This Is War!: A Photo Narrative of the Korean War

Customer Reviews:

This is War!.......2000-06-28

My father, who was an artillery Captain in the Philippines during WWII, frequently pulled this book off the shelf to show me what war was like. He said that it was as close as you could get without actually being there. He died before he could see "Saving Private Ryan," but I think he would still say so even after seeing the movie.

BEING THERE THRU THE CAMERA LENS.......2000-06-26

This is THE most unforgettable view of the first days of the then called "Police Action" in Korea. Author Duncan lived with the men and portrayed all the comraderie, terror and fear that they did. His work makes an indelable image in our mind & is easy to grasp the magnatude of it. My now deceased husband was one of those young Marines and one of the walking wounded who lived in pain his whole life. He treasured this book and knew the subjects. He found it a way to bury his emotions and go on with a "normal" lifestyle. This book had to help Truman change and understand it was not a simple mop-up action....but This WAS War! Although out of print, my family is trying to get copies to pass on to their children to help us better understand their father. It is especially appropriate at this time when attention is being given the Korean Conflict's 50th anniversary. I wish they would reprint it and distribute a copy to all high school and college libraries.

Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953

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Please, truth in advertising
Evaluation of the People and Command Decisions of the War

Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea 1950-1953
D. Clayton James
Manufacturer: Free Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0029160014

Customer Reviews:

Please, truth in advertising.......2000-09-15

"Refighting the Last War" is an interesting title, because it conjures up all the things that soldiers never want to be guilty of, looking back and doing things the "old way." I picked up this book expecting a lively criticism of how we may have missed the boat in the Cold War's first hot spot. My disappointment was compounded by my naivite. It is immediately apparent to the reader that the author is not attempting a fresh interpretation, but rather a recap of what has already been discussed, debated, and decided (sometimes erroneously as will be pointed out later).

From the beginning it is clear that Korea is not fought like any war previous: the fact that the Sec State led us into conflict, the fact that Congress did not declare war, the President did not call up reserve forces or nationalize the economy for war mobilization, to say nothing of the air and naval restrictions imposed from the beginning of the conflict. Maybe MacArthur thought HE was refighting the last war, but that is a conclusion the reader will come to independent of the author's arguments.

Most telling to me is that although the book is post-Soviet Union, there is no attempt to access archival material that many other authors have, and who have published some startling conclusions, that perhaps our interpretation of the war in the 50's was in fact correct. The author claims that there was a "gentleman's agreement" between the USSR, US, and PRC to limit the war, and that Stalin and Mao monitored US congressional hearings to take their cues on American strategy. No joke. Where is the evidence? No foot notes, no citations of archival material, no logical followup. The reader is expected to accept the statement and the implications that maybe the Reds weren't so awful after all.

There are occaissional flashes of interest, particularly in discussing the issues surrounding the less known personalities such as Admiral Joy, and Generals Van Fleet and Clark. But if anything, all these individuals chaffed at not being able to "refight the last war", that is to wage war as they saw fit.

There are many statements and assertions that just don't do justice to the reader looking for a deeper story from Korea. There is a lot better scholarship and interpretion out there.

Evaluation of the People and Command Decisions of the War.......1997-12-02

This is a good text that highlights the (5)critical players and (6) command decisions that were part of the war.

Truman left the details up to Acheson but felt the war, and especially prisoner repatriation, were moral imperatives. (The later cost Truman the election in '52...an armistice would have been signed before the election had Truman yielded). Ridgway, stabilizing the front after MacArthur's collapse, decided to extract maximum Chinese casualities for largely insignifcant terrain. Admiral Joy wore two hats as commander and negotiator. His minesweeping and Marine air support were often underappreciated, even as his worst fears about the Soviets in Vladivostok never materialized. On the other hand he often negotiated as much with his own State Department as with the communists. General Clark chafed under the restraints of limited war, and wound up signing the Armistice 'with a heavy heart.'

As an analyst the command decisions are more interesting.
***The decision to intervene showed the growing strength of the state department vis a vis military matters. It had been the Joint Chiefs ,after all, who had said a war on the Asian mainland should be avoided. But pressure of McCarthyism and fear of a Kremlin monolith pushed us in. For their part, the North Koreans assumed that the US machinery of declaring war would be too cumbersome for a timely response. While bypassing congress was justified under the urgent circumstances that late June of 1953, it was foolish not to engage and consult with key leaders as the war progressed.
***The author, as many do, gives a good description of the insurmountable logistics of the Inchon landing. Asked about its risks, MacArthur (perhaps sarcastically) commented that the real risk was putting US boys on the mainland in the first place. The author could have pointed out that 'donkeys' revealed the Flying Fish Channel was not mined, nor was the port heavily guarded. In any case, the momentum gained at Inchon was lost with the Wonsan landing on the east coast.
***With regards to the decision to cross the parallel, James points out that speeches and excitement about uniting Korea predated US force breakouts. But the success foundered as US forces outran their supplies in the west; the peninsula widened and the temperatures plummeted; the Taebek mountains prevented the 'pincers' from closing. As for the disaster of Chinese intervention, the author lays some blame on Truman. He used the Wake Island meeting with MacArthur largely for political grandstanding when it called for hardnosed geopolitical analysis.
***On the decision to fire MacArthur: Keep in mind MacArthur felt US policymakers placed too much emphasis on Europe. [Reviewers comment: we still do. Can you say BOSNIA?] His proposals to extend the war into Manchuria and China involved limited air and sea operations, not ground troops. [Clark made the same proposals 2 years later]. As for the advance itself, MacArthur took full advantage of what he felt were ambiguous orders. A final source of misunderstanding was simply that links between MacArthur, the JCS and presidential advisors (especially Acheson) were weak.
*** In his chapter 'Victory or Armistice' James deals well with arguments that we should have exploited the weak CCF instead of pursuing an Armistice in mid 1951. Should we have advanced to the Korean 'waist'-- the line between Wonsan and Pyongyang? Considering the difficulties we encountered later at the Iron Triangle and the Punchbowl, this might not have been as easy as we thought. True, Van Fleet and Admiral Joy felt we had fumbled an opportunity to 'crush the enemy'. But the author states frankly the American led alliance decided that 'if the blood of their young men' was to be shed further, it should be in areas more strategically critical. (of course this means, Europe.).
***Could the war have been fought in another way or by other means?? America never decided to use Chiang Kai Sheks forces; not only could this be provocative, but there was a feeling that they were not up to snuff, anyway. America sent its extra 4 divisions to Europe partly as a signal to the communists that we wish to keep the war confined to the Peninsula.
What about more of a sea war? Not only would a blockade of Manchuria have been ineffective, but it might have brought in the Russians from nearby Vladivostok. Shelling of Chinese cities and bases also would have been largely ineffective since many facilities were beyond the range of coastal gunfire.
Could the air war have been different? Strategic bombing had little impact on the defensive lines of the enemy. Atomic bombs were a charming threat, but overkill ; and ineffective in such rural terrain. [nuclear bombs are good for one and only one thing...blowing up large cities.] Hot pursuit of MiGs scooting back north of the Yalu was eventually allowed. (and effective: read No Kum Sok's book, A MiG15 to Freedom).

Customer Reviews:

Good study from a small unit perspective.......1999-07-30

Hammel's book is focused on the experience of the near defeat at Choosin from the perspective of some of the small units that were involved, with a special emphasis on groups of company to regiment size (100 to 1000) men. It does this in a careful chronology that is supported by adequate and detailed maps (but I wish a few more had been available). I was impressed by the ability of these small fragmented groups to resist the overwhelming numbers they faced, reminding me of the adage that a three to one force ratio is the minimum for sucess.

As a top down look at the events and commanders of the battle I would perhaps suggest another book with a more strategic view, the tight focus does not allow a complete discussion of the surrounding events.

As an historical description of the individual solider and the battle experience with a competent understanding of military organization I recommend it.

Most inaccurate account so far........1998-12-08

Hammell has quite a large number of inaccuracies, slanted opinions, and has failed to verify facts from his sources. The book has a very negative view of the same US Army, whose sacrifice on the east side of Chosin undoubtedly saved the allies chance for withdrawal from Hagaru-ri and also provided the rear guard action for the evacuating column. Appears to be written more for personal glory and profit, than a source of useful information.

White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Ausa Institute of Land Warfare Book.)

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A story long un-told
Excellent Book -- 40+Years in Coming
Cloak and dagger in the Korean conflict

White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Ausa Institute of Land Warfare Book.)
Ben S. Malcom , and Ron Martz
Manufacturer: Brassey's Inc
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 1574880160

Book Description

Operating from a clandestine camp on an island off western North Korea, Army Lt. Ben Malcom coordinated the intelligence activities of eleven partisan battalions, including the famous White Tigers. With Malcomâ€™s experiences as its focus, White Tigers examines all aspects of guerrilla activities in Korea. This exciting memoir makes an important contribution to the history of special operations.

Customer Reviews:

A story long un-told.......2006-03-05

In the world of foreign military advisors, Ben Malcom's name is not a household word in comparison to Joe Stilwell, John Glubb, Edward Lansdale, and, of course, T E Lawrence. His short memoir of life with North Korean guerrillas during the Korean War deserves to be read along with those of his more famous colleages.

Ben Malcom was trained as a traditional military officer, but was thrust into a highly unusual role as an advisor to a small group of North Korean guerrillas fighting against the North Korean government. Until the 1990s, the missions the so-called White Tigers undertook were still classified. While their contribution to the overall war effort can be disputed, Malcom's lessons cannot be ignored for what they teach us about the US Army and its abiding discomfort with non-traditional warfare.

Malcom demonstrates convincingly that the US Army forgot many of the lessons derived from working with partisan forces from Burma to Greece to France during the Second World War. Those lessons would have proved invaluable to young Lieutenant Malcom as he took on a role he was not trained for, but for which he demonstrated great aptitude. His book takes us from his ROTC days, to instructor at Fort Knox, through his time in Korea, and finally to Vietnam, where he experienced a nasty case of de ja vue. His memoir is short, but exciting and written with great verve.

Much has been written about the current conflict in Iraq and how the the US military is adapting to re-learn the lessons it forgot after Vietnam about insurgency, counter-insurgency, and partisan warfare. Many authors have applauded the adaptability of the US military; Malcom's book is a cautionary tale that shows we have been down this path before and failed to institutionalize the lessons of previous conflict. For that alone, his memoir is worth the price.

Excellent Book -- 40+Years in Coming.......1999-06-14

(Note: Part of the details furnished here are based on my discussions with the author shortly after White Tigers was originally released)

First, I'll have to say I'm a bit prejudiced toward Ben Malcom. COL Ben Malcom was the post commander at Fort McPherson, Georgia in the late 70's and I commanded his military police company. In fact, Ben was instrumental in my career -- first he allowed me to command a company as a first lieutenant, something his predecessor would not do. Second, he literally pushed my application for a regular army commission through and made sure it was approved. Ben is a true gentleman and was a fine Army officer.

On to the book. White Tigers recounts Ben's story, from ROTC to the Infantry, and shortly after his commission, to Korea. Ben was scheduled to be a rifle platoon leader in Korea, but was somewhat randomly selected to train North Korean partisans --- behind enemy lines. What was so remarkable about Ben's selection is that he is over 6', has no oriental features, and did not speak Korean.

Ben found himself behind enemy lines where he trained a battalion-size North Korean force, and managed to get to the mainland on more than one occasion to recruit and do combat -- where he was awarded the Silver Star.

My favorite portion of the book is Ben recounting how he left Korea after a year wearing the Silver Star, but no combat patch (his unit did not have patch) and no combat infantryman's badge (his unit was not recognized as a line infantry unit that qualified for the CIB). When Ben reported in to his next unit, his superiors asked how it was that he was wearing a silver star, but no combat patch or CIB. Ben's answer: "I'm sorry, I can't disclose that because it's classified."

And Ben's operations were classified -- in fact, for more than 40 years. Ben had started a book in the mid-50s, but terminated his efforts because of the classification of the operations in which he was involved. Once the operations were declassified in the early 90s, Ben dusted off his 40-year old manuscript, which served as the basis for White Tigers.

I will have to say that White Tigers is not an accomplished thriller -- however, what it is is a fine personal account of Ben's exploits in a very unusual operation. Many of the activities that Ben was involved in -- and many that he directed ad lib due to the lack of training and doctrine --have become the basis of some special operations today.

Ben deserves a huge well done for an outstanding effort in documenting a very unusual experience. I would highly recommend his work.

Charles D. Childers Colonel, US Army

Cloak and dagger in the Korean conflict.......1997-10-16

This is an interesting addition to the military history collection. The book is an account of indigent intelligence gathering and sabotage operations behind the lines in North Korea. A few U.S. Army Officers and Enlisted men were tabbed as advisors to assist North Korean nationals in the disruption of the Communist forces north of the DMZ. For the most part well written, the narrative is most worthy by demonstrating the reluctance, if not downright obstructionism shown by senior Army members toward unconventional warfare in this period. The young officers selected for the mission generally had little if any training or background for the job and were given minimal support. A good accounting of the initiative and ingenuity of our young college grads when thrown in a difficult position.

The Korean War: Challenges In Crisis, Credibility And Command

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The Korean War: Challenges In Crisis, Credibility And Command
Burton I. Kaufman
Manufacturer: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Langua
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (A Council on Foreign Relations Book)

ASIN: 0070341508

Book Description

This concise and cogent text is a history of America's diplomatic and military involvement in the Korean War. Carrying the themes of crisis, credibility, and command throughout the book, the author emphasizes the diplomatic and political setting of the conflict, both domestically and internationally.

Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City

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Good view of how Korean-Americans see themselves and others

Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City
Claire Jean Kim
Manufacturer: Yale University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0300093306

Book Description

This book examines escalating conflicts between Blacks and Koreans in American cities by focusing on the Flatbush Boycott of 1990, led by Black and Haitian activists against Korean-owned produce stores in Brooklyn. Claire Jean Kim rejects the notion that Black-Korean conflict constitutes racial scapegoating and helps us understand Black activists' collective action and the responses of others.

Customer Reviews:

Good view of how Korean-Americans see themselves and others.......2003-11-16

I have read some of the theories surrounding post-colonialism, identity and the like, but this book stuck me as something different. Claire Kim refuses to be draw into the binary mode of thinking surrounding identity (specifically racial identity) whilst clearing a path with her clearly defined view of racial conflict in America as part of of a wider culture and psychological war in modern society. For many Korean immigrants to go to America to fullfill their 'dream' this experience of race, identity and politics is a new cultural experience. However, maintaining the status-quo is easier than rocking-the-boat - thus the conflict begins with the other cultural groups contesting the space for their 'dream'. Her style is open and concise, which makes this a great book for those who don't know anything about identity and culture. In summary, I am very pleased with this book which I would recommend to anyone who has an interest in the source of these news stories from the 1990's in America. I would especially recommend this book for Korean-American's as well.

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (Texas a & M University Military History Series)

Average customer rating:

Can it get any worse?
Hung Out to Die
Honest, In Depth and Heartbreaking.
Infantryman's War
A reader from St.John's, Newfoundland

East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 (Texas a & M University Military History Series)
Roy Edgar Appleman
Manufacturer: Texas A&M University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0890964653

Customer Reviews:

Can it get any worse?.......2004-08-20

Having read several books about the Chosin Campaign, I was pleased to finally get the story of what occurred on the East side of the reservoir. Mr. Appleman exaustingly found the details through official Army and Marine combat reports as well as listening to the survivors of this tragic event. The 31st RCT was doomed almost before they started and poor weather, traffic jams, raw Korean recruits, bad luck and command mistakes caused its demise. The Soldiers fought bravely and tenaciously but being out-numbered by as much as 10 to 1 was just too much to overcome.
The author has given us a clear, detailed, hour by hour account
of this heroic but heartbreaking episode in American military history.

Hung Out to Die.......2004-04-01

Never served. I've read plenty of war stories telling of brave men though. This story of the Army's fight trying to get back from the east side of the Chosin Reservoir is the saddest story I've ever read.

Bad plan. Frigid weather. Four straight days and nights under attack in the cold. No help available. Get back on your own, guys. Frostbite. All out of bandages, gasoline, ammunition. Then death in the cold cold night so close to getting back.

I've read this book twice and it effected me even more the second time.

skwirl60646@yahoo.com

Honest, In Depth and Heartbreaking........2001-11-21

I've long been very familiar with the 1st Marine Division's history at the Chosin, but until I read Roy Appleman's book I didn't realize just how much I didn't know about the Army's side of the conflict. This tale of desperation and bravery should be required reading amongst all American service personnel and perhaps even in High Schools. Excellently written, this book holds your attention despite the huge amount of very detailed geographic and unit data presented.

Infantryman's War.......2001-06-13

I've read a lot of military history over the years, though I'm definitely not as well-read as some. This book and the others in Appleman's Korean War series really helped me understand small unit operations. They can be dry and a little tough going, but if you give them a chance you may discover a side of battle often overlooked. Making great use of original after action reports as well as interviews and the more common types of sources, Appleman reminds us that (unlike the movies) often ammunition and rations run out and what happens when they do. (Real men have to be sent to get more.) He shows us how and why troops are moved from one nondescript hill to another. (Almost never due to command brilliance.) And better than anyone else he shows us how great battles are built up from squad and platoon actions.

You may lose track of which regiment "L Company" is a part of, but you will come to care what happened to L Company.

A reader from St.John's, Newfoundland.......2000-06-29

A very engrossing account. Despite the level of detail on the geography, personnel and their units it holds your attention. Also provides comment on areas of uncertainty over what actually happened. One of the most successful books on warfare in putting you there - to the point where it was difficult to read ( in this case an indication of the author's success ). One really sensed the isolation of the units and the desperate situation in which they found themselves. Recommended.

Average customer rating:

Brought back memories
A powerful look at Marines at war in Korea
A two night read an well worth it
5 Stars.
story fair for professional writer

The Coldest War: A Memoir of Korea
James Brady
Manufacturer: St. Martin's Griffin
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0312265115

Book Description

America's "forgotten war" lasted just thirty-seven months, yet 54,246 Americans died in that time -- nearly as many as died in ten years in Vietnam.On the fiftieth anniversary of this devastating conflict, James Brady tells the story of his life as a young marine lieutenant in Korea.In 1947, seeking to avoid the draft, nineteen-year-old Jim Brady volunteered for a Marine Corps program that made him a lieutenant in the reserves on the day he graduated college.He didn't plan to find himself in command of a rifle platoon three years later facing a real enemy, but that is exactly what happened after the Chinese turned a so-called police action into a war.The Coldest War vividly describes Brady's rapid education in the realities of war and the pressures of command.Opportunities for bold offensives sink in the miasma of trench warfare; death comes in fits and starts as too-accurate artillery on both sides seeks out men in their bunkers; constant alertness is crucial for survival, while brutal cold and a seductive silence conspire to lull soldiers into an often fatal stupor.The Korean War affected the lives of all Americans, yet is little known beyond the antics of "M*A*S*H."Here is the inside story that deserves to be told, and James Brady is a powerful witness to a vital chapter of our history.

Customer Reviews:

Brought back memories.......2007-01-15

I served in Korea with 3/7, USMC from Nov 1951 to Nov 1952.
This was a vivid reminder of that cold inhospitable place. The authot invoked many memories and for a moment I felt the bone numbing cold even in my warm home.
Although Brady was an officer and I an enlistem man we share the honor of being awarded the Title Unites States Marine.
Every Marine will appreciate this book

A powerful look at Marines at war in Korea .......2006-02-16

In "The Coldest War: A Memoir of Korea," author James Brady vividly describes what it was like to be a junior officer in the Marine Corps during the Korean War. Brady notes the irony of his decision to sign up for a Marine Corps officer training program: "I'd joined up to dodge the draft and ended up being sent to war." He gives many insights into the positions he held: platoon leader, company executive officer, and battalion intelligence officer. His narrative also illuminates the culture and organization of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Brady's story is rich in details of life in the Korean war zone. He discusses food, clothing, recreation, relationships among the Marines, and encounters with Korean civilians. The text is also full of fascinating technical details about the tactics and hardware of war; I was particularly interested in his passages about the mortarman's deadly art and the usefulness of the Browning Automatic Rifle. Brady makes the story come to life with his evocative descriptions of sounds of different weapons, the sizzle of hot brass hitting the snow, and other realities of wartime. He doesn't shy away from discussing the real down-and-dirty details of his service. He vividly describes the personal hygiene aspect of front-line duty; I found a dry humor to his graphic discourse on one of the unpleasant side effects of not bathing for a long time.

Brady's story includes vivid anecdotes about revelry at a British officers' mess, a visit to the relative luxury of a hospital ship, and more. He also recalls the punishingly cold weather, and includes some gripping accounts of combat. He presents the violence, death, and destruction of war without flinching. The text is enhanced by several black-and-white photos showing Brady, his fellow Marines, and the environment in which they lived and fought. The Korean conflict has been called a "forgotten war"; this makes Brady's thoughtful, well-written personal account even more valuable. It's both an important historical document and a powerful piece of literature.

A two night read an well worth it.......2006-02-05

I do not know James Brady and hae no connection to him. I know him mostly from his good writing in Crain's New York Business. His Memoir of Korea was simply a great and compelling read. It was like being in front of a fire with a vintage port wine, a Cuban cigar and a friend who finally decides to tell you his story. That the friend is a master racounteur (sp?) helps and that James Brady has one hell of story to tell also helps. Thanks Mr. Brady. Here's to you and your buddies who sacrificed so much. May all your nights be warm.

5 Stars........2005-10-01

My criteria for a book is simple. The writing has to be good: This one is well-written. A book has to capture my attention: This one does that. And a good book should never break-the-spell with crude interruptions...like gross factual errors, improbable-implausible action, and gross incongruence in the traits of the character's. There are no "What in hell was that all about?" moments in this book. Brady's experience in Korea is similar to my Vietnam experience, and it's similar to other recollections of Korea. But the bottom-line is: Is this book a "keeper" for the library? It is.

story fair for professional writer.......2005-01-05

while it is true that Mr. Brady was a Marine and in the Korean War, his writing 45+ years later leaves doubts about it. For example the word Marine is alwaysa used as as proper noun, yet in none of his books does he do this. Secondly, Marines don't wear FATIGUES, they wear UTILITIES. They wear trousers, not pants. Finally, the rank Gunnery Sgt. did not exist during Korea, that rank came out in around '59 or so. The gunny of Korea was a Tech Sdt. for a good book on Korea, read COLDER THAN HELL by Owens, or THE LAST PARRALEL.

Protest and Survive: Underground GI Newspapers during the Vietnam War

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Cutting-Edge and Timely: GI Resistance Still Exists

Protest and Survive: Underground GI Newspapers during the Vietnam War
James Lewes
Manufacturer: Praeger Publishers
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0275978613

Book Description

Drawing from more than 120 newspapers, published between 1968 and 1970, this study explores the emergence of an anti-militarist subculture within the U.S. armed services. These activists took the position that individual GIs could best challenge their subordination by working in concert with like-minded servicemen through GI movement organizations whose behaviors and activities were then publicized in these underground newspapers. In examining this movement, Lewes focuses on their treatment of power and authority within the armed forces and how this mirrored the wider and more inclusive relations of power and authority in the United States. He argues that this opposition among servicemen was the primary motivation for the United States to withdraw from Vietnam. This first book length study of GI-published underground newspapers sheds light on the utility of alternative media for movements of social change, and provides information on how these movements are shaped by the environments in which they emerge. Lewes asserts that one cannot understand GI opposition as an extension of the civilian antiwar movement. Instead, it was the product of an embedded environment, whose inhabitants had been drafted or had enlisted to avoid the draft. They came from cities and small towns whose populations were often polarized between those who wholeheartedly supported the war and those who became progressively more critical of the need for Americans to be involved in Vietnam.

Customer Reviews:

Cutting-Edge and Timely: GI Resistance Still Exists.......2003-11-14

GI resistance as detailed in this book through the underground newspapers which projected the collective voice of unrest amoung enlisted men and women, is not only a unique history of GI protest during the Vietnam War, but also a timely look into the blogs, newspapers, letters, and broadcasts of the soldiers in Iraq who resent being kept there for what they believe are the economic interests of large, American corporations.

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (The New Cold War History)

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Interesting but lacking
Read for Class, Pretty Good
Cooperation & Containment in Sino-Vietnamese Relations
good summary but...

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (The New Cold War History)
Qiang Zhai
Manufacturer: The University of North Carolina Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0807848425
Release Date: 2000-03-15

Book Description

In the quarter century after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Beijing assisted Vietnam in its struggle against two formidable foes, France and the United States. Indeed, the rise and fall of this alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia. Drawing on newly released Chinese archival sources, memoirs and diaries, and documentary collections, Qiang Zhai offers the first comprehensive exploration of Beijing's Indochina policy and the historical, domestic, and international contexts within which it developed.

In examining China's conduct toward Vietnam, Zhai provides important insights into Mao Zedong's foreign policy and the ideological and geopolitical motives behind it. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, he shows, Mao considered the United States the primary threat to the security of the recent Communist victory in China and therefore saw support for Ho Chi Minh as a good way to weaken American influence in Southeast Asia. In the late 1960s and 1970s, however, when Mao perceived a greater threat from the Soviet Union, he began to adjust his policies and encourage the North Vietnamese to accept a peace agreement with the United States.

Customer Reviews:

Interesting but lacking.......2007-04-16

This is very important history. For much of the last 50 years the history of Vietnam has mostly been one of the history of the Vietnam war, there has been little attention paid to the history of the country or its relations with its other neighbors such as Cambodia or China. Yet the Chinese relationship is immensely important. Even during the Vietnam war the relationship was very complex, especially in light of Detente. By the high point of Detente in 1973, Vietnam and China had many differences, not onyl culturally and historically but also in terms of power-politics. Vietnam became mostly an ally of the U.S.S.R. After the fall of Saigon and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia things changed again and China demonstrated along the Vietnamese border and invaded the country for a few kilometers to teach it that China was the boss of southeast Asia, not Vietnam. After all Vietnam ousted China's ally, Pol Pot, from Pnomh Penh. However this book does not make light of this, it ends in 1975 and for that this book is a shame for it should have continued the story.

Nevertheless this is an important book and an important contribution.

Seth J. Frantzman

Read for Class, Pretty Good.......2006-04-24

Author Qiang Zhai, professor of history at Auburn University Montgomery in Alabama, explains his rationale for writing this book in the introduction, "The rise and fall of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia in general and Chinese foreign relations in particular." During the course of his research, Zhai found many, yet complex, motives behind Beijing's Indochina policy and one of his main premises is that the Beijing-Hanoi relationship was composed of both agreements and contradictions, cooperation and confrontation.

China and Vietnam had a complicated relationship long before the Indochina wars of the mid-20th century. Zhai believes that the Vietnamese "had a tradition of looking to China for models and inspirations," but there also were "historical animosities between the two countries as a result of China's interventions in Vietnam." Zhai writes that Mao Zedong was very eager to help Vietnam because Mao believed Indochina constituted one of the three fronts (the others being Korea and Taiwan). When the Viet Minh army headed toward the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, they were accompanied by a Chinese general military adviser and China furnished the PAVN with antiaircraft guns, as well as engineering experts and large quantities of ammunition. The Viet Minh won the battle but were bitterly disappointed by the peace which followed. According to Zhai, China's approach to the Geneva conference was motivated by fear of the United States' designs in Indochina: "To prevent American intervention, [Zhou Enlai] was ready to compromise of the Laotian and Cambodian issue," and he formally proposed the immediate withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia.
An interesting part of the book is when Zhai makes the assertion that, in 1961, President Kennedy set out to increase U.S. commitment to the Saigon regime. In response, according to Zhai, Mao Zedong expressed a general support for the armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people, but China's leaders were uneasy about their Vietnamese comrades' tendency to conduct large-unit operations in the south. Zhai writes: "The period between 1961 and 1964 was a crucial one in the evolution of Sino-DRV relations....Its urgent need to resist American pressure increased its reliance on China's material assistance." In Zhai's view, although Chinese leaders were determined to avoid war with the United States, Beijing said that if the United States attacks China, that would mean war and there would be no limits to the war. Above all, Mao and his associates wanted the North Vietnamese to wage a protracted war to tie down the United States in Vietnam.
When the Paris negotiations began in May 1968, Beijing was "unenthusiastic." In less than three years, the international situation changed. By 1971, according to Zhai, Chinese leaders were hoping to see an early conclusion of the Vietnam War in order to preserve American power and contain Soviet influence. After President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972, according to Zhai, the North Vietnamese learned that Chinese foreign policy drew less on Communist unity and more on Chinese national interest. In September 1975, just a few months after Saigon fell and Vietnam was unified, Zhai writes that Mao told a Vietnamese visitor, in effect, "Hanoi should stop looking to China for assistance...The long historical conflict between China and Vietnam...had returned to life."
In conclusion, and in my opinion, the most important aspects of this book is its demonstration that international Communism was not huge in the 1960s and 1970s. Zhai makes clear that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China encouraged and aided Vietnam's struggle for independence from France and its war for national unification against the United States, but the Communist powers were motivated more by national interests than by revolutionary solidarity. The history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations between 1950 and 1975 must be viewed within the broader contexts of growing Sino-Soviet competition for dominance in the international Communist movement and of China's eventual, if only limited, relationship with the United States.

Cooperation & Containment in Sino-Vietnamese Relations.......2000-10-09

In the introduction to this scholarly and impassive, but very interesting, study of China's relations with Vietnam during the height of the Cold War, Author Qiang Zhai, professor of history at Auburn University Montgomery in Alabama, explains his rationale for writing this book: "The rise and fall of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia in general and Chinese foreign relations in particular." According to Zhai, he drew on "fresh Chinese documents to present a full-length treatment of the evolution of the Sino-DRV relationship between the two Indochina wars, focusing on its strategic, political, and military aspects." During the course of his research, Zhai found "a complex blend of motives behind Beijing's Indochina policy," and one of his main premises is that the "Beijing-Hanoi relationship was composed of both agreements and contradictions, cooperation and confrontation."

China and Vietnam had a complicated relationship long before the Indochina wars of the mid-20th century. According to Zhai, the Vietnamese "had a tradition of looking to China for models and inspirations," but there also were "historical animosities between the two countries as a result of China's interventions in Vietnam." Zhai writes that Mao Zedong was "eager to aid Ho Chi Minh in 1950" because Mao believed "Indochina constituted one of the three fronts (the others being Korea and Taiwan) that Mao perceived as vulnerable to an invasion by imperialist countries headed by the United States." When the Viet Minh army headed toward the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, they were accompanied by a Chinese "general military adviser," and China furnished the PAVN with antiaircraft guns, as well as engineering experts and large quantities of ammunition. The Viet Minh won the battle but were bitterly disappointed by the peace which followed. According to Zhai, China's approach to the Geneva conference was motivated by fear of the United States' designs in Indochina: "To prevent American intervention, [Zhou Enlai] was ready to compromise of the Laotian and Cambodian issue," and he formally proposed "withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia." Zhai writes: "For the Vietnamese Communists, the Geneva Conference served as a lesson about the nature and limits of Communist internationalism," and both Beijing and Moscow pressured the Viet Minh "to abandon its efforts to unify the whole of Vietnam."

Zhai makes the controversial assertion that, in 1961, President Kennedy "set out to increase U.S. commitment to the Saigon regime." In response, according to Zhai, Mao Zedong "expressed a general support for the armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people," but China's leaders "were uneasy about their Vietnamese comrades' tendency to conduct large-unit operations in the south." Zhai writes: "The period between 1961 and 1964 was a crucial one in the evolution of Sino-DRV relations....Its urgent need to resist American pressure increased its reliance on China's material assistance." According to Zhai: "The newly available Chinese documents clearly indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) to Hanoi during the Vietnam War and in doing so risked war with the United States." In Zhai's view, although Chinese leaders were "determined to avoid war with the United States," Beijing warned that "if the United States bombs China[,] that would mean war and there would be no limits to the war." According to Zhai: "Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing strongly opposed peace talks between Hanoi and Washington and rejected a number of international initiatives designed to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict." "Above all, Mao and his associates wanted the North Vietnamese to wage a protracted war to tie down the United States in Vietnam." When the Paris negotiations began in May 1968, Beijing was "unenthusiastic." In less than three years, the international situation changed. Zhai's lengthy discussion of the complicated internal and international events leading up to the crisis in Cambodia in 1970 is a case study in Machiavellian politics and diplomacy. By 1971, according to Zhai, Chinese leaders were "keen to see an early conclusion of the Vietnam War in order to preserve American power and contain Soviet influence." After President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972, according to Zhai, the North Vietnamese "drew a bitter lesson from Nixon's handshake with Mao that China's foreign policy was concerned less with Communist unity than with the pursuit of China's national interest." In Zhai';s view: "Nixon's decision to normalize relations with Beijing nullified the hitherto basic rationale of the Vietnam War, namely to contain and isolate Communist China." According to Zhai: "Mao and Zhou Enlai viewed with satisfaction the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement." In September 1975, just a few months after Saigon fell and Vietnam was unified, Zhai writes that Mao told a Vietnamese visitor, in effect, "Hanoi should stop looking to China for assistance." "The long historical conflict between China and Vietnam...had returned to life."

In conclusion, Zhai asserts that "[t]here were two strands in China's policy toward Vietnam during the two Indochina wars: cooperation and containment;" "From the 1950s to 1968, the cooperation side of China's policy was predominant; and "From the late 1960s, particularly between 1972 and 1975, the containment side of China's policy became more prominent." In my opinion, the most important aspects of this book is its demonstration that international Communism was not monolithic in the 1960s and 1970s. Zhai makes clear that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China encouraged and aided Vietnam's struggle for independence from France and its war for national unification against the United States, but the Communist powers were motivated more by national interests than by revolutionary solidarity. The history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations between 1950 and 1975 must be viewed within the broader contexts of growing Sino-Soviet competition for primacy in the international Communist movement and of China's eventual, if only limited, rapprochement with the United States. Zhai's book is, therefore, an important contribution to the literature about the most controversial foreign war in American history.

good summary but..........2000-05-17

Mr. Zhai's contribution to Cold War history is a worthy addition to any CW buff's collection, since China's role in the conflict has always been a mix of "Yellow Peril" paranoia, rumor and biased commentary. It is a sound summary of the initially cozy, then increasingly frosty relations between the two communist Asian nations. However, being familiar with many of the observations made in this book from other sources, I was hoping for a more cogent analysis of the synergy between the radicalization of Mao's vision of perpetual revolution and the Indochinese wars. For example, did the Cultural Revolution hinder or help the Vietnamese, and what were their perceptions? Did China encourage Pol Pot's intransigence vis-a-vis Hanoi because of ideological affinity or just plain spite? How did the Ussuri River clashes affect the Soviet supply link to Hanoi? This is a good volume for factual summary of the events, but a more profound reading of the new archival sources needs to follow.

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