly equipped, undertrained, and inexperienced GIs battled their way across North Africa. Hobbled by inferior weaponry and an inexperienced officer corps, these green but courageous citizen soldiers clashed head-on with the fabled German Afrika Korps and its legendary commander, Erwin Rommel. Meeting the Fox tells the unforgettable tale of the men who transformed themselves, in the heat of battle, from a poorly organized army of convenience into a relentless and unstoppable fighting force.
Customer Reviews:
Competent and well-written history of WW2 in Tunisia.......2007-05-14
This is a very well-writen military history of WW2 in Tunisia, from late 1942 to May 1943. Although the "Fox" in the title refer to German general Rommel, Rommel figures in only a small part of the book because he is largely involved in his famous retreat across North Africa while much of the action in the book takes place. Once Rommel finally arrives on the scene, he makes some inspections of the military situation at hand, issues orders, then soon departs for Germany, never to return. Other German commanders, notably von Arnim, direct most of the Axis movements. The author interweaves the stories of ground and air units, large and small, and includes the experiences of many individual soldiers as well. My only complaint was that the maps were not very good and made it difficult to follow the movements of the ground units. With as much detail as was provided in the text, good maps would have made the battles much easier to visualize.
A good military history.......2006-12-15
This is an excellent military history of the African invasion. If you are looking for a book that will tell you about the importance of the invasion and how it influenced the war this is not for you. This is strictly a military account and while it is well done it offers little else. The prose is very clear and conventional like most military histories. Overall it is a great analysis of the war and provides an essential report on what happened in Africa.
The U.S. Army's Baptism of Fire .......2005-11-14
Some in the Allied Command structure during WWII wanted to bypass the North African campaign and strike directly at Normandy as early as late 1942 / early 1943. This book shows clearly how much of a disaster that would have been.
The North African campaign was the testing ground of the Allied war machine, where the U.S. Army raised the officer corps and developed the tactics which would lead to ultimate victory on the fields and in the cities of Europe.
This book was written on a very interesting topic and is an excellent history. I sort of painstakingly only gave it four stars rather than five, because the book is mostly history and can sometimes be a little bit dry since there's no single group of soldiers or unit that it follows and that you can connect with. Of course, this is impossible for a history of an entire campaign in the largest war ever fought, so it really is five star history, just four star reading for me.
It lets you know all the strategic reasoning behind both sides moves, delves into the technological capabilities of the allies, explains the political wrangling between the U.S., England, and the French who joined the allies. As it progresses it tells the story of smaller units in the myriad string of battles that made up the campaign, expertly navigating back and forth between the tactical scene and the big picture, and between the telling of events and the analysis that gives them meaning and puts them into context. The history is chronological, comprehensive, and complete. One can imagine the fear, drama, suspense, sting of defeat, and adrenaline of going into combat for the first time against one of the most vaunted armies ever assembled on completely foreign land.
The North African campaign shows the U.S. military's somewhat painful growth process which was extremely interesting. Working with allies became sorted out, but not without major frictions such as the falling out between Patton and Air Marshall Cunningham. Tanks, artillery, infantry and air power were mixed and matched many different ways until the combination that worked was found, the price for that secret paid dearly in blood. Political, too old, or just sadly not competent officers were shaken out, and a solid, in-depth leadership core of middle and lower level officers were minted with experience.
One of the things I liked best about the book was how the author occasionally spiced it up with the sort of amazing fact is stranger than fiction moments that can only happen in war. U-boats torpedo supply ships on the invasion beaches, and guys jumping off ship get sucked back inside the hole the torpedo ripped in the side of the ship, forcing them to abandon ship twice. Soldiers trying to retreat are run over by tank treads, and simply pushed into the mud so that after the tank passes they get right back up and keep running, only a lot dirtier than before. Units surrounded on Djebels wait for nightfall and literally WALK through enemy lines, feet away from sleeping German soldiers and 88mm guns.
Recommended for anyone with an interest in military history, the U.S. Army, North African History, or how the start of great endeavors can be difficult learning experiences.
An Excellent Summary of the African campaign.......2005-07-19
Meeting the Fox turned out to be the book I was looking for - one which would give a detailed, but not confusing, history of the Allied campaign in Africa during WW II. It helps me and my late husband's grandsons appreciate and understand his part in that war.
Meeting the Fox is a quality read........2004-01-09
Orr Kelly did an excellent job recounting the history of Operation Torch and the battle for Tunisia. He brought it alive by documenting and re-telling the personal stories of some real American heroes (Major Siglin, Captain Bill Tuck, Colonel Waters, etc.) This is a very enjoyable read that flows without losing the detail. Thank you Mr. Kelly.
Book Description
A dazzling biography that is destined to be the definitive account of Horatio Nelson's life for generations
How did Horatio Nelson achieve such extraordinary success? In this authoritative biography, the eminent scholar Roger Knight places him firmly in the context of the Royal Navy of the time. Nelson was passionate and relentless from the outset of his career; his charisma and his coolness in battle are legendary. But his success depended also on the strength of intelligence available to him, the quality of the ships he commanded, the potency of his guns, and the skill of his seamen.
Based on a vast array of new sources, this biography demolishes many of the myths that have for two centuries surrounded Nelson. Knight demonstrates that this great Romantic hero was in his time a shrewd political operator and often a difficult subordinate. He was occasionally na•ve, often impatient, and only happy when completely in command.
Readers will emerge from this biography with a greatly enriched understanding of this singular man-one who was brilliant, severely flawed, and never to be crossed.
"A wonderfully clear portrait of a complex man, seen squarely in his time. There is every reason to think that this superb work will become the definitive Nelson biography." (The Economist)
Customer Reviews:
An Engrossing Description of Nelson's Career and Era.......2006-11-18
I highly recommend The Pursuit of Victory: The Life And Achievement of Horatio Nelson, a new biography of England's greatest warfighting admiral, Horatio Nelson.
This biography does a superb job of providing context and background for Nelson's astonishing rise to fame and his equally astonishing victories at sea--and lesser known defeats, which always occurred on territory unfamilar to Nelson, i.e. land. We find that the extreme risks of Britain's war with Napoleonic France created a brief window of opportunity for commoners such as Nelson to rise within the class-conscious and peerage-dominated Admiralty. Merit was so essential to victory that the Admiralty could not afford to advance captains by favoritism alone.
Equally interesting is the author's careful descriptions of the role of mentors in Nelson's career arc--captains and admirals above him in the bureaucratic Royal Navy who guided, aided and promoted him, not so much to benefit themselves but in recognition of his talents. Without these mentors--several of whom he maintained as close personal friends until death--his rise from the ranks of hundreds of junior captains to admiral at a young age would not have happened.
Not that Nelson enjoyed a perfect career. A gross political miscalculation--falling under the influence of the King's ne'er do well son, who had been given a position as Admiral not on talent but on birthright--caused Nelson's career to falter at a critical juncture. Having fallen out of favor for his destructive sycophancy, Nelson was sent home without a command, where he languished for seven long years as a poor gentleman landowner.
A renewal of the war with France gave him one more chance, and with the aid of his mentors, he assumed command of the Mediterranean Fleet (bypassing many jealous senior admirals), enabling him to score his first great strategic victory in the Battle of the Nile.
Life at sea was not easy, and Nelson was often ill and exhausted. Having lost an eye and an arm in two land engagements (he was deployed twice to joint Army-Navy commands, both of which ended badly, partly due to Nelson's ignorance of land warfare), he was often in pain. he also had to make judicious political decisions regarding allies, harrass the Admiralty for supplies, maintain discipline on a huge fleet of wooden ships in poor weather, and a host of other challenges which would have ground down by sheer workload alone a lesser commander.
This engaging, masterly paced work covers not just Nelson's life but the political context of the Royal Navy and the role of senior commanders in his rise to the highest levels of command. It is a portrait of one man's life set within a detailed account of his family, era, superiors and comrades.
Best One Volume Biography on Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson.......2006-10-20
Noted Nelson scholar Roger Knight has written an elegant biography of Great Britain's greatest fighting admiral, Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson, which was published shortly after the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar; both Nelson's greatest victory and the scene of his tragic, yet heroic, death. But is it the definitive biography devoted to Admiral Nelson's life and career? Although it does come close, regrettably, the answer is "no", since another eminent Nelson scholar, John Sugden, is currently at work on the second volume of his Nelson biography, which will cover Nelson's exploits from late 1797 to the Battle of Traflagar, which occurred on October 21, 1805 (This review is being published here at Amazon.com one day prior to the 201st anniversary of this battle.).
Knight covers Nelson's life and career in a massive tome of more than 800 pages, breaking it down into five sections. Much to my amazement, Knight has successfully covered Nelson's life and career from his birth in 1758 to his appointment as captain of HMS Agamemnon in January, 1793 in slightly more than a hundred pages, "I Youth and Disappointment 1758-1793" (Readers who think they are missing important aspects of Nelson's career should turn instead to the first volume in John Sugden's Nelson biography, "Nelson: A Dream of Glory", which emphasizes the young Nelson's rapid rise through officer ranks to becoming among the Royal Navy's youngest post captains.). Here Knight demonstrates how Nelson relied upon patronage from well-connected relatives like his uncle Captain Maurice Suckling and substantial exposure to good seamanship and officer conduct, which allowed him to secure rapid promotion to Post Captain and command of a frigate during the American Revolution. We also get our first glimpse of the heroic Nelson through his participation in an ill-fated joint Royal Navy and Army invasion to seize Nicaragua from the Spanish, which will not only cost him his command of a heavily armored frigate, but also his good health, and indeed, almost his life. Knight covers succinctly Nelson's two tours of duty in the British West Indies, devoting substantial coverage to Nelson's adulation of the mediocre Prince William Henry, later, Duke of Clarence, and eventually, King William IV, assigned to Nelson's command as a junior Royal Navy frigate captain (Here we see Nelson's unabashed admiration for royalty emerge unexpectedly, which will have serious consequences for his career in the late 1790s.).
The biography's second section, "II Maturation and Triumph 1793 - 1798" covers Nelson's early career during the French revolutionary wars, chronicling his eventual rise to Rear Admiral and his hard-fought victories at the battles of Cape Saint Vincent and the Nile. Nelson learns how to command a squadron at sea, cultivating friendships with many of the Royal Navy officers who would become his celebrated "Band of Brothers"; distinguished captains such as Thomas Troubridge, Samuel Hood, Benjamin Hallowell and Thomas Masterman Hardy. Knight also discusses Nelson's complex relationships with his superiors, most notably Admiral Sir John Jervis, later Earl Saint Vincent, his commanding officer at the Battle of Cape Saint Vincent. We also witness the disastrous attack on Tenerife, Santa Cruz, in the Canary Islands, which nearly costs him his life.
The biography's third section, "III Passion and Discredit 1798- 1801", is devoted to the most controversial period of Nelson's career; his service as Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, in which he finds himself supporting unabashedly the Bourbon royal dynasty of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Knight demonstrates clearly that Nelson's actions in "liberating" Naples following a French-supported popular insurrection, were motivated solely by his notions of loyalty and duty to a royal family in dire need of both, and though quite critical of them, he does not agree with Terry Coleman, author of "The Nelson Touch: The Life and Legend of Horatio Nelson", that these acts amounted to war crimes. Moreover, he demolishes completely the myth that Nelson fell immediately in love with Emma Hamilton, the young wife of Britain's ambassador to the Bourbon court at Naples, showing that it blossomed months later. And Knight, while sympathetic to Nelson, does show that Nelson's actions immediately before and after the Battle of Copenhagen, left much to be desired for someone serving as a fleet commander.
In "IV Adulation and Death" Knight opens with Nelson, now living openly with Emma Hamilton, enjoying nearly 18 months of peace, finding time to take a leisurely journey through Wales and serving in the House of Lords. With the resumption of hostilities between Great Britain and Napoleonic France, Nelson, now a vice admiral, returns to the Mediterranean Sea as the Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, hoisting his broad pendant aboard HMS Victory. Some of Knight's finest prose is devoted to the long chase across the Atlantic Ocean to the West Indies in search of French admiral Pierre Villeneuve's fleet, culminating of course in the bloody Battle of Trafalgar. In "V Transfiguration", Knight describes not only Nelson's funeral in London, but also takes stock of the admiral's character, yielding a sympathetic, yet highly nuanced, appraisal of Nelson's life and career.
"The Pursuit of Victory: The Life And Achievement of Horatio Nelson" includes several appendices, of which the most important ones are the brief chronologies of the major events in Nelson's life and career, and of world events during Nelson's life, especially with regard to the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. There is also a chronological recounting of Nelson's service aboard various Royal Navy warships, which, regrettably, isn't nearly as succinct as both chronological outlines. Less successful, but still quite useful, are the brief biographical sketches devoted to Nelson's family, friends, and associates, both in the British government, and of course, in the Royal Navy itself.
The Best Biography of Nelson I've Read.......2006-06-05
As others have noted, there are many biographies of Nelson, and almost all of them suffer from the same problem: that a man so brilliant, talented, contradictory, demented, jealous, generous, gracious, foolish, naive and clear-thinking is very hard to understand. The fact that his death at the triumphant British naval victory of Trafalgar in 1805 immediately turned his life into legend, means that from first to last it's been hard to get a handle on Nelson the flawed but unique human being.
I've read many biographies of the man, and I was shocked to find that many second-hand truths fine biographers have relied on in prior biographies are incorrect. Knight's meticulous scholarship, his lifetime of study of the age of fighting sail in Britain and France, means that his careful analysis of sources in this book is stunning and irrefutable. No book I have ever read on Nelson is so thorough in finding every possible source to illuminate the daily life at sea, as well as by land, of this remarkable leader. That he quietly sets the record straight on innumerable myths and errors of past biographies with grace is simply another pleasure of the book. The fact that Knight deals tautly with the fairly disastrous consequences of Nelson's affair with Emma, Lady Hamilton, without letting it swallow his book, is a fine achievement. The heart of Nelson's importance in English history lies in his life at sea, and there Knight's study is especially enlightening.
Although not a book for everyone - you need to want to learn about both Nelson and the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars - I tend to agree with the dust jacket blurb, that this book will be THE definitive factual study of Nelson. But as Knight himself admits - in the end, the whole of the man is greater than the sum of his parts, and probably always will be.
Great Nelson Biography.......2006-05-02
There is no shortage of books about Nelson. The past couple of years have added several more titles. There is no shortage of interest in the man, and the great days of the Royal Navy.
This book is very good--I doubt there are any better. It is detailed, full of new information, and extremely readable. The man can write, and the book carries you away.
Nelson is presented as a man with some great abilities-- and some faults. He did not always distinguish himself, but he never made any fatal blunders. It is interesting to note that he, too, was able to benefit from connections--something that was almost impossible to get along without in the Royal Navy, with so many officers, and so few ships.
Nelson's faults did cost him, but his strengths and abilities overcame them. He was lucky. His ability to ignore orders helped him, when it would have hurt others. His connections carried him through other difficulties, and , in the end, he was the right man at the right time.
As is usual, the reader also comes to appreciate his great friend Collingwood. If Nelson had a secret weapon, it had to be Collingwood, who was less impetuous, and more reasoned in his actions. His behavior and skill helped Nelson more than a few times. This book, like so many others, makes it obvious.
Nelson will always fascinate--his affair with Lady Hamilton, his bravery in battle, his fearless method of attack, and his brilliance always appeal to new generations. A great story about a great man.
Praise for author - keelhaul the publisher!.......2006-04-11
This 800-plus page book, painstakingly put together by its author is one of the worst copy-edited books I have ever seen. Additionally its binding is cheap and flimsy. There is no pagination of the charts it includes and the biographical sketches that could clarify much of the text are hopelessly out of order. It is another demonstration that slovenliness in publishing is acceptable.
Book Description
The Hungarians is the most comprehensive, clear-sighted, and absorbing history ever of a legendarily proud and passionate but lonely people. Much of Europe once knew them as "child-devouring cannibals" and "bloodthirsty Huns." But it wasn't long before the Hungarians became steadfast defenders of the Christian West and fought heroic freedom struggles against the Tatars (1241), the Turks (16-18th centuries), and, among others, the Russians (1848-49 and 1956). Paul Lendvai tells the fascinating story of how the Hungarians, despite a string of catastrophes and their linguistic and cultural isolation, have survived as a nation-state for more than 1,000 years.
Lendvai, who fled Hungary in 1957, traces Hungarian politics, culture, economics, and emotions from the Magyars' dramatic entry into the Carpathian Basin in 896 to the brink of the post-Cold War era. Hungarians are ever pondering what being Hungarian means and where they came from. Yet, argues Lendvai, Hungarian national identity is not only about ancestry or language but also an emotional sense of belonging. Hungary's famous poet-patriot, Sándor Petofi, was of Slovak descent, and Franz Liszt felt deeply Hungarian though he spoke only a few words of Hungarian. Through colorful anecdotes of heroes and traitors, victors and victims, geniuses and imposters, based in part on original archival research, Lendvai conveys the multifaceted interplay, on the grand stage of Hungarian history, of progressivism and economic modernization versus intolerance and narrow-minded nationalism.
He movingly describes the national trauma inflicted by the transfer of the historic Hungarian heartland of Transylvania to Romania under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920--a trauma that the passing of years has by no means lessened. The horrors of Nazi and Soviet Communist domination were no less appalling, as Lendvai's restrained account makes clear, but are now part of history.
An unforgettable blend of eminent readability, vibrant humor, and meticulous scholarship, The Hungarians is a book without taboos or prejudices that at the same time offers an authoritative key to understanding how and why this isolated corner of Europe produced such a galaxy of great scientists, artists, and entrepreneurs.
Customer Reviews:
Harm not the Magyars! (Zrinyi).......2005-07-15
I often wondered why Hungary and Hungarians have such poor public relations, particularly in the US. Unfortunately, this book fails to answer that question. It is a fascinating read, if only because it gives, (in parts) a refreshingly different perspective. In others, unfortunately, the Communist-era interpretation of the author's sources is painfully evident. The many details in the narrative are interesting, partly because the selection of the details reveals the author's biases. There are a number of translation errors I found in the book which naturally led to faulty conclusions. P.e. "Honved"(seg)(hon=home, vedni=to defend) is not the militia, it's the standing army. "Nemzet orseg," (nemzet=nation, orseg=guard) is the militia. All in all however, it was worthwhile to read through the book. It will lead those, who are not familiar with the Magyars to some understanding of the background of this nation although will leave them feel shortchanged in understanding their psyche. I sent a copy of the book to both of my (adult) children together with a 16 page commentary.It is a laudable effort on the part of author Lendvai and by and large I believe it will benefit the Hungarians' image as well.
The Hungarians is a victory.......2005-05-24
This book is a well rounded look at a thousand year old country.
It not only tells the story but gives the flavor of people and the times they lived in.
I only regret that the length of the book limited the author in the amount of details he could include.
A comprehensive focus on the Hungarian people .......2004-12-12
Hungarian history is largely omitted from college-level courses, at least as a focus on its own: European journalist and television commentator Paul Lendvai corrects this omission with The Hungarians: A Thousand Years Of Victory In Defeat, a comprehensive focus on the Hungarian people once known in Europe as 'huns'. Hungarians became defenders of the Christian West and fought many freedom battles: The Hungarians traces their many achievements, their country's changing history, and how the Hungarians have survived as a people against all odds.
For the Magyar but not of the Magyar.......2004-03-01
Stlyistically this book is palatable to the novice historian who's looking for something beyond "the facts". The author successfully entertains the reader with a melodic progression through the history of a former transient,esoteric, people from outside the bosom of europe. Using the natural tendency of everyone to root for the underdog the reader is lead with elequent prose to read through the successive chapters hoping for the proud and stalwart Magyar to be vindicated with victory only to be denied--but, its history.
"Victory in Defeat" is used often by the author revealing how the history of the Magyar was defined not so much by themselves but by their neighbors. From the defeat of these horseback raiders by the Germans more than a thousand years ago forceing them to leave their hunter gatherer past and accept a agrarian existence, to the crushing defeat under the unstopable juggernaut of Stalins USSR, these people have been forged into a community of realists with the spectre of "what could of been" standing on their souls. Subjugated by no less then the Germans and Turks, and defeated by the Russians at two crucial points in time its ironic that the author reveals that the darkest days of Hungary were not under the heel of a foreigner but from a Hungarian of Jewish decent in the communist post WWII days. Its odd that the author seems critical of the few times in its history Hungary persued a self propagating ideal, especially in the Magyarization period during the later half of the nineteenth century and the nationalistic "Horthy" years.
I think this book falls short in two places. First, it follows a contemporary line of seeing history through the eyes of the most famous and or privlidged personalities of the times they lived which can be a deceptivly narrow perspective, though it can make a more dynamic read. It was refreshing when the author did elucidate the commoners lot during significant periods in Hungary's history, but not enough for my liking. Of course the farther back in histroy the author reaches the harder it is to gauge the average mans life due to lack of info but it should really be the foundation of any historical accounting. Secondly I came away unsatisfied that the Hungarian history is properly expressed due to the fact that a Magyar perspective is relayed from non Magyars of either German or Jewish decent. At the end of the book the author lists a number of persons who left Hungary and made significant contributions to the many sciences but often revealed their non Magyar decent. Thus I can only come to the conclusion that only a true Magyar could relate what is and what is not Magyar and who is and who is not a succesfull Magyar. This book is definatly worth the price and worth owning. But I'd suggest reading as many Hungarian historical books as thier are availabe to gain a rounded view of this elusive people's culture history.
Engaging history on this people.......2003-12-25
Well written, detailed, and fascinating history of this often beleaguered but important people and country. My interest is mostly in Ural-Altaic linguistics, which includes Hungarian, which belongs to what is called the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic sub-family, which contains Finnish, Estonian, and Hungarian, but I also found I enjoyed picking up some history about the Hungarians and their culture, too. I already had the basics and knew about when they'd first arrived in eastern Europe, and about their later wars with the Tatars, Turks, and Russians, but I learned quite bit more about it from this book.
A little aside here, Hungarians have contributed disproportionately, relative to their numbers, to modern math, physics, and other areas of science. They include greats like mathematician Paul Erdos, who founded the area of discrete mathematics, worked in many areas of pure math, and may have been the most prolific mathmematician who ever lived, with 1500 papers; John von Neumann, who developed game theory and was the inventor of the electronic computer; Edward Teller, the "father of the H-Bomb," and Bela Julesz, a mathematical psychophysicist and researcher in the field of visual perception, and recipient of the prestigious MacArthur "Genius Award." And last but not least, Andy Grove, the former President and CEO for 20 years of Intel Corporation, the famous computer chip-maker, was Hungarian also.
Interestingly, although I'm not Hungarian myself, I have a few connections to some of the above. I'm related to Ernest Lawrence, who invented the cyclotron, or atom smasher, which made possible critical technology for the building of the atom bomb, without which there wouldn't have been the later hydrogen bomb. Lawrence won the Nobel Prize in 1939 for his invention. I worked at Intel for several years, and met Andy Grove. And my immediate boss at Intel was Hungarian too, and he and I used to discuss Hungarian history and culture occasionally, which he used to get a kick out of, since I was the only non-Hungarian he knew with any interest in it.
I also had the pleasure of travelling around Hungary and most of the eastern-bloc countries back in the early 80s, before the wall came down, and found the Hungarian people both worldly and hospitable. It's said that because of their turbulent history, Hungarians approach life realistically and without illusions, and I think I can say this is certainly true based on my own experience.
But getting back to the present book, I wanted to mention one other interesting fact about the Hungarians, which is that they are most closely related to the Ostyak tribes of Siberia. The Ostyaks have the distinction of being the only tribes and villages the Communists couldn't take over and subjugate, and their villages remained politically independent of Moscow throughout the entire communist period.
Book Description
As the driving force behind the Allied effort in World War I, France willingly shouldered the heaviest burden. In this masterful book, Robert Doughty explains how and why France assumed this role and offers new insights into French strategy and operational methods.
French leaders, favoring a multi-front strategy, believed the Allies could maintain pressure on several fronts around the periphery of the German, Austrian, and Ottoman empires and eventually break the enemy's defenses. But France did not have sufficient resources to push the Germans back from the Western Front and attack elsewhere. The offensives they launched proved costly, and their tactical and operational methods ranged from remarkably effective to disastrously ineffective.
Using extensive archival research, Doughty explains why France pursued a multi-front strategy and why it launched numerous operations as part of that strategy. He also casts new light on France's efforts to develop successful weapons and methods and the attempts to use them in operations.
An unparalleled work in French or English literature on the war, Pyrrhic Victory is destined to become the standard account of the French army in the Great War.
Customer Reviews:
They Adapted and Overcame .......2007-02-06
Despite the fact that the French Army carried the bulk of the Allied war effort on the Western Front in 1914-18, it has rarely received its due in First World War historiography. Brigadier General (ret.) Robert A. Doughty, head of West Point's history department for twenty years, seeks to correct that omission in his Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War. Overall, this is an erudite, well-written book for professional military officers and historians and an essential addition to any serious library on the First World War.
This book consists of ten chapters, with one on pre-war doctrine, eight that each cover about six months of the war and a conclusion. The initial chapter on transformation examines pre-war doctrine and strategic planning. Despite first-rate intelligence on German order of battle, the author notes that the French expected an invasion of Belgium but thought that the Germans lacked the reserves to make a deep penetration. The French Army was also fairly well equipped for war, but the neglect of heavy artillery was a serious omission. Furthermore, the author notes that initial combat on the borders indicated "the bankruptcy of French tactical doctrine and the inadequacy of their artillery," although these flaws were not immediately apparent to General Joffre, the French commander-in-chief. Indeed, the author paints a poor picture of Joffre in August 1914, as a commander who blamed others for his faulty operational plan, failed to concentrate his forces and ignored intelligence about enemy intentions. On the other hand, Joffre showed marked improvement in September 1914 by effectively utilizing France's railroads to mass forces for the Battle of the Marne - a victory which the author notes to Joffre's credit.
Once the war shifted to a static phase in 1915, the author notes that the French failure to defend vital coal and steel regions at the start of the war hindered their long-term war industrial potential. It is not uncommon that military men ignore economic factors until they are faced with shortages. As the French Army gradually shifted to an offensive strategy in 1915, the author describes how Joffre succeeded in creating a substantial reserve force but that the early attacks were costly failures due to limited artillery support. Two competing offensive doctrines emerged: Joffre's "continuous battle," which envisaged a massive `big push' style attack, and the "methodical battle" advocated by younger generals such as Foch and Petain. While Joffre believed that a decisive breakthrough on the Western Front was possible, more realistic officers such as Petain realized that it was no longer possible and that the conflict had become a war of attrition. However, Joffre set the strategic agenda well into 1916 and he adamantly opposed diversions such as operations in the Mediterranean that took troops away from his `big push' offensives on the Western Front. It was not until near-disaster at Verdun that Joffre realized the demands of attrition warfare and promoted defense-in-depth against German counterattacks. Also, by 1916 the French Army had finally corrected its deficiencies in heavy artillery, which transformed its operational potential. Yet unlike Germany, France did not opt for total war as Germany did, with its political leaders placing limits on bombing German cities and the use of chemical warfare.
By the end of 1916, French officers such as Nivelle, Petain and Foch had developed new methods of infantry-artillery coordination that enabled the French Army to launch short, but effective attacks. Nivelle became a little too enamored of these new tactics and when he replaced Joffre, he attempted to use them to achieve a major breakthrough in the ill-fated Nivelle offensive. The mutiny that resulted from Nivelle's poor judgment nearly broke the French Army, but it was Petain that saved it from dissolution. Petain adopted a new program for the army that emphasized material over haphazard use of infantry and this program emphasized aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks and chemicals. Ultimately, Petain found the material key to victory but it was Foch - who finally became the unified commander of Allied forces in the desperate days of 1918 - who found the morale key to victory.
Pyrrhic Victory also offers readers a very different perspective on British actions. From the French perspective, the BEF was not pulling its fair share of the load in 1914-15 and British offensives were rather puny. While the author does not denigrate the British, Belgian or American contributions to victory, this book helps to illuminate the major role played by the French in achieving that victory. Although starting out wrong-footed, the French Army survived a major offensive by one of the best armies in the world, adapted and eventually developed the means to push that enemy off its soil. While the price of victory was crippling, there is no doubt that the French Army in the First World did far more than merely `survive' until the Americans came to `rescue them.'
A new look at WW1.......2006-08-06
Most histories of the First World War have focused on the British or German perspective. This is a history of the French operations, which provided the bulk of the resistance to the Germans on the western front.
Histories of the First World War suffered from partisan books written directly after the war that gave a caricatured version of operations. They suggested that French and British generals failed to appreciate the impact of modern technology and simply used men as cannon fodder. This book is one that seeks to counter that view and show how the French commanders reacted to the success and failure of operations and developed strategies which evolved during the war to lessen the loss of human life and develop more efficient methods of attack and defence. In fact the year of 1914 saw one of the French Armies considerable triumphs the defeat of the German movement through Belgium aimed at outflanking the French line. This success occurred when the Germans devoted the majority of their army to the western front in an attempt to gain an early victory. England at the time had only mobilised a small army so the defeat of the Germans was a remarkable victory.
One of the interesting points made by the book is that some 50% of the French losses occurred in the first year of the war before the development of the trench system. The reason of course was that before the development of the trenches when there was the war of movement infantry were much more vulnerable to artillery fire. In 1915 when the French attacked again and again in an attempt to aid the Russian offensives the losses were although substantial far less than in the disastrous first year. The losses suffered in resisting the German offensive at Verdun again were again less than in 1915. It was only in 1918 that France carried out the series of attacks that finally led to Germany's capitulation that the casualty figures increased to levels close to 1915.
The book is interesting as it shows how the French developed tactics over time. The rolling barrage to protect the infantry in its advance. The notion of the flexible defence so that infantry was kept away from the front line to avoid the heavy losses which resulted from opening barrages and instead using counter attacks and the holding of key points to inflict casualties on the attacker.
In fact it is clear that the French became frustrated with the English under Haig who launched his Somme offensive without using the sorts of advances in strategy that had been developed by the French and Germans thus turning that battle into a costly stalemate. One of the attractions of the book is that it shows the history of the English campaign and issues though an observers eyes.
The book also reveals how close the Germans came to victory in 1918. If Ludendorff had been able to move more quickly to separate the English and French armies in detail he could have won. Instead he relied on costly staged offensives delayed so much that the French and English were able to hang on.
Despite the loss of the major industrial section of their country the French were able to turn their country into an arsenal producing ¾ of the weapons that were used by the Americans. Huge numbers of tanks aircraft and heavy artillery.
The book also shows clearly the importance of the operations in Macedonian in hastening the end of the war. The attack on this front in `1918 led to Bulgaria being forced out of the war. This broke the German supply line to Turkey which meant that the British under Allenby were able to advance from Egypt easily also defeating that country. Lastly the surrender of Bulgaria opened up yet another front that the weakened Austro-Hungarian Empire could not hold. One of the more interesting books on the First World War which is valuable in giving another perspective on the conflict.
An essential and understudies topic.......2006-06-01
As has been noted there are a rash of english language books on the Anglo and American participation of the war. The battle of the Somme and the 1918 offensive are covered in detail in most books on the war. Anyone with a serious interest knows about the destruction of the British regular army and England's officer class. We read about the war at sea because of England's involvement.
Few books have concentrated on the French aspect except to mention the Mutiny's, the miracle of 1914 and of course the mention the damage done to the French nation by the death of so many Frenchmen.
THis book is parhaps one of a kind then because it gives the English language reader insight into the French strategy. Mostly a strategy that hs been mocked or passed over. Most have viewed the 1917 offensive as one more ill-concevied blood bath leading directly to mutiny. Many know about Verdun, however the rest of the front, some 70% of it was manned by Frenchmen. The French army shared the burden of the war on the western front. Here we are given a fuller picture of the french general staff, of Foch and Petain and of the french strategy in more minute detail. Keegan and others have done wonderful books on WWI, the more specific study will sppeal to those with a genuine interest in the period. A worthwhile read.
Seth J. Frantzman
Magnificent history of French strategy in WWI.......2006-03-04
First book on World War One that covers the French strategy. Most books cover the Btitish or American effort. All other books on WWI pale beside this magnificent effort. Great insight into the strengths and weaknesses of Marshals Joffre, Petain and Foch. Balanced view of the tug of war between the French politicos and the generals. Another book I would recommend on WWI if you want to learn about the German strategy would be Robert Asprey's book on Hindeburg and Ludendorf.
Great World War I book.......2006-02-18
Pyrrhic victory is an important English-language addition to scholarship on France's role in the First World War. Nearly 1.5 million Frenchmen died in the war, a loss that would help end France's reign as a great power. Although France won the war--sacrificing more than any allied victor--the costs of four years of battle proved disastrous.
Pyrrhic victory is first and foremost a study of the French command's strategic goals. Doughty also discusses tactical maneuvers in some key battles. While the tactical coverage may be a little inconsistent at points, or open to debate, explanation of the evolving strategy of French leaders is first rate. There is little on the soldiers themselves, though the effects of the 1917 mutinies are discussed. Doughty relies most on official government sources and the accounts of French leadership. Those more interested in daily life in the trenches will have to look elsewhere. But anyone deeply interested in the military operations of the Great War will need to read Pyrrhic victory.
Product Description
At the onset of World War II, the U.S. Army was a third-rate ground force of 145,000 with some generals who still believed in the relevance of horse cavalry. Its soldiers were untrained, its doctrine out of date, and its weapons hopelessly obsolete. Four years later, the U.S. Army was engaged in a global war with a force of more than 8 million men armed with modern weapons and equipment. Nothing Less than Full Victory is the story of how American ground troops in Europe managed to defeat one of the most proficient armies in history. The author, a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, draws on his twenty years of experience in military logistics and eight years of scholarly research to examine the Army s remarkable transformation. Focusing on areas rarely considered in other books on World War II, Edward G. Miller analyzes the performance of American soldiers in the 1944 45 campaign in western Europe against a background of logistics, organization, training, and deployment. In doing so, this groundbreaking work refutes decades of assumptions to reset the historical framework for comparison of U.S. and German performance over the course of the campaign. Lieutenant Colonel Miller s skillful melding of little-known individual and small-unit combat action with the various facets of generating, deploying, and projecting power allows the reader to understand as never before the true significance of what took place. This book is published in cooperation with the Association of the United States Army.
Customer Reviews:
An impressively informed and articulate study.......2007-08-07
Edward G. Miller is a retired Army logistics officer and department of the Army-designated military history. In "Nothing Less Than Full Victory: Americans At War In Europe, 1944-1945", Miller draws upon his many years of experience, research, and expertise to provide an impressively articulate and informative history of American military involvement in the European Theater of World War II during the last two years of the conflict. Enhanced with the inclusion of a number of historical battle maps, "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" begins with two chapters of background that covers events and preparations from 1940 through 1943, plus a descriptive chapter on 'The Enemy'. The rest of the chapters are arranged chronologically and cover the progress of the war as it took place on European soil. Enhanced with appendices providing a 'Table of Comparative Officer Ranks'; 'The U.S. Armor Problem'; and 'Battle and Non-battle Causalities, June 1944-May 1945', "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" also features a section of extensive Notes, a Glossary, a Bibliography, and an Index. An impressively informed and articulate study, "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" is a welcome and recommended contribution to the expanding library of World War II Military Studies reference and histories.
solid scholarly and readable examination of US Army combat prowess in WWII.......2007-07-25
In 2003, Ed Miller made a significant and scholarly impact in the Second World War history genre with his book "A Dark and Bloody Ground: The Hurtgen Forest and the Roer River Dams, 1944-1945". With his recent foray, "Nothing Less Than Full Victory: Americans At War in Europe, 1944-1945", he attempts to broaden his impact by tackling a topic that has fueled controversy since before the end of WWII; namely, why did the Allies win in NW Europe? Did victory result simply from an overwhelming material force (`brute force') of the US applied against a tactically and operationally superior German army, or was the US Citizen Soldier and his young army (including new and veteran officers) a major factor not so easily discounted by curse examination of selected engagements made in isolation? Independent of the `why', it is also an important to address `how' the US Army prepared and participated in the ETO to precipitate defeat of the German armed forces. In the course of addressing his first question (why), Miller also addresses this latter question (how).
Miller's thesis is simple: the US Army achieved success in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) not because of `brute force' (in fact Miller makes solid arguments with operational examples given in the text that in many cases strength factors of the two opposing forces were often very similar) but because the US Army applied its material resources better than the Germans - thus in the end the Citizen Soldier force the US fielded was operationally superior to the Wehrmacht. Miller is one of a handful of historian/authors who has openly challenged the popular belief that the Wehrmacht was a superior force only defeated through application of `brute force' and meddling from the top of the Nazi power structure (i.e., Hitler). For this fact alone Miller's work should be applauded. But how does it stand up when one examines the thesis in the context of the history presented and analyzed? In short, Miller provides considerable evidence in support of his thesis. Readers will walk away with a deeper appreciation for the topic at hand and many of the issues that have in the past oft clouded serious discourse. However, the organization and presentation of the book is at times not well suited to clear disposition and reader assessment of Miller's thesis. The specific pros and cons of "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" are presented below.
Pros: Miller's `Preface' and conclusion (`Genesis to Greatness') chapters represent solid and lucid bookends to the book as a whole. In the short `Preface' (4 pp.) Miller articulates the question at hand, as well as his thesis, clearly and lucidly. He proposes a particular approach to the problem at hand - namely analysis of engagements under conditions where combat power of US and German units were relatively balanced, or at least evened out by additional factors such as terrain or weather. In `Genesis to Greatness' (19 pp. total) Miller does a bang-up job re-stating his initial thesis and then making his conclusions. The reader certainly will not be disappointed by the lead and exit chapters of "Nothing Less Than Full Victory". Sandwiched between the `Preface' and "Genesis to Greatness' are 16 chapters in which Miller takes the reader on a ride with the US Army from before the war and entrance into Fortress Europa (`Introduction' through Chapter 4), through numerous engagements from D-Day (Chapter 5) to cessation of hostilities on 8 May (first 7 pp. of `Genesis to Greatness'). What makes these sections of the book most interesting and valuable, aside from being utilized to test Miller's thesis, is the novelty of much of the material relative to most contemporary histories. In particular, many of the engagements Miller utilizes in his book are from lesser known locations and were fought by units many readers will not be very familiar with. Consistent with Miller's high level of scholarship established with "A Dark and Bloody Ground", these portions of the book are extremely well researched and will provide readers with considerable material to mull over.
Cons: As introduced above, the only real `con' associated with "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" is how organization and presentation of the books `middle 16 chapters' can at times detract from the reader getting a clear grasp on how those sections support or refute Miller's thesis. While Miller presents a thoroughly detailed and engaging prose with respect to the selected engagements described in the book, the `devil' is unfortunately often lost in the `details'. For example, while Miller almost always starts a new engagement discussion by laying out the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces - generally showing with ease that the US forces did not in fact posses greater total combat power, his subsequent discussion of combat often gets muddled in ways emblematic of the chaos of war. Action moves from small unit to small unit, from US to Wehrmacht forces, with little clear thread of conscience, beyond exposition of combat itself. Miller also tends, in trying to make the case for strong combat performance of US forces, to over emphasize the opposing strength of the German forces, such that most of the discussion of a given combat engagement has the Germans `on top'. In the end the US forces prevail but the way in which the argument is posed tends to bury or minimize the how and why of the US tactical/strategic victory. Miller's summary sentences/paragraphs in these sections is less thorough than the lead in portions and thus the aforementioned issues tend to persist rather than being assuaged. This is too bad since Miller clearly has the ability to ties the knots more tightly! Fortunately for the reader Miller comes through in his conclusion chapter (`Genesis to Greatness') with flying colors so that the reader leaves on a high point.
"Nothing Less Than Full Victory" is a solid piece of scholarship - 4.5 stars; the style is solid if sometimes letting the desired impact slip out of sight, but the introductory and conclusion sections are `pay dirt' - 3.5 stars. Total impact = 4 stars, although readers who want to be spoon feed will likely rate this book one star lower.
Extremely Well Written and Extremely Insightful and Informative!.......2007-07-13
Ed Miller's "Nothing Less Than Full Victory" is a well written and extremely insightful and informative book on the U.S. Army in World War II.
The book, however, falls somewhat short of it ambitious main thesis - to explain how the U.S. Army was transformed from a third-rate force of 145,000 men to a modern global power, with more than 8 million men and women in its ranks, capable of defeating Nazi Germany and one of the world's most militarily proficient armed forces. Indeed, it would take several volumes to even begin to describe the magnitude of that transformation.
Still, Miller debunks a great number of myths along the way - most importantly the myth of the superior Germany Army of World War II. A noted historian, retired U.S. Army military officer and logistics expert, Miller rightly focuses on logistical aspects of the U.S. Army's transformation as the foundation for its successes in World War II. He compares the logistical organizations and capabilities of the United States and German militaries to show convincingly that a failure of logistics played a seminal role in the defeats suffered by Hitler and his generals in World War II.
Miller is a talented writer, well versed in not only the logistical aspects of the war but also in narrating combat at the small unit level, making his book a very good read indeed!
Book Description
Originally published in Germany in 1955, and in England and the United States in 1958, this classic memoir of WWII by a man who was an acknowledged military genius and probably Germany's top WWII general, is now made available again. Field Marshal Erich von Manstein described his book as a personal narrative of a soldier, discussing only those matters that had direct bearing on events in the military field. The essential thing, as he wrote, is to "know how the main personalities thought and reacted to events." This is what he tells us in this book.His account is detailed, yet dispassionate and objective. "Nothing is certain in war, when all is said and done," But in Manstein's record, at least, we can see clearly what forces were in action. In retrospect, perhaps his book takes on an even greater significance.
Customer Reviews:
Fascinating insights into WWII by one of it's most active participants.......2007-08-29
Erwin Rommel is widely regarded as the best German general of the war by writers and historians in the West. This is, in large part, due to the fact that he is really the only general faced by Western Armies and there is a self-serving arrogance in claiming that the British and US forces `best the best' the Germans had. Among the Germans, however, Erich von Manstein is considered one of the top, if not the top, field commander of the war. I'm certainly not going to weigh in on that debate, but the memoirs of one of the most noted German officers of WWII can be regarded as nothing but fascinating. This is a must read for an serious student of WW II. You can't claim to be knowledgable about WWII without having read this memoir.
There are so many wonderful insights contained in this book that I can't possibly relate them all, I'll just give a few that particularly struck me as relevent. First, most of the book covers the war in the Eastern front, but in many ways the most interesting part of the book is the first several chapters describing von Manstein's role in the Polish campaign and the development of the plans for the invasion of France in 1940. The French defeat of 1940 is today considered to be one of the most catastrophic military defeats of all time, but how different would things have been if von Manstein (and others) were unable to force their view on the General Staff via Hitler? The details of the Sevastopol campaign are also enlightening, and von Manstein has some interesting insights into the Rumanian soldiers.
Second, von Manstein discusses at length the idea that Germany could have won the war even after Stalingrad if the decision had been made at that point to withdraw from large parts of the Soviet Union, go on the defensive, and use the superior German leadership and mobility to defeat one Soviet thrust after another. For a long time I accepted this as at least plausible, but now I doubt this to be true. The Soviets would have eventually ground the Wehrmacht into the ground. Much has been made about Hitler's decision to pursue the southern option in 1942 and defend Stalingrad to the last man in the winter of 1942/43 and that this was a strategic error. Von Manstein weighs in on this issue at length. My view about this has changed, and I challenge the reader of this review who disagrees with me to check out the book `Sunrise at Abadan' for a different view after reading von Manstein's memoirs. In particular, the Baku oilfields were critical to the Soviet war effort. Had they been occupied, the Soviet Union would have been knocked out of the war and Iran quickly occupied by Germany. This would have meant the loss of Abadan to the British and all their oil as well. The Germans lost the war when they couldn't break through to Baku, and Hitler may have wanted to hold onto Stalingrad in the winter of 42/43 to renew the attack in that direction in the spring/summer of 43. Fundamentally, the Baku oil fields and Iran were the decisive front in the war. Capture these and total German victory is assured, otherwise the combined economic and military weight of the allies ultimately ensures the defeat of Germany. In any case, von Manstein's views on this matter (how Germany could have avoided defeat after Stalingrad) are fascinating.
A third compelling aspect of this book is von Manstein's discussion of his relationships with and views of members of his staff and other German officers. For example, von Manstein discusses the issue of why Hitler refused to visit the soldiers at the front line. According to von Manstein the talk around the campfire was that Hitler was a coward. Von Manstein claims, however, that it was quite the opposite. Hitler didn't want to be weakened by seeing the solders and subsequently hesitating to make difficult decisions because he was in fact too sympathetic to their plight. I have no idea if there is any truth in this, but I was surprised by it.
My only negative comment is that this is not really a stand alone memoir, you have to know a great deal about the events to really get the most out of this book. This is not meant to be a complete or detailed history about any aspect of the war, only von Manstein's views and, from his perspective, the role that he played. As such, I can only recommend this to a serious student (for whom it is a must read).
Must read for people interested in the Eastern Front and WWII.......2007-08-19
This is one of the most interesting books I have read about WWII. Obviously it is biased by the author but I found it extremely interesting. Von Manstein, besides being one of history's most brilliant generals sheds some light on dealing with Hitler as well
Insightful.......2007-07-08
Very detailed book with many details not learned in normal history despite Holocaust references being conspicuously absent.
Erich von Manstein the German soldier's choice for Chief of staff.......2007-06-10
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was born in Berlin in 1887 as Erich von Lewinsky, he fought in WW1 and was injured in Poland in 1915. He may have had Jewish relatives. He served on the Staffs of a number of Army Groups. General Erich von Manstein (he was adopted by his mother's brother-in-law, General von Manstein) served as Commander of 56 Army Corps in March 1941 spearheading the dash for Lake Ilmen during the attack on Leningrad. September 1941 he commanded the 11th Army and conquered the Crimea, he was promoted Field Marshal. In 1942 he assumed command of Southern Army Group attempting to relieve Stalingrad, he defeated a Russian Army at Kharkov March 1943, for this he was awarded Oak Leaves to his Knight's Cross.
The title Die Verlorene Siege (Lost Victories) highlights von Manstein's disgust with Hitler over operations in the east, Hitler relieved von Manstein of command, he was not used in war operations again.
This book is an essential war diary for aspiring Military Commanders interested in dealing with large unit tactics.
Lost Victories is an interesting study of the German high command.......2007-04-28
Lost Victories is doubtless one of the best and most interesting studies of the German high command to be published and coming from one of Germany's greatest wartime military commanders in the most lucid language, it is an enthralling read from first to last. Indeed, it is one of the most readable war memoirs of any highly-placed commander of any belligerent in the Second World War; it is arguably the best. That said, the readability of the English-language edition has come at the cost of the excision of certain sections of the book.
In this instance I must echo the criticisms of others who have reviewed it. I do not think that the translator with the book's English-language editors or publishers should have taken it upon themselves (back in the late 'fifties when the English translation was published) to excise sections of the text to shorten the book, but left it whole and complete in translation as Manstein had written the text in the original German. And following on from this, the chapter on "Operation Citadel" should have been left entire and complete instead of excised from the English-language edition and a much shorter article on "Citadel" written by Manstein for the US Marine Corps Gazette inserted in its stead. I realise that these excised sections were so removed in order to increase the book's readability for publication in English-speaking countries, which readability, as I have said, is excellent; however, I would have preferred these deletions included as I believe that they probably would have given an even deeper insight into the character and attitudes of Manstein.
These criticisms aside, Lost Victories is still, I repeat, an exceedingly interesting book in which Manstein's excellent intellect with its great clarity and marvellous vigour shine through from beginning to end. It gives the reader a crystal-clear view of what the German Army's high command had become under National Socialism through Manstein's sharply-sensed and vivid though concise descriptions. Such descriptions include those of Hitler and his government's attitudes and general relationship to the German military and the converse relationship of the Wehrmacht's high command, as professional soldiers, to its National-Socialist masters, the leading personalities of these sometimes conflicting entities, and their interaction under the strain of conflict through the course of the European war up to Manstein's removal from command in 1944. All of which is riveting material for consumers of military history, and others. Indeed, I would recommend this book even for those who are not inclined as a rule to read military history, but would still like some understanding of the course of the Second World War from the German perspective (up to Manstein's dismissal) and of the interior history of the German military during Hitler's war.
Book Description
For the first time ever, veteran World War II cryptographer Hervie Haufler details how American and British codebreakers were the decisive factor in the Allied victory. From the Purple Machine to the Navajo Talkers to the breaking of Japan's JN-25 Naval Code to the shadowy world of decoding units like Hut-8 in Bletchley Park, he shows how crucial information-often obtained by surreptitious and violent means-was the decisive edge in the Battle of Britain, at Midway and against the U-Boats in the North Atlantic, and how Allied intelligence saved the Soviet Union from almost certain defeat.
In an accessible account based on years of research, interviews and exclusive access to previously top-secret archives, Haufler demonstrates how cryptography enabled Nimitz and MacArthur to persevere in the Pacific and helped Eisenhower and Patton mount the assaults on Normandy. In compelling detail, Haufler shows us how it was done-as only one who was on the frontlines of the "secret war" could tell it.
Customer Reviews:
Haufler v. Keegan.......2004-02-17
It is ironic that Hervie Haufler's book, "Codebreakers' Victory," was published at the same time that John Keegan's book, "Intelligence in War" came out. In the first sentence of his book, Keegan, an otherwise astute observer of military affairs, asks "How useful is intelligence in war?" Keegan's answer is, not very useful. He should have read Haufler. Though it contains only a little primary research, Haufler's compilation from solid sources collected over his lifetime is a major contribution to the study of intelligence during World War II. For battle after battle, on every front of the war, Haufler makes a solid case that intelligence has made a difference-in many cases a significant difference. It is unfortunate that Haufler is less well known than Keegan. I fear it may cause some to overlook Haufler's valuable book. It should not. Haufler writes in an easily readable style (in contrast to Keegan), and recognizes that, while intelligence may not win a battle or a war, it can make all the difference. Prior to this book, those interested in the role of intelligence in WWII would have needed to consult scores of books and articles to get this same picture. Haufler has done that work for us and has collected from the best the information in this volume. It needs noting that he does contribute some important primary research in the form of interviews with several WWII cryptanalysts. Haufler's only hyperbole is contained in his sub-title--"How the Allied Cryptographers Won World War II". That, one can hope, was added by his publishers and not by him.
Book Description
The Mediterranean theater in World War II has long been overlooked by historians who believe it was little more than a string of small-scale battles--sideshows that were of minor importance in a war whose outcome was decided in the clashes of mammoth tank armies in northern Europe. But in this ground-breaking new book, one of our finest military historians argues that the Mediterranean was World War II's pivotal theater.
Douglas Porch examines the Mediterranean as an integrated arena, one in which events in Syria and Suez influenced the survival of Gibraltar. Without a Mediterranean alternative, the Western Allies would probably have committed to a premature cross-Channel invasion in 1943 that might well have cost them the war.
Brilliantly argued, with vivid portraits of Churchill, Montgomery, FDR, Rommel, and Mussolini, this original, accessible, and compelling account of a little-known theater emphasizes the importance of the Mediterranean in the ultimate Allied victory in Europe in World War II.
Customer Reviews:
Great look at how World War 2 developed.......2007-03-16
The Mediterranean theater was an important place during World War 2. It comprised a significant amount of forces (although never as much as the east) and gave experience to those who would command operation overlord. From the shores of Tripoli to the peaks of Italy's mountains battles were waged for control of this strategic "lake". Both the Italians and the British saw the Mediterranean as a lake that they would command. Each side fought to make this a reality. The British were able to convince the United States to commit their forces here and exploit the weakness of Italy's armies and the lack of German forces. The argument for the importance of this theater is very clear and done well.
There are some errors in this book pointed out by other reviewers but the scope that Porch undertakes still make this a four star book. It is well written and clearly analyzes the salient points of the war. It is hard to find a book that is as comprehensive as this one can be. There are several great books on North Africa and Italy is only recently coming into its own but few approach this level. By covering the conflict as a region you get a richer picture of the "lake" and how it was impacted by the strategies of war. This book is highly recommended for those who want to understand World War 2 and the way in which operations unfolded.
Well Written.......2006-05-29
The book is engaging in its style and presents many fascinating details of the war in the "Med". Porch argues this theater of war was not a strategic dead end, a view with which I happen to agree. Many German divisions were tied up by either direct action or the threat of action. I am somewhat less enthusiastic over Porch's theory that much needed practice was available to Allied, escpecially American troops (not that they didn't need it, however it tends to belittle the importance of the Med).
Particuarly interesting in my view is the treatment of the former Vichy General Juin in capable command of Free French troops and the tension between FF and former Vichy units.
As an earlier reviewer pointed out, the naval side of the conflict contains some silly errors. Andrew Browne Cunningham is named as "Bourne" instead of "Browne" (OK, I may be one in a million to know ABC's middle name). Porch's sinking of HMS NELSON in 1941 is particularly jarring, since the the Italian Navy actually surrendered on her decks in 1943 and she must have been above water as the Japanese Penang Command also surrendered on her decks in 1945.
Despite the errors, well worth the read in my view.
Interesting but too many rambles........2006-03-25
Although this book is quite well written, it is unfortunately full of too many factual errors (particularly with regard to the naval war) to be useful. An example of this is the author having the battleship Nelson sunk in Sept 1941. Nelson was in fact only damaged during this action. The author also has a tendency to ramble and switch subjects three or four times in the same paragraph. There are better books out there on this admittedly neglected theatre of WWII.
Serviceable analysis of a wide-ranging theatre of war.......2006-01-20
A serviceable, but uninspiring campaign history that will have to suffice until a better one comes along. Porch seeks to refute the traditional view held by most military historians, namely, that the Mediterranean theatre was a waste of Allied time and resources. He argues that it served to give American forces, in particular, an opportunity to learn how to make war in a relatively "safe" environment, paving the way for later successes in Northern Europe. This is a reasonable thesis and I find no fault with it; there was essentially no other outlet for Allied military intervention in late '42 / 1943 than the Mediterranean, and a cross-channel assault was certainly inadvisable prior to early '44. Porch's other main argument is that the Italian campaign, as labored and bloody as it was, was useful in that it served to divert sizeable Axis military assets from potentially harmful intervention against the Allies in the Overlord and northern France campaigns. In this, he tends to give short shrift to the Russian front and the strains it imposed on German resources, and the strong possibility that Axis troops freed from combat in Italy would more likely have been sent to that theatre.
As a campaign history the book has its faults. Too often the narrative is brought to an ill-timed halt while Porch expounds, in lengthy segments of text, on the shortcomings of the tactical and strategic approaches employed by both sides, as well as the deficiencies (and rarely, the attributes) of various commanders. The final chapter is an over-long, labored rehash of the arguments put forth in previous chapters and the book would have benefited from a more concise summary, and putting the freed pages to use elsewhere in the narrative. While a large number of maps are included, they are often quite small and ill-reproduced, and making out salient details requires a magnifying glass. Another quirk is (Francophile) Porch's liberal use of French phrases and idioms; in a book published 40 or 50 years ago, when French was still a worldwide language, this may have been justified, but in books of the contemporary era it's rather...archaic.
It's possible to write an engaging, smooth-flowing campaign narrative about a theatre of the Second World War; British author Max Hastings has done so in his 2004 book about the assault on Germany, "Armageddon". Porch makes a decent enough attempt here, but too often The Path to Victory reads more as a disguised doctoral dissertation than a graspable, entertaining history of one of the War's more eccentric theatres.
How poor writing style can overwhelm a potentially fascinating subject.......2005-10-05
The title to this review says it all! Porch's editors turned what could have been a great book into a dull exercise in the use of superfluous adjectives. I couldn't wait to put the book down!
Book Description
A vivid new account of one of the most decisive military encounters in history--the Battle of Lepanto.
On the morning of October 7, 1571, in the Gulf of Lepanto on the Ionian Sea, the vast and heavily-manned fleets of the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League clashed in one of the most significant battles in history. By four o'clock that afternoon the sea was red with blood. It was a victory of the west--the first major victory of Europeans against the Ottoman Empire.
In this compelling piece of narrative history, Niccolo Capponi describes the clash of cultures that led to this crucial confrontation and takes a fresh look at the bloody struggle at sea between oared fighting galleys and determined men of faith. As a description of the age-old conflict between Christianity and Islam, it is a story that resonates today.
Customer Reviews:
the best on this subject.......2007-09-06
by far the best book I have read on this battle, full of information and ancedote
One of the turning points of history here..........2007-08-27
For many Westerners, history is something that happened last year and this deliberate ignorance of the past gives rise to many false beliefs today. Chief among them would be the belief in the West that we have always been aggressors in the Levant and Islam is simply now fighting back. Even a cursury examination of history reveals the dangerous falsehood in that belief.
Niccolo Capponi's book on the Battle of Curzolaris (AKA Lepanto to many Americans)is well worth the time to read. Though he breaks no real new ground, his detail and love of subject (pre 16th century Med cultures, esp. Italy)shows. Copiously end noted with many charts comparing manpower, ships, armaments, losses etc (about 20% of the book), the book puts together an engrossing story of a world at war.
From the pre League political climate and the earlier attempts to forge a concerted Christian force to battle the Ottomans as they ravaged the shores of Europe, Mr. Capponi's book does an admirable job of illustrating the problems and weaknesses of Christian Europe at this time. He notes how the new Pope, Pius V would be the mover and true shaker of the enterprise. to do so, he had to overcome a relucant Spain, many suspicious Italian states, the crusading orders of St Stephen and Hospitallers, the machinations of France trying to aid its Ottoman allies(!), and everyone's suspicions of Venice. By devious use of sub
General
| Europe
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology)
Grand Strategy of Phillip II
Imperial Spain: 1469-1716
War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-military States, 1500-1660 (Warfare and History)
The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford History of Early Modern Europe)
